S.M. Donahue v. SCSC (DHS) ( 2020 )


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  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Sean M. Donahue,                           :
    Petitioner            :
    :
    v.                                  : No. 164 C.D. 2020
    : SUBMITTED: October 2, 2020
    State Civil Service Commission             :
    (Department of Human Services),            :
    Respondent             :
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    PER CURIAM                                                       FILED: December 14, 2020
    Sean M. Donahue petitions for review, pro se, of the January 30, 2020 letter of
    the State Civil Service Commission (Commission) denying his Request for a Subpoena
    Duces Tecum (Subpoena Request) directed to the Governor’s Office of Administration
    (OA) and the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS). The Commission
    has also filed with this Court an Application for Summary Relief, asking us to dismiss
    the Petition for Review for lack of jurisdiction.            Because we conclude that the
    Commission’s January 30, 2020 letter is not an appealable order under the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, we grant the Commission’s Application
    for Summary Relief and dismiss Mr. Donahue’s Petition for Review.
    Background
    In November 2019, Mr. Donahue filed an appeal with the Commission (Appeal
    No. 30412), challenging his ineligibility for, and non-selection for appointment to, a
    position as a Spanish-speaking income maintenance caseworker with DHS’s Luzerne
    County Assistance Office.1          In that appeal, which is still pending before the
    1
    The job posting to which Mr. Donahue applied stated: “[DHS] is seeking Spanish-speaking
    [i]ncome [m]aintenance [c]aseworker candidates for a position in Luzerne County.” Record (R.) Item
    No. 1.
    Commission, Mr. Donahue asserts that DHS discriminated against him based on his
    national origin and engaged in disparate treatment in its hiring process. R. Item No.
    1.2
    On January 8, 2020, Mr. Donahue submitted a Request for Subpoena Duces
    Tecum to the Commission, seeking information relating to recent applicants for
    positions with DHS’s Luzerne County Assistance Office, as well as information about
    the individuals who have sought welfare and other forms of assistance from that office.
    R. Item No. 6. The Commission granted Mr. Donahue’s request in part and issued
    subpoenas to both DHS and the OA on January 15, 2020. Id.
    On January 26, 2020, Mr. Donahue submitted the instant Subpoena Request to
    the Commission via email, seeking an “additive subpoena.” R. Item No. 7. Mr.
    Donahue sought to obtain additional documentation from DHS and the OA
    demonstrating their failure to comply with federal veterans’ preference laws in the
    hiring process. Relying on 
    38 U.S.C. § 4212
    ,3 Mr. Donahue avers that because DHS
    2
    In Appeal No. 30412, Mr. Donahue avers in pertinent part:
    [DHS] is discriminating and retaliating against me because it does not like my political
    and religious beliefs and because I am a White non[-]Spanish[-]speaking individual
    who is from Hazleton, instead of being a non[-]White Spanish[-]speaking individual
    from another country.
    R. Item No. 1.
    3
    This statute provides in relevant part:
    Any contract in the amount of $100,000 or more entered into by any department or
    agency of the United States for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal
    services (including construction) for the United States, shall contain a provision
    requiring that the party contracting with the United States take affirmative action to
    employ and advance in employment qualified covered veterans. This section applies
    to any subcontract in the amount of $100,000 or more entered into by a prime
    contractor in carrying out any such contract.
    
    38 U.S.C. § 4212
    (a)(1).
    2
    “accepts more than $100,000 per year in federal funding, qualified veterans must be
    considered for all job openings before any non[-]veterans are considered.” Pet. for
    Review, ¶ 12. Mr. Donahue further avers that DHS and the OA “must move all
    qualified veterans to the top of every state civil service list for jobs at state agencies
    that accepted more than $100,000 of federal funding for the programs they implement.”
    
    Id., ¶ 11
    .
    In his Subpoena Request, Mr. Donahue requested the following documents:
    [A]ll contracts that the government of Pennsylvania signed with any and
    all federal government agencies and entities that provided or w[ere]
    related to the providing of federal funding for any and all programs that
    are administered by [DHS] in either of the two Luzerne County Assistance
    [O]ffices or through any other state office or program in Luzerne County.
    ...
    . . . [A]ll documents that prove how [the OA] adheres to federal constraints
    on hiring with regard to state offices and programs located in Luzerne
    County. . . .
    . . . [A]ll documents that prove that [the] OA and DHS adhere[] to the
    above mentioned federal constraints on the instant case.
    . . . [A]ll documents that show how [the Commission] ensured that [the]
    OA and DHS adhere[] to the above mentioned federal constraints on the
    instant case.
    R. Item No. 7.
    On January 28, 2020, the OA sent an email to the Commission, objecting to Mr.
    Donahue’s Subpoena Request. R. Item No. 5. The OA stated that it was objecting
    because “the documents requested by Mr. Donahue lack any colorable relevance to the
    issues before the Commission” and because “Mr. Donahue fails to articulate the
    relevancy of the requested documents.”          
    Id.
       The OA further noted that the
    Commission’s regulations mandate that a party requesting a subpoena “‘specify as
    3
    clearly as possible the relevance of the testimony or documentary evidence sought.’”
    
    Id.
     (quoting 
    4 Pa. Code § 105
    .14a(a)(2)).4
    By letter dated January 30, 2020, the Commission denied Mr. Donahue’s
    Subpoena Request, finding that it “failed to provide sufficient explanation as to how
    the documents requested are relevant to the instant appeal.” R. Item No. 10.
    On February 12, 2020, Mr. Donahue filed his Petition for Review with this
    Court, asserting that the Commission’s January 30, 2020 letter is appealable as a
    collateral order. Pet. for Review, ¶ 5. As to the merits, Mr. Donahue avers that the
    documents requested “are directly relevant to the case he is trying to prove” and
    “essential to proving that the Commonwealth is not obeying proper procedures in state
    hiring.” 
    Id., ¶¶ 3, 16
    . Mr. Donahue asks this Court to order DHS to produce documents
    responsive to his Subpoena Request. 
    Id., ¶ 18
    .
    On July 22, 2020, the Commission filed an Application for Summary Relief,5
    asserting that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition for Review because the
    January 30, 2020 letter is not an appealable order under the Pennsylvania Rules of
    Appellate Procedure.
    On March 12, 2020, this Court issued an Order, stating in relevant part:
    Because it appears that the Commission’s January 30, 2020 letter is not a
    final order as defined by Pa.[]R.A.P. 341, and it is not readily apparent
    4
    This regulation provides that a “[w]ritten application” for a subpoena “shall specify as
    clearly as possible the relevance of the testimony or documentary evidence sought.” 
    4 Pa. Code § 105
    .14a(a)(2) (emphasis added). The regulation further provides that “[a]s to documentary evidence,
    the request must specify to the extent possible the documents desired and the facts to be proved
    thereby.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    5
    This Court may grant an application for summary relief only if the moving party’s right to
    judgment is clear and there are no material issues of fact in dispute. Pa. R.A.P. 1532(b); Eleven
    Eleven Pa., LLC v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 
    169 A.3d 141
    , 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). When ruling
    on an application for summary relief, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    non-moving party. Eleven, 169 A.3d at 145.
    4
    whether the letter is a collateral order as defined by Pa.[]R.A.P. 313, the
    parties shall address the appealability of the Commission’s January 30,
    2020 letter in their principal briefs on the merits or other appropriate
    motion.
    Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 3/12/20, at 1. In compliance with our Order, both parties have
    addressed the appealability issue in their briefs filed with this Court.
    Analysis
    In his Petition for Review, Mr. Donahue asserts that the Commission abused its
    discretion in denying his Subpoena Request. He asserts that the requested documents
    “are essential to proving that the Commonwealth is not obeying proper procedures in
    state hiring.” Pet. for Review, ¶ 16. In particular, Mr. Donahue contends that he “needs
    copies of the [requested] documents . . . so that he can prove that [the] OA is in violation
    of 38 U.S.C. §[]4212.” Donahue Br. at 11.
    Before we can review the merits of Mr. Donahue’s appeal, however, we must
    address the appealability of the Commission’s January 30, 2020 letter, as it implicates
    this Court’s jurisdiction.6
    Generally, a litigant may appeal only from a final order. However, Pa. R.A.P.
    313(a) permits a litigant to file an appeal as of right from a collateral order of an
    administrative agency. Pa. R.A.P. 313(b) defines a “collateral order” as “an order
    separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is
    too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is
    postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Thus,
    an order is immediately appealable as a collateral order if: (1) the order is separable
    from, and collateral to, the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too important
    to be denied review; and (3) the question presented is such that, if review were
    6
    Whether an order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine is a question of law for
    which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Rae v. Pa. Funeral Dirs.
    Ass’n, 
    977 A.2d 1121
    , 1126 n.8 (Pa. 2009).
    5
    postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim would be irreparably lost. H.R. v.
    Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    676 A.2d 755
    , 759 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). These requirements
    must be construed narrowly, and all three prongs must be satisfied before this Court
    may conduct appellate review of a collateral order. Rae, 977 A.2d at 1126.
    With regard to the first prong of the collateral order test, “if the resolution of an
    issue concerning a challenged [decision] can be achieved independent from an analysis
    of the merits of the underlying dispute, then the order is separable” from the main cause
    of action. MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Res., LLC v. Clean Air Council, 
    71 A.3d 337
    , 342 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (en banc). Here, in his appeal before the Commission,
    Mr. Donahue alleges that DHS “is intentionally adding a Spanish[-]speaking
    requirement to every outside hiring announcement” and “using the language
    requirement to keep [him] out.” R. Item No 1. In its January 30, 2020 letter, the
    Commission stated that it denied Mr. Donahue’s Subpoena Request because he failed
    to specify how the requested documents were relevant to the issues before the
    Commission, i.e., whether DHS discriminated against Mr. Donahue based on his status
    as a non-Spanish-speaking person. R. Item No. 10; see R. Item Nos. 1, 6.
    In essence, the Commission denied the Subpoena Request on the basis of
    relevance. To determine if that decision was proper, we would not need to examine
    the merits of Mr. Donahue’s underlying claim. In other words, by reviewing the
    language of the Subpoena Request itself, we would be able to determine if the requests
    contained therein are sufficiently specific and relevant to warrant production of the
    items, without actually analyzing whether the OA improperly discriminated against
    Mr. Donahue based on his status as a non-Spanish-speaking person. Therefore, we
    conclude that the Commission’s January 30, 2020 letter is separable from and collateral
    to the main cause of action.
    6
    While Mr. Donahue has satisfied the first prong of the collateral order test, we
    conclude that he fails to satisfy the second and third prongs of the test. With regard to
    the second prong, a decision involves a right too important to be denied review only if
    it is “deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.”
    Geniviva v. Frisk, 
    725 A.2d 1209
    , 1214 (Pa. 1999). “[I]t is not sufficient that the issue
    be important to the particular parties.” 
    Id.
     The claims must be analyzed “in the context
    of the broad public policy interests that they implicate” and not “with respect to the
    specific facts of the case.” 
    Id.
    Here, Mr. Donahue fails to explain how the Commission’s January 30, 2020
    letter denying his Subpoena Request implicates rights beyond those involved in his
    particular case. In his Petition for Review, Mr. Donahue contends that he needs the
    requested documents to prove his discrimination case before the Commission. See Pet.
    for Review, ¶¶ 3, 16. The averments in his Petition for Review relate only to how the
    Commission’s January 30, 2020 letter impacts his ability to succeed in his appeal
    before the Commission; he identifies no broad public policy interests implicated by the
    letter. See also Donahue Answer to Appl. for Summ. Relief, ¶ 3 (averring that the
    requested documents “are directly relevant to the case [before the Commission]
    because they contain the information [Mr. Donahue] needs to make his case”). Thus,
    Mr. Donahue fails to satisfy the second prong of the collateral order test.
    Finally, we agree with the Commission that meaningful review of the January
    30, 2020 letter will be available to Mr. Donahue after the Commission issues a final
    decision in the underlying case. By objecting to the denial of his Subpoena Request in
    the proceedings before the Commission, see Donahue Br., Bates Stamp 4, Mr. Donahue
    has preserved the issue for future appeal to this Court. Cf. Quinn v. Pa. State Civil
    Serv. Comm’n, 
    703 A.2d 565
    , 570 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (on appeal from the
    Commission’s final order denying the petitioner’s statutory appeal, this Court
    7
    concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to issue certain
    requested subpoenas, because the proposed witnesses’ testimonies were irrelevant to
    the issues raised in the petitioner’s appeal alleging discrimination in the scoring of his
    civil service exam). Therefore, Mr. Donahue fails to satisfy the third prong of the
    collateral order test.
    For these reasons, we conclude that the Commission’s January 30, 2020 letter
    does not satisfy all three requirements for appellate review of a collateral order under
    Pa. R.A.P. 313. See Melvin v. Doe, 
    836 A.2d 42
    , 47 (Pa. 2003) (“[E]ach prong of the
    collateral order doctrine must be clearly present before an order may be considered
    collateral.”).7
    Conclusion
    Accordingly, because we conclude that the Commission’s January 30, 2020
    letter is not an appealable order under Pa. R.A.P. 313, we grant the Commission’s
    Application for Summary Relief and dismiss Mr. Donahue’s Petition for Review.
    7
    In a separately filed motion, Mr. Donahue asks this Court, in the alternative, to direct the
    Commission to “reissue” its January 30, 2020 letter denying his Subpoena Request in the format of
    an order. Mr. Donahue claims that such a change in format would render the letter appealable under
    Pa. R.A.P. 313. We disagree. Reformatting the letter would not automatically render it appealable,
    as it is the substance of the decision that determines whether it is a collateral order. See Pa. R.A.P.
    313(b); Ben v. Schwartz, 
    729 A.2d 547
    , 551-52 (Pa. 1999). Even if the letter were reformatted as an
    order, it would still not be appealable at this time for the reasons explained above.
    In that same motion, Mr. Donahue also asks this Court to “remove” Appeal No. 30412 to the
    Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, asserting that “neither [the Commission] nor [the OA] has
    a mechanism in place for enforcing 
    38 U.S.C. § 4212
    .” Mr. Donahue claims that “he will likely get
    better treatment in a common pleas court, where he has access to discovery through . . . the
    [Pennsylvania] Rules of Civil Procedure.” Donahue Br. at 21-22. However, as the Commission
    correctly notes, the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas does not have jurisdiction to hear Appeal
    No. 30412, as such jurisdiction lies exclusively with the Commission. See 71 Pa. C.S. § 3003(7)(ii).
    Therefore, we deny Mr. Donahue’s “Motion to Require [the Commission] to Reissue its
    Denial in the Format of an Order and to Remove the Underlying Proceeding to a Court.”
    8
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Sean M. Donahue,                    :
    Petitioner       :
    :
    v.                            : No. 164 C.D. 2020
    :
    State Civil Service Commission      :
    (Department of Human Services),     :
    Respondent      :
    PER CURIAM
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 14th day of December, 2020, we hereby GRANT the
    Application for Summary Relief filed by the State Civil Service Commission
    (Commission), DISMISS the Petition for Review filed by Sean M. Donahue, and
    DENY Mr. Donahue’s Motion to Require the Commission to Reissue its Denial in
    the Format of an Order and to Remove the Underlying Proceeding to a Court.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 164 C.D. 2020

Judges: PER CURIAM

Filed Date: 12/14/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/14/2020