L.J. Cleary v. UCBR ( 2017 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Lisa J. Cleary,                               :
    Petitioner       :
    :
    v.                            :   No. 795 C.D. 2016
    :   Submitted: November 18, 2016
    Unemployment Compensation                     :
    Board of Review,                              :
    Respondent                :
    BEFORE:         HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge
    HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE SIMPSON                              FILED: May 17, 2017
    Lisa J. Cleary (Claimant) petitions for review of the order of the
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that reversed the decision
    of a referee and denied her unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. The
    Board found Claimant ineligible for UC benefits pursuant to 402(b) of the
    Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 (voluntary quit) because she did not
    demonstrate through competent evidence a firm offer of employment at the time
    she voluntarily quit her job with Bloomsburg Carpet Industries, Inc. (Employer).
    Claimant contends the Board erred in reaching this determination. Upon review,
    we affirm.
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S.
    §802(b).
    I. Background
    A. Current Proceedings
    Claimant worked for Employer as a general laborer from May 2005
    until December 24, 2015. From December 25, 2015 through January 4, 2016,
    Employer was closed. On January 4, 2016, Claimant telephoned Employer and
    quit, effective immediately. She did not provide Employer with a reason for
    quitting.
    On January 7, 2016, Claimant applied for benefits.          Based on
    information from Claimant explaining her reason for leaving work and
    documented in the Internet Initial Claim, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 19a-23a,
    the local service center granted benefits. Employer appealed, and a referee held a
    hearing.
    Claimant did not appear at the referee’s hearing.         Tracy Hess,
    Employer’s Human Relations Manager (HR Manager), appeared and testified on
    behalf of Employer. At the beginning of the hearing, the referee identified the file
    documents, including the Internet Initial Claim (Ex. 8), the Claim Record (Ex. 10),
    and the Certification of Documents (Ex. 1). All the file documents were received
    without objection. Referee’s Telephone Hr’g, Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 2/19/16,
    at 3; R.R. at 58a.
    When asked at the hearing why Claimant left her job with Employer,
    HR Manager stated: “She just called and said that she would not be in on January
    4th, that morning, that she was resigning. We had heard rumors that she had
    another job but we were not positive of that.” Id. at 4.
    2
    The referee determined Claimant was not ineligible for UC benefits
    under Section 402(b) of the Law beginning with the waiting week ending January
    9, 2016. The referee found that Claimant’s last day of work for Employer was
    December 24, 2015. From December 25, 2015 to January 4, 2016, Employer was
    closed. Employer did not have work available for Claimant between those dates.
    On January 4, 2016, Claimant called Employer and quit. Claimant did not give
    Employer a reason for quitting. Referencing the Claim Record (Ex. 10), the
    referee found that Claimant quit in order to accept other full-time employment and
    had a bona fide offer of other employment. Referee’s Dec., 2/19/16, Findings of
    Fact (F.F.) Nos. 2-8. Ultimately, the referee determined Claimant had a bona fide
    offer of employment, which she began on January 4, 2016, and, therefore, she was
    not ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(b). Referee’s Dec. at 2. The
    referee advised Employer to file a Request for Relief from Charges. Id.
    Employer appealed to the Board. The Board found that Claimant was
    last employed by Employer, from May 23, 2005, and her last day of work was
    December 24, 2015. Employer was closed from December 25, 2015 until January
    4, 2016. On January 4, 2016, Claimant called Employer and quit her employment,
    effective immediately. Bd. Op., 4/19/16, F.F. Nos. 1-3.
    Ultimately, the Board determined that Claimant voluntarily left her
    employment; therefore, she bore the burden of showing necessitous and
    compelling cause for so doing.     Bd. Op. at 1.    The Board found the record
    contained circumstantial evidence indicating Claimant quit her employment with
    Employer to accept a job with new employer. Id. at 1-2. However, the Board
    3
    found the record devoid of competent evidence of a firm offer of employment by
    the new employer to Claimant. Id. at 2. Thus, the Board concluded Claimant was
    ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law.2 Claimant requested
    reconsideration of the Board’s order, which the Board denied. Claimant now
    petitions for review of the Board’s order denying her benefits.
    B. Companion Proceedings
    In order to understand Claimant’s arguments in the present appeal, it
    is necessary to explain Claimant’s claim for UC benefits from her subsequent
    employer. When Claimant quit her job with Employer, she apparently did so to
    begin working for a law firm on January 4, 2016. Claimant worked for the new
    employer from January 4, 2016 through January 7, 2016. The new employer and
    Claimant agreed that she was not a good fit for the job. Claimant filed for UC
    benefits, and the Board determined that Section 402(e) (relating to willful
    misconduct) did not disqualify Claimant from receiving UC benefits as a result of
    her subsequent employment (companion UC case).
    In the present case, this Court denied the Board’s motion to strike
    from Claimant’s brief and reproduced record the Board’s decision granting
    benefits in the companion UC case and authorized review of the Board’s decision
    here “to whatever extent the panel deems it appropriate.” Cmwlth. Ct. Order,
    9/28/16.
    2
    The Board noted its decision of ineligibility followed two prior decisions of eligibility.
    The Board found that a resulting overpayment was not the result of a misrepresentation or non-
    disclosure of a material fact. Therefore, it determined any resulting overpayment was non-
    recoupable under Section 804(b)(1)(iii)(A) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P.S.
    §874(b)(1)(iii)(A).
    4
    II. Issues
    On appeal,3 Claimant contends the Board erred in denying her UC
    benefits. She asserts the necessitous and compelling reason for leaving her job
    with Employer was demonstrated by the testimony contained in her companion UC
    case. Pet’r’s Br. at 10.
    III. Discussion
    In UC cases, the Board is the ultimate fact-finder and is empowered to
    resolve all conflicts in evidence, witness credibility and weight accorded to the
    evidence. Ductmate Indus., Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    949 A.2d 338
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
    Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence upon which a
    reasonable mind could base a conclusion. Umedman v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
    of Review, 
    52 A.3d 558
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). “The fact that [a party] … might
    view the testimony differently than the Board is not grounds for reversal if
    substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings.” Tapco, Inc. v. Unemployment
    Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    650 A.2d 1106
    , 1108-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
    Under Section 402(b) of the Law, an employee is ineligible for UC
    benefits for any week in which her unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving her
    employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.                  43 P.S.
    3
    Our review is limited to determining whether the necessary findings of fact were
    supported by substantial evidence, whether errors of law were committed, or whether
    constitutional rights were violated. Oliver v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    5 A.3d 432
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (en banc).
    5
    §802(b); Bell v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    921 A.2d 23
     (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2007). A claimant who voluntarily quits her employment bears the burden of
    proving her termination was caused by reasons of a necessitous and compelling
    nature. Solar Innovations, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    38 A.3d 1051
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). The question of whether an employee had necessitous
    and compelling reason to quit is a question of law reviewable by this Court,
    Brunswick Hotel & Conference Ctr., LLC v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    906 A.2d 657
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), and the answer is determined from the
    totality of the record. Bell.
    The receipt and acceptance of a firm offer of other employment
    constitutes termination for cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. Solar
    Innovations. A firm offer of employment is one that specifies the conditions of
    employment, such as wages, hours, duties and a starting date.            Baron v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    384 A.2d 271
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978). In order
    to be a firm offer, the offer of employment must be definite, and the claimant must
    act prudently with regard to her employer.           Twp. of N. Huntingdon v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    450 A.2d 768
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982).
    Claimant argues she voluntarily quit because of a firm job offer with
    the new employer.       Claimant concedes the record in the current case lacks
    competent evidence of a firm offer of employment. Br. of Pet’r at 8-9. However,
    the evidence in the companion case establishes a firm offer of employment, and the
    decision in that case should be given effect here.
    6
    The Board argues that using findings of fact from a different case
    involving the Claimant would violate this Employer’s rights to due process. That
    is because Employer here was not given notice of or an opportunity to be heard in
    the companion matter, which involved Claimant’s subsequent employer only.
    Similarly, the Board argues that the determination in the companion case does not
    have preclusive effect under legal theories of law of the case and res judicata
    because both theories require that the parties be the same in both proceedings.
    We reject Claimant’s attempts to incorporate the entire record in the
    companion UC case into this case to cure any deficiencies in the record in this
    appeal. Because Claimant failed to appear at the referee hearing here, she offered
    no evidence, including the record in her companion UC case, in support of her
    claim for benefits. The law is well-settled that matters not appearing in the record
    may not be considered by the appellate court on appeal. B.K. v. Dep’t of Pub.
    Welfare, 
    36 A.3d 649
    , 657 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (“For purposes of appellate review,
    that which is not part of the certified record does not exist….’ [I]t is the
    responsibility of the appellant to supply this Court with a complete record for
    purposes of review. The failure by an appellant to insure that the original record
    certified for appeal contains sufficient information to conduct a proper review
    constitutes waiver of the issue(s) sought to be examined.’”) (citation omitted);
    DeLong v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1966 C.D.
    2012, filed May 23, 2014) (Covey, J.), 
    2014 WL 2160735
     (unreported).
    Moreover, Employer was not a party to Claimant’s companion UC
    case. It did not receive notice of the companion UC proceeding and, therefore, it
    7
    had no opportunity to be heard on the facts of that case and challenge the basis for
    Claimant’s separation from the new employer and how that may impact the current
    case. In an administrative hearing, the essential elements of due process are notice
    and an opportunity to be heard. Grouch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review,
    
    472 A.2d 286
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). Employer lacked notice, lacked an opportunity
    to be heard, and had no reason to know the facts surrounding Claimant’s discharge
    from her subsequent employer. Therefore, it would be unfair to Employer to
    permit consideration of the facts in Claimant’s companion case.
    In addition, res judicata does not apply to this appeal. Among other
    elements, identity of parties is required for the application of res judicata. Sariano
    v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    487 A.2d 1064
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985).
    There is no identity of parties between the current appeal and the companion case,
    because the employers are different.
    Further, the law of the case doctrine does not aid Claimant’s cause
    here. Under that doctrine, issues decided by an appellate court on a prior appeal
    between the same parties become the law of the case and will not be reconsidered
    on a second appeal. Commonwealth v. Tick, Inc., 
    246 A.2d 424
     (Pa. 1968). Here,
    however, the parties are not the same, as discussed above.
    For all these reasons, we affirm.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    8
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Lisa J. Cleary,                      :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                      :   No. 795 C.D. 2016
    :
    Unemployment Compensation            :
    Board of Review,                     :
    Respondent       :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2017, the order of the
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is AFFIRMED.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Lisa J. Cleary,                           :
    Petitioner             :
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation                 :
    Board of Review,                          :   No. 795 C.D. 2016
    Respondent               :   Submitted: November 18, 2016
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge
    HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    DISSENTING OPINION
    BY JUDGE COSGROVE                             FILED: May 17, 2017
    As I believe Lisa J. Cleary (Claimant) satisfied all that was required of
    her in proving that her reasons for leaving employment were “necessitous and
    compelling,” i.e., that she had a firm offer of employment, I must dissent.
    Although Claimant did not appear before the referee, the record of her claim and
    the reasons for her leaving Bloomsburg Carpet Industries, Inc. (Employer) were
    provided to Employer before the referee’s hearing. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at
    20a-23a.) This included recognition that her subsequent employment ended rather
    quickly and for reasons which would likely not preclude a second claim. 
    Id.
     at
    22a. As such, there was no lack of notice to Employer of the circumstances
    surrounding Claimant’s position and thus no due process violation.
    Given the relaxed atmosphere which is supposed to mark the
    proceedings below, the evidentiary requirements imposed on Claimant were met.
    As the referee was correct in finding for Claimant, I would reverse the Board’s
    contrary decision.
    ___________________________
    JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge
    JMC-2