United States v. Mann , 373 F. App'x 350 ( 2010 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-6376
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    ROBERT CY MANN, a/k/a B,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
    Judge. (2:98-cr-00047-RAJ-TEM-12)
    Argued:   January 26, 2010                 Decided:   April 9, 2010
    Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.       Jenifer Wicks,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellee.    ON BRIEF: Dana James Boente,
    United   States  Attorney,   Alexandria,   Virginia;   Darryl  J.
    Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    A jury convicted Robert Mann of possession with intent to
    distribute       crack    cocaine     and       distribution   of     cocaine,    in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1).                  On January 15, 1999, the
    district court held a hearing to determine the drug quantities
    involved and sentenced Mann to 252 months’ imprisonment on each
    count,    to   run   concurrently,          plus    five   years     of   supervised
    release for each count, also to run concurrently.
    On May 27, 2008, Mann moved for a reduction of sentence
    pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) (2006) and the crack cocaine
    amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”
    or “Guidelines”).          U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 706, 711.               On July
    14, 2008, the district court denied the motion, finding Mann
    “ineligible for an adjustment of sentence, as [his] drug weight
    exceeds 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base.”
    On July 22, Mann moved pro se to alter or amend the July 14
    order, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure.       The district court construed this motion as one for
    reconsideration and appointed counsel to represent Mann.                          On
    January    26,    2009,     the     district       court   granted    the    motion,
    explaining that “after further review, . . . the record of the
    sentencing       hearing     does     not       sufficiently       establish     that
    Petitioner was explicitly held responsible for 4.5 kilograms of
    crack cocaine.”      The Government noted this appeal.
    2
    We heard oral argument in this case on the same day as we
    heard argument in United States v. Goodwyn, 
    596 F.3d 233
     (4th
    Cir. 2010).       In Goodwyn, the Government asserted that a district
    court    does    not    have     jurisdiction           to    reconsider         a     months-old
    order     granting       or     denying         a     § 3582       motion        for     sentence
    reduction.       We agreed, holding that the district court in that
    case lacked the authority to further reduce Goodwyn’s sentence
    after initially granting his § 3582(c)(2) motion.
    Although represented by the same attorney, the Government
    did not take the same approach in its brief in this case as it
    had in Goodwyn.          On brief in the case at hand, the Government
    made     no     jurisdictional            argument.               Failure        to     challenge
    jurisdiction,         however,       does    not      eliminate      the     need       for     this
    court “to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but
    also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.”                                       United
    States v. Poole, 
    531 F.3d 263
    , 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    Accordingly,          after    issuing         our     opinion       in    Goodwyn,        we
    requested supplemental briefing in this case, affording Mann the
    opportunity to show a basis for jurisdiction here.                                    Mann offers
    no     legal    authority       for       the       sentence      reduction           other     than
    § 3582(c)(2).          Rather,       in     addition         to   simply     protesting          the
    result in Goodwyn, Mann only argues that the district court in
    his    case     had    the    authority         to    reduce       his   sentence         because
    3
    “[u]nlike in Goodwyn, here, the trial court did not grant a
    reduction in sentence twice.”               Supp. Br. of Appellee at 2. *             Our
    holding    in   Goodwyn     forecloses          this     argument,    for   we    there
    explained:
    When the Sentencing Commission reduces the Guidelines
    range   applicable  to   a  prisoner’s   sentence, the
    prisoner has an opportunity pursuant to § 3582(c)(2)
    to persuade the district court to modify his sentence.
    If the result does not satisfy him, he may timely
    appeal it. But he may not, almost eight months later,
    ask the district court to reconsider its decision.
    Goodwyn, 
    596 F.3d at 236
    .
    Thus,      the    district    court        lacked     jurisdiction     to    grant
    Mann’s    second      request    for    a   sentence       reduction    pursuant       to
    § 3582(c)(2).         We therefore vacate the January 26, 2009 order
    granting   Mann’s       motion    for   reconsideration         and    reducing       his
    sentence   to    188    months’    imprisonment          on   each    count,     to   run
    concurrently.         We remand the case for reinstatement of the 252-
    month concurrent sentences pronounced on January 15, 1999 and
    affirmed in the July 14, 2008 order.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    *
    Mann also contends that the Government waived any
    arguments challenging the district court’s jurisdiction, but, of
    course, “subject-matter jurisdiction can never be forfeited or
    waived” because “it involves a court’s power to hear a case.”
    United States v. Hartwell, 
    448 F.3d 707
    , 715 (4th Cir. 2006)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-6376

Citation Numbers: 373 F. App'x 350

Judges: Agee, King, Motz, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 4/9/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/1/2023