I. Chestnut v. UCBR ( 2020 )


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  •                 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Israel Chestnut,                                :
    Petitioner                :
    :   No. 202 C.D. 2019
    v.                               :
    :   Submitted: October 4, 2019
    Unemployment Compensation                       :
    Board of Review,                                :
    Respondent                     :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                                FILED: January 3, 2020
    Israel Chestnut (Claimant) petitions for review of the January 18, 2019
    order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), which affirmed
    the referee’s decision finding that he was ineligible for unemployment compensation
    (UC) benefits pursuant to section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law
    (Law).1
    Claimant was employed by the United States Department of Treasury,
    specifically, the Internal Revenue Service (Employer and IRS), as a full-time Seasonal
    Clerk until August 24, 2018. (Certified Record (C.R.), Item Nos. 2, 11, Finding of Fact
    (F.F.) Nos. 1, 10.) On December 4, 2013, Employer suggested terminating Claimant
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(e).
    In relevant part, section 402(e) states that an employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any
    week in which his unemployment is due to willful misconduct connected with his work.
    for his failure to file his 2011 income tax return and pay his 2011 federal income taxes
    on time. (C.R. Item No. 11, F.F. No. 2.) Claimant entered into a Last Chance
    Agreement on February 27, 2014, with Employer (LCA) and was suspended for 30
    days. (C.R. Item No. 11, F.F. No. 3.) In the LCA, Claimant agreed that he would
    refrain from engaging in any future tax-related misconduct, “such as failing to properly
    and timely file and pay [his] federal income taxes,” and acknowledged that any further
    tax-related misconduct would result in his proposed termination. (C.R. Item No. 11,
    F.F. No. 4.) Four years later, on May 23, 2018, Employer notified Claimant that it
    planned to discharge him because he failed to timely pay his 2015 federal income taxes.
    (C.R. Item No. 11, F.F. No. 6.) Claimant was given 15 days to respond to the proposed
    action. (C.R. Item No. 11.) In June of 2018, Claimant started retirement procedures.
    (F.F. No. 8.) Claimant did not respond to the letter and was notified on August 16,
    2018, that he would be terminated because he did not pay his 2015 federal income
    taxes. (F.F. No. 9.) Claimant voluntarily resigned from employment, citing retirement,
    on August 22, 2018. (F.F. No. 11.)
    Although Claimant maintains at the time of his termination that he had
    already initiated retirement procedures, Employer argues that he was terminated for
    misconduct. The referee noted that Claimant voluntarily resigned on August 22, 2018,
    stating that he was retiring. (C.R. Item No. 11, F.F. No. 11.) However, the referee
    found that although Claimant may have initiated retirement proceedings, he was
    terminated effective August 24, 2018. (C.R. Item No. 11, F.F. No. 10.)
    On September 20, 2018, the local service center determined that Claimant
    was ineligible for benefits under section 402(b) of the Law, 43 P.S. §802(b).2 (C.R.
    2
    Section 402(b) of the Law provides, in relevant part,
    2
    Item No. 4.) Claimant appealed the local service center’s determination on September
    25, 2018. (C.R. Item No. 5.) A hearing was held before the referee on October 23,
    2018, with respect to the following issues: (1) whether Claimant’s unemployment was
    due to him voluntarily leaving work without a necessitous and compelling reason under
    section 402(b) of the Law, 43 P.S. §802(b); (2) whether Claimant’s unemployment was
    due to willful misconduct under section 402(e) of the Law, 43 P.S. §802(e); and (3)
    whether Claimant was able and available for suitable work under section 401(d)(1), (2)
    of the Law, 43 P.S. §801(d)(1), (2). (C.R. Item No. 10.) The referee conducted a
    hearing at which Employer testified to the above facts.
    By decision mailed October 24, 2018, the referee affirmed but modified
    the local service center’s determination. (C.R. Item No. 12.) More specifically, the
    referee concluded that Claimant was ineligible under section 402(e) of the Law. 
    Id. The referee
    found that under Pennsylvania law, Claimant resigned in the face of
    termination and, therefore, the separation should be treated as a discharge.         
    Id. Consequently, the
    referee explained that because Claimant was discharged for
    misconduct, i.e., violating his LCA, he was not entitled to UC benefits. 
    Id. The referee
    stated that, because Claimant did not dispute the testimony or evidence presented by
    Employer, but remained silent, the testimony and evidence was deemed to be “an
    admission.” 
    Id. Therefore, he
    found that Employer had met its burden and that
    An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week --
    (b) In which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work
    without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature, irrespective
    of whether or not such work is in “employment” as defined in this
    act.
    43 P.S. §802(b).
    3
    Claimant had failed to establish good cause for his actions and was therefore
    appropriately terminated for willful misconduct. 
