A. Murray v. PA DOC ( 2019 )


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  •              IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Albert Murray,                                  :
    Petitioner               :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    Pennsylvania Department of                      :
    Corrections, et al.,                            :   No. 595 M.D. 2017
    Respondents                :   Submitted: November 21, 2018
    BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                             FILED: May 2, 2019
    Before the Court are the Respondents’ Preliminary Objections to
    [Amended] Petition for Review (Preliminary Objections) filed by the Department of
    Corrections (Department), Hearing Examiner Wiggins,1 John Wetzel, and Joseph
    Dupont (collectively, “Respondents”) in this Court on January 19, 2018 in response
    to pro se petitioner Albert Murray’s (Murray) Amended Petition for Review (In the
    Nature of a Complaint In Mandamus) (Amended Petition). Murray challenges the
    process utilized in the prosecution of misconduct violations that he received
    following a search of his cell. He also raises claims that Respondents violated the
    1
    Hearing Examiner Wiggins’ first name does not appear in the record beyond the initial
    “S.”
    Administrative Agency Law,2 denied his access to courts, and violated his rights
    under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by retaliating against
    him for filing a grievance regarding treatment he received at his prison job.
    Respondents argue that: Murray’s due process claim should be dismissed because
    he has failed to plead facts that establish Respondents denied him any protected
    property or liberty interest; the Administrative Agency Law does not apply to
    misconduct hearings; Murray has not pleaded an actual injury regarding his access-
    to-court claim; and Murray’s First Amendment claim should be dismissed because
    he failed to plead facts that would disprove Respondents acted with a legitimate
    penological interest in issuing the disputed misconduct violations. For the reasons
    that follow, we sustain the Preliminary Objections.3
    Murray is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Somerset
    (SCI-Somerset). On August 14, 2017, Murray filed a grievance with prison officials
    related to his job in the prison laundry. See Official Inmate Grievance No. 691531,
    dated August 14, 2017 (Grievance), attached to the Amended Petition as Exhibit B1-
    B10.4 The Grievance alleged that Murray’s supervisor in the prison laundry had
    unfairly demoted him to a less desirable laundry task based on the supervisor’s
    personal animosity against Murray and the animosity of another inmate employee
    against Murray. See Grievance at 1-2. Attached as exhibits to the Grievance,
    2
    2 Pa.C.S. §§ 501-508, 701-704.
    3
    Also before this Court to be decided with Respondents’ Preliminary Objections is
    Murray’s motion for sanctions. See Motion for Sanctions filed August 7, 2018, and Orders dated
    August 20, 2018 and October 30, 2018.
    4
    See Diess v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 
    935 A.2d 895
    , 903 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (“Courts
    reviewing preliminary objections may consider not only the facts pleaded in the complaint, but
    also documents or exhibits attached to the complaint, and based upon the averments and
    documentary support may address challenges to the legal sufficiency of the complaint.”).
    2
    Murray included nearly identical signed statements from eight (8) other inmates
    Murray claimed supported his arguments against the prison laundry supervisor. See
    Grievance, Exhibits B3-B10.
    On August 16, 2017, prison officials at SCI-Somerset conducted an
    investigative search of Murray’s cell. See Department Misconduct Report dated
    August 16, 2017 (Misconduct Report), attached to the Amended Petition as Exhibit
    E. During the search, officials found and confiscated a homemade iPod case, an
    unpermitted extra-large laundry bag, a broken razor, and “27 papers pertaining to a
    petition against the CI laundry staff,” all of which were considered contraband. 
    Id. Prison officials
    charged Murray with the following misconduct violations:
    possession or circulation of a petition; possession of contraband; lying to an
    employee; failure to report the presence of contraband; and possession of any item
    not authorized for retention or receipt. 
    Id. A hearing
    on Murray’s misconduct charges occurred before a hearing
    examiner, Respondent Wiggins, on August 18, 2017. See Department Disciplinary
    Hearing Report dated August 18, 2017 (Disciplinary Hearing Report), attached to
    the Amended Petition as Exhibit G. Murray pleaded guilty at the hearing to the
    charges of possession of contraband and failure to report the presence of contraband
    and not guilty to the charges of possession or circulation of a petition, lying to an
    employee, and possession of any item not authorized for retention or receipt. 
    Id. The hearing
    examiner accepted Murray’s guilty plea to the possession of contraband
    and failure to report the presence of contraband charges and found Murray guilty of
    the charge of possession or circulation of a petition.5 The hearing examiner imposed
    5
    The hearing examiner credited the prison official’s version over Murray’s version and
    found that Murray did, in fact, circulate a petition among other inmate laundry staff, who Murray
    also had sign and date reproduced forms. See Disciplinary Hearing Report. Accordingly, the
    3
    the following sanctions: (1) 30 days of disciplinary time for the possession or
    circulation of a petition conviction; (2) revocation of contraband for the possession
    of contraband conviction; and (3) 15 days of concurrently served disciplinary time
    and removal from his job in the prison laundry for the failure to report the presence
    of contraband conviction. 
    Id. Murray appealed
    the misconduct decision to the prison Program
    Review Committee (PRC), which affirmed the hearing examiner’s decision on
    August 24, 2017. See PRC Decision and Rationale dated August 24, 2017, attached
    to the Amended Petition as Exhibit J2. Murray further appealed to the prison
    Superintendent, who also denied the appeal on September 19, 2017.                            See
    Superintendent’s Decision dated September 19, 2017 (Superintendent’s Decision),
    attached to the Amended Petition as Exhibit K2.6 Following the issuance of the
    Superintendent’s Decision, Murray appealed the misconduct decision to the
    Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals, which also denied the appeal
    on October 10, 2017. See Letter of Department Chief Hearing Examiner Joseph
    Dupont dated October 10, 2017, attached to the Amended Petition as Exhibit A.
    hearing examiner determined that “[a] preponderance of the evidence exist[ed] to support the
    charge [of possession or circulation of a petition].” 
    Id. The hearing
    examiner dismissed the
    remaining charges of lying to an employee and possession of any item not authorized for retention
    or receipt. 
    Id. 6 In
    denying Murray’s appeal, the Superintendent’s Decision explained as follows:
    I am in agreement with the Hearing Examiner and PRC’s findings.
    I reviewed the documents in question with the Security Captain and
    although you claim they are in reference to a grievance, based on the
    content and nature of the documents found in your possession the
    documents support the decision. Therefore, I agree with the
    sanction and will not alter or dismiss the findings.
    Superintendent’s Decision.
    4
    On December 12, 2017, Murray filed his Petition for Review with this
    Court. In his Petition for Review, Murray claimed that his due process rights were
    violated during the grievance process and further alleged that the Respondents
    violated his right to access the courts, his right to free speech, and the Administrative
    Agency Law. Murray requested that this Court issue a variety of declaratory
    statements and various orders related to Murray’s allegations and interpretations of
    the law regarding the confiscation of his property, the prison’s grievance procedures,
    and the implementation thereof.
    Respondents filed preliminary objections to the Petition for Review on
    January 19, 2018. Murray filed the instant Amended Petition for Review on
    February 6, 2018, which again requests this Court to issue declaratory statements
    and orders related to Murray’s allegations and legal interpretations regarding the
    confiscation of his property and the content and implementation of the prison’s
    grievance procedures.7 Respondents filed the instant Preliminary Objections on
    7
    Specifically, Murray requests that this Court:
    A. Issue a Declaratory Judgment stating that:
    1. The Respondents[’] acts and omissions described herein
    violated the [Murray’]s rights under the U.S. and Pa.
    Constitutions, and Administrative Agency Law.
    2. Respondent Wetzel[’]s regulation, 37 Pa. Code § 93.10,
    and Administrative Directive DC-ADM 801 policy are
    deficient and unconstitutional and violative of [Murray’]s
    Due Process rights under the U.S. and Pa. Const.
    3. Respondent Wetzel[’]s regulation, 37 Pa. Code § 93.10,
    and Administrative Directive DC-ADM 801 policy is
    inadequate and inconsistent with state law and in violation
    of [Section 506 of the Administrative Code of 1929, Act of
    April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended,] 71 P.S. § 186.
    5
    4. Respondent Wiggins[’] actions in conducting the
    [Murray’]s disciplinary hearing and Respondent
    Dupont[’]s actions in sustaining the hearing violated
    [Murray’]s rights under the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
    and the Pa. Const., and Administrative Agency Law.
    5. Respondents[’] actions in failing to provide a legally
    adequate hearing and a[n] adequate administrative remedy
    violated [Murray’]s rights under the Due Process Clause of
    the U.S. and Pa. Const., and Administrative Agency Laws
    [sic].
    6. Respondents[’] actions in subjecting [Murray] to a[n]
    “ALL OR NONE” plea process violated his rights under
    the Due Process Clause of the U.S. and Pa. Const.
    7. Respondent Wiggins[’] actions in depriving [] Murray
    of 27 pages of written material and Respondent Dupont[’]s
    actions in affirming the deprivation violated [Murray’]s
    right to “Freedom of Speech” and “Access to Courts”
    under the U.S. and Pa. Const., and [Murray’]s substantive
    due process rights under the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
    Const., and Respondents[’] own regulation 37 Pa. Code §
    93.9, and Administrative Directive DC-ADM 804 § 1
    (A.24).
    8. The deficiencies in Respondent Wetzel[’]s regulation 37
    Pa. Code § 93.10 and Administrative Directive DC-ADM
    801 policy[] prejudiced [Murray] and produced an invalid
    plea.
    9. The Respondents arbitrarily and irrationally singled
    [Murray] out as an individual for unfair treatment, and
    unnecessary discipline without a rational basis for the
    disparity in treatment, and that [Murray] was treated
    differently from other prisoners in similar situations for no
    just cause which denied [Murray] Equal Protection of the
    Law in violation of his 14th Amendment rights.
    10. The actions of the Respondents deprived [Murray] of a
    protected property interest in the right to use, possess,
    enjoy, and read the 27 pages of written material.
    6
    B. To issue the following injunctive relief:
    1. An order prohibiting the Respondents from taking any
    further action concerning [Murray’]s 27 pages of written
    material.
    2. An order compelling the Respondents to return
    [Murray’]s 27 pages of written material.
    3. An order compelling Respondent Wetzel to enforce 37
    Pa. Code § 93.9, and DC-ADM 804 § 1 (A.24).
    4. An order compelling Respondents Wiggins and Dupont
    to comply with 37 Pa. Code§ 93.9, and DC-ADM 804 § 1
    (A.24), and Administrative Agency Law [].
    5. An order prohibiting Respondents Dupont and Wiggins
    from deciding any remanded hearing concerning
    misconduct #CO65439 or related issues, due to the
    possibility of implicit bias.
    6. An order prohibiting the Respondents from further
    practicing the “ALL OR NONE” plea process.
    7. Order the Respondents to expunge the disciplinary
    conviction described in this complaint from [Murray’]s
    institutional record.
    8. Order the Respondents to reinstate [Murray] to his
    previous place of institutional employment at CI-Laundry
    with the prior rate of 42¢ an hour.
    9. Order Respondents to credit [Murray] for time served in
    the RHU.
    10. An order prohibiting the Respondents from utilizing the
    currently inadequate misconduct reports.
    11. An order compelling the Respondents to correct the
    deficiencies in 37 Pa. Code § 93.10, and DC-ADM 801,
    along with the plea process and misconduct reports to
    reflect a multiple count scenario which is consistent with
    the law of this Commonwealth.
    7
    March 9, 2018.8 Murray filed his Answer to Preliminary Objections on May 10,
    2018. On May 21, 2018, this Court filed an order directing the Preliminary
    Objections to be decided on briefs. The parties have each submitted briefs, and the
    matter is now ripe for determination.
    Initially, we note that:
    [i]n ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as
    true all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for
    review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced
    therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions
    of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative
    allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain
    preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that
    the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be
    resolved by a refusal to sustain them.
    A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits
    every well-pleaded fact in the complaint and all inferences
    reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the legal
    sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be
    12. An order compelling the Respondents to provide
    [Murray] a full due process hearing.
    13. An order enjoining the Respondents from taking any
    future action against [Murray] concerning the possession
    of any returned written material.
    C. [Murray] also seeks equitable relief for the recovery of costs
    associated with the filing of this complaint and lost wages for the
    months of Aug., Sept., Oct., Nov., and Dec. 2017.
    D. And any additional relief this [C]ourt deems just, proper and
    equitable.
    Amended Petition at 22-25.
    8
    After Murray’s filing of the Amended Petition, this Court dismissed Respondents’
    original preliminary objections as moot by order dated February 15, 2018.
    8
    sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed
    to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When
    ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to
    the complaint.
    Torres v. Beard, 
    997 A.2d 1242
    , 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
    The Due Process Claim
    Respondents first argue that Murray’s 14th Amendment due process
    claim should be dismissed because Murray has failed to plead facts that would
    establish that he was deprived of a protected property or liberty interest when he
    received 30 days in disciplinary confinement, had contraband seized from his cell,
    or lost his job in the prison laundry. See Respondents’ Brief at 9-11. We agree.
    As this Court has explained:
    The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution provides, in relevant part, that no “State
    [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
    without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
    § 1. To maintain a due process challenge, a party must
    initially establish the deprivation of a protected liberty or
    property interest. If, and only if, the party establishes the
    deprivation of a protected interest, will the Court consider
    what type of procedural mechanism is required to fulfill
    due process.
    Shore v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    168 A.3d 374
    , 383 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (some internal
    citations omitted). Procedural due process rights are triggered by deprivation of a
    legally cognizable liberty interest. See Myers v. Ridge, 
    712 A.2d 791
    , 795 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1998). “For a prisoner, such a deprivation occurs when the prison imposes
    atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
    of prison life.” Brown v. Blaine, 
    833 A.2d 1166
    , 1172 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (quoting
    9
    Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 484 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    “Lesser restraints on a prisoner’s freedom are deemed to fall within the expected
    perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” 
    Brown, 833 A.2d at 1172
    (quoting 
    Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484
    ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Prison inmates
    maintain no protected interest in being housed at any particular custodial level within
    a prison. Chem v. Horn, 
    725 A.2d 226
    , 229 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (“remaining in a
    prison’s general population is not a protected liberty interest”); see also Sandin.
    Prison inmates also have no property interest in maintaining a prison job or in
    property that is contraband. Bush v. Veach, 
    1 A.3d 981
    , 984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010);
    Fennell v. Captain N.D. Gross (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1198 C.D. 2015, filed Feb. 5,
    2016),9 slip op. at 11 n.10 (“We recognize that . . . a prisoner does not possess a
    protectable property interest in contraband.”) (citing Lowrey v. Cuyler, 
    521 F. Supp. 430
    , 433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
    Here, although Murray received an aggregate of 30 days’ disciplinary
    time for his misconduct, he has no protected interest in being housed at a particular
    custodial level. See 
    Chem, 725 A.2d at 229
    . Further, 30 days’ disciplinary time
    does not represent an atypical and/or significant hardship in relation to ordinary
    prison life so as to trigger a cognizable liberty interest. See Singleton v. Lavan, 
    834 A.2d 672
    , 675-76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (noting that an inmate’s placement in
    restricted housing unit for 30 days does not violate his due process rights); 
    Brown, 833 A.2d at 1172
    (finding prisoner’s confinement for 120 days in prison’s long-term
    security unit did not impose an atypical and significant hardship in relation to
    ordinary prison life and did not trigger a liberty interest; no process was due even if
    the transfer resulted in a less favorable living situation). Likewise, Murray has no
    9
    This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited for persuasive value. 210
    Pa. Code § 69.414.
    10
    protected interest in maintaining his prison job. See 
    Bush, 1 A.3d at 984
    ; see also
    Miles v. Wiser, 
    847 A.2d 237
    , 240-41 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Nor does Murray have
    a property interest in the witness statements/petition materials confiscated from his
    cell that the hearing examiner deemed to be contraband.10 See 
    Lowrey, 521 F. Supp. at 433-34
    . Consequently, neither Murray’s 30 days’ disciplinary custody, the loss
    of his job, nor the loss of his contraband property implicates his due process rights.
    Further, the Amended Petition fails to plead facts sufficient to support
    a claim that the process Murray received in this matter was inadequate. This Court
    has held that the Department’s internal grievance procedure provides
    constitutionally adequate and meaningful legal remedies to inmates. See Fennell v.
    Goss (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1198 C.D. 2015, filed October 2, 2015); Silo v. Ridge, 
    728 A.2d 394
    , 399 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). “Procedural due process is satisfied in prison
    disciplinary proceedings resulting in the loss of benefits when the inmate is afforded
    with (1) written notice of the violation charged at least 24 hours in advance of
    hearing; (2) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and
    reasons for the disciplinary action; and (3) the right to call witnesses on his own
    behalf and to present documentary evidence when institutional safety or correctional
    goals will not be unduly placed in hazard.” Robson v. Biester, 
    420 A.2d 9
    , 12 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1980) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    (1974)).
    Here, a hearing occurred on Murray’s misconduct charges pursuant to
    the Department’s grievance procedures for which Murray had notice and an
    opportunity to present a written version of the events. See Amended Petition
    10
    We note that Murray was not completely and permanently deprived of the papers
    confiscated from his cell in that the confiscated materials were copies of the materials Murray
    included as exhibits to the Grievance. See Amended Petition at 7, ¶ 32.
    11
    Exhibits E & H; Disciplinary Hearing Report. Murray complains that the hearing
    examiner denied his request to call certain requested witnesses.11 See Amended
    Petition at 5-6, ¶¶ 19 & 21-23. However, aside from the charges to which Murray
    pleaded guilty, the hearing officer found Murray guilty only of the charge of
    possession or circulation of a petition. See Disciplinary Hearing Report. The
    Amended Petition does not plead that the confiscated papers were not in Murray’s
    possession. Further, the Amended Petition does not plead that either of the requested
    witnesses would have presented exculpatory or even relevant evidence regarding the
    charge of possession or circulation of a petition. Thus, the Amended Petition fails
    to plead a legally sufficient claim for inadequate process regarding the possession or
    circulation of a petition charge.
    Further, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that an inmate
    cannot state a cognizable claim for the deprivation of property where there exists an
    adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 
    468 U.S. 517
    (1984).
    Murray claimed that he had availed himself of the inmate grievance process in an
    attempt to remedy the seizure of his materials. See Amended Petition at 5, ¶ 20; 8-
    9, ¶¶ 42-43; 14, ¶ 68; 19-20, ¶ 91. Murray had a hearing, the result of which he
    appealed to the PRC, the prison Superintendent, and the Secretary’s Office of Inmate
    Grievances and Appeals, losing at every level. The Amended Petition contained
    nothing beyond Murray’s asserted dissatisfaction with the results of his Grievance,
    which dissatisfaction does not state a claim for deficient post-deprivation process.
    Finally, to the extent Murray claims his due process rights were violated
    by being subjected to an “all-or-none” plea process, or that his guilty plea was
    11
    Murray sought to call Correctional Officer Palmieri and Sgt. Porborsky. Amended
    Petition at 5, ¶ 19.
    12
    somehow treated as a blanket plea of guilty to all misconduct charges,12 we note that,
    at his misconduct hearing, Murray pleaded guilty to two misconduct charges and not
    guilty to three misconduct charges.             See Disciplinary Hearing Report.               Thus,
    Murray’s claim that he was subjected to an unfair or inadequate “all-or-none” plea
    process lacks merit.
    The Administrative Agency Law Claim
    Murray also alleges Respondents’ failure to provide adequate process
    violated his rights under the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 501-508,
    701-704. See Amended Petition at 19-21, ¶¶ 90-94 (Count V). As we have
    explained, “[a] decision by an intra-prison disciplinary tribunal is not a final
    adjudication by an administrat[ive] agency within this Court’s appellate
    jurisdiction[.]” 
    Robson, 420 A.2d at 12
    . “It is well-established that [Department]
    decisions concerning misconduct charges are beyond the scope of this Court’s
    appellate or original jurisdiction.” Curtis v. Canino (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 160 M.D.
    2015, filed Mar. 6, 2017) (finding not cognizable a claim challenging alleged
    disciplinary tribunal hearing misconduct or an original jurisdiction challenge to the
    result of a prison disciplinary tribunal). Thus, Murray fails to state a claim upon
    which relief may be granted based on a violation of the Administrative Agency Law.
    The First Amendment Access to Courts Claim
    Murray also alleges the confiscation of his papers and legal materials
    from his cell violated his First Amendment right to access the courts. See Amended
    Petition at 19, ¶¶ 88-89 (Count IV).
    12
    See Amended Petition at 3, ¶ 11; 6-7, ¶¶ 24-31; 13, ¶ 62; 16, ¶ 78; and 21, ¶ 98.
    13
    As this Court has explained:
    Although denial of access to legal documents may
    constitute a violation of a prisoner's First Amendment
    right to petition the courts and/or Fourteenth Amendment
    due process rights, in order to state a cognizable claim for
    violation of the right to access to the courts, a prisoner
    must allege and offer proof that he suffered an “actual
    injury” to court access as a result of the denial. The
    Supreme Court has defined actual injury as the loss or
    rejection of a nonfrivolous legal claim regarding the
    sentencing or the conditions of confinement.
    Hackett v. Horn, 
    751 A.2d 272
    , 275 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (quoting Robinson v. Ridge,
    
    996 F. Supp. 447
    , 449 (E.D. Pa. 1997)) (internal citations omitted). Where a
    petitioner fails to point to any legal case or cause of action that was harmed or
    defeated by the confiscation of materials, the petitioner has not suffered an actual
    injury and fails to state an access to courts claim. 
    Hackett, 751 A.2d at 276
    .
    Here, Murray has failed to allege that any cause of action was harmed
    by the confiscation of his legal papers. In fact, the Amended Petition explains that
    the Grievance had been filed prior to the confiscation of the papers. As such, Murray
    has not claimed that the confiscation of his papers harmed a case or cause of action,
    and thus, Murray has failed to state an access to courts claim.
    The Retaliation Claim
    To the extent Murray alleges Respondents violated his First
    Amendment rights by improperly retaliating against him for having filed the
    Grievance, he fails to state a claim.
    In prisoner retaliation claims, “courts require proof the inmate engaged
    in constitutionally protected conduct, prison officials took adverse action, and the
    14
    protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the action.” Yount v.
    Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    966 A.2d 1115
    , 1120 (Pa. 2009). In addition to these basic
    elements, to prevail on a retaliation claim, a prisoner also maintains the burden of
    proof to disprove a legitimate penological goal for the alleged retaliatory action. 
    Id. The reason
    for this requirement stems from the “potential for abuse” inherent in
    retaliation claims and also a policy of judicial deference to the prison officials’
    “legitimate interest in the effective management of a detention facility.” 
    Id. at 1120-
    21. “Claims of retaliation fail if the alleged retaliatory conduct violations were
    issued for the actual violation of a prison rule.” Horan v. Newingham (Pa. Cmwlth.,
    No. 2622 C.D. 2015, filed Oct. 24, 2016), slip op. at 9 (quoting Hartsfield v. Nichols,
    
    511 F.3d 826
    (8th Cir. 2008)). “Thus, a defendant may successfully defend a
    retaliatory discipline claim by showing some evidence the inmate actually
    committed a rule violation.” 
    Id. Further, “a
    report from a correctional officer, even
    if disputed by the inmate and supported by no other evidence, legally suffices as
    ‘some evidence’ upon which to base a prison disciplinary violation[.]” 
    Id. at 9-10.
                 Here, Murray has not pleaded facts that establish Respondents lacked a
    legitimate penological interest in issuing the misconduct violations. Many courts
    have found that the banning of the circulation of petitions by prisoners represents a
    legitimate penological interest for prison administrators. See May v. Libby, 256 F.
    App’x 825, 829 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Banning petitions to maintain control over group
    activity by prisoners is a reasonable response to a legitimate penological concern.”);
    Westefer v. Snyder, 
    422 F.3d 570
    , 575 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The decision of prison
    administrators as to the detrimental effect of [group activity] is a decision to which
    we owe great deference.”); Duamutef v. O’Keefe, 
    98 F.3d 22
    , 24 (2d Cir. 1996)
    (explaining that prisons may ban circulation of petitions provided grievance
    15
    procedures remain available); Wolfel v. Morris, 
    972 F.2d 712
    , 716 (6th Cir. 1992)
    (“[A] prison does not violate a prisoner’s rights by refusing to allow circulation of
    petitions.”). Additionally, materials circulated for signature by multiple prisoners to
    support grievances can constitute a petition. See May, 256 F. App’x at 829 (finding
    that the confiscation of identical grievance materials ostensibly from 10 different
    inmates “substantiated the defendants’ explanation that they searched [the
    prisoner’s] cell not because he had grieved prison conditions, but because he had
    circulated a petition.”).
    Here, the Amended Petition alleges simply:
    [Murray] avers that the actions of the Respondents were
    not related to a legitimate penological interest, and only
    served to arbitrarily and irrationally single [Murray] out as
    an individual for unfair treatment, [Murray] was treated
    differently from other inmates in similar situations without
    a rational basis.
    Amended Petition at 10, ¶ 47. This bald accusation fails to state a claim that
    Respondents lacked a legitimate penological goal for the alleged retaliatory action.
    Thus, Murray’s retaliation claim fails.
    Additionally, the Amended Petition indicates that Murray actually
    committed multiple rule violations. First, he pleaded guilty to the charges of
    possession of contraband and failure to report the presence of contraband. See
    Disciplinary Hearing Report. This plea alone constitutes “some evidence” that
    Murray committed a rule violation. Further, the Amended Petition explains that the
    confiscated papers were copies and originals of exhibits to his previously-filed
    Grievance, which exhibits included nearly identical signed statements from multiple
    other inmates regarding Murray’s complaints against the prison laundry supervisor.
    16
    See Amended Petition at 7, ¶ 32; see also Grievance Exhibits, attached to the
    Amended Petition as Exhibits B3-B10. These materials also represented “some
    evidence” of a violation of the prison rule against inmates possessing or circulating
    petitions. See May, 256 F. App’x at 829. For these reasons, the Amended Petition,
    to the extent it states a retaliation claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
    be granted.
    Accordingly, we sustain Respondents’ Preliminary Objections and
    dismiss the Amended Petition.        Additionally, given our disposition, we deny
    Murray’s Motion for Sanctions.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    17
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Albert Murray,                         :
    Petitioner          :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    Pennsylvania Department of             :
    Corrections, et al.,                   :   No. 595 M.D. 2017
    Respondents       :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 2nd day of May, 2019, Respondents’ Preliminary
    Objections to [Amended] Petition for Review are SUSTAINED and petitioner
    Albert Murray’s (Petitioner) Amended Petition for Review (In the Nature of a
    Complaint In Mandamus) is DISMISSED with prejudice.
    Petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions filed August 7, 2018 is DENIED.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge