City of Pittsburgh v. WCAB (Marinack) ( 2017 )


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  •               IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    City of Pittsburgh,                             :
    Petitioner             :
    :
    v.                             :   No. 2048 C.D. 2016
    :   Submitted: April 28, 2017
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal                    :
    Board (Marinack),                               :
    Respondent                    :
    BEFORE:          HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT                                         FILED: August 21, 2017
    The City of Pittsburgh (Employer) petitions for review of an
    adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) denying
    Employer’s petition to suspend the compensation benefits of Kenneth Marinack
    (Claimant).        In so doing, the Board affirmed the decision of the Workers’
    Compensation Judge (WCJ) that Employer did not prove Claimant had voluntarily
    removed himself from the workforce. Employer argues that the evidence proves
    otherwise and, thus, the Board erred in affirming the WCJ. Discerning no merit to
    this contention, we affirm the Board.
    This case has a protracted history. Claimant worked as a firefighter
    for Employer. On May 21, 2004, he was injured when he fell in a stairwell while
    pulling down a ceiling in a burning building.1 Employer issued a Notice of
    Compensation Payable (NCP) describing the accepted injury as a left shoulder
    1
    Claimant was 42 years old at the time of the injury.
    rotator cuff tear; aggravation of lumbar disc disease; and a psychological
    adjustment disorder with anxiety and depression. Pursuant to the NCP, Claimant
    collected compensation benefits in the amount of $690 per week.
    On September 16, 2008, Dennis J. Phillips, II, M.D., one of
    Claimant’s treating physicians, informed Employer that Claimant could return to
    full-time work in a light-duty position. On September 18, 2008, Employer sent
    Claimant a Notice of Ability to Return to Work pursuant to Section 306(b) of the
    Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).2 On September 24, 2008, Employer filed a
    petition to suspend Claimant’s compensation benefits as of September 16, 2008,
    because Claimant had “retired and voluntarily removed himself from the entire
    labor market and/or work force.” Reproduced Record at 2 (R.R. __). A hearing on
    the suspension petition was conducted before WCJ Nathan Cohen.3
    2
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, added by the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, 77
    P.S. §512(3). Section 306(b)(3) of the Act states as follows:
    If the insurer receives medical evidence that the claimant is able to return to work
    in any capacity, then the insurer must provide prompt written notice, on a form
    prescribed by the department, to the claimant, which states all of the following:
    (i) The nature of the employe’s physical condition or change of
    condition.
    (ii) That the employe has an obligation to look for available
    employment.
    (iii) That proof of available employment opportunities may
    jeopardize the employe’s right to receipt of ongoing benefits.
    (iv) That the employe has the right to consult with an attorney in
    order to obtain evidence to challenge the insurer’s contentions.
    77 P.S. §512(3).
    3
    Employer also filed a termination petition regarding Claimant’s psychological injury, which
    was granted by the WCJ. Claimant filed a penalty petition, which was denied by the WCJ. The
    termination and penalty petitions were not appealed to this Court.
    In 2010, Employer filed a second suspension petition, asserting that Claimant’s failure to
    report earnings from self-employment warranted a suspension of benefits. This Court agreed,
    (Footnote continued on the next page . . .)
    2
    Employer submitted the deposition of Dr. Phillips, a board certified
    orthopedic surgeon who has treated Claimant for his left shoulder injury since
    October 2004. Dr. Phillips opined that Claimant’s left shoulder injury rendered
    him incapable of doing the heavy work of a firefighter. However, in April 2005,
    Dr. Phillips sent Employer a report stating that Claimant could do sedentary work.
    On September 16, 2008, Dr. Phillips released Claimant to do light-duty work, with
    a lifting limit of no more than twenty pounds.              When Claimant experienced
    increasing left shoulder pain, Dr. Phillips limited Claimant to sedentary work as of
    October 28, 2008. On March 25, 2009, Dr. Phillips did surgery on Claimant’s left
    shoulder, which left him temporarily totally disabled. The postoperative diagnosis
    was mild arthritis in the shoulder joint. As of May 1, 2009, when he was deposed,
    Dr. Phillips had not yet released Claimant to do any type of work.
    Employer also presented the deposition testimony of Barbara E.
    Swan, M.D., who is board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation, and has
    treated Claimant’s work-related back injury since July 28, 2005. In September
    2005, Dr. Swan informed Claimant that he would not be able to return to work as a
    firefighter. On October 14, 2008, following a physical examination, Dr. Swan
    released Claimant to do medium-duty work, notwithstanding his back injury.4 Dr.
    Swan testified that Claimant has never asked her to identify his job restrictions, but
    in 2006 they did have a conversation about the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation
    (continued . . .)
    and granted a suspension as of June 2009. Marinack v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (City of Pittsburgh), (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 871 C.D. 2015, filed February 19, 2016). However, that
    decision did not affect the instant suspension petition.
    4
    Employer sent Claimant a second Notice of Ability to Return to Work upon receipt of Dr.
    Swan’s release.
    3
    (OVR). Claimant advised her that OVR was pessimistic about his job prospects
    given his physical limitations.
    Employer submitted Claimant’s employment record. It recounted that
    Claimant was discharged because he did not inform Employer that he was earning
    wages in construction while he was collecting disability compensation and benefits
    under what is commonly known as the Heart and Lung Act.5 Claimant’s discharge
    rendered him ineligible for a disability or retirement pension. However, Claimant
    has continued to receive workers’ compensation disability and Heart and Lung Act
    benefits since his discharge.
    Claimant testified in opposition to Employer’s petition, both by
    deposition and by live testimony. Claimant recounted that he has experienced both
    back and shoulder pain since his 2004 work injury and has never returned to work.
    Regarding Employer’s April 2005 discharge, Claimant explained that
    an elderly couple for whom he was doing construction work complained to
    Employer about the quality of his work. Employer investigated and referred the
    matter to the “Fire Trial Board,” which found that Claimant had acted unethically
    by failing to report his construction work income to Employer. R.R. 25. On that
    basis, Claimant was discharged.
    Claimant stated that prior to being fired he had applied for a pension.
    He testified that he was required to submit documentation from three medical
    doctors in order to apply and he did submit this evidence. However, shortly
    5
    Act of June 28, 1935, P.L. 477, as amended, 53 P.S. §§637-638. The Heart and Lung Act
    provides firemen injured on the job their full salary. They receive these benefits concurrent with
    their workers’ compensation disability benefits. According to Claimant, Employer attempted to
    stop paying him Heart and Lung Act benefits after he was fired, but a city arbitrator did not
    allow it.
    4
    thereafter, Employer discharged him, which caused his pension application to be
    denied.
    Claimant testified that he considers himself to be disabled, but he
    denied that he has withdrawn from the workforce. He testified that he began
    working with a vocational counselor from OVR sometime in 2006 and met with
    him three times, most recently in September 2007. Because of his significant
    physical limitations, Claimant is not sure what work, if any, he is able to do.
    Claimant acknowledged receiving Employer’s two Notices of Ability
    to Return to Work in September and October of 2008. After receiving the Notices,
    Claimant interviewed for two jobs. One position was at a financial planning
    company managed by his aunt and the other was at a commercial insulation
    company owned by a high school friend. Claimant also looked at the want ads for
    jobs. However, when Claimant was scheduled for surgery, he stopped looking for
    work.6 Claimant stated that he planned to return to OVR to seek employment
    training after his March 25, 2009, shoulder surgery, at which point he would learn
    the full extent of his capabilities.
    Crediting the testimony of Dr. Phillips and Dr. Swan, the WCJ found
    that Claimant was capable of modified-duty work “at all relevant times.”                 WCJ
    Cohen Decision, 10/27/2009, at 12; Finding of Fact No. 40.7 The WCJ also found
    that Claimant never asked his doctors about what, if any, work restrictions applied
    to him and did not seek their help with the OVR.                 The WCJ did not credit
    6
    Claimant testified on March 16, 2009.
    7
    The WCJ has complete authority over questions of credibility, conflicting medical evidence and
    evidentiary weight. Sherrod v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Thoroughgood, Inc.),
    
    666 A.2d 383
    , 385 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
    5
    Claimant’s testimony that he did not withdraw from the workforce. The WCJ
    found that contacting a family member and a childhood friend about a job did not
    constitute a good faith effort to find work. The WCJ also found that because
    Employer alleged Claimant had retired, Claimant had the burden to show that he
    had been forced out of the workforce by his injury or that he was searching for
    work in good faith. Claimant failed to meet his burden. Accordingly, the WCJ
    suspended Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits as of September 16, 2008,
    the date of Dr. Phillips’ initial work release.
    Claimant appealed, and the Board reversed. First, the Board held that
    the WCJ erred in finding that Claimant had retired. To the contrary, the evidence
    showed that Employer fired Claimant, who was then rendered ineligible for any
    type of pension. Claimant’s discharge did not show that Claimant had withdrawn
    from the workforce. In the absence of evidence that Claimant had withdrawn from
    the workforce, the Board held that it was Employer’s burden to prove that
    Claimant had earning capacity, which it could do by introducing evidence of a job
    referral or a labor market survey. Because Employer did not do so, the Board
    denied the suspension petition.
    Employer petitioned this Court for review, and we affirmed the Board
    in City of Pittsburgh v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Marinack), (Pa.
    Cmwlth., No. 100 C.D. 2011, filed February 7, 2012). Our decision was based on
    City of Pittsburgh v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Robinson), 
    4 A.3d 1130
    , 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (plurality op.) (Robinson I), affirmed, 
    67 A.3d 1194
     (Pa. 2013) (Robinson II), which at that time was pending before the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
    6
    Employer petitioned for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court.
    By that time the Supreme Court had decided Robinson II, which affirmed Robinson
    I. In doing so, Robinson II established a new “analytical paradigm” for deciding
    whether an employee on compensation has withdrawn from the workforce.
    Robinson II, 67 A.3d at 1209. The Supreme Court vacated this Court’s order of
    February 7, 2012, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Robinson II.
    On remand, this Court explained that the WCJ had not made factual
    findings on Claimant’s separation from the workforce and did not have the benefit
    of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Robinson II.        Accordingly, we ordered a
    remand so the WCJ could “reassess all relevant evidence presented in this case and
    determine whether Employer proved, through the totality of the circumstances, that
    Claimant voluntarily withdrew from the workforce.”           City of Pittsburgh v.
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Marinack), (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 100 C.D.
    2011, filed January 8, 2015), slip op. at 11.
    On remand, the case was reassigned to a new WCJ, Gerald Yanity.8
    WCJ Yanity adopted WCJ Cohen’s prior findings of fact and then made additional
    findings to address the issue presented on remand. Specifically, the WCJ found as
    follows:
    2. Claimant has made no affirmative statements, nor has he
    taken any affirmative actions, which indicate an intent to
    withdraw from the workforce voluntarily. Judge Cohen found
    that Claimant’s efforts to locate work were “questionable at
    best” and I reaffirm that finding. Although Claimant’s job
    search efforts were certainly questionable, the record of OVR
    and Claimant’s applications for employment are not consistent
    with a purported voluntary withdrawal from the workforce.
    8
    WCJ Cohen had retired.
    7
    3. Claimant’s initial separation from his job with Employer
    was not voluntary. There is no genuine dispute regarding the
    fact that Claimant’s termination from the Employer was the
    result of his violation of Fire Bureau Regulations.
    4. Following his termination from employment, Claimant made
    various perfunctory and feeble attempts to find suitable work on
    his own. Claimant’s lack of diligence in his job search does
    not, however, convert his removal from the workforce from
    involuntary to voluntary.
    WCJ Yanity Decision, 11/06/2015, at 4-5; Findings of Fact Nos. 2-4 (internal
    citations to the record omitted). Based on these findings, the WCJ concluded that
    “Employer has failed to prove, by the totality of the circumstances, that Claimant
    ha[d] voluntarily removed himself from the workforce.” WCJ Yanity Decision,
    11/06/2015, at 5; Conclusion of Law No. 4.
    Employer appealed to the Board, arguing that the WCJ’s conclusion
    was not consistent with the factual findings of WCJ Cohen, which had been
    adopted by WCJ Yanity. The Board rejected this argument. The Board concluded
    that WCJ Yanity carried out the remand order and properly applied the legal
    analysis required by Robinson II.             Board Adjudication, 11/30/2016, at 11.
    Claimant’s lack of diligence in looking for work did not, under Robinson II, prove
    that he had voluntarily left the workforce. Accordingly, it was Employer’s burden
    to prove the availability of work within Claimant’s residual capacity, either by job
    referrals or by a labor market survey, in accordance with Robinson II.
    Employer has petitioned for this Court’s review.9               Employer first
    contends that the Board misinterpreted and misapplied the holding in Robinson II,
    9
    This Court’s review of an order of the Board is to determine whether the necessary findings of
    fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether constitutional rights were violated, or
    (Footnote continued on the next page . . .)
    8
    thereby imposing an insurmountable burden of proof upon Employer. Second,
    Employer contends that because WCJ Cohen found, as fact, that Claimant had
    removed himself from the workforce, WCJ Yanity erred in finding otherwise.
    We begin with a review of Robinson II. In that case, a police officer
    was placed on light-duty work in 1997 because of a work injury. In 2001, she
    sustained new injuries in an automobile accident, while traveling to a medical
    appointment to treat her 1997 work injury. The employer accepted liability for the
    new injuries. Thereafter, the claimant did not return to her light-duty position and
    the employer did not offer any other light-duty work. In 2004, the claimant
    applied for and received a disability pension from the employer on the basis that
    she was unable to perform her pre-injury job.
    In 2007, the claimant underwent an independent medical examination
    (IME), which found her unable to return to work as a police officer but able to
    perform modified-duty work. The employer sent the claimant a Notice of Ability
    to Return to work on November 8, 2007, and three weeks later filed a petition to
    suspend compensation benefits, asserting that the claimant had voluntarily
    removed herself from the workforce.
    The WCJ denied the suspension petition because the employer had
    eliminated the claimant’s light-duty job. Further, the claimant had reported to the
    local unemployment center after receipt of the Notice of Ability to Return to Work
    and the suspension petition. At the center, she searched for available jobs she
    could perform, but did not find any. The Board affirmed the WCJ.
    (continued . . .)
    whether an error of law was committed. City of Philadelphia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal
    Board (Brown), 
    830 A.2d 649
    , 653 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
    9
    Before this Court, the employer argued that the claimant had retired.
    With one exception, the claimant made no effort to find employment after 2001.
    In a plurality opinion, we held that the employer did not meet its burden for several
    reasons: the employer terminated the claimant’s light-duty position; the claimant
    did not state in her disability pension application that she was incapable of any
    employment; the claimant did look for work at least once; and the employer did
    not submit any evidence of available positions within her restrictions. Robinson II,
    67 A.3d at 1199-1200 (summarizing this Court’s analysis in Robinson I).
    The Supreme Court affirmed Robinson I. It used the appeal to clarify
    the standard to apply when considering whether a claimant has voluntarily
    withdrawn from the workforce. Id. at 1209. The Supreme Court explained that a
    claimant’s application for a disability or retirement pension does not create a
    presumption that a claimant has removed herself from the workforce. At most, the
    acceptance of a retirement pension creates a
    permissive inference that the claimant has retired. Such an
    inference, if drawn, is not on its own sufficient evidence to
    establish that the worker has retired-the inference must be
    considered in the context of the totality of the circumstances.
    The factfinder must also evaluate all of the other relevant and
    credible evidence before concluding that the employer has
    carried its burden of proof.
    Id. The Supreme Court further explained as follows:
    If the employer produces sufficient evidence to support a
    finding that the claimant has voluntarily left the workforce, then
    the burden shifts to the claimant to show that there in fact has
    been a compensable loss of earning power. Conversely, if the
    employer fails to present sufficient evidence to show that the
    claimant has retired, then the employer must proceed as in any
    other case involving a proposed modification or suspension of
    benefits.
    10
    Id. at 1209-10.
    Applying this standard, the Supreme Court held that the claimant’s
    disability pension showed only an intention to withdraw from her pre-injury job,
    not the entire workforce.     Regarding the employer’s claim that the claimant
    received a disability pension for many years without seeking new employment or
    evidence that she was incapable of work, the Supreme Court responded as follows:
    the fact that claimant did not submit evidence showing that she
    was unable to work does not prove voluntary retirement,
    especially in light of the [e]mployer’s own medical testimony
    regarding [c]laimant’s physical limitations, and the absence of
    evidence of available work within her restrictions or expert
    testimony regarding her earning power.
    Id. at 1210 (internal footnote omitted).
    With the principles of Robinson II in mind, we turn to Employer’s
    first issue, i.e., that the Board misapplied the principles of Robinson II, thereby
    placing an insurmountable burden of proof upon Employer. Employer argues that
    Robinson II directed a “totality of the circumstances” analysis; on remand, the
    WCJ did only “piecemeal analysis” of the record. Employer Brief at 23. Claimant
    responds that WCJ Yanity properly followed the standard set forth in Robinson II,
    as the Board held. Employer simply failed to meet its burden of proof that
    Claimant had removed himself from the workforce.
    In its challenge to the WCJ’s Robinson II analysis, Employer
    challenges Findings of Fact Nos. 2 through 4 in the WCJ ’s decision. We consider
    those challenges seriatim.
    In Finding of Fact No. 2, the WCJ recited that Claimant made no
    affirmative statement or actions indicating his intent to retire.        Employer
    11
    characterizes this statement as self-serving. That characterization does not make
    the finding of fact erroneous.
    In Finding of Fact No. 3, the WCJ recited that Claimant’s separation
    was involuntary.    Employer complains that Claimant’s separation was due to
    misconduct and Claimant would have been receiving a pension had it not been for
    his misconduct.     Finding of Fact No. 3 correctly characterizes Claimant’s
    separation from work as involuntary, an apt description of a discharge. It does not
    mention Claimant’s attempt to obtain a pension, but that does not constitute error.
    In any event, “seek[ing] or accept[ing] a pension” is not sufficient evidence of
    intent to retire. Robinson II, 67 A.3d at 1209.
    In Finding of Fact No. 4, the WCJ found that Claimant’s lack of
    diligence in seeking work did not constitute a voluntary removal from the
    workforce.    Employer argues that Claimant’s attempts to find work were
    discredited by WCJ Cohen and, thus, Finding of Fact No. 4 is in error. We
    disagree.
    WCJ Yanity adopted WCJ Cohen’s findings of fact, but these findings
    were silent on the issue of Claimant’s retirement. Nevertheless, WCJ Yanity
    expressly accepted WCJ Cohen’s determination that Claimant’s efforts to locate
    work were “questionable at best.” WCJ Yanity Decision, 11/6/2015, at 2; Finding
    of Fact No. 2. In fact, WCJ Yanity described Claimant’s attempts as “perfunctory”
    and “feeble.” WCJ Yanity Decision, 11/6/2015, at 3; Finding of Fact No. 4.
    However, WCJ Yanity concluded it could not be inferred from Claimant’s feeble
    job search that he had removed himself from the workforce.
    Claimant’s “feeble” attempts to find employment were more
    substantial than those of the claimant in Robinson II, who had not sought
    12
    employment in the six years before receiving the Notice of Ability to Return to
    Work and then responded with a single job application. Nevertheless, this lack of
    effort to seek employment was held not to prove voluntary retirement, particularly
    in “the absence of evidence of available work within her restrictions or expert
    testimony regarding her earning power.” Robinson II, 67 A.3d at 1210. Likewise,
    here, Employer did not present evidence on the availability of work within
    Claimant’s restrictions or his earning power.
    Claimant was fired for misconduct and, thus, rendered ineligible for a
    pension. Employer does not explain whether Claimant sought a disability pension
    or a retirement pension. The fact that Claimant was in his mid-40s when he
    applied for the pension, and presented medical documentation to qualify, suggests
    that he sought a disability pension. However, it does not matter. Under Robinson
    II, seeking or accepting any type of pension, “much less a disability pension,” does
    not raise a presumption that one has left the workforce. Id. at 1209. The Supreme
    Court explained that a disability pension shows “at most” that a claimant cannot
    perform the “time-of-injury position.”     Id. at 1205.   It does not show that a
    claimant “decided to forgo all employment. Any presumption of a total inability to
    work or intent not to work is conjectural.” Id.
    Simply, Employer did not present the evidence required, such as job
    availability to Claimant, to allow the inference that Claimant has withdrawn from
    the workforce.    The WCJ and Board did not err in their understanding and
    application of Robinson II.
    In its second issue, Employer argues that WCJ Yanity’s decision
    cannot be reconciled with WCJ Cohen’s decision that Claimant voluntarily
    13
    removed himself from the workforce.           WCJ Yanity did not, according to
    Employer, follow the remand instructions.
    The decision of WCJ Cohen placed the burden on Claimant to prove
    that he could not work at any job because of his work injury or that he was actively
    looking for work. WCJ Cohen so held because he reasoned that Employer should
    not be burdened with having to demonstrate Claimant’s intentions, an evidentiary
    matter within the control of Claimant. However, the Board held that WCJ Cohen
    erred because it was Employer’s burden to prove Claimant had retired. Thus, the
    Board reversed WCJ Cohen. This Court agreed with the Board, but in light of
    Robinson II, we remanded the case to the WCJ because of the lack of a factual
    finding that Claimant had voluntarily separated from the workforce.
    On remand, a WCJ must “confine his decision to the instructions
    within the remand order.”        Teter v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Pinnacle Health System), 
    886 A.2d 721
    , 723 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). “[A] WCJ is
    not required to produce the same result as the initial decision….” 
    Id.
    WCJ Yanity complied with the remand instructions. His new findings
    related solely to the question of Claimant’s separation from the workforce pursuant
    to Robinson II; the initial burden of proof was placed squarely on Employer.
    Further, under Robinson II, the fact that Claimant applied for a disability pension
    was not sufficient to meet Employer’s burden. The only other evidence of record
    of retirement was Claimant’s “perfunctory” and “feeble” attempts to find a job.
    WCJ Yanity Decision, 11/6/2015, at 3; Finding of Fact No. 4. Both WCJ Yanity
    and the Board agreed that Claimant’s lack of diligence did not prove a voluntary
    separation from the workforce.
    14
    We find no error in the Board’s affirmance of WCJ Yanity’s decision.
    As noted above, Claimant’s attempts to find employment were more substantial
    than that of the claimant in Robinson II. Further, Employer’s evidence was that
    Claimant was released to light-duty work in September 2008, but again limited to
    sedentary work in October 2008, due to increased shoulder pain. From October
    2008 to March 2009, Claimant was awaiting medical clearance for shoulder
    surgery. On March 25, 2009, he underwent surgery and was held temporarily
    totally disabled. Thus, Claimant spent the majority of the time following his
    receipt of the September 18, 2008, Notice of Ability to Return to Work awaiting
    surgery. Under these circumstances it would be difficult to conclude Claimant’s
    minimal job efforts during that period were due to a decision to separate from the
    workforce, as opposed to the limits imposed on him by his work injury.
    For these reasons, we affirm the Board’s adjudication.
    _____________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    15
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    City of Pittsburgh,                  :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                      :   No. 2048 C.D. 2016
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal         :
    Board (Marinack),                    :
    Respondent         :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 21st day of August, 2017, the order of the Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board dated November 30, 2016, in the above-captioned
    matter is AFFIRMED.
    ______________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: City of Pittsburgh v. WCAB (Marinack) - 2048 C.D. 2016

Judges: Leavitt, President Judge

Filed Date: 8/21/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/21/2017