    Id. Claimant appealed
    the referee’s decision, arguing that Employer had not
    shown his actions constituted willful misconduct. (C.R. Item Nos. 13, 15.) The Board
    rejected this argument and affirmed the referee’s decision. (C.R. Item No. 16)
    Discussion
    On appeal,3 Claimant raises one issue: whether the Board erred in finding
    him ineligible for benefits under section 402(e) of the Law for willful misconduct.
    Claimant argues that the Board’s decision was incorrect because Employer did not
    meet its burden under section 402(e) of the Law to establish that his actions constituted
    willful misconduct. As a corollary matter, Claimant states that his silence and failure
    to deny the allegations in this case do not constitute an admission.
    The issue of whether a claimant's conduct constituted willful misconduct
    is a question of law fully reviewable by this Court. Klampfer v. Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, 
    182 A.3d 495
    , 499 (Pa. Cwmlth. 2018) (citing
    Ductmate Industries, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    949 A.2d 338
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)).4 Section 402(e) of the Law provides that an employee shall
    be ineligible for compensation for any week
    3
    Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
    whether the adjudication is in accordance with the law, and whether findings of fact are supported by
    substantial evidence. Ellis v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    59 A.3d 1159
    , 1162
    n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
    accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Chartiers Community Mental Health and Retardation
    Center v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    134 A.3d 1165
    , 1170 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2016).
    4
    This Court has recently reiterated that
    4
    [i]n which his unemployment is due to his discharge or
    temporary suspension from work for willful misconduct
    connected with his work, irrespective of whether or not
    such work is “employment” as defined in this act. . . .
    43 P.S. §802(e). Although the statute does not define willful misconduct, this Court
    has defined willful misconduct as:
    (1) wanton and willful disregard of an employer’s
    interests; (2) deliberate violation of rules; (3) disregard of
    the standards of behavior which an employer can
    rightfully expect from an employee; or[] (4) negligence
    showing an intentional disregard of the employer’s
    interests or the employee’s duties and obligations.
    It is well settled that the Board is the ultimate factfinder in
    unemployment compensation proceedings. Peak v. Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, . . . 
    501 A.2d 1383
    , 1385 ([Pa.]
    1985); Chapman [v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
    Review, 
    20 A.2d 603
    , 607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)]; Chamoun v.
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, . . . 
    542 A.2d 207
    ,
    208 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1988). Thus, issues of credibility are for the
    Board, and the Board may accept or reject a witness’s testimony
    whether or not it is corroborated by other evidence of record. Peak;
    Chamoun. The Board’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if
    the record, taken as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support
    them. Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, . .
    . 
    378 A.2d 829
    , 831 ([Pa.] 1977). Finally, this Court must examine
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed
    before the Board and give that party the benefit of all inferences that
    can be logically and reasonably drawn from the evidence.
    
    Chapman, 20 A.2d at 607
    .
    Halloran v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    188 A.3d 592
    , 597 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
    5
    Waverly Heights, Ltd. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    173 A.3d 1224
    , 1228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). However, “a negligent act alone does not constitute
    willful misconduct; rather, the conduct must be of ‘an intentional and deliberate
    nature.’” Fugh v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    153 A.3d 1169
    , 1176
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting Grieb v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
    
    827 A.2d 422
    , 426 (Pa. 2003)). The employer bears the burden of establishing that it
    discharged an employee for willful misconduct. Waverly Heights, 
    173 A.3d 1224
    ,
    1228 (quoting Adams v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    56 A.3d 76
    ,
    78-79 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)).
    Here, Claimant wantonly and willfully disregarded Employer’s interests.
    Employer is the IRS, the entity responsible for collecting federal income taxes, and has
    a right to expect that its employees will timely file and pay their income taxes. Initially,
    on December 4, 2013, Claimant was recommended for termination for failing to pay
    or file his 2011 federal income taxes. This led to him being placed on the LCA on
    February 27, 2014. The LCA explicitly reflected that claimant was to refrain from
    engaging in any future tax-related misconduct including failing to pay or file his taxes
    on time. Claimant engaged in such misconduct by failing to pay his 2015 federal
    income taxes on time.
    Furthermore, this Court has found that the violation of a last chance
    agreement rises to the level of willful misconduct. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, 
    738 A.2d 518
    , 522 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (affirming the
    Board’s finding that the violation of a last chance agreement by the employee satisfied
    the employer’s burden of proving willful misconduct); Walton v. Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, 
    797 A.2d 437
    , 438 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (finding that
    failing to abide by a last chance agreement prohibiting the use of illegal drugs is willful
    6
    misconduct);      Hartman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Pa.
    Cmwlth., No. 1089 C.D. 2011, filed Apr. 5, 2012) (unreported) (concluding that the
    violation of a last chance agreement for failing to be a model employee and adhere to
    the employer’s standards of conduct constitutes willful misconduct); Gordon Terminal
    Service Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2086
    C.D. 2014, filed July 7, 2015) (unreported) (finding an employee ineligible for benefits
    because of willful misconduct, where the employee was put on a last chance agreement
    for tardiness and absenteeism and continued such behavior).5
    The instant matter is similar to the issues this Court encountered in Walton
    and Guthrie. In Walton the employee was found to have marijuana in his system after
    a drug 
    test. 797 A.2d at 438
    . The employee entered into a last chance agreement
    understanding that he was specifically prohibited from the use of illegal drugs and that
    a positive test would result in his termination. 
    Id. A later
    drug test showed that the
    employee had tested positive for marijuana and, therefore, he was discharged for
    violating the terms of the agreement. 
    Id. This Court
    found that his violation of the
    agreement constituted willful misconduct. 
    Id. at 439.
                  In Guthrie, the Board found that the employee’s conduct was governed by
    a last chance agreement between him, his union, and the 
    employer. 738 A.2d at 520
    .
    Under the agreement, the employee was required to refrain from insubordination; if he
    failed to refrain from such conduct, the first instance would result in a five-day
    suspension and the second would result in termination. 
    Id. The employee
    subsequently
    was disrespectful toward his supervisor and was discharged for violating the
    5
    Gordon and Hartman are unreported opinions. Under section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal
    Operating Procedures, an unreported opinion may be cited for its persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code
    §69.414(a).
    7
    agreement. 
    Id. at 521.
    This Court concluded that the violation of the last chance
    agreement was sufficient to establish willful misconduct. 
    Id. at 522.
                  In the present case, Claimant was put on the LCA for failing to pay and
    file his 2011 income tax returns on time. Claimant was aware that he was precluded
    from engaging in any more tax-related misconduct, such as failing to file or pay his
    taxes on time. The record clearly establishes that Claimant failed to abide by the LCA
    and was subsequently discharged. Similar to Guthrie and Walton, we conclude, here,
    the Board did not err in concluding that Claimant committed willful misconduct
    because he violated the LCA between him and Employer.
    Nevertheless, Claimant contends that the Board’s conclusion was not
    supported by substantial evidence in the record. We disagree. Claimant contends that
    “there is no evidence in the record to establish whether or not Claimant committed
    willful misconduct. The only testimony is the vague allegation that Claimant’s ‘tax
    issue’ was a violation of the alleged agreement from 2014.” (Claimant’s Br. at 13.)
    However, the record clearly reflects two letters, sent on May 23, 2018,6 and August 16,
    2018, respectively, which addressed misconduct. (C.R. Item No. 11.) The May letter
    reflects that Claimant was expressly prohibited from engaging in other tax-related
    misconduct, including failing to pay his taxes. Significantly, Claimant alleges that
    “[he was] not clear what the tax-related issue was.” (C.R. Item No. 11, N.T. at 12.)
    However, the May 23, 2018 letter clearly reprimanded him for failing to pay his 2015
    federal income taxes. Additionally, in the same letter, Claimant was afforded the
    opportunity to respond and take four hours of administrative time in order to secure
    affidavits and prepare an answer. Claimant had the chance to respond and investigate
    but decided not to do so. Despite any confusion that took place during the hearing, the
    6
    Claimant unequivocally acknowledges that he received the letter proposing his termination
    for failure to follow the LCA. (C.R. Item No. 11, Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 10.)
    8
    letter unmistakably states that Claimant failed to pay his taxes. Furthermore, following
    the receipt of these letters, Claimant began to initiate retirement proceedings in order
    to better preserve his financial interests.7 Thus, the record supports the Board’s
    conclusion.
    Accordingly, having found that the Board did not err in affirming and
    adopting the referee’s decision, we affirm the Board’s order.8
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    7
    Claimant explained that he initiated retirement proceedings early because “the Agency
    extracts a part of your retirement money if you are removed for termination,” and he wanted to leave
    with as much of his retirement as he could have. (C.R. Item No. 11, N.T. 7-8.)
    8
    In light of our determination above that the record contains substantial evidence in support
    of a finding of willful misconduct, we need not reach Claimant’s remaining argument with respect to
    whether his silence constituted an admission.
    9
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Israel Chestnut,                       :
    Petitioner          :
    :    No. 202 C.D. 2019
    v.                        :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation              :
    Board of Review,                       :
    Respondent            :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 3rd day of January, 2020, the January 18, 2019 order
    of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review affirming the referee’s
    decision is affirmed.
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge