R.E. Myers, III v. UCBR ( 2019 )


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  •                 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Robert E. Myers, III,                             :
    Petitioner                     :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation                         :
    Board of Review,                                  :   No. 1275 C.D. 2018
    Respondent                       :   Submitted: April 11, 2019
    BEFORE:            HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge (P.)
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                               FILED: May 3, 2019
    Robert E. Myers, III (Claimant) petitions for review of the August 2,
    2018 order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that
    affirmed the referee’s decision dismissing Claimant’s Petition for Appeal (Appeal)
    for failure to timely file the Appeal pursuant to Section 501(e) of the Unemployment
    Compensation Law (Law),1 which provides for a 15-day appeal period following the
    mailing of a notice of determination by the Department of Labor and Industry
    (Department) through an Unemployment Compensation Service Center. We affirm.
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §
    821(e).
    Claimant began working for Capitol Copy (Employer) at Employer’s
    Lancaster, Pennsylvania, location on December 15, 2014. See Notes of Testimony
    June 13, 2018 (N.T.) at 7.2 Claimant’s employment with Employer ended shortly
    thereafter when either Employer fired Claimant on December 19, 2014, or Claimant
    voluntarily quit by no-call/no-showing for his shift the following Monday,
    December 22, 2014.3 N.T. at 7-9.
    Thereafter,     Claimant      submitted      an    Application      for    Benefits
    (Application) via the internet, which the Department processed on December 29,
    2014.4 Referee’s Findings of Fact (F.F.) No. 1;5 N.T. at 10. As his mailing address
    on the Application, Claimant provided the address of the Camp Hill, Pennsylvania,
    home of a friend with whom he was staying after his mother threw him out of her
    Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, home on the morning of December 19, 2014. N.T. at 11.
    On January 5, 2015, Employer completed and filed a Request for Relief from
    Charges, claiming that Claimant quit on December 22, 2014, when he failed to report
    2
    Prior to the events of the instant appeal, Claimant previously worked for Employer at its
    location in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, but had left for a time to work for a different employer, Ratt
    Incorporated d/b/a Orkin. N.T. at 6 & 16. After Claimant left Orkin, Employer rehired Claimant,
    who began work on December 15, 2014 at Employer’s Lancaster location because no jobs were
    then available at Employer’s Harrisburg location. N.T. at 7 & 16-17.
    3
    The referee and the Board disposed of this appeal on timeliness grounds and thus did not
    make any factual determinations regarding the merits of Claimant’s underlying claims. See
    generally Board’s Order dated August 2, 2018 (Board Order); Referee’s Decision dated June 15,
    2018 (Referee’s Decision).
    4
    Because he believed he could not claim unemployment compensation through Employer
    without first having worked six pay periods, Claimant listed his prior employer, Orkin, as his
    separating employer on the Application. Findings of Fact (F.F.) No. 1; N.T. at 10.
    5
    The Board adopted and incorporated the referee’s findings of facts and conclusions in its
    order affirming the referee’s decision. See Board Order dated August 2, 2018.
    2
    for his shift. F.F. No. 3; Claim Record, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 8. Claimant
    began to receive unemployment compensation (UC) benefits beginning with the
    waiting week ending December 27, 2014. F.F. No. 8; Claim Record, R.R. at 3.
    Sometime in May 2015, Claimant returned to work for Employer at
    Employer’s Harrisburg location.6 N.T. at 11. Also, upon returning to work with
    Employer, Claimant’s mother allowed him to return to and reside in her home in
    Harrisburg. N.T. at 11. Claimant neither forwarded his mail from his Camp Hill
    mailing address nor updated his mailing address with the Department. N.T. at 12.
    On October 14, 2015, the Department’s Employers’ Charge Unit
    identified a separation issue regarding the payment of Claimant’s UC benefits and
    forwarded the information to the Department’s Harrisburg Overflow Center (HOC).
