Adams, R. v. PBPP ( 2019 )


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  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Robert Adams,                            :
    :
    Petitioner :
    :
    v.                : No. 777 C.D. 2018
    : Submitted: January 4, 2019
    Pennsylvania Board of                    :
    Probation and Parole,                    :
    :
    Respondent :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                               FILED: August 27, 2019
    Robert Adams (Parolee) petitions for review of the order of the
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) that denied his
    Administrative Appeals and Petitions for Administrative Review challenging its
    October 3, 2016 decision recommitting him as a convicted parole violator (CPV) to
    serve 12 months’ backtime1 when available based on his conviction for terroristic
    1
    This Court has previously defined the term backtime as:
    [T]hat part of an existing judicially[]imposed sentence which the
    Board directs a parolee to complete following a finding after a civil
    administrative hearing that the parolee violated the terms and
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    threats, and its November 4, 2016 decision referring to the October 3, 2016
    decision and recommitting him as a CPV to serve a concurrent 12 months’
    backtime when available2 based on his conviction for possession of a small amount
    of marijuana for personal use and possession of marijuana. Also before us is the
    petition of Kent D. Watkins, Esquire (Counsel), for leave to withdraw as counsel
    for Parolee on the grounds that Parolee’s appeal is without merit and lacks support
    in either law or fact. For the reasons that follow, we grant Counsel’s petition for
    leave to withdraw and affirm the Board’s order.
    On June 29, 2001, Parolee was sentenced in Bucks County to an
    aggregate 10- to 20-year term of imprisonment based on his conviction for two
    counts of robbery, and a consecutive 7-year probationary term for his conviction of
    carrying a firearm without a license. Certified Record (C.R.) at 1, 3. With an
    effective date of December 26, 2000, the minimum sentence expiry date for these
    convictions was December 26, 2010, and the maximum sentence expiry date was
    December 26, 2020. Id. at 2. He was released on parole in February 2011, but was
    recommitted by the Board as a technical parole violator in July 2012, and his
    maximum sentence expiry date was extended to October 7, 2021. Id. at 1, 2, 124.
    In February 2014, Parolee was released on reparole. Id. at 7.
    (continued…)
    conditions of parole, which time must be served before the parolee
    may again be eligible to be considered for a grant of parole.
    Krantz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    483 A.2d 1044
    , 1047 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1984) (emphasis in original).
    2
    The Board noted that Parolee’s availability was “pending parole from/completion of
    [his] Berks County sentence and [his] return to a State Correctional Institution.” Certified
    Record (C.R.) at 154.
    2
    On September 1, 2015, Parolee was arrested by the Reading Police
    and charged with possession of synthetic marijuana, possession of crack cocaine,
    and public drunkenness. C.R. at 65, 140-141. On August 4, 2016, Parolee pleaded
    guilty to possession of crack cocaine and was sentenced by the Berks County Court
    of Common Pleas to 119 days to 23 months’ incarceration. Id. at 66-69, 115. He
    received credit for the 119 days of time served with the provision that “upon
    completion of his[] minimum sentence shall be released without a petition upon
    approval of a suitable parole plan by the Berks County Parole Office.” Id.
    On December 14, 2015, Parolee was arrested in Philadelphia for
    aggravated assault, terroristic threats, simple assault, recklessly endangering
    another person, harassment, and stalking. C.R. at 31-33, 34. On January 4, 2016,
    the aggravated assault charge was dismissed and the charges of terroristic threats,
    simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, harassment, and stalking
    were remanded to municipal court. Id. at 96-97. On April 25, 2016 Parolee
    pleaded guilty to terroristic threats and harassment, and was sentenced by the
    Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas to time served to 23½ months’
    incarceration with immediate parole. Id. at 100.
    On December 21, 2015, Parolee was arrested in Berks County for
    possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use. C.R. at 46-48. On
    June 23, 2016, Parolee pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to pay a
    $300.00 fine and costs and to complete 16 hours of community service. Id. at 52-
    58.3
    3
    Documents in the certified record demonstrate that Parolee has been convicted of
    various additional crimes that are not relevant to the disposition of the instant appeal.
    Accordingly, they will not be addressed in this opinion.
    3
    On August 25, 2016, Parolee waived his right to counsel and a parole
    revocation hearing, and admitted his Philadelphia County terroristic threats and
    harassment convictions. C.R. at 84-86. As a result, the Board issued its October 3,
    2016 decision recommitting Parolee as a CPV to serve 12 months’ backtime when
    available. Id. at 104-05. The Board noted that Parolee’s availability was “pending
    resolution of [his] outstanding criminal charges.” Id. at 104.
    On September 30, 2016, Parolee waived his right to counsel and a
    parole revocation hearing, and admitted his Berks County drug and public
    drunkenness convictions. C.R. at 116-119. As a result, the Board issued its
    November 4, 2016 decision recommitting Parolee as a CPV to serve 12 months’
    backtime concurrently with the previously imposed backtime when available. Id.
    at 154-155. The Board specifically referred to its October 3, 2016 decision, and
    noted that Parolee’s availability was “pending parole from/completion of [his]
    Berks County sentence and [his] return to a State Correctional Institution.” Id. at
    154.
    On October 16, 2016, Parolee submitted an Administrative Remedies
    Form challenging the Board’s October 3, 2016 decision. C.R. at 195. Parolee
    asked that he “be given time credited from the date the state detainer was placed on
    [him] as it kept [him] detained and that the time given by the Board be cut in half.”
    Id.    He also asked that he “be reparoled upon completion of [the] program
    suggested by the Parole Board.”        Id.       He explained that “without the state
    detainer,” he would have been able to post bail, receive house arrest, or be placed
    on work release. Id.
    On September 14, 2017, Parolee submitted another Administrative
    Remedies Form challenging the Board’s November 4, 2016 decision. C.R. at 197-
    4
    199.   Parolee alleged that the Board erred in imposing 12 months’ backtime
    because only 6 months could be imposed for his misdemeanor drug convictions.
    Id. at 197. Parolee also claimed: (1) his maximum sentence expiry date should be
    December 26, 2021, because the sentencing judge did not order that the date be
    extended and the Board did so without a court order; (2) he is entitled to credit for
    391 days because the Board failed to transport him to a State Correctional
    Institution after he was paroled in Berks County on August 4, 2016; (3) the
    backtime imposed should be adjusted from 12 months to 6 months because the
    offenses to which he pleaded guilty were misdemeanors; (4) he should receive
    credit from December 14, 2015, to the date of filing because the Board had placed
    a detainer that prevented him from obtaining bail; and (5) the program evaluations
    imposed by the Board should be removed because he has exhibited no
    inappropriate conduct warranting such evaluations. Id. at 198-99.
    On April 12, 2018, the Board responded via letter and affirmed its
    October 3, 2016 decision, and dismissed the September 14, 2017 appeal of its
    November 4, 2016 decision as untimely. C.R. at 201-202. In affirming the
    October 3, 2016 decision, the Board explained that Parolee was not available to re-
    start service of his original sentence at the time of the decision due to the
    unresolved criminal charges. Id. at 201. The Board also explained that it properly
    recommitted Parolee when he was available, pending resolution of the outstanding
    charges. Id. Moreover, the Board stated that it mailed Parolee a recalculation
    decision on November 4, 2016, that reflects the appropriate credit allocation. Id.
    Thus, the Board determined that the decision mailed on November 4, 2016,
    triggered Parolee’s appeal rights on the issue of calculation reflecting his credit
    allocation. Id.
    5
    In dismissing Parolee’s appeal of its November 4, 2016 decision as
    untimely, the Board noted that petitions must be received at the Board’s Central
    Office within 30 days of the mailing of the Board’s action under its regulations, 
    37 Pa. Code §73.1
    , which was mailed on November 4, 2016. C.R. at 201. Therefore,
    Parolee had until December 4, 2016, to object to the Board’s action. 
    Id.
     Because
    the Board did not receive his petition before that date, and there is no indication
    that it was submitted to prison officials for mailing by that date, Parolee’s petition
    was untimely and could not be accepted. 
    Id.
     Parolee then filed the instant pro se
    petition seeking this Court’s review.
    In his petition for review, Parolee claims that the Board: (1) violated
    his due process rights and his rights against cruel and unusual punishment, and
    abused its discretion when it extended the maximum sentence expiry date of his
    original judicially imposed sentence on his robbery convictions; (2) erred and
    abused its discretion by not granting time credit from December 14, 2015, to
    August 30, 2017, because a Board warrant prevented the imposition of bail on his
    pending charges; (3) committed perjury, erred, and abused its discretion by relying
    on false evidence in denying him credit for time served from August 4, 2016, to
    August 30, 2017; and (4) violated his substantive and procedural due process
    rights, and his rights against cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy by
    extending the unexpired term of his maximum sentence expiry date.
    This Court appointed Counsel to represent Parolee in his appeal.
    Thereafter, Counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and a no-merit
    letter under Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988), contending that
    the appeal is meritless.
    6
    When court-appointed counsel concludes that a petitioner’s appeal is
    meritless, counsel may withdraw if counsel: (1) notifies the petitioner of the
    request to withdraw; (2) furnishes the petitioner with a copy of a brief pursuant to
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), or a no-merit letter satisfying the
    requirements of Turner4; and (3) advises the petitioner of his right to retain new
    counsel or submit a brief on his own behalf. Miskovitch v. Pennsylvania Board of
    Probation and Parole, 
    77 A.3d 66
    , 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Once appointed
    counsel has complied with the technical requirements for withdrawal, we
    independently review the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 
    Id. at 70
    .
    Upon review, Counsel’s letter satisfies the technical requirements of
    Turner. The letter sets forth the procedural history of the case, reflecting his
    review of the record.         Counsel states that he conducted a conscientious and
    thorough review of the record, applicable statutes and case law. He sets forth the
    issues Parolee raised in his Administrative Remedies Forms to review the Board’s
    recalculation of his maximum sentence expiry date, provides a thorough analysis
    as to why the case lacks merit, and cites applicable regulations and case law in
    4
    In cases where there is a constitutional right to counsel, court-appointed counsel seeking
    to withdraw must submit an Anders brief that
    (1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the record that
    counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth
    counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) states
    counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 361 (Pa. 2009). Where, as here, the right to counsel
    is statutory and does not derive from the United States Constitution, counsel may provide a “no-
    merit letter,” which details the nature and extent of the attorney’s review, identifies each issue
    the petitioner wishes to raise, and explains why counsel concludes those issues are meritless.
    Turner, 544 A.2d at 928.
    7
    support. Based on his review, Counsel concludes that Parolee’s appeal to this
    Court is without merit, and he requests permission to withdraw.
    Counsel provided Parolee with a copy of the Turner letter and his
    request to withdraw. Counsel advised Parolee of his right to retain new counsel or
    proceed by representing himself.5 As we are satisfied that Counsel has discharged
    his responsibility in complying with the technical requirements to withdraw from
    representation, we will conduct an independent review of whether Parolee’s
    petition for review lacks merit.6
    Upon review, we agree with Counsel that Adams’ claims are without
    merit, lacking support in either law or fact. With respect to the Board’s October 3,
    2016 decision, Parolee’s claim in the October 16, 2016 Administrative Remedies
    Form regarding the credit that was granted on his sentence is without merit because
    the Board did not allocate credit in its decision. See C.R. at 104-105.
    Parolee’s other claim regarding the amount of backtime imposed is
    likewise without merit. Pursuant to Section 75.1(a) of its regulations, the Board is
    authorized to apply the aggregate presumptive ranges for each conviction when it
    orders the recommitment of a CPV after holding a revocation hearing. 
    37 Pa. Code §75.1
    (a). The presumptive backtime ranges for the terroristic threats and
    harassment offenses to which Parolee pleaded guilty are 6 to 12 months and 1 to 6
    5
    By order dated November 1, 2018, this Court denied Parolee’s Motion for Appointment
    of New Counsel and instructed Parolee that he may raise his appellate claims in a pro se brief
    that must be filed by November 26, 2018. To date, Parolee has not retained new counsel, and he
    has not filed a pro se brief in support of his petition for review.
    6
    Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
    whether the adjudication was in accordance with law, and whether necessary findings were
    supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S.
    §704; Miskovitch, 
    77 A.3d at
    70 n.4.
    8
    months, respectively. 
    37 Pa. Code §75.2
    . See also C.R. at 77. Thus, the 12
    months’ backtime that the Board imposed is well within the aggregate presumptive
    ranges for these offenses and is not subject to appellate review by this Court.
    As we have explained, “This court will not review the Board’s
    exercise of discretion in imposing backtime for parole violations where the
    violations are supported by substantial evidence and the backtime imposed is
    within the published presumptive ranges for those violations.           Chapman v.
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, [
    484 A.2d 413
    , 417 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1984)].” Lotz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    548 A.2d 1295
    ,
    1296 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). Further, “[o]ur Supreme Court has held that ‘[a]s long
    as the period of recommitment is within the presumptive range for the violation,
    the Commonwealth Court will not entertain challenges to the propriety of the term
    of recommitment.’” Fisher v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    62 A.3d 1073
    , 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (quoting Smith v. Pennsylvania Board of
    Probation and Parole, 
    574 A.2d 558
    , 560 (Pa. 1990)).
    Finally, with respect to the Board’s November 4, 2016 decision,
    Parolee untimely submitted the Administrative Remedies Form thereby precluding
    further review by the Board. We note that Section 73.1(a)(1) of the Board’s
    regulations states, in pertinent part:
    (1) An interested party . . . may appeal a revocation
    decision. Appeals shall be received at the Board’s
    Central Office within 30 days of the mailing date of the
    Board’s order. When a timely appeal of a revocation
    decision has been filed, the revocation decision will not
    be deemed final for purpose of appeal to a court until the
    Board has mailed its decision on the appeal.
    
    37 Pa. Code §73.1
    (a)(1).
    9
    Similarly, Section 73.1(b)(1) of the Board’s regulations states, in
    relevant part:
    (1) A parolee . . . may petition for administrative review
    under this subsection of determinations relating to
    revocation decisions which are not otherwise appealable
    under subsection (a). Petitions for administrative review
    shall be received at the Board’s Central Office within 30
    days of the mailing date of the Board’s determination.
    When a timely petition has been filed, the determination
    will not be deemed final for purposes of appeal to a court
    until the Board has mailed its response to the petition for
    administrative review.
    
    37 Pa. Code §73.1
    (b)(1). Based on the foregoing, if Parolee’s September 14, 2017
    Administrative Remedies Form is deemed to be either an untimely Administrative
    Appeal of the Board’s November 4, 2016 decision or a Petition for Administrative
    Review of the same, the Board was without jurisdiction to consider the claims
    raised therein or to grant the requested relief.7
    7
    See, e.g., Merriweather v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    693 A.2d 1000
    , 1001 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (“[T]he recommitment of fifteen months was ordered in the
    Board’s June 11, 1996 decision and [the parolee] had thirty days from that date to challenge that
    decision. However, [he] did not petition the Board until July 18, 1996. Therefore, although he
    ostensibly appealed the Board’s June 28, 1996 decision, any challenge to the Board’s June 11,
    1996 action, including its imposition of fifteen months backtime, would be untimely, thereby
    divesting the Board of jurisdiction to consider [his] petition . . . .”) (citations omitted); McCaskill
    v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    631 A.2d 1092
    , 1095 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)
    (“Because [the parolee’s] request for administrative relief was not filed with the Board until
    1992, 6 years after the Board’s 1986 determination was issued, and 4 years after the Board’s
    1988 determination was issued, any allegations concerning such determinations would have been
    untimely and the Board would have been required to dismiss the appeal as it related to those
    issues.”) (citation omitted); Ayers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    565 A.2d 1257
    , 1258 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (“Under the provisions of 
    37 Pa. Code § 73.1
    , a petition for
    administrative review of a board determination relating to revocation decisions is to be received
    within 30 days of the mailing date of the determination. . . . Because Petitioner did not file his
    request for reconsideration of the Board’s October 26, 1987 order until April of 1989 it was
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    10
    Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw as
    counsel and we affirm the Board’s decision.
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    (continued…)
    untimely, and since the timeliness of an appeal is jurisdictional, the Board was without authority
    to consider it.”) (citation omitted).
    11
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Robert Adams,                      :
    :
    Petitioner :
    :
    v.               : No. 777 C.D. 2018
    :
    Pennsylvania Board of              :
    Probation and Parole,              :
    :
    Respondent :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 27th day of August, 2019, Kent D. Watkins,
    Esquire’s petition for leave to withdraw as counsel is GRANTED, and the decision
    of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, dated April 12, 2018, is
    AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge