A. Tapper v. WCAB (UPMC/Passavant) ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Amanda Tapper,                     :
    : No. 135 C.D. 2014
    Petitioner   : Submitted: June 13, 2014
    :
    v.                 :
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board :
    (UPMC/Passavant),                  :
    :
    Respondent :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN                                FILED: August 5, 2014
    Amanda Tapper (Claimant) petitions for review of the December 30,
    2013, order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), which affirmed,
    as modified, the decisions of a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) denying and
    dismissing Claimant’s multiple claim petitions and reinstatement petition and
    granting the termination petitions filed by UPMC/Passavant (Employer). The WCAB
    modified the WCJ’s decisions to reflect Claimant’s full recovery from her work
    injury “as of” September 16, 2010.1 We affirm.
    1
    The WCJ’s decisions referenced Claimant’s full recovery from her work injury “on or
    before” September 16, 2010. (WCJ’s Conclusions of Law, No. 3.)
    On June 25, 2007, in the course and scope of her employment with
    Employer, Claimant, a certified nursing assistant, injured her back while bending
    down to lift a patient’s legs. Claimant missed four or five days of work with back
    pain and then returned to work at a light-duty position for several weeks before
    returning to full-duty. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact, No. 1.a.)
    On February 26, 2008, Claimant slipped and fell outside of Employer’s
    emergency room on snow and ice, landing on her buttocks. Claimant worked a light-
    duty position for six weeks and, thereafter, returned to full-duty. (Id., No. 1.b.)
    On October 27, 2008, Claimant experienced low back pain while
    assisting a co-worker in pulling a combative patient upward on a recliner. Claimant
    treated at Occupational Health and missed five days of work. Thereafter, Claimant
    treated with James L. Cosgrove, M.D. Claimant returned to a light-duty position for
    six months and, thereafter, was released to full-duty. (Id., No. 1.c.)
    Claimant alleged that on July 6, 2009, while in the course and scope of
    her employment with Employer, she experienced back pain when she bent over to
    pick something up.      Claimant reported the injury to Employer.         (Id., No. 1.d.)
    Claimant was placed on light-duty until November when Employer received a copy
    of Dr. Cosgrove’s office notes from Claimant’s October 22, 2009, examination,
    which stated that Claimant’s lumbar radiculopathy had resolved and Claimant had
    completed her physical therapy program.         (Id.; Employer Letter, 11/3/09, at 1.)
    Employer notified Claimant by letter dated November 3, 2009, that due to Dr.
    2
    Cosgrove’s notes, Employer would not support Claimant’s continued work
    accommodation and that Claimant’s
    Return to Work Assistance Program will be suspended as of
    11/03/09. You will remain off of work until WorkPartners
    receive[s] medical [documentation] that supports your
    requested accommodation or until you provide a note
    releasing you to full duty Nursing Assistant work . . . .
    Should you disagree with this decision you may provide
    WorkPartners with any additional medical documentation
    that you feel supports your need for an accommodation at
    this time.
    (Employer Letter, 11/3/09, at 1.)
    Employer sent Claimant a second letter on December 2, 2009,
    acknowledging that Claimant requested leave from November 3, 2009, to January 15,
    2010. (Employer Letter, 12/02/09, at 1.) Employer notified Claimant that “[p]ending
    receipt of the attached documents . . . your eligibility has been reviewed and you are
    eligible for leave under . . . [the] Family and Medical Leave Act [FLMA] – 11 weeks
    starting availability.” (Id.) Employer’s letter further stated:
    [i]n order for us to determine whether your absence
    qualified under the policies listed above, you must return a
    completed medical certification of you[r] serious health
    condition and other enclosed forms. You must furnish this
    documentation within 15 days (by 12/17/2009).              A
    Certification form that sets forth the information necessary
    to support your leave request is enclosed. Your health care
    provider must complete and sign the Certification of Health
    Care Provider for Employee’s Own Health Condition form.
    Please return the completed, signed documents to me. . . .
    Failure to return a completed Certification form
    which supports your request for leave may delay the
    commencement of your leave or cause UPMC to take other
    3
    appropriate action, up to and including termination of your
    employment if unapproved leave time is taken.
    (Id. at 1-2.)
    On December 29, 2009, Employer sent Claimant a third letter notifying
    Claimant that Employer had not yet received Claimant’s documents.             Employer
    informed Claimant that “[f]ailure to return this requested paperwork by 01/13/2010
    and/or failure to return to work by this date could result in corrective action being
    issued upon your return to work. This action would follow the UPMC correction
    action policy up to and including termination.” (Employer Letter, 12/29/09, at 1.)
    On January 20, 2010, Employer sent Claimant a fourth letter notifying
    Claimant that her leave was not approved because “no documentation was returned to
    certify the leave.”      (Employer Letter, 1/20/10, at 1.)    Employer set forth that
    Claimant’s “unauthorized time away from work may be counted toward your
    department’s time and attendance policy. This may result in disciplinary action up to
    and including termination.” (Id. at 1.)
    On January 27, 2010, Employer sent Claimant a fifth letter informing
    Claimant that she failed to qualify for any leave time and that “your active status will
    be converted to resignation [for] failure to return from a leave.” (Employer Letter,
    1/27/10, at 1.)
    Employer terminated Claimant on January 15, 2010. (WCJ’s Findings
    of Fact, No. 1.d.) After her termination, Claimant filed four claim petitions seeking
    total disability benefits from January 15, 2010, and continuing.         (Id., No. 1.f.)
    4
    Claimant alleged a low back injury on June 25, 2007; a lumbar sprain on February
    26, 2008; a lumbar strain on October 27, 2008; and a low back injury on July 6, 2009.
    Employer accepted the February 26, 2008, and October 27, 2008, injuries as “medical
    only” claims. Claimant also filed a reinstatement petition for the October 27, 2008,
    injury, claiming a recurrence of that injury on July 6, 2009.                  Employer filed
    termination petitions with respect to each alleged injury date. (WCJ’s Decisions,
    8/18/11, at 1.)2
    At the hearings before the WCJ, Claimant testified that, in 2004,
    Employer counseled Claimant for excessive absenteeism and put her on “step one
    counseling.” This counseling continued into 2005 because of additional call-offs. In
    2007, both before and after Claimant’s work injuries, Employer again counseled
    Claimant for absenteeism and tardiness and issued written warnings.                   In 2008,
    Claimant treated with her primary care physician for back pain after lifting furniture
    at home. In August 2009, Employer put Claimant on “final notice” and informed
    Claimant that failure to provide a medical excuse in a timely fashion for future
    absences would result in dismissal. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 1.e., 1.f.)
    Claimant presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Cosgrove, who is
    board-certified in physical medicine, rehabilitation, and electrodiagnosis.                  Dr.
    Cosgrove first saw Claimant on February 16, 2009, after the October 27, 2008,
    incident. He reviewed a magnetic resonance imaging scan (MRI) dated March 13,
    2
    The WCJ filed four identical decisions on August 18, 2011, under separate claim numbers:
    3542397, 3425650, 3323686, and 3654180. The WCJ consolidated the separate claim,
    reinstatement, and termination petitions.
    5
    2008, which revealed mild disc bulging at L4-5. Dr. Cosgrove felt there was a
    “possible” lumbar radiculopathy and kept Claimant on light-duty restrictions. Two
    weeks later, Dr. Cosgrove released Claimant to full duty. (Id., No. 4.)
    Dr. Cosgrove next saw Claimant on July 15, 2009, after a recurrence of
    back pain upon bending at work. Dr. Cosgrove concluded that the herniated disc
    recurred. Dr. Cosgrove treated Claimant with epidural steroids and released her to
    light-duty work. A repeat MRI on April 29, 2010, showed additional protrusion at
    L4-5.   Dr. Cosgrove opined that the October 27, 2008, incident caused a disc
    protrusion at L4-5. (Id.)
    On cross-examination, Dr. Cosgrove admitted that he was not provided
    Claimant’s history of low back injuries before October 27, 2008. Dr. Cosgrove
    agreed that Claimant’s prior physician diagnosed Claimant with degenerative disc
    disease and no disc herniation. Dr. Cosgrove acknowledged that Claimant is obese,
    which puts pressure on her low back. He further acknowledged that obesity is a risk
    factor for degenerative disc disease, which he agreed is partially responsible for
    Claimant’s low back problems and is a significant contributing factor to her light-
    duty limitations.   (Id.)   Dr. Cosgrove also admitted that on October 22, 2009,
    Claimant’s condition had resolved and that he was ready to release Claimant to
    regular-duty. (Cosgrove Dep., 6/28/10, at 25.)
    Employer presented the testimony of Kathleen Smith, Employer’s
    emergency department unit director and Claimant’s supervisor. Smith stated that she
    suspended Claimant in August 2009 and provided her a “final notice” based upon
    6
    violations of Employer’s absenteeism policies. Smith testified that Claimant was
    later terminated for failing to report to work when her leave and light-duty position
    ended. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact, No. 2.)
    Employer also presented the testimony of Maureen Little, the human
    resources director. Little stated that Claimant was dismissed through the progressive
    discipline policy. Little further stated that after Dr. Cosgrove provided a note in
    November 2009, stating that Claimant’s lumbar radiculopathy had resolved and she
    could return to full-duty, Claimant applied for FMLA, which was denied. Little
    stated that Claimant did not return to work after the FMLA was denied. (Id., No. 3.)
    Employer presented the deposition testimony of Brian M. Ernstoff,
    M.D., who is board-certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation. Dr. Ernstoff
    conducted an independent medical examination (IME) on Claimant on September 16,
    2010, took an oral history, and reviewed her medical records. Dr. Ernstoff weighed
    Claimant in at over 350 pounds and, based upon her medical records, determined that
    Claimant gained close to 50 pounds since her August 2, 2010, examination by Dr.
    Bookwalter. Dr. Ernstoff found no limiting factors or findings apart from Claimant’s
    obesity. Dr. Ernstoff opined that Claimant had completely recovered from any injury
    she may have suffered to her low back as of September 16, 2010. Dr. Ernstoff
    attributed Claimant’s degenerative disc disease to her weight and smoking. (Id., No.
    5.)
    The WCJ found Claimant’s testimony credible except where it conflicted
    with the credible medical and lay testimony. The WCJ credited the testimony of
    7
    Smith and Little3 and determined that Claimant was dismissed for failing to return to
    her full-duty position with Employer. The WCJ found the testimony of Dr. Cosgrove
    less than convincing because he was unaware of Claimant’s 2007 back problems and
    her 2008 injury that occurred after a lifting incident at home. Further, Dr. Cosgrove
    failed to adequately explain whether the work injury or Claimant’s obesity caused her
    light-duty restrictions. The WCJ credited Dr. Ernstoff’s testimony because it was
    consistent with the objective medical evidence, Claimant’s history, and common
    sense. (Id., Nos. 3-5.)
    The WCJ concluded that Claimant failed to meet her burden of proof in
    the claim and reinstatement petitions and that Employer met its burden of proving
    that Claimant had completely recovered from her work injuries “on or before”
    September 16, 2010. (WCJ’s Conclusions of Law, No. 1.) The WCJ denied and
    dismissed Claimant’s claim and reinstatement petitions and granted Employer’s
    termination petitions effective September 16, 2010.               Claimant appealed to the
    WCAB.
    The WCAB found that the WCJ properly denied and dismissed
    Claimant’s claim and reinstatement petitions. The WCAB further determined that
    Claimant was not entitled to disability benefits from the date of her termination on
    January 15, 2010, to the date she allegedly recovered, September 16, 2010, because
    Claimant was unable to establish that her restrictions at the time of her termination
    3
    Little testified that Claimant took FMLA as of November 3, 2009; however, the leave was
    not ultimately approved. Little stated that Claimant failed to report to work or produce medical
    documentation that she could not work. Smith terminated Claimant on January 15, 2010, for
    “failure to return from leave.” (N.T., 7/15/10, at 13, 22-24.)
    8
    were causally related to her work injury. Finally, to the extent that the WCJ’s
    conclusion that Claimant recovered from her work injury “on or before” September
    16, 2010, could be interpreted as a finding that Claimant was fully recovered before
    the date of Dr. Ernstoff’s examination, the WCAB modified the WCJ’s decision to
    reflect that Claimant fully recovered “as of” September 16, 2010. Claimant now
    petitions this court for review.4
    Initially, Claimant contends that the WCAB erred in finding that the
    WCJ’s decisions denying Claimant’s claim and reinstatement petitions and granting
    Employer’s termination petitions are supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
    It is well settled that in a claim petition, a claimant bears the burden of
    proving all elements necessary for an award.                   Inglis House v. Workmen’s
    Compensation Appeal Board (Reedy), 
    634 A.2d 592
    , 595 (Pa. 1993). Specifically, a
    claimant must establish that she sustained an injury during the course and scope of
    her employment and that the injury was causally related to her employment.
    Delaware County v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Baxter-Coles), 
    808 A.2d 965
    , 967-68 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). A claimant must also prove that the injury resulted
    in a disability that caused a wage loss. 
    Id. at 968
    . Similarly, in a reinstatement
    petition, a claimant bears the burden of proving that her disability increased or
    recurred and that her physical condition actually changed in some way, along with the
    duration of her disability. Mader v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (USAir,
    4
    Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
    whether the adjudication is in accordance with the law, and whether necessary factual findings are
    supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §704.
    9
    Inc.), 
    669 A.2d 511
    , 513 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). Conversely, in a termination petition,
    the employer bears the burden of proving that all disability related to a work injury
    has ceased or that ongoing disability results from a non-work-related source.
    Campbell v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Antietam Valley Animal
    Hospital), 
    705 A.2d 503
    , 506-07 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
    Our review in this matter is not a re-weighing of all of the evidence, but
    a review of whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial
    evidence.   Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §704.
    “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
    adequate to support a conclusion.      It is irrelevant whether the record contains
    evidence to support findings other than those made by the WCJ; the critical inquiry is
    whether there is evidence to support the findings actually made.” Delaware County,
    
    808 A.2d at 969
     (internal citations omitted). “If supported by substantial evidence, a
    WCJ’s findings are conclusive on appeal, despite the existence of contrary evidence.”
    Watson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Special People in Northeast), 
    949 A.2d 949
    , 953 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).           When reviewing witnesses’ testimony,
    determinations as to weight and credibility are solely for the WCJ as fact-finder.
    Cittrich v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Laurel Living Center), 
    688 A.2d 1258
    , 1259 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). A WCJ may accept or reject the testimony of any
    witness in whole or in part. Lombardo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Topps Company, Inc.), 
    698 A.2d 1378
    , 1381 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).
    Here, Claimant sought full disability benefits from her termination date
    of January 15, 2010. Thus, Claimant was required to establish that her restrictions at
    10
    the time of her termination were causally related to her work injuries. The WCJ
    relied upon Dr. Ernstoff’s credible testimony that, based upon Claimant’s medical
    records from Dr. Cosgrove, Claimant’s lumbar radiculopathy had resolved and,
    therefore, no objective findings supported a continued need for modified duty work
    as of November 2009.5 (Ernstoff Dep., 2/24/11, at 13; Employer Letter, 11/3/09, at
    1.)
    Dr. Ernstoff credibly testified that the progression of Claimant’s
    degenerative disc disease in the MRI scan reports from March 13, 2008, through
    April 29, 2010, was related to Claimant’s obesity, smoking, and lack of exercise, not
    to any work-related event or activity.6 (See Ernstoff Dep., 2/24/11, at 34-35; Ernstoff
    IME, 10/5/10, at 10.) Dr. Ernstoff further opined that Claimant had fully recovered
    from any alleged work-related injury as of September 16, 2010, the date he examined
    Claimant, and that Claimant could return to full, unrestricted activities. (Ernstoff
    Dep., 2/24/11, at 36.)
    Dr. Ernstoff’s credible testimony supports the WCJ’s finding that
    Claimant’s degenerative disc disease is the result of her obesity and smoking, not her
    alleged work injuries. Thus, the WCJ did not err in determining that Claimant failed
    5
    On cross-examination, Dr. Cosgrove admitted that on October 22, 2009, Claimant’s
    condition had resolved and that he was ready to release Claimant to regular-duty. (Cosgrove Dep.,
    6/28/10, at 25.)
    6
    We note that the cause of Claimant’s work injuries was never at issue prior to the filing of
    her claim petitions. Employer accepted the February 26, 2008 and October 27, 2008, claims as
    medical only. Therefore, Claimant needed to prove that the work injuries caused her current back
    problems, not her prior non-work-related injury or her degenerative disc disease.
    11
    to prove a compensable work injury or a recurrence of a prior work injury in January
    2010.7 Further, based on the credited evidence of record, the WCJ did not err in
    granting Employer’s termination petitions.8
    Next, Claimant contends that the WCAB went beyond the scope of its
    review in changing the specific language of the WCJ’s decision to “interpret” what it
    thought the WCJ meant to hold with respect to the termination of Claimant’s benefits
    “on or before” the date of Employer’s IME of September 16, 2010. We disagree.
    The WCAB is authorized to correct or modify a WCJ’s decision to
    conform to the factual and legal findings contained in that decision. See Bentley v.
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pittsburgh Board of Education), 
    987 A.2d 1223
    , 1230 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (stating that the WCAB can make a technical
    correction to a WCJ’s decision to make it conform to the evidence); Morella v.
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Mayfield Foundry, Inc.), 
    935 A.2d 598
    , 602
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (holding that “it was within the [WCAB’s] province to make the
    WCJ’s findings conform to the award”).
    Here, Claimant contested the language used by the WCJ, and the WCAB
    clarified the language to Claimant’s benefit by changing “on or before” to “as of.” It
    7
    We do not consider the non-credited testimony of Dr. Cosgrove and Claimant, as it is the
    WCJ’s duty to weigh the evidence and determine its credibility, not this court’s. See Cittrich, 
    688 A.2d at 1259
    ; Lombardo, 
    698 A.2d at 1381
    .
    8
    The credited testimony of Dr. Ernstoff reveals that Claimant had fully recovered from any
    alleged work injury as of Dr. Ernstoff’s IME of Claimant on September 16, 2010. (Ernstoff’s Dep.,
    2/24/11, at 27.)
    12
    is irrelevant whether Claimant recovered three months or three days prior to the IME
    of September 16, 2010. Even with this finding, if Claimant were receiving benefits,
    they would terminate on September 16, 2010, not before. The WCAB did not exceed
    the scope of its review in clarifying the WCJ’s language.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    ___________________________________
    ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    13
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Amanda Tapper,                     :
    : No. 135 C.D. 2014
    Petitioner   :
    :
    v.                 :
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board :
    (UPMC/Passavant),                  :
    :
    Respondent :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 5th day of August, 2014, we hereby affirm the
    December 30, 2013, order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board.
    ___________________________________
    ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge