Mader, S., Aplt. v. Duquesne Light ( 2020 )

[J-27-2020] [MO: Todd, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WESTERN DISTRICT
STEVEN MADER, : No. 33 WAP 2019
:
Appellant : Appeal from the Order of the
: Superior Court entered November
: 30, 2018 at No. 609 WDA 2018,
v. : affirming in part and reversing in part
: the Order of the Court of Common
: Pleas of Allegheny County entered
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY, : April 17, 2018 at No. GD 13-6249
: and remanding.
Appellee :
: SUBMITTED: April 21, 2020
DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: NOVEMBER 18, 2020
The majority affirms the Superior Court’s remand for a new trial on noneconomic
damages and past and future lost earning capacity, but not on past and future medical
damages. Because I do not agree the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a new
trial on all damages, I dissent.
As noted by the majority, in addressing the appropriate standard and scope of
review, “it is a fundamental precept that a decision to order a new trial lies within the
discretion of the trial court[,]” and “the proper standard of appellate review is determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Majority Op. at 7 (citing Morrison v.
Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare, 646 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa. 1994); Coker v.
S.M. Flickinger Co., Inc., 625 A.2d 1181, 1184 (Pa. 1993)). Furthermore, “[a]n abuse of
discretion exists when the trial court has rendered a judgment that is manifestly
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, has failed to apply the law, or was moved by
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. at 8 (citing Coker, 625 A.2d at 1184-1185).
“‘Where the record adequately supports the trial court’s reasons and factual basis, the
court did not abuse its discretion.’” Id. (quoting Morrison, 646 A.2d at 571). The majority
additionally explains that “the grant of a new trial may be required to achieve justice in
those instances where the original trial . . . produces something other than a just and fair
result.” Id. at 17 (citing Dornan v. McCarthy, 195 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 1963)). A jury’s
verdict can be set aside “‘where it clearly appears from the uncontradicted evidence that
the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable relation to the loss suffered by the
plaintiff[,]’” and a new trial should be awarded where the verdict is “‘so contrary to the
evidence as to ‘shock one’s sense of justice[.]’” Id. (citing Kiser v. Schulte, 648 A.2d 1, 4
(Pa. 1994)). Where “‘the injustice of the verdict ‘stand[s] forth like a beacon,’ a court
should not hesitate to find it inadequate and order a new trial.’” Id. (citing Kiser, 648 A.2d
at 4).
Instantly, the jury heard the uncontradicted evidence that Mader’s feet were so
severely burned by electricity that his injuries required several invasive surgeries and the
eventual amputation of half of each extremity. Nevertheless, the jury did not award Mader
any damages for the pain and suffering that resulted from his electrocution, nor did they
award any pain and suffering related to the past and future surgeries necessary to treat
his horrific injuries. The trial court, well within the boundaries of its discretion, correctly
recognized this was an error and ordered a new trial on all damages. The majority, in
determining this decision of the trial court was an abuse of discretion, articulated a new
standard of review, to wit: “we hold that, when faced with the question of the full or partial
granting of a new trial on damages, a trial court should discern whether the properly
awarded damages in the first trial were ‘fairly determined[,]’ and, if so, whether they are
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sufficiently independent from, and are not ‘intertwined’ with, the erroneously determined
damages.” Majority Op. 20-21.
I disagree with the creation of a new standard which unfairly limits the discretion
of the trial court to considering the factors outlined above.1 From a commonsense
approach, all damages suffered by Mader as a result of this accident are related. When
a victim, such as Mader, is catastrophically injured, endures pain and suffering, cannot
work, and requires medical treatment, the damages will necessarily be “intertwined” and
it is not possible to excise “fairly determined” damages without consideration of all
damages. Unlike the majority, I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion when
it concluded there can be no confidence the jury rationally determined damages for future
medical expenses given its irrational determination of damages overall. The fact that the
jury’s award approximated the amount advocated by Duquesne’s expert, does not render
the trial court’s assessment unsupported by the record.
Regarding the medical expenses,2 the majority recognizes “the jury in the new trial
may be entitled to hear evidence about Mader’s past and potential future treatment, but
only as it relates to his pain and suffering.” Majority Op. 27. This half-hearted concession
to the intertwined nature of the categories of damages belies the efficacy of the new
1 I further question the Majority’s reliance on McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,
680 A.3d 1145 (Pa. 1996), for this novel standard, since that case involved the doctrine
of res judicata on different causes of action regarding non-cancer and cancer-related
injuries from asbestos exposure. Finding the cancer-related injury claim was fully
litigated, our Court determined the new trial should be limited to non-cancer claims, and
not both claims as ordered by the Superior Court. See McNeil, 680 A.3d at 1148. Here,
however, the issue does not involve res judicata or a remand based on different causes
of action.
2I recognize that the stipulated award of past medical expenses was a fixed number
borne out by the medical bills relating to Mader’s treatment for injuries that existed up
until a particular time. This amount may or may not change during the pendency of the
new trial, and/or the parties may again stipulate to a specific sum.
[J-27-2020] [MO: Todd, J.] - 3
standard adopted by the majority today. In my view, the physical pain and mental anguish
Mader endured, not only from the injuries themselves, but also from the consequent
medical treatments he had to endure, is sufficiently intertwined with the evidence of the
medical procedures and their costs. Consider the pain and suffering in the context of an
injury where the future medical treatment is the cost of a Band-Aid and antibiotic ointment
versus the pain and suffering attendant to an injury where the medical treatment is the
partial amputation and skin grafting of both feet. In determining an award of pain and
suffering attendant to future medical treatment and procedures, the jury is entitled to know
if that involves a $5.00 procedure or a $50,000 procedure. As aptly stated by the Superior
Court in Hobbs v. Ryce, 769 A.2d 469, 476 (Pa. Super. 2000), “as [Plaintiff’s] medical
treatment and expenses will necessarily be at issue in the determination of the severity
of [Plaintiff’s] injuries, and any pain and suffering, we must vacate the molded verdict for
medical expenses and remand for a new trial on this claim [along with the claim for pain
and suffering].” Id. at 476. I believe the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to consider
damages for pain and suffering together with the medical expenses that resulted from the
medical procedures which necessarily caused Mader’s physical and mental suffering is
clearly within the discretion of the trial court.
For the above reasons, I find no abuse of discretion in awarding a new trial on all
damages, including past and future medical expenses, and would affirm the order of the
trial court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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