W. Teeter v. PBPP ( 2017 )


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  •           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    William Teeter,                          :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                          :   No. 317 C.D. 2017
    :   Submitted: July 21, 2017
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation          :
    and Parole,                              :
    Respondent       :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE SIMPSON                         FILED: October 20, 2017
    William Teeter (Teeter) petitions for review of an order of the
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) denying his request for
    administrative relief from an order recommitting him as a convicted parole violator
    to serve the unexpired term of his original sentence (11 months, 27 days) and
    recalculating the maximum date of his original sentence as August 4, 2017. Teeter
    contends the Board failed to hold a revocation hearing within 120 days of its receipt
    of official notice of Teeter’s guilty plea to new criminal charges. Teeter further
    asserts the Board erred by failing to award him credit for all the time he spent
    incarcerated and by adding 11 months and 27 days (361 days) to the maximum date
    of his original sentence. To that end, Teeter argues the Board does not have the
    authority to alter a judicially-imposed sentence. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    I. Background
    In December 2013, the Board granted Teeter parole from his original
    sentence of 1 year and 9 months to 4 years for fleeing or attempting to elude an
    officer and reckless endangerment. Teeter’s original sentence had a maximum date
    of January 15, 2016. Teeter’s parole included the following condition:
    If you are convicted of a crime committed on
    parole/reparole, the Board has the authority, after an
    appropriate hearing, to recommit you to serve the balance
    of the sentence or sentences which you were serving when
    paroled/reparoled, with no credit for time at liberty on
    parole.
    Certified Record (C.R.) at 10.
    On January 23, 2014, the Board released Teeter from a state
    correctional institution to a home plan with his wife. On January 26, 2015, the
    Greensburg Police Department arrested Teeter on multiple felony counts of forgery,
    theft by unlawful taking, conspiracy to commit forgery and conspiracy to commit
    theft by unlawful taking (new charges).
    Also on January 26, the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas
    (trial court) detained Teeter in lieu of monetary bail of $200,000. C.R. at 53. The
    same day, the Board issued a detainer for Teeter. C.R. at 39. In February 2015, the
    trial court reduced Teeter’s bail to $25,000. C.R. at 53.
    On January 22, 2016, following the expiration of the maximum date of
    Teeter’s original sentence, the Board withdrew its warrant and declared Teeter
    2
    delinquent for control purposes. On February 12, 2016, Teeter posted bail on the
    new charges.
    On August 2, 2016, Teeter pled guilty to five lesser misdemeanor
    counts including theft by unlawful taking (two counts), forgery (two counts) and
    receiving stolen property (one count). C.R. at 67. The felony charges were
    withdrawn. C.R. at 67-68. The same day, the trial court sentenced Teeter to a
    maximum term of five years of probation. C.R. at 81.
    On August 8, 2016, the Board lodged a detainer for Teeter and he
    returned to a state correctional institution (SCI-Fayette). C.R. at 92. The same day,
    the Board provided Teeter with a notice of charges and revocation hearing based on
    his new convictions. C.R. at 95. Teeter executed a waiver/admission form (PBPP
    72c) waiving his right to a revocation hearing and counsel. C.R. at 96-97. Teeter
    also admitted to his new convictions. Id. The waiver/admission form states that
    Teeter waived his right to a parole revocation hearing and counsel with full
    knowledge and understanding of his rights, out of his own free will, and without
    promise, threat or coercion. C.R. at 96. The form also states that Teeter admitted to
    violating his parole based on his new convictions. Id. The form advised Teeter that
    he had 10 days to submit a written withdrawal of his waiver and admission. Id.
    Teeter, however, did not submit a withdrawal.
    The Board panel accepted Teeter’s waiver/admission form and voted to
    recommit Teeter as a convicted parole violator to serve his unexpired term of 11
    months and 27 days on his original sentence with no credit for time spent at liberty
    3
    on parole. C.R. at 98-105. On October 3, 2016, the Board mailed Teeter a formal
    decision recommitting him as a convicted parole violator and extended the
    maximum date of his original sentence to August 4, 2017. C.R. at 106-08.
    Thereafter, Teeter filed an administrative appeal objecting to the
    amount of credit given to him for the time he spent in prison and the Board’s
    recalculation date. In particular, Teeter asserted the Board lacked the authority to
    recalculate his maximum date. Teeter further claimed the Board’s waiver/admission
    form violated his administrative due process rights under Board regulations at 
    37 Pa. Code §71.2
     (procedure for violation of parole conditions).
    In February 2017, the Board mailed Teeter a decision denying his
    administrative appeal. Explaining the new maximum date, the Board pointed out
    that when it initially paroled Teeter on January 23, 2014, he had 722 days remaining
    on his original sentence. Following his conviction on the new charges, the trial court
    sentenced Teeter to probation. Although Teeter failed to make bail on the new
    charges from the date of his arrest on January 26, 2015 until February 12, 2016, the
    Board also held him on a detainer warrant for 361 days from January 26, 2015 until
    it lifted the detainer on January 22, 2016. Because Teeter received only probation
    on the new charges, the Board awarded Teeter 361 days credit toward his original
    sentence for the time the Board held him on the detainer. See Martin v. Pa. Bd. of
    Prob. & Parole, 
    840 A.2d 299
     (Pa. 2003) (holding that where parolee is held on both
    a Board warrant and new criminal charges, and it is not possible to award all of the
    credit on the new sentence because the presentence incarceration exceeds the new
    4
    sentence, the credit must be applied to the parolee’s original sentence). Teeter
    petitions for review.1
    II. Issues
    On appeal, Teeter contends the Board erred in extending the maximum
    date of his original sentence and that he was not given the credit to which he was
    entitled for time he spent in prison. Teeter also asserts the Board violated his
    constitutional rights to due process by not holding a timely revocation hearing and
    by not advising him that his “street time”2 was at risk.
    III. Discussion
    We first address Teeter’s contention that the Board erred in extending
    the maximum date of his original sentence. Teeter argues the Board does not have
    the power to alter a judicially-imposed sentence. We disagree. In Young v.
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    409 A.2d 843
     (Pa. 1979), the Supreme
    Court squarely addressed this issue and held that the Board’s statutory power to deny
    a convicted parole violator credit toward his original sentence for time spent at
    liberty on parole, which extends the maximum date for the original sentence, does
    not encroach upon the judicial sentencing power.
    1
    Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether
    the adjudication was in accordance with law, or whether the necessary findings of fact were
    supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa C.S.
    §704; Adams v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    885 A.2d 1121
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
    2
    “Street time” is a term which means the period of time a parolee spends at liberty on
    parole. Dorsey v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    854 A.2d 994
    , 996 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
    5
    Further, when a parolee is recommitted as a convicted parole violator,
    the maximum date of his sentence may be extended to include the period of time he
    spent at liberty on parole. Richards v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    20 A.3d 596
     (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2011). The Board’s authority to extend the maximum date of a parolee’s
    sentence does not usurp the court’s sentencing function. Gaito v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. &
    Parole, 
    412 A.2d 568
     (Pa. 1980).
    Here, when the Board initially paroled Teeter on January 23, 2014, he
    had 722 days remaining on his original sentence. Following his arrest on new
    charges on January 26, 2015, Teeter spent 361 days confined on both the new
    criminal charges and the Board’s detainer. On January 22, 2016, the Board lifted its
    detainer because Teeter’s original sentence expired. From January 22, 2016 until he
    made bail on February 12, 2016, Teeter remained incarcerated on the new charges.
    On August 2, 2016, Teeter pled guilty to lesser misdemeanor charges
    and received a sentence of probation. Pursuant to Martin, the Board properly
    awarded Teeter 361 days credit toward his original sentence for the time the Board
    held him on the detainer, regardless of the fact he could not make bail on the new
    charges. Following his conviction on the new charges, the Board again lodged a
    detainer warrant for Teeter, and he returned to SCI-Fayette on August 8, 2016. The
    same day, Teeter waived his right to a revocation hearing and admitted to his
    convictions on the new charges.
    On October 3, 2016, the Board mailed Teeter a decision recommitting
    him as a convicted parole violator to serve the 11 months and 27 days (722-361=361
    6
    days) remaining on his original sentence. The Board retains jurisdiction to recommit
    a parolee convicted of a crime committed while on parole even after the expiration
    of the parolee’s original maximum sentence. Adams v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
    
    885 A.2d 1121
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). There is no doubt that the Board can recommit
    and re-compute the sentence of a parolee who commits a crime on parole but is not
    convicted until after his original sentence expired. 
    Id.
     Although Teeter did not
    receive credit toward his original sentence for the time he spent in jail after January
    22, 2016, he was confined solely on the new charges. The Board had no duty under
    Martin to award Teeter credit for time he was not confined under a Board warrant.
    See Armbruster v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    919 A.2d 348
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)
    (parolee must be confined on both the new charges and a Board warrant in order for
    Martin to apply). As such, we detect no error in the Board’s recalculation of Teeter’s
    original sentence maximum expiry.
    Teeter also asserts the Board violated his constitutional rights to due
    process by not holding a timely revocation hearing and by not advising him that his
    street time was at risk. We disagree. In Prebella v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
    and Parole, 
    942 A.2d 257
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), and later in McKenzie v.
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    963 A.2d 616
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), this
    Court upheld parole revocations where the parolees executed waiver/admission
    forms similar to the form Teeter signed in the present case. As we noted in Prebella,
    Pennsylvania law clearly supports the type of waiver Teeter executed. To that end,
    we noted:
    In order to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver in
    Parole Board cases, all that is required is for the Board to
    show that it followed its own regulations and provided the
    7
    necessary information to the offender prior to the offender
    signing the written waiver form. … The waiver need not
    be effectuated in an ‘on the record colloquy.’ … Rather,
    as here, execution of the Board’s form is sufficient.
    Prebella, 
    942 A.2d at 261
     (citations omitted). Because these conditions were met
    here, the Board was under no statutory or administrative obligation to advise Teeter
    that the Board could deny him, as a convicted parole violator, credit for the time he
    spent at liberty on parole prior to time he committed the new criminal offense for
    which he was convicted. McKenzie; Prebella.
    As discussed above, Teeter waived his right to a revocation hearing and
    counsel by executing the waiver/admission form. C.R. at 96-97. Teeter also
    admitted to his new convictions. 
    Id.
     The waiver/admission form states that Teeter
    waived his right to a parole revocation hearing and counsel with full knowledge and
    understanding of his rights, out of his own free will, and without promise, threat or
    coercion. C.R. at 96. The form also states that Teeter admitted to violating his parole
    based on his new convictions. 
    Id.
     The form advised Teeter that he had 10 days to
    submit a written withdrawal of his waiver and admission. 
    Id.
     Teeter, however, did
    not submit a withdrawal.
    Further, a parolee’s right to counsel in a parole violation hearing is not
    guaranteed by either the state or federal constitutions. Prebella, 
    942 A.2d at 261
    .
    Rather, it is based on statutory and case law. 
    Id.
     (citing Worthington v. Pa. Bd. of
    Prob. & Parole, 
    784 A.2d 275
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)). “A parolee’s waiver of counsel
    is deemed informed and voluntary if, as here, the parolee is informed of the right to
    counsel, provided the name and address of the appropriate public defender, and gives
    8
    his written statement that he has been fully advised of this right and has waived it
    out of his own free will.” 
    Id.
     Our review of the waiver/admission form Teeter
    executed indicates these conditions have been met. See C.R. at 96.
    Having determined the waiver/admission form Teeter executed
    constituted a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a revocation hearing and
    counsel, we hold that Teeter’s waiver of his revocation hearing and admission of his
    conviction on the new charges was validly executed and properly accepted by the
    Board. McKenzie; Prebella. Because Teeter waived the revocation hearing on
    August 8, 2016, less than a week after his conviction on the new charges and on his
    first day back in a state correctional institution after being released on bail, Teeter’s
    waiver fell within the 120-day period in which a revocation hearing must be held
    following his return to a state correctional institution. As such, Teeter’s timeliness
    challenge also fails on this ground. See 
    37 Pa. Code §71.4
    (1)(i); McDonald v. Pa.
    Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    673 A.2d 27
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
    For the above reasons, we discern no error, abuse of discretion or
    constitutional violations in the Board’s order denying Teeter’s administrative appeal.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    9
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    William Teeter,                         :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                          :   No. 317 C.D. 2017
    :
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation         :
    and Parole,                             :
    Respondent      :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 20th day of October, 2017, for the reasons stated in the
    foregoing opinion, the order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is
    AFFIRMED.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge