P. Rojas v. Lehigh County Office of the DA ( 2020 )


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  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Peter Rojas,                                 :
    Appellant             :
    :
    v.                                     : No. 1451 C.D. 2019
    : SUBMITTED: April 24, 2020
    Lehigh County Office of the                  :
    District Attorney                            :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE CEISLER                                FILED: July 16, 2020
    Peter Rojas (Rojas), pro se, appeals from an order of the Court of Common
    Pleas of Lehigh County (trial court). The trial court denied and dismissed Rojas’s
    appeal from a decision of the Right to Know Appeals Officer (Appeals Officer) for
    the Lehigh County District Attorney’s Office (DA) upholding the DA’s denial of
    Rojas’s request for information under the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL).1 The DA
    determined the requested information was exempt from disclosure under Section
    708(b)(16) and (17) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(16) (records “relating to or
    resulting in a criminal investigation”) and (17) (records “relating to a noncriminal
    investigation”), and was also prohibited from disclosure under Section 9106(c)(4) of
    the Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA), 18 Pa. C.S. § 9106(c)(4)
    (precluding disclosure of “investigative and treatment information” from criminal
    1
    Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101 – 67.3104.
    justice system records, except to “a criminal justice agency which requests the
    information in connection with its duties . . .”). After thorough review, we affirm
    the trial court’s order.
    I. Background
    Rojas is an inmate at a state correctional institution. In March 2019, he
    submitted an RTKL request to the DA seeking a video recording made by the
    Allentown Police Department (Police) in May 2009. Original Record (O.R.), Item
    #4, Ex. A-1. The video purportedly showed a Police interrogation of Rojas in which
    he gave a confession that was later introduced in court at his criminal trial. The DA,
    through its Right to Know Officer, denied the request because it sought investigative
    information that was exempt from disclosure under the RTKL and prohibited from
    disclosure under CHRIA. O.R., Item #4, Ex. C-1.
    Rojas appealed from the DA’s determination. O.R., Item #4, Ex. A-2. The
    Appeals Officer2 upheld the DA’s denial of the information request. See O.R., Item
    #15 (trial court’s opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a)).3
    Rojas next appealed the Appeals Officer’s decision to the trial court. O.R.,
    Item #4. After reviewing the record, the trial court issued an order in August 2019
    denying and dismissing Rojas’s appeal.4 O.R., Item #10. In a footnote to its order,
    2
    Rojas initially directed his appeal to the Office of Open Records (OOR), which transferred
    the appeal to the Right to Know Appeals Officer (Appeals Officer) for the Lehigh County District
    Attorney’s Office (DA). See Original Record (O.R.), Item #4, Ex. A-4. Neither party challenges
    the propriety of the OOR’s transfer of that appeal.
    3
    The Appeals Officer’s decision itself is not in the record. However, neither party
    challenges the trial court’s statement that the Appeals Officer denied and dismissed Rojas’s appeal.
    4
    Rojas alleges the trial court initially scheduled a status conference for October 2019, but
    then, without waiting for the scheduled conference, issued an order denying and dismissing Rojas’s
    2
    the trial court opined that the requested information was exempt from disclosure
    under the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(16)(ii), as a custodial interrogation related to
    a criminal investigation. The trial court found: “Police or other law enforcement
    documentation of information received by alleged suspects is considered criminal
    investigative information exempted from disclosure under the RTKL.” O.R., Item
    #10 (citing Pa. State Police v. Grove, 
    161 A.3d 877
    , 392-893 (Pa. 2017)). “Such
    records remain exempt from disclosure even after the investigation is completed.”
    Id. (citing Burros
    v. Martin, 
    92 A.3d 1243
    , 1250 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)).
    In addition, the trial court concluded the requested information was prohibited
    from disclosure under CHRIA. The trial court found the police interrogation video
    constituted investigative information.              See
    id. (citing 18
    Pa. C.S. § 9102
    (investigative information is material obtained as a result of any inquiry regarding a
    criminal incident or allegation of criminal wrongdoing)). Noting that Rojas is not a
    member of a criminal justice agency, the trial court determined the interrogation
    video was precluded from release to him under the CHRIA, and as a result, was also
    exempted from disclosure under Section 305(a)(3) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.305(a)(3).
    O.R., Item #10.
    Rojas then appealed to this Court.
    II. Issues
    On appeal,5 Rojas asserts several arguments, which we reorganize and
    paraphrase for clarity as follows:
    appeal. Although the trial court docket does not reflect the scheduling of a status conference, an
    October 3, 2019 notation on the docket does indicate that a status conference was cancelled.
    5
    This Court’s review of an appeal in a Right-to-Know Law (RTKL) matter is limited to
    determining whether the trial court committed an error of law and whether its findings of fact were
    supported by substantial evidence. California Borough v. Rothey, 
    185 A.3d 456
    , 462 n.6 (Pa.
    3
    1.      The trial court committed legal error and abused its discretion by
    finding the requested information was exempt from disclosure under the RTKL,
    without requiring the DA to sustain its burden of proving exemption from disclosure.
    The DA offered no evidence to sustain its burden, and its mere statements of law
    were not sufficient to sustain its burden of proof. The trial court also improperly
    issued its decision without conducting a status conference, which it had already
    scheduled, and at which Rojas would have been able to explain and argue his
    position.
    2.      The trial court acted arbitrarily by finding the primary purpose of the
    video was criminal investigation. According to a written Police policy, the purpose
    of video recordings was to document Police conduct during interrogations (rather
    than to document information related to a criminal investigation), and the trial court
    admitted the Police also use such video recordings for training purposes. In this
    regard, the trial court misapplied the analysis of Grove, 
    161 A.3d 877
    . At a
    minimum, the trial court should have ordered redaction of the audio portion of the
    recording and production of the video portion.
    3.      The video, which was introduced in court, was also subject to disclosure
    as a record of a judicial agency. The trial court erred by determining that only
    financial records of a judicial agency are subject to disclosure.
    4.      The trial court acted unreasonably in finding that CHRIA prohibited
    disclosure of the video as a matter of law.
    Cmwlth. 2018) (citing Paint Twp. v. Clark, 
    109 A.3d 796
    , 803 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)). However,
    construction of the RTKL is a question of law over which this Court exercises plenary, de novo
    review. California 
    Borough, 185 A.3d at 462
    n.6 (citing Hearst Television, Inc. v. Norris, 
    54 A.3d 23
    , 29 (Pa. 2012)).
    4
    III. Discussion
    A. Burden of Proving Exemption from Disclosure
    Rojas argues the trial court committed legal error and abused its discretion by
    finding the video he requested from the DA was exempt from disclosure under the
    RTKL. Rojas asserts the trial court failed to hold the DA to its burden of proving an
    exemption from disclosure under the RTKL. Rojas contends the DA could not
    sustain that burden solely with statements of law; rather, the DA had to offer
    evidence, but did not do so. Rojas also reasons that because the trial court scheduled
    a status conference, it acted improperly when it then issued a decision without
    waiting to conduct that conference. Rojas suggests if he had been able to participate
    in the status conference as scheduled, he could have explained and supported his
    position. We discern no merit in these arguments.
    The DA is a local agency for RTKL purposes. Pennsylvanians for Union
    Reform v. Centre Cty. Dist. Att’y’s Office, 
    139 A.3d 354
    , 356 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
    Section 302 of the RTKL requires a local agency to provide access to public records
    upon request. 65 P.S. § 67.302.
    Section 102 of the RTKL defines a “record” as:
    [i]nformation, regardless of physical form or characteristics, that
    documents a transaction or activity of an agency and that is created,
    received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction,
    business or activity of the agency. The term includes a document,
    paper, letter, map, book, tape, photograph, film or sound recording,
    information stored or maintained electronically and a data-processed or
    image-processed document.
    65 P.S. § 67.102. The video recording Rojas seeks is a “record” as defined in the
    RTKL.
    5
    Section 102 of the RTKL defines a “public record” as a “record, including a
    financial record, of a Commonwealth or local agency that: (1) is not exempt under
    section 708 [of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708]; (2) is not exempt from being disclosed
    under any other Federal or State law or regulation or judicial order or decree; or (3)
    is not protected by a privilege.” 65 P.S. § 67.102. Under Section 708(a)(1) of the
    RTKL, a local agency denying a record request has the burden of establishing by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the requested record is exempt from public
    access and therefore not a public record. See 65 P.S. § 67.708(a)(1).
    Section 708(b)(16)(ii) of the RTKL exempts from disclosure any agency
    record “relating to or resulting in a criminal investigation,” including
    “[i]nvestigative materials, notes, correspondence, videos and reports.” 65 P.S.
    § 67.708(b)(16)(ii). The RTKL does not define the phrase “criminal investigation,”
    but our Supreme Court has observed that the term “clearly and obviously refers to
    an official inquiry into a possible crime.” 
    Grove, 161 A.3d at 893
    .
    Applying these definitions here, the video at issue undisputedly documented
    the Police’s interrogation of Rojas as part of a criminal investigation of a death.
    Although Rojas argues the DA was required to offer evidence rather than merely
    legal assertions in order to sustain its burden of proof, he fails to explain what
    evidence was required beyond this undisputed fact.
    Similarly, despite his assertion that he should have been allowed to offer
    evidence or arguments at a status conference before the trial court issued its decision,
    Rojas offers no description of what evidence or arguments he would have offered or
    how he believes they would have impacted the trial court’s decision. In fact, the
    record provides no support for Rojas’s assertion that he would have been allowed to
    offer either evidence or arguments at a status conference. Assuming he could have
    6
    done so, however, and further assuming he would have presented in the trial court
    the same arguments he makes on appeal to this Court, they would not have altered
    the outcome in the trial court, for all the reasons stated herein.
    The trial court did not err in concluding the video was exempt as a matter of
    law from disclosure under the RTKL.
    B. Purpose of the Video at Issue
    In a related argument, Rojas contends the trial court erred in finding that a
    criminal investigation was the primary purpose of the video. He argues that because
    the primary purpose of the video was not related to a criminal investigation, the
    video was not exempt from disclosure. This argument, too, lacks merit.
    Rojas points to a written Police policy requiring documentation of “the
    conduct of interrogations and recording of confessions. . . .” Br. of Appellant, Ex.
    B at 5.6 Rojas asserts that under this policy, video recordings are used to document
    Police conduct during performance of interrogations, rather than the interrogations
    themselves. We believe that in the context of the policy, the word “conduct” is not
    used in the sense of documenting behavior by officers of the Police, but rather, in
    the sense of documenting that the interrogation was performed. In either event,
    however, the policy statement relates to documentation of a criminal investigation,
    which is exempt from disclosure under the RTKL.
    Rojas also contends the trial court “admitted” the video was used for training
    purposes. Br. of Appellant at 10. This is a mischaracterization of the trial court’s
    6
    We note that Exhibit B to Rojas’s brief includes several pages that are not part of the
    record. We do not consider any information outside the record. Pa. R.A.P. 1921 & Note; HYK
    Constr. Co. v. Smithfield Twp., 
    8 A.3d 1009
    , 1016-17 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); see also Sanders v.
    Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Marriott Corp.), 
    756 A.2d 129
    , 133 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (briefs are
    not part of the record and appellate court may not consider facts outside the record). However,
    page 5 of Exhibit B to Rojas’s brief is part of the record. See O.R., Item #4, Ex. B-2.
    7
    statement. In a footnote to its order, the trial court observed, in part: “Whether the
    interrogation video can be used by the [Police] for other purposes not related to
    criminal investigation, like training, does not change the primary use of the video at
    issue which is to investigate an incident which ultimately resulted in the filing of
    charges against [Rojas].” O.R., Item #10 at 1-2 n.1 (emphasis added). Thus, the
    trial court did not find the video was used for training purposes; rather, the trial court
    merely commented that any potential additional uses of the video did not alter its
    primary purpose of documenting a criminal investigation.
    In his alternative argument, Rojas insists that even if the audio portion of the
    recording constituted documentation of a criminal investigation, the video portion
    did not. Based on the analysis in Grove, Rojas reasons the trial court here should
    have ordered redaction of the audio portion of the recording and production of the
    video portion.7 We do not reach the merits of this argument.
    7
    In Pennsylvania State Police v. Grove, 
    161 A.3d 877
    (Pa. 2017), the requester sought
    access to two mobile video recordings relating to a traffic accident. The recordings were generated
    automatically when police officers responded to the accident scene. The Pennsylvania State Police
    denied the request for the recordings, claiming they were exempt as investigatory records. The
    OOR sustained the requester’s appeal, and the State Police sought judicial review. The State Police
    argued the recordings were criminal investigative records because they depicted a vehicle accident
    that resulted in traffic citations, which are summary criminal offenses.
    Ultimately, affirming a decision of this Court, our Supreme Court held the recordings were
    not automatically exempt from disclosure as criminal investigative records under Section 708 of
    the RTKL or under CHRIA. Rather, the State Police had the burden of establishing that the
    recordings were investigative records, a determination our Supreme Court concluded must be
    made on a case-by-case basis.
    Id. at 894.
            Our Supreme Court found the video components of the recordings in Grove were not
    exempt from disclosure, because they did not depict the accident itself. They showed only the state
    troopers at the accident scene, interacting with drivers and bystanders.
    Id. Further, the
    State Police
    acknowledged in Grove that the information for the criminal citations did not come from the
    recording, but from witness interviews. Accordingly, the video portions of the recordings were
    subject to disclosure under the RTKL.
    Id. 8 As
    the trial court correctly found, and as the DA correctly observes, Rojas did
    not raise this alternative argument for the first time until his statement of issues on
    appeal pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b), after he filed his notice of appeal from the
    trial court’s order. See O.R., Item #15 (trial court’s opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P.
    1925(a), observing that Rojas first raised his redaction argument in his statement of
    issues pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)); Item #4 (appeal to trial court from decision
    of DA’s Appeals Officer affirming DA’s denial of records request); Item #4, Ex. A-
    2 (appeal from initial denial of information request). Therefore, he has failed to
    preserve this issue for our review. Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 
    32 A.3d 287
    , 291 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (“issues not raised before the trial court cannot be
    raised for the first time on appeal or in a Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement of [Errors
    Complained of] on Appeal”). Accordingly, the issue is waived.
    C. Judicial Agency Records
    Rojas next asserts the video was subject to disclosure as a judicial agency
    record, and the trial court erred in concluding that disclosure of judicial agency
    records is limited to financial records. We disagree.
    As set forth above, the DA is a local agency, not a judicial agency.
    Pennsylvanians for Union 
    Reform, 139 A.3d at 356
    ; see also Miller v. Cty. of Centre,
    
    173 A.3d 1162
    , 1163-64 (Pa. 2017). Accordingly, its records are not judicial agency
    records.
    To the extent Rojas suggests the video is a judicial agency record because of
    its introduction in court8 at his criminal trial, that argument is irrelevant. He is not
    seeking the video from the trial court. Even if he were, the limitation of disclosure
    of judicial records to production of financial records would still prevent disclosure
    8
    A court is a “judicial agency” as defined by Section 102 of the RTKL. 65 P.S. § 67.102.
    9
    of the video. See 
    Miller, 173 A.3d at 1163
    (“[u]nder the RTKL, only the financial
    records of a judicial agency are subject to disclosure in response to RTKL requests”)
    (citing Section 304 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.304). The trial court’s finding on that
    issue was correct.
    D. CHRIA’s Prohibition of Disclosure
    Finally, Rojas argues the trial court erred in finding that CHRIA precluded the
    DA from producing the video in response to the RTKL request. Rojas’s argument
    is without merit.
    CHRIA, in pertinent part, governs the dissemination and disclosure of
    criminal history record information. Specifically, Section 9106(c)(4) of CHRIA
    prohibits disclosure of “investigative information” except to criminal justice agents
    and agencies:
    Investigative and treatment information shall not be disseminated to
    any department, agency or individual unless the department, agency or
    individual requesting the information is a criminal justice agency which
    requests the information in connection with its duties, and the request
    is based upon a name, fingerprints, modus operandi, genetic typing,
    voice print or other identifying characteristic.
    18 Pa. C.S. § 9106(c)(4).
    Section 9102 of CHRIA defines “investigative information” as “[i]nformation
    assembled as a result of the performance of any inquiry, formal or informal, into a
    criminal incident or an allegation of criminal wrongdoing. . . .” 18 Pa. C.S. § 9102.
    The word “assemble,” in this context, means to “‘bring or gather together into a
    group or whole.’” California Borough v. Rothey, 
    185 A.3d 456
    , 467 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2018) (quoting Pa. State Police v. Kim, 
    150 A.3d 155
    , 160 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016);
    citing Am. Heritage Dictionary 134 (2nd Coll. ed. 1985)).
    Section 9102 of CHRIA defines a “criminal justice agency” as:
    10
    [a]ny court, including the minor judiciary, with criminal jurisdiction or
    any other governmental agency, or subunit thereof, created by statute
    or by the State or Federal constitutions, specifically authorized to
    perform as its principal function the administration of criminal justice,
    and which allocates a substantial portion of its annual budget to such
    function. Criminal justice agencies include, but are not limited to:
    organized State and municipal police departments, local detention
    facilities, county, regional and State correctional facilities, probation
    agencies, district or prosecuting attorneys, parole boards, pardon
    boards, the facilities and administrative offices of the Department of
    Public Welfare that provide care, guidance and control to adjudicated
    delinquents, and such agencies or subunits thereof, as are declared by
    the Attorney General to be criminal justice agencies as determined by
    a review of applicable statutes and the State and Federal Constitutions
    or both.
    18 Pa. C.S. § 9102 (emphasis added). Thus, the DA is a criminal justice agency.
    In California Borough, information routinely recorded on a holding cell
    surveillance video showed an altercation between a police officer and an arrestee
    awaiting arraignment. As part of a criminal investigation into the police officer’s
    conduct, the police chief downloaded the information stored on the video and gave
    it to the district attorney for evaluation. This Court concluded the police chief
    thereby “assembled” criminal investigation information within the meaning of
    CHRIA. California 
    Borough, 185 A.3d at 467
    . Consequently, CHRIA precluded
    disclosure of the video to an individual requester.
    Id. Here, the
    trial court correctly determined that the video of Rojas’s
    interrogation by Police was investigative. Indeed, Rojas does not dispute that it
    related to an “inquiry, formal or informal, into a criminal incident or an allegation
    of criminal wrongdoing.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 9102. Although the record does not
    expressly demonstrate that the Police provided a copy of the video to the DA, Rojas
    does not explain how it would otherwise be in the DA’s possession for presentation
    as evidence at his trial, and Rojas neither contends nor cites authority suggesting that
    11
    he could compel the DA to produce information not in its possession. Therefore, as
    in California Borough, the Police here presumably “assembled” investigative
    information within the meaning of 18 Pa. C.S. § 9106(c)(4) by providing the
    information on the video to the DA for review. Accordingly, the restriction on
    disclosure set forth in Section 9106(c)(4) of CHRIA was applicable.
    Contrary to Rojas’s assertion, he is not a criminal justice agency as defined in
    Section 9102 of CHRIA, nor is he rendered such by his pro se status. Rather, he is
    an individual litigating an information request against a criminal justice agency, the
    DA. Nothing in the definition of a criminal justice agency suggests that it includes
    an agency’s opposing party in an administrative proceeding. See 18 Pa. C.S. § 9102.
    Under Section 102 of the RTKL, information restricted from disclosure under
    another state law is not a public record subject to disclosure under the RTKL. 65
    P.S. § 67.102. The trial court correctly found that CHRIA prohibited the DA from
    releasing the video to any person other than a criminal justice agency. Accordingly,
    the video was not subject to disclosure in response to Rojas’s RTKL request.
    IV. Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the DA correctly refused
    to produce the video of Rojas’s interrogation by Police. We affirm the trial court’s
    order denying and dismissing Rojas’s appeal from the Appeals Officer’s decision
    upholding the DA’s determination.
    __________________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    12
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Peter Rojas,                       :
    Appellant        :
    :
    v.                           : No. 1451 C.D. 2019
    :
    Lehigh County Office of the        :
    District Attorney                  :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 16th day of July, 2020, the order of the Court of Common
    Pleas of Lehigh County is AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1451 C.D. 2019

Judges: Ceisler, J.

Filed Date: 7/16/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/16/2020