M.A. Williams v. UCBR ( 2015 )


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  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Mark A. Williams,                              :
    : No. 2381 C.D. 2014
    Petitioner        : Submitted: July 2, 2015
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation                      :
    Board of Review,                               :
    :
    Respondent        :
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN                                          FILED: August 25, 2015
    Mark A. Williams (Claimant) petitions for review, pro se, of the
    November 25, 2014, order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
    (UCBR) affirming a referee’s decision to deny Claimant unemployment
    compensation (UC) benefits under section 401(a) of the Unemployment
    Compensation Law (Law)1 and section 204(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act
    (Act).2 We affirm.
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S.
    §801(a). Section 401(a) of the Law, 43 P.S. §801(a), provides that in order to qualify for UC
    benefits, an employee must have been paid wages for employment within his base year.
    2
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §71(b). Section 204(b) of the Act, 77
    P.S. §71(b), provides that for the purposes of determining eligibility for UC benefits, an employee
    who fails to meet the monetary and credit week requirements under section 401(a) of the Law, 43
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    Claimant was employed as a full-time workers’ compensation claims
    representative with Comp Services, Inc. (Employer) from April 21, 2010, through
    November 26, 2011. On October 3, 2011, Claimant sustained a work-related injury
    in the form of anxiety and stress after being suspended by Employer on October 3,
    2011, and subsequently fired on November 26, 2011. As a result of the work-related
    injury, Claimant and Employer entered into a Compromise and Release Agreement
    (Agreement) on December 18, 2012.3 (Referee’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 1, 4-5; N.T.,
    9/15/14, at 5.)
    Claimant initially filed for UC benefits on February 3, 2013, and the
    service center determined that Claimant was financially ineligible for benefits on
    February 7, 2013.4         (Referee’s Findings of Fact, No. 6.)              The service center
    subsequently vacated the February 7, 2013, determination on February 14, 2013, for
    further investigation. On February 28, 2013, Claimant called the service center to
    inform it of an impending surgery and that he would not be able and available for
    work. (N.T., 9/15/14, at 9.) The service center allegedly informed Claimant that
    (continued…)
    P.S. §801(a), due to a work-related injury that is compensable under the Act, may elect to have his
    base year consist of the four complete calendar quarters immediately preceding the date of the
    work-related injury.
    3
    In the Agreement, Employer specifically denied that Claimant suffered a work-related
    injury, but agreed to pay Claimant a specific sum in exchange for Claimant’s release of Employer
    from further liability. (Agmt., 12/18/12, at 2-3.)
    4
    The referee incorrectly lists Claimant’s initial filing as February 7, 2013, not February 3,
    2013. (Referee’s Findings of Fact, No. 6.) This error, however, is de minimis and does not affect
    the outcome of this case. See Skurkey v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Foster-Wheeler
    Corporation), 
    531 A.2d 883
    , 886 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
    2
    Claimant could not file for UC benefits while he was not able and available for work,
    but could re-open his claim once he was released to return to work. (Id.) On June 16,
    2014, Claimant was declared able and available for work. (Referee’s Findings of
    Fact, No. 7.)
    On July 10, 2014, Claimant contacted the service center to reactivate his
    application for UC benefits dated February 3, 2013. However, the benefit year for
    Claimant’s February 3, 2013, application had expired during the week ending
    February 8, 2014. As a result, the service center opened a new application for UC
    benefits effective July 6, 2014, establishing a base-year period of April 1, 2013,
    through March 31, 2014. (Id., Nos. 2-3, 8-10.)
    On August 8, 2014, the service center found Claimant financially
    ineligible and disapproved UC benefits under section 401(a) of the Law, 43 P.S.
    §801(a), and section 204(b) of the Act, 77 P.S. §71(b), for Claimant’s July 6, 2014,
    application.     Claimant appealed, and the referee held a hearing at which only
    Claimant appeared and testified.
    The referee determined that:
    [b]y entering into the . . . Agreement there is a
    presumed assumption, the [C]laimant was voluntarily
    separating [from] his employment with [Employer], in
    December of 2012.[5] In order to utilize the provisions of
    5
    We note that this statement is incorrect. Entering into a compromise and release
    agreement does not invoke a presumption that a claimant has voluntarily separated from his or her
    employment. See Marinos v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, (Pa. Cmwlth., No.
    1819 C.D. 2013, filed June 11, 2014), slip op. at 8-9 (stating that “[w]e do not hold that merely
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    3
    [s]ection 204([b]) of the . . . Act, the [C]laimant’s financial
    ineligibility for benefits must be as the direct result of
    receiving Worker’s [sic] Compensation during the base year
    as the result of a work-related injury. Because the . . .
    Agreement was made well before the base year time period
    on this application, the [r]eferee cannot conclude that the
    [C]laimant’s lack of base year wages was the result of the
    receipt of Worker’s [sic] Compensation due to the work-
    related injury, therefore, the [C]laimant [is] not entitled to
    an alternate base year on the application for benefits in
    question.
    (Referee’s Determination, 9/26/14, at 2.) The referee further noted that the service
    center was correct in not reactivating Claimant’s initial application of February 3,
    2013, and in treating his request for reactivation as a new claim because the 52-week
    claim period for the February 3, 2013, application had expired. (Id.)
    The referee affirmed the service center and found Claimant financially
    ineligible for UC benefits under section 401(a) of the Law, 43 P.S. §801(a), and for
    an alternate base year under section 204(b) of the Act, 77 P.S. §71(b). Claimant
    appealed to the UCBR, which, on November 25, 2014, adopted and incorporated the
    referee’s findings and conclusions and affirmed. The UCBR also determined that the
    (continued…)
    because Claimant signed a compromise and release agreement he is ineligible for unemployment
    compensation benefits”); see also Dotterer v. School District of the City of Allentown, 
    92 A.3d 875
    ,
    884 & n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (stating that an unpublished opinion may be cited for its persuasive
    value). However, in this case it is irrelevant because Employer terminated Claimant before the
    Agreement was executed.
    4
    record was sufficient to render a decision and denied Claimant’s request to
    supplement the record. Claimant now petitions this court for review.6
    Claimant contends that the UCBR erred in determining Claimant was
    financially ineligible for UC benefits under section 401(a) of the Law, 43 P.S.
    §801(a), because he was eligible for an alternate base year under section 204(b) of the
    Act, 77 P.S. §71(b).7 Claimant states that he filed for UC benefits when he became
    able and available for work and, thus, his initial application for benefits should have
    been reactivated.8 We disagree.
    Pursuant to section 4(b) of the Law, a ‘benefit year’ is comprised of 52
    consecutive weeks, beginning on the date the application for UC benefits is filed. 43
    6
    Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
    whether an error of law was committed, or whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by
    substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §704.
    7
    We note that Claimant raises additional contentions that he fails to develop in his brief.
    Claimant fails to develop the contentions that he was unable to confront witnesses at the referee’s
    hearing, and that the referee’s decision was biased “maybe because of [Claimant’s] ethnicity or due
    to his previous employment with . . . the Commonwealth[’s] . . . workers’ compensation third-party
    administrator.” (Cl.’s Br. at 11.) These assertions, without a developed argument, are waived.
    Commonwealth v. Spontarelli, 
    791 A.2d 1254
    , 1259 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (“Mere issue spotting
    without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review of this
    matter”); Rapid Pallet v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    707 A.2d 636
    , 638 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1998) (“Arguments not properly developed in a brief will be deemed waived by this
    [c]ourt”). However, a review of the record reveals that Claimant was provided the opportunity to
    present testimony and evidence pertaining to his July 2014 application for benefits, that Claimant
    was the only witness at the hearing, and that the referee’s decision was not biased. Thus, Claimant
    received a full and fair hearing before the referee. See 34 Pa. Code §101.21(a).
    8
    We note that it is not necessary to reactivate the February 3, 2013, application in order for
    section 204(b) of the Act, 77 P.S. §71(b), to apply.
    5
    P.S. §753(b). Here, Claimant’s initial claim, filed on February 3, 2013, expired after
    52 weeks and, thus, was no longer valid when Claimant asked that his initial
    application be reactivated. See 
    id. Claimant was,
    however, permitted to file a new
    claim at the expiration of his previous benefit year. Id.; see Daman v. Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, 
    840 A.2d 457
    , 458 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (stating that
    when a benefit year ends, a claimant is required to file another application for
    benefits because it is a new benefit year).       The service center properly treated
    Claimant’s request to reactivate his initial application as a new claim.
    In order to qualify for UC benefits under section 401(a) of the Law, 43
    P.S. §801(a), an employee must, within his base year, be paid wages for employment,
    as required by section 404(c) of the Law, 43 P.S. §804(c). Claimant failed to meet
    his base-year requirement for his initial filing on February 3, 2013, as well as for his
    July 6, 2014, filing. Thus, Claimant’s only argument is whether an alternate base
    year should be applied pursuant to section 204(b) of the Act, 77 P.S. §71(b).
    Section 204(b) of the Act, 77 P.S. §71(b), provides that an employee
    who fails to meet the monetary and credit-week requirements under section 401(a) of
    the Law, 43 P.S. §801(a), due to a work-related injury that is compensable under the
    Act, may elect to have his base year consist of the four complete calendar quarters
    immediately preceding the date of the work-related injury.
    Here, the referee determined that Claimant had a work-related injury.
    However, Claimant settled his workers’ compensation claim without establishing that
    he suffered an injury that is compensable under the Act. In the Agreement, Employer
    6
    specifically denies liability for the injury.9 Thus, Claimant did not establish a work-
    related injury that is compensable under the Act. Although Claimant wanted to
    submit evidence regarding his work-related injury, the UCBR does not have the
    “authority to adjudicate the merits of a workers’ compensation claim.” Bosch v.
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    55 A.3d 758
    , 761 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2012).     Therefore, the UCBR correctly determined that Claimant failed to prove that
    his work-related injury is compensable under the Act10 and failed to prove his
    eligibility for UC benefits under section 401(a) of the Law, 43 P.S. §801(a), and
    section 204(b) of the Act, 77 P.S. §71(b).
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    ___________________________________
    ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    9
    The Agreement states in pertinent part: “By entering into this Agreement,
    Employer/Carrier in no way admits liability. To the contrary, Employer/Carrier has, at all times in
    the past, denied it is liable for this alleged injury and it will continue to deny all such allegations
    into the future.” (Agmt., 12/18/12, at 3.)
    10
    We may affirm the UCBR’s decision on any ground. Finfinger v. Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, 
    854 A.2d 636
    , 639 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
    7
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Mark A. Williams,                       :
    : No. 2381 C.D. 2014
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                  :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation               :
    Board of Review,                        :
    :
    Respondent     :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 25th         day of August, 2015, we hereby affirm the
    November 25, 2014, order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.
    ___________________________________
    ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge