C. Mickens v. PA BPP ( 2016 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Clinton Mickens,                        :
    : No. 1671 C.D. 2015
    Petitioner     : Submitted: April 8, 2016
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    Pennsylvania Board of                   :
    Probation and Parole,                   :
    :
    Respondent     :
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN                                 FILED: August 23, 2016
    Clinton Mickens petitions for review of the July 1, 2015, decision of the
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) dismissing Mickens’ request for
    administrative review and affirming the Board’s recommitment decision mailed April
    27, 2015. Appointed counsel, Marc T. Valentine, Esquire (Counsel), has filed an
    application for leave to withdraw as counsel, asserting that Mickens’ petition for
    review is meritless. We grant Counsel’s application and affirm the Board’s decision.
    On August 3, 2010, the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
    sentenced Mickens to 1 year, 6 months, 3 days’ to 4 years, 6 months’ incarceration
    for various crimes. (C.R. at 1-4.) On October 3, 2011, the Board paroled Mickens to
    his parents’ home in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. (Id. at 6-9.)
    On August 13, 2013, Altoona Police arrested Mickens in Blair County
    for selling drugs to a confidential informant (CI)1 on June 25, 2012, March 18, 2013,
    and August 13, 2013. (Id. at 14-15, 20-21, 25, 33, 39.) Ultimately, on October 2,
    2014, Mickens pled guilty to the new criminal charges in Cambria County and was
    sentenced on January 27, 2015. (Id. at 50.)
    In a decision mailed on April 27, 2015, the Board recommitted Mickens
    as a convicted parole violator (CPV) to a state correctional institution (SCI) to serve
    24 months, when available, pending the sentencing on his Blair County charges and
    his return to a SCI. (Id. at 109.) On May 7, 2015, Mickens filed an administrative
    appeal of the Board’s recommitment decision. (Id. at 111.) Mickens asserted that his
    parole agent was aware of his June 25, 2012, and March 18, 2013, criminal activities
    when they took place and, therefore, the parole agent should have immediately taken
    him into custody and detained him as a parole violator. (Id. at 113.) Instead,
    Mickens remained free and engaged in further criminal activity on August 13, 2013.
    (Id.)       Thus, Mickens contended that the parole agent engaged in sentencing
    entrapment, which is a violation of state law. (Id.)
    On July 1, 2015, the Board dismissed Mickens’ appeal “for failure to
    present adequate factual and legal points for consideration” and affirmed its
    recommitment decision. (Id. at 116-17.) The Board stated that Mickens’ “appeal
    does not indicate that the Board made any specific evidentiary, procedural, or
    calculation errors in revoking your parole.” (Id. at 116.) Mickens petitioned this
    1
    The CI works for the Cambria County Drug Task Force and was working with the Altoona
    Police in Blair County. Mickens was charged in both Cambria and Blair Counties.
    2
    court for review.2 Thereafter, Counsel filed an application for leave to withdraw and
    a no-merit letter, contending that Mickens’ appeal is meritless.
    When court-appointed counsel concludes that a petitioner’s appeal is
    meritless, counsel may be permitted to withdraw if counsel: (1) notifies the petitioner
    of the request to withdraw; (2) furnishes the petitioner with a copy of an Anders3 brief
    or a no-merit letter satisfying the requirements of Turner;4 and (3) advises the
    petitioner of his right to retain new counsel or submit a brief on his own behalf.
    Encarnacion v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    990 A.2d 123
    , 125 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2010).         A no-merit letter must set forth: (1) the nature and extent of
    counsel’s review of the case; (2) the issues the petitioner wishes to raise on appeal;
    and (3) counsel’s analysis as to why the appeal has no merit. 
    Id. at 126.
    Once these
    requirements are met, this court will independently review the petitioner’s appeal to
    determine whether it is meritless. 
    Id. Here, Counsel
    mailed Mickens a letter informing Mickens of Counsel’s
    request to withdraw. Counsel included a no-merit letter, which detailed the nature
    and extent of Counsel’s review of Mickens’ case, set forth the issues raised, and
    explained why Counsel concluded that Mickens’ appeal is meritless. The no-merit
    letter also advised Mickens of his right to retain substitute counsel or file a pro se
    2
    Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether
    an error of law was committed, or whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial
    evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §704.
    3
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967).
    4
    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
    (Pa. 1988).
    3
    brief. Because Counsel has satisfied the technical requirements of Turner, this court
    will now independently review the merits of Mickens’ appeal.
    Mickens argues that the Board’s decision should be reversed because his
    parole officer knew of his criminal activity on June 25, 2012, and March 18, 2013,
    but did not have him detained until after his arrest on August 13, 2013, thus
    committing sentencing entrapment. We disagree.
    Sentencing entrapment occurs when “a defendant,
    although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is
    entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater
    punishment.” To succeed on a claim of sentencing
    entrapment, the defendant must show either “outrageous
    government conduct” or “extraordinary government
    misconduct.” This consists of conduct “so grossly shocking
    and so outrageous that it violates the universal sense of
    justice.” This standard puts a heavy burden on the
    defendant, as sentencing entrapment is not established
    “simply by showing that the idea originated with the
    government or that the conduct was encouraged by it . . . or
    that the crime was prolonged beyond the first criminal act
    . . . or exceeded in degree or kind what the defendant had
    done before.”
    Commonwealth v. Kittrell, 
    19 A.3d 532
    , 539 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).
    Sentencing entrapment is a defense to criminal charges, as “it provides a convicted
    defendant the opportunity for a reduced sentence” and “can be used to exclude one of
    several criminal transactions included in a sentencing scheme.” Commonwealth v.
    Petzold, 
    701 A.2d 1363
    , 1365 (Pa. Super. 1997).
    4
    A Board recommitment order, however, is not a criminal charge or
    sentence, but an administrative action. Martin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
    and Parole, 
    840 A.2d 299
    , 303 (Pa. 2003).
    The distinction between sentences imposed by the
    judiciary upon convicted criminal defendants and backtime
    compelled by the Board upon parole violators is significant.
    A sentence can be defined as the judgment formally
    pronounced by the court upon a defendant who has been
    convicted in a new criminal prosecution and which imposes
    the term of punishment to be served. By way of
    comparison, backtime is “that part of an existing judicially-
    imposed sentence which the Board directs a parolee to
    complete following a finding[,] after a civil administrative
    hearing[,] that the parolee violated the terms and conditions
    of parole,” and before the parolee begins to serve the new
    sentence. Therefore, service of backtime relates to the
    original sentence from which an offender is paroled and is
    unrelated to any sentence required for a conviction on other
    criminal charges.
    
    Id. (emphasis added)
    (citations omitted).
    Because the alleged sentencing entrapment relates to Mickens’ new
    criminal charges, it is unrelated to the Board’s decision to recommit Mickens as a
    CPV. The Board did not err or abuse its discretion.
    Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as
    counsel and affirm the Board’s decision.
    ___________________________________
    ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    5
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Clinton Mickens,                        :
    : No. 1671 C.D. 2015
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    Pennsylvania Board of                   :
    Probation and Parole,                   :
    :
    Respondent     :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 23rd day of August, 2016, we hereby grant the
    application for leave to withdraw as counsel filed by Marc T. Valentine, Esquire, and
    affirm the July 1, 2015, decision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.
    ___________________________________
    ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge