M.M. Frantz v. UCBR ( 2020 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Marlene M. Frantz,                           :
    Petitioner                 :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation                    :
    Board of Review,                             :    No. 1474 C.D. 2019
    Respondent                  :    Argued: June 8, 2020
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                           FILED: July 7, 2020
    Marlene M. Frantz (Claimant) petitions for review of the October 4,
    2019 order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, which affirmed
    a referee’s decision finding that Claimant had voluntarily quit her employment
    without a necessitous or compelling cause and was, therefore, ineligible for
    unemployment compensation benefits (benefits) under Section 402(b) of the
    Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 Upon review, we affirm.
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §
    802(b). Section 402(b) provides that an employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any
    week in which his/her unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a
    necessitous and compelling nature.
    The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. Claimant was in a
    longstanding relationship with Charles S. Nemeth (Nemeth), the owner of King
    Kone and the Jungle Kafe (King Kone), an ice cream business. Finding of Fact
    (F.F.) 2; Certified Record (C.R.) at 105.2 Claimant worked for a third party
    (Employer) as a full-time assistant manager of King Kone from January 1, 2015,
    through June 28, 2019. F.F. 1; C.R. at 105. In late 2014, Nemeth entered into a
    purchase agreement to sell the business to Employer, but the agreement required
    Employer to keep Claimant and Nemeth employed until the sale was finalized. F.F.
    3; C.R. at 105.
    More specifically, the purchase agreement, dated December 15, 2014,
    required Employer to make annual payments for a period of five years, with a final
    payment due and owing on August 1, 2020, during which time Claimant would
    remain employed. C.R. at 90. The purchase agreement further provided Claimant
    and Nemeth with the option of extending their employment for three years past the
    August 1, 2020 date.
    Id. Claimant was
    fully aware of the terms of the purchase
    agreement. F.F. 4; C.R. at 105. Following negotiations with Employer with respect
    to increased wages and vacation time in late 2018/early 2019, Employer agreed to
    promptly pay the remaining balance due under the purchase agreement. F.F. 5; C.R.
    at 106. As a condition of this accelerated payment, however, Claimant and Nemeth
    agreed to a cessation of their employment upon the final payoff which was scheduled
    for June 28, 2019, and was later extended to July 3, 2019.3 F.F. 6; C.R. at 106. In
    2
    The certified record does not include page numbers. The citations to the certified record
    contained herein will refer to the page of the certified record in PDF format as submitted to this
    Court.
    3
    The record reveals that Claimant and Nemeth executed an amendment to the original
    purchase agreement on December 31, 2018, which included a waiver of their option to extend their
    2
    anticipation of the closing of the sale of the business, Claimant and Nemeth informed
    Employer that June 28, 2019, would be the last day of their employment. F.F. 7;
    C.R. at 106. Thus, “[C]laimant voluntarily left her job as a condition of the sale[] of
    the business.” F.F. 8; C.R. at 106.
    On July 3, 2019, Claimant initiated a claim for benefits via the internet.
    C.R. at 9-12. By notice of determination mailed July 24, 2019, the Department of
    Labor & Industry (Department) denied benefits to Claimant, concluding that she was
    ineligible under Section 402(b) of the Law, because she had voluntarily quit her
    employment without a necessitous or compelling reason. C.R. at 34-36. Claimant
    appealed to a referee, who scheduled and held a hearing on August 15, 2019, at
    which Claimant, Nemeth, and Employer testified.
    Id. at 38-41,
    48, 59, 64-89. The
    referee affirmed the Department’s determination. Referee’s Decision & Order at 2,
    C.R. at 107. Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed the referee’s decision.
    Board’s Order at 2, C.R. at 122.
    The Board adopted the referee’s findings in their entirety, except that
    the Board amended the referee’s Finding of Fact 8 to read that “[C]laimant
    voluntarily quit due to personal reasons.” Board’s Order at 1, C.R. at 121. The
    Board resolved all conflicts in testimony in favor of Employer.
    Id. The Board
    noted
    that Nemeth called Employer on June 27, 2019, to inform Employer that the next
    day would be Nemeth’s and Claimant’s last day of work, which constituted a
    voluntary quit.
    Id. The Board
    also noted that Employer credibly testified that
    Claimant and Nemeth celebrated their last day with “flowers, balloons, friends
    visiting, and photographs.”
    Id. employment for
    a period of three years after August 1, 2020, the original closing date for the sale
    of King Kone. See C.R. at 100-01. The record also reveals that Claimant and Nemeth executed
    affidavits on June 22, 2019, whereby they agreed that their employment would cease entirely upon
    Employer’s final payoff. See C.R. at 96-97.
    3
    The Board indicated that “[t]he totality of the circumstances demonstrates a
    conscious intention to quit.”
    Id. Finally, the
    Board stated that any issues with
    respect to Claimant’s continued employment under the purchase agreement, and her
    argument that she could not have quit her employment on June 28, 2019, in light of
    the same, were “contractual legal issues” not relevant to the Board’s consideration
    of whether Claimant had voluntarily quit her employment.
    Id. Before this
    Court,4 Claimant argues as follows:
    The question posed to the court for consideration is
    whether a prior owner [Nemeth] when transferring the
    business (identified as King Kone) pursuant to a fully
    executed Business Purchase Agreement which contains a
    guarantee of continued employment (IA) for [Claimant]
    until the business is in fact transferred, can in any way
    deny benefits to [Claimant] based on some form of alleged
    voluntary/conscious dismissal of [e]mployment, when it is
    impossible to be unemployed under the Agreement until
    transfer of the Business pursuant to Section IA of the
    Business Purchase Agreement is perfected (via full
    payment of existing purchase from [Employer to
    Nemeth]?
    Claimant’s Brief at 3. In other words, Claimant appears to argue that she cannot be
    deemed to have voluntarily quit her employment when her continued employment
    is required in accordance with the terms of the purchase agreement, and, consistent
    with the subsequent amendment to this agreement and affidavit, her employment
    could only cease after the final payoff by Employer. We disagree.
    This Court addressed an identical issue in the companion case of
    Nemeth v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1473
    C.D. 2019, filed July 7, 2020), and the reasoning in that case applies equally herein.
    4
    This Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether substantial evidence
    supported necessary findings of fact, whether errors of law were committed or whether
    constitutional rights were violated. Johns v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    87 A.3d 1006
    ,
    1009 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
    4
    The fact that the purchase agreement required Claimant’s continued employment
    until the final payoff was made has no bearing on the determination of whether her
    actions constituted a voluntary quit such that she is precluded from receiving
    benefits. Claimant, similar to Nemeth in the companion case, voluntarily chose to
    forgo her continued employment with Employer in consideration of Nemeth
    receiving an accelerated payoff to complete the purchase agreement. Claimant
    executed an affidavit on June 22, 2019, while still employed, whereby Claimant
    agreed that her employment with King Kone would terminate upon final payoff
    under the purchase agreement, effectively renouncing any right she had to continued
    employment. Further, Claimant simply ceased working after June 28, 2019, without
    cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. Like Nemeth, Claimant’s actions in
    this regard render her ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law. See
    Monaco v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    565 A.2d 127
    (Pa. 1989); Greenray
    Indus. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    135 A.3d 1140
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016);
    Wise v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    111 A.3d 1256
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015);
    Middletown Twp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    40 A.3d 217
    (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2012).
    Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    5
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Marlene M. Frantz,                   :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation            :
    Board of Review,                     :   No. 1474 C.D. 2019
    Respondent          :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 7th day of July, 2020, the October 4, 2019 order of
    the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1474 C.D. 2019

Judges: Fizzano Cannon, J.

Filed Date: 7/7/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/7/2020