    F.F. No. 4; see also Claim Record, R.R. at 7-8. The HOC mailed Employer and
    Claimant fact-finding forms on October 15, 2015, with instructions to complete and
    return the forms by October 22, 2015. F.F. No. 5; R.R. at 7-8. On October 20, 2015,
    Employer returned the fact-finding form, completed only to the extent that Employer
    had written notations reading “NO CONTEST” and “I DO NOT WISH TO
    CONTEST” upon the form. F.F. No. 6; R.R. at 8. Claimant did not return a
    completed fact-finding form. F.F. No. 7; R.R. at 8.
    On December 9, 2016, the HOC issued multiple determinations. See
    F.F. Nos. 8-10; see also R.R. at 7-8 & 27-36. First, the HOC issued a Notice of
    Determination that found Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits pursuant to
    6
    Claimant stopped submitting biweekly claims, and thus stopped receiving UC benefits,
    in mid-May 2015. See Claim Record, R.R. at 3.
    3
    Section 402(b) of the Law7 beginning with the waiting week ending December 27,
    2014. F.F. No. 8; R.R. at 7-8 & 27-29. The HOC issued another Notice of
    Determination of Overpayment of Benefits that found Claimant received a total of
    $5,719.00 in UC benefits to which he was not entitled for the claim weeks ending
    January 3, 2015 through May 9, 2015. F.F. No. 9; R.R. at 7-8 & 30-32. The Notice
    of Determination of Overpayment of Benefits further classified the amount of UC
    benefits Claimant received as a fault overpayment under Section 804(a) of the Law.8
    F.F. No. 9; R.R. at 7-8, 30 & 35-36. Finally, the HOC issued a Notice of 15% Penalty
    Determination penalizing Claimant 21 weeks of benefits to which he would be
    entitled under Section 801(b) of the Law9 and imposing an $857.85 penalty pursuant
    7
    Section 402(b) of the Law provides that an employee shall be ineligible to receive UC
    benefits in any week “[i]n which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without
    cause of a necessitous and compelling nature[.]” 43 P.S. § 802(b).
    8
    Section 804(a) of the Law provides for the repayment of fault overpayments, in pertinent
    part, as follows:
    (a) Any person who by reason of his fault has received any sum as
    compensation under this act to which he was not entitled, shall be
    liable to repay to the Unemployment Compensation Fund to the
    credit of the Compensation Account a sum equal to the amount so
    received by him and interest[.]
    43 P.S. § 874(a).
    9
    Section 801(b) of the Law provides for UC benefit disqualification periods based on fault
    overpayments, in pertinent part, as follows:
    (b) Whoever makes a false statement knowing it to be false, or
    knowingly fails to disclose a material fact to obtain or increase any
    compensation or other payment under this act or under an
    employment security law of any other state or of the Federal
    Government or of a foreign government, may be disqualified in
    addition to such week or weeks of improper payments for a penalty
    period of five weeks and for not more than one additional week for
    each such week of improper payment . . . The penalty weeks herein
    4
    to Section 801(c) of the Law.10 F.F. No. 10; R.R. at 7-8 & 33-34. The determinations
    informed Claimant that he had 15 days, or until December 27, 2016, to appeal if he
    disagreed with the determinations. F.F. Nos. 13 & 14; R.R. at 27-29. The HOC
    mailed the determinations to Claimant’s last known mailing address at his friend’s
    house in Camp Hill, and the determinations were not returned as undeliverable. F.F.
    No. 11; N.T. at 12; R.R. at 7. Claimant, who had moved back to his mother’s house
    in May 2015 without forwarding his mail or changing his mailing address with the
    Department, did not receive the notices and did not appeal the determinations within
    the 15-day appeal period. N.T. at 12 & 15.
    Claimant finally became aware of the December 2016 denial of
    benefits, overpayment, and 15% penalty in mid-April of 2018, when he was
    informed that his tax return would be confiscated to repay the fault overpayment.
    N.T. at 12-13. On April 16, 2018, Claimant contacted the HOC to inquire about the
    overpayment and was informed as to the overpayment and recoupment requirements
    provided for shall be imposed against any weeks with respect to
    which the claimant would otherwise be eligible for compensation,
    under the provisions of this act[.]
    43 P.S. § 871(b).
    10
    Section 801(c) of the Law provides for fault overpayment fines, in pertinent part, as
    follows:
    (c) Whoever makes a false statement knowing it to be false, or
    knowingly fails to disclose a material fact to obtain or increase
    compensation or other payment under this act or under an
    employment security law of the Federal Government and as a result
    receives compensation to which he is not entitled shall be liable to
    pay to the Unemployment Compensation Fund a sum equal to
    fifteen per centum (15%) of the amount of the compensation.
    43 P.S. § 871(c).
    5
    and his appeal rights. F.F. Nos. 17 & 18; R.R. at 7. Claimant also updated his
    address to his correct Harrisburg mailing address on April 16, 2018. F.F. No. 16;
    R.R. at 7. Personnel at the HOC again advised Claimant of the overpayment and his
    appeal rights a week later, on April 23, 2018. F.F. No. 19; R.R. at 7. HOC personnel
    again spoke with Claimant on April 26, 2018, when he called and stated he had not
    received the determinations. F.F. No. 20; R.R. at 7.
    Ultimately, Claimant appealed the determinations on May 21, 2018.
    F.F. No. 21; R.R. at 38-41. After conducting a hearing on June 13, 2018, the referee
    issued a decision and order on June 15, 2018 that disposed of Claimant’s appeal on
    grounds that it was untimely. See Referee’s Decision, R.R. at 86-91. Claimant filed
    a Petition for Appeal on June 29, 2018, and the Board affirmed the Referee’s
    Decision by order dated August 2, 2018. See Petition for Appeal, R.R. at 93-97;
    Board Order, R.R. at 99. Claimant then petitioned this Court for review.11
    Claimant purports to raise eight claims for this Court’s review.12
    Claimant’s first six issues argue that the Board erred in affirming the referee’s
    determination that Claimant’s appeal was untimely filed. We disagree.
    11
    This Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether substantial evidence
    supported necessary findings of fact, whether errors of law were committed, or whether
    constitutional rights were violated. Johns v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    87 A.3d 1006
    ,
    1009 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
    12
    Claimant lists the following issues:
    A. Whether the [Board] committed error in affirming the Referee’s
    Order which denied [Claimant’s] appeal from the HOC’s
    Determination[s] from December 9, 2016 as untimely because the
    record developed by the Referee does not support such a finding?
    B. Whether the [Board] committed error when it asserted that
    [Claimant] was negligent in updating his address with the
    Department in April of 2018 when the Referee made no finding?
    6
    Initially, “[t]he Board’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal . . . so
    long as the record taken as a whole contains substantial evidence to support them.”
    Henderson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    77 A.3d 699
    , 718 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2013) (citing Penflex, Inc. v. Bryson, 
    485 A.2d 359
    , 365 (Pa. 1984)). “Substantial
    evidence is correctly defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
    accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Peak v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    501 A.2d 1383
    , 1387 (Pa. 1985) (quoting Murphy v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare,
    
    480 A.2d 382
    , 386 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984)). “In determining whether there is substantial
    C. Whether the [Board] committed error in affirming the Referee’s
    Decision when the Referee made no finding of fact as to when
    [Claimant] was served the HOC’s determinations?
    D. Whether the [Board] committed error when it affirmed the
    Referee’s Decision which relied on a finding that all three of the
    HOC’s Determination[s] were not returned as undeliverable as that
    finding was unsupported by the Referee’s own statements?
    E. Whether the [Board] committed error when it affirmed the
    Referee’s Order when there was not sufficient evidence to support
    the finding that the filing of the “late” appeal was not caused by
    fraud or its equivalent by the administrative authorities or
    breakdown in the appellant [sic] system?
    F. Whether the [Board] committed error when it affirmed the
    Referee’s Order when there was not sufficient evidence to support
    the finding that the delay in the appeal was due to the negligence of
    [Claimant]?
    G. Whether the [Board] committed [an] error of law by affirming
    the Referee’s Order which was premised on unsupported and
    inappropriate denial of [Claimant’s] Unemployment Compensation
    [b]enefits?
    H. Whether it was an error to deny [Claimant] Unemployment
    compensation benefits?
    Claimant’s Brief at 5-6.
    7
    evidence to support the Board’s findings, this Court must examine the testimony in
    the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of any
    inferences that can logically and reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”
    
    Henderson, 77 A.3d at 718
    .
    Section 501(e) of the Law requires that a claimant appeal from an
    adverse Department determination within 15 days of the mailing of notice of such a
    determination to the claimant’s last known address. 43 P.S. § 821(e).13 “Failure to
    timely appeal an administrative agency’s decision constitutes a jurisdictional
    defect.” Russo v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    13 A.3d 1000
    , 1002 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2010). “The appeal provisions of the [L]aw are mandatory: failure to file
    an appeal within fifteen days, without an adequate excuse for the late filing,
    mandates dismissal of the appeal.” Dumberth v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    837 A.2d 678
    , 681 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    620 A.2d 572
    , 573 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)).
    If an appeal is not filed within fifteen days of the mailing
    of the determination, it becomes final, and the Board does
    not have the requisite jurisdiction to consider the matter.
    Appeal periods, even at the administrative level, are
    13
    Specifically, Section 501(e) provides:
    Unless the claimant or last employer or base-year employer of the
    claimant files an appeal with the board, from the determination
    contained in any notice required to be furnished by the department
    under section five hundred and one (a), (c) and (d),[] within fifteen
    calendar days after such notice was delivered to him personally, or
    was mailed to his last known post office address, and applies for a
    hearing, such determination of the department, with respect to the
    particular facts set forth in such notice, shall be final and
    compensation shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith.
    43 P.S. § 821(e).
    8
    jurisdictional and may not be extended as a matter of grace
    or indulgence; otherwise, there would be no finality to
    judicial action. Therefore, an appeal filed one day after
    the expiration of the statutory appeal period must be
    dismissed as untimely.
    
    Id. (internal citations
    omitted). The Board may, however, entertain an untimely
    appeal in very limited circumstances. Hessou v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    942 A.2d 194
    , 198 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
    The burden to establish the right to have an untimely
    appeal considered is a heavy one because the statutory
    time limit established for appeals is mandatory. [A
    claimant] may satisfy this heavy burden in one of two
    ways. First, he can show the administrative authority
    engaged in fraudulent behavior or manifestly wrongful or
    negligent conduct. Second, he can show non-negligent
    conduct beyond his control caused the delay. Failure to
    file an appeal within fifteen days, without an adequate
    excuse for the late filing, mandates dismissal of the appeal.
    
    Id. (internal citations
    , brackets, and quotations omitted).
    Additionally,
    [i]f there is evidence in the record that the determination
    of the [Department] was mailed to the claimant’s last
    known address, and that the notice was not returned to the
    [Department] by the postal officials as undeliverable, then
    there is a presumption of the regularity of administrative
    acts of public officials which the referee may invoke in
    reaching a determination that the claimant did have proper
    notice.
    Gaskins v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    429 A.2d 138
    , 140 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1981). This Court has found that a failure to update a mailing address or forward
    9
    mail to a new address does not excuse a claimant’s failure to timely file an appeal.
    See Maloy v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1009 C.D.
    2015, filed Apr. 13, 2016),14 slip op. at 2 (finding claimant’s failure to forward mail
    after moving did not excuse failure to file a timely appeal); S.L., Jr. v. Dep’t of Pub.
    Welfare (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2190 C.D. 2014, filed Sept. 3, 2015), slip op. at 6
    (denying nunc pro tunc relief where delay attributable to petitioner’s failure to advise
    of address change or forward mail).
    Taken as a whole, the record in this case contains substantial evidence
    to support the Board’s findings of fact. Claimant’s own testimony at the hearing
    revealed that, when he applied for UC benefits at the end of December 2014,
    Claimant provided as his mailing address the address of his friend’s home in Camp
    Hill, where he had moved after his mother revoked permission for him to stay within
    her Harrisburg home on December 19, 2014. N.T. at 10-11 & 15-16. Claimant
    explained that, when he moved back to his mother’s house in Harrisburg upon
    recommencing work with Employer in May 2015, he did not forward his mail or
    update his address with the UC Service Center. N.T. at 11 & 15-16. Claimant
    testified that he only notified the Department of his change of address on April 16,
    2018, when he contacted the HOC after learning that his tax refund had been
    confiscated to cover his UC overpayment. N.T. at 12-13 & 16.
    The Claim Record entered into evidence revealed that, on December 9,
    2016, all three December 9, 2016 determinations were mailed to Claimant at his last
    known address in Camp Hill. N.T. at 3; R.R. at 7. The Claim Record corroborated
    that Claimant’s mailing address of record remained the Camp Hill address until April
    14
    Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure 414(a), 210 Pa. Code §
    69.414(a), unreported panel decisions of this Court, issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited
    for their persuasive value.
    10
    16, 2018.     R.R. at 7.      Further, the determinations themselves explained that
    Claimant’s last day to timely appeal was December 27, 2016. N.T. at 3; R.R. at 27.
    The hearing testimony further revealed, and the Claim Record
    confirmed, that when Claimant contacted the HOC on April 16, 2018, HOC
    personnel advised him of the overpayment and recoupment and the appeal
    requirements. N.T. at 13 & 16; R.R. at 7. HOC personnel again notified Claimant
    of the appeal requirements during a second conversation on April 23, 2018 and a
    third call on April 26, 2018. N.T. at 13 & 16; R.R. at 7. Claimant conceded that the
    HOC informed him of the appeal requirements multiple times during these
    conversations. N.T. at 13 & 16. Claimant further testified he did not mail his appeal
    until May 21, 2018, because he was attempting to acquire documents. N.T. at 13-
    14 & 16.
    Based on the above evidence, we conclude that substantial evidence
    existed to support the Board’s necessary findings of fact that Claimant filed his
    appeal in the instant matter well after December 27, 2016 and, thus, untimely. The
    Department sent the determinations on December 9, 2016 to Claimant’s last known
    address, the Camp Hill address he had put on the Application for UC benefits in
    December of 2014. Claimant did not update his mailing address when he moved
    away from the Camp Hill address in May 2015. Claimant’s own negligence in
    failing to update his mailing address cannot serve as an excuse for his failure to
    timely comply with appeal time limitations. See Constantini v. Unemployment
    Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    173 A.3d 838
    , 845–46 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (noting that a
    claimant’s own negligence cannot remedy untimely filed appeal).15 Further, despite
    15
    Even were we to assume that Claimant’s 15-day appeal period somehow reset when he
    called and informed the HOC on April 16, 2018 that he had not received the determinations and
    gave them his new address, Claimant still did not timely appeal. Even giving Claimant the benefit
    11
    Claimant’s arguments to the contrary, no record evidence exists that his untimely
    appeal was due to “the administrative authority engag[ing] in fraudulent behavior or
    manifestly wrongful or negligent conduct[,]” or “non-negligent conduct beyond
    [Claimant’s] control[.]”16 
    Hessou, 942 A.2d at 198
    . Because Claimant filed his
    appeal after the expiration of the Section 501(e) 15-day deadline, we hold that the
    Board did not err in concluding that Claimant untimely filed his appeal.
    Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision affirming the Referee’s Decision that
    dismissed Claimant’s appeal as untimely.17
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    of the April 26, 2018 date when he last spoke with the HOC after having been informed of his
    appeal obligations, Claimant still did not mail his appeal until May 21, 2018, 25 days later.
    Claimant’s own negligence cannot excuse his failure to timely comply with required appeal
    periods. See 
    Constantini, 173 A.3d at 845
    –46. Therefore, even measuring from the period when
    Claimant alleges he discovered the benefit denial and overpayment and penalty determinations,
    Claimant failed to timely file his appeal in this matter.
    16
    To the extent Claimant argues two of the three determinations were returned as
    undeliverable, we do not agree that the evidence supports such a conclusion. Viewing the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the Department, as we must in this instance, see 
    Henderson, 77 A.3d at 718
    , we note that the Claim Record materials confirm that the determinations were mailed to
    Claimant’s last known address and not returned as undeliverable. R.R. at 7.
    17
    Given our determination on the timeliness question, we need not discuss herein
    Claimant’s remaining claims pertaining to the merits of the underlying UC benefits determination.
    12
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Robert E. Myers, III,                 :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                        :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation             :
    Board of Review,                      :   No. 1275 C.D. 2018
    Respondent           :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 3rd day of May, 2019, the order of the Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review dated August 2, 2018 is AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge