C. Talbert v. DOC G. Little ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Charles Talbert, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 125 M.D. 2022
:
Department of Corrections; :
George Little, :
Respondents : Submitted: October 21, 2022
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE CEISLER FILED: March 21, 2023
Before this Court are an Application for Summary Relief filed by Charles
Talbert and a Cross-Application for Summary Relief filed by the Department of
Corrections and George Little (together, DOC)1 in this Court’s original jurisdiction.
Because we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and
DOC’s right to relief is clear, we deny Mr. Talbert’s Application for Summary Relief
and grant DOC’s Cross-Application for Summary Relief.
Background
On December 18, 2019, the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
(Trial Court) sentenced Mr. Talbert to 29 months to 60 months’ incarceration for
possessing an instrument of crime, followed by a consecutive sentence of 1 to 2
years’ incarceration for recklessly endangering another person. The sentencing
order states in relevant part:
1
Mr. Little is the former Secretary of DOC.
Credit for time served if applicable on this case. Sentence is
consecutive to any other sentence being served. Court recommends
[State Correctional Institution (SCI)-]Waymart for mental health and
drug treatment. While incarcerated[,] defendant to have anger
management, drug and mental health treatment, job training. Upon
release[,] defendant to continue mental health and drug treatment,
random urinalysis, seek and maintain employment, stay away from
both victims. . . .
Mandamus Pet., Ex. 1 (emphasis added).
On March 23, 2022, Mr. Talbert filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus
(Mandamus Petition) in this Court’s original jurisdiction, seeking to compel DOC to
credit his sentence for time served and to either transfer him to SCI-Waymart for
mental health treatment or release him on parole.2
On April 4, 2022, Mr. Talbert filed an Application for Summary Relief,
asserting that he has a clear right to have DOC fully implement the sentence imposed
by the Trial Court. Specifically, Mr. Talbert seeks pre-sentence time credit “from
the date of arrest, up until being released on bail (59 days), [a]nd from the date of
his bail being revoked, up until his sentence (344 days).” Mandamus Pet. ¶ 11. Mr.
Talbert asks this Court “to fix his minimum sentence date to February 23, 2022,
and[] . . . put him on the parole list.” Talbert Appl. for Summ. Relief at 1. Mr.
Talbert also asks this Court to direct DOC to provide him with “the anger
2
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Taglienti v. Dep’t of Corr., 806 A.2d
988, 991 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). “This Court may only issue a writ of mandamus where the petitioner
possesses a clear legal right to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty, the
[respondent] possesses a corresponding duty to perform the act, and the petitioner possesses no
other adequate or appropriate remedy.” Detar v. Beard, 898 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
2
management, drug, and mental health treatment” that the Trial Court “ordered [him]
to receive while in DOC custody.” Id.; see Mandamus Pet. ¶ 16(B).3
On August 3, 2022, DOC filed a Cross-Application for Summary Relief,
asserting that Mr. Talbert has failed to establish a clear right to mandamus relief.
DOC asserts that the Trial Court did not direct DOC to apply the specific credit Mr.
Talbert seeks. DOC also asserts that although the Trial Court recommended that Mr.
Talbert be housed at SCI-Waymart, it is within DOC’s discretion to determine
where, and under what conditions, to house Mr. Talbert. According to DOC, the
Pennsylvania Parole Board and DOC have exclusive “authority over the treatment
conditions, programming, and employment aspects of [Mr. Talbert’s] sentence.”
DOC Appl. for Summ. Relief ¶ 39.
Analysis
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532(b) provides that “[a]t any
time after the filing of a petition for review in an . . . original jurisdiction matter the
court may on application enter judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is clear.”
Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). “An application for summary relief is properly evaluated
according to the standards for summary judgment.” Myers v. Com., 128 A.3d 846,
849 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). In ruling on a motion for summary relief, we must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and may enter
judgment only if: (1) there are no genuine issues of material fact; and (2) the right
to relief is clear as a matter of law. Nw. Youth Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare,
1 A.3d 988, 990 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). “The record, for purposes of [a] motion
for summary relief, is the same as [the] record for purposes of a motion for summary
3
Mr. Talbert also previously filed an Application for Peremptory Relief and an Application
for Preliminary Injunction, both of which this Court denied.
3
judgment.” Summit Sch., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 108 A.3d 192, 195 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2015).
First, Mr. Talbert asserts that he was entitled to credit for time served and it
was DOC’s responsibility to figure out exactly how much time should be credited to
his sentence. In response, DOC asserts that it cannot sua sponte apply credit to Mr.
Talbert’s sentence without clear direction from the sentencing court. We agree with
DOC.
Here, the Trial Court’s sentencing order did not identify specific dates of
credit to be applied to Mr. Talbert’s sentence, nor did it unambiguously award him
credit. Rather, the sentencing order merely stated: “Credit for time served if
applicable on this case.” Mandamus Pet., Ex. 1 (emphasis added). Our courts have
consistently denied relief to a petitioner seeking a modification or recalculation of
his sentence where the sentencing order was either silent as to credit or ambiguous
in stating that the petitioner should receive “credit for time served.” See, e.g.,
McCray v. Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127, 1133 (Pa. 2002) (holding that DOC had
no duty to credit the petitioner’s sentence for time served because the sentencing
order did not indicate that he was to receive credit for time served); Hoyt v. Dep’t of
Corr., 79 A.3d 741, 742 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (sustaining DOC’s preliminary
objections to a mandamus petition where the sentencing order was silent as to credit);
Canfield v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 585 M.D. 2016, filed Aug. 11, 2017),
slip op. at 2, 4 (sustaining DOC’s preliminary objections to a mandamus petition
where the sentencing order did not indicate a specific number of days for which
credit should be given, merely stating that the petitioner was to receive “credit for
time served as allowed by law”); Mullen v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 328
M.D. 2013, filed Jan. 30, 2014), slip op. at 4-6 (sustaining DOC’s preliminary
4
objections to a mandamus petition where the sentencing order did “not clearly
require credit for the . . . period at issue”).4 In Canfield, this Court explained:
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to correct an error in DOC’s
computation of maximum and minimum dates of confinement where
the sentencing order clearly gives the inmate credit for the time period
in question and DOC’s computation does not comply with that credit.
It cannot be used to challenge DOC’s failure to give credit where the
sentencing order is either ambiguous or does not provide the credit at
issue. The requirements for mandamus cannot be satisfied in those
circumstances because there is no clear right to relief and because the
inmate has an adequate and more appropriate alternative remedy of
seeking modification or clarification of the sentence in the trial court.
Canfield, slip op. at 3-4 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see Terrell v.
Facility Mgr. at SCI-Mahoney State Prison (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 95 M.D. 2020, filed
Nov. 19, 2020), slip op. at 6 (“[M]andamus cannot be used to challenge the failure
to award credit when the sentencing order is either ambiguous or does not provide
the specific credit at issue.”) (emphasis added).
We agree with DOC that the sentencing order in this case was ambiguous with
regard to credit. The sentencing order did not specify an amount of credit to be
applied, stating only that “credit for time served” would be given “if applicable.” As
explained above, mandamus cannot be used to challenge DOC’s failure to apply
credit where the sentencing order is ambiguous. Therefore, we conclude that DOC
has a clear right to relief on this issue.5
4
Pursuant to this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, unreported decisions of this Court,
issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited for their persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
5
Our courts have held that when a sentencing court does not give an inmate full credit for
time served, the appropriate remedy is to seek modification or clarification from the sentencing
court or through the direct appeal process, not through a mandamus action in this Court. See
McCray, 872 A.2d at 1133; Hoyt, 79 A.3d at 743; see also Mullen, slip op. at 5 (holding that where
5
Second, Mr. Talbert asserts that DOC is obligated to provide him with mental
health and drug treatment while he is in custody, rather than commit him to “the
restrictive housing unit where his mental health has, and continues to, contrarily
deteriorate without the treatment.” Talbert Reply Br. at 4. Mr. Talbert avers that
instead of providing him with the treatment recommended by the Trial Court, DOC
“sent him to [a] maximum security prison[], in long[-]term restrictive housing, for
behavior that resulted from his ‘untreated’ anger, drug, and mental health issues.”
Mandamus Pet. ¶ 19. Mr. Talbert further avers:
[Mr. Talbert] has the following serious mental disorders: anxiety, [post-
traumatic stress disorder], [attention deficit hyperactivity disorder],
bipolar, paranoia schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder, and
borderline personality disorder. Instead of being treated for these
conditions, . . . DOC has established and maintained a campaign of
punishing [Mr. Talbert] with more and more isolated confinement for
behavior directly related to the symptoms of his mental illness.
Talbert Br. in Support of Appl. for Prelim. Inj. at 1-2 (emphasis added). Mr. Talbert
contends that by keeping him in “long[-]term isolated confinement alone,” DOC has
“cause[d] him to suffer permanent psychological harm.” Id. at 4; see also Talbert
Answer to DOC New Matter ¶¶ 16, 19-20 (averring that “keeping [Mr. Talbert] in
long-term isolated confinement” continues to aggravate “his pre[]existing physical
and mental health issues”).
However, as this Court previously recognized, since the filing of his
Mandamus Petition and Application for Summary Relief, Mr. Talbert has been
transferred out of the restrictive housing unit at SCI-Camp Hill; he is now
permanently housed at SCI-Coal Township. Talbert v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth.,
a sentencing order did not unambiguously require the credit the petitioner sought, his remedy was
to seek modification or clarification of the sentence from the trial court).
6
No. 125 M.D. 2022, filed Oct. 18, 2022), slip op. at 2 (unpaginated). Therefore, the
adverse conditions Mr. Talbert allegedly suffered while in restrictive housing at SCI-
Camp Hill, which formed the basis of both his Mandamus Petition and Application
for Summary Relief, no longer exist. Id.
Furthermore, while the sentencing court may make recommendations to DOC,
DOC has the ultimate authority to determine where and under what conditions an
inmate will be housed. See 37 Pa. Code § 93.11(a) (“An inmate does not have a
right to be housed in a particular facility or in a particular area within a facility.”);
Lopez v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 119 A.3d 1081, 1085 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (“‘It is entirely
a matter of [DOC’s] discretion where to house an inmate.’”) (citation omitted), aff’d,
144 A.3d 92 (Pa. 2016); Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)
(“[J]udges may not indiscriminately denominate the place a prisoner is housed[.]”).
Moreover, “[m]andamus does not lie to compel [DOC] employees to exercise their
discretion in a particular way, even if th[is] Court believes it has been exercised
incorrectly.” Clark, 918 A.2d at 160-61. Thus, even though the Trial Court
recommended that Mr. Talbert be housed at SCI-Waymart for mental health
treatment, DOC was not bound by that recommendation. Rather, DOC avers that,
since Mr. Talbert has been in DOC’s custody, it “has provided [him] with reasonable
and appropriate mental health care” and “has recommended reasonable and
appropriate programming for [him].” DOC Appl. for Summ. Relief ¶¶ 41-42.6
There is nothing in the record to suggest that SCI-Coal Township, where Mr. Talbert
is now confined, is incapable of providing the treatment he needs. Therefore, we
conclude that DOC has a clear right to relief on this issue.
6
According to DOC, “[Mr. Talbert] has an extensive misconduct history of refusing to
obey orders and threatening [DOC] employees, sometimes with threats of physical harm, making
it difficult for [DOC] employees to communicate with him.” DOC Appl. for Summ. Relief ¶ 43.
7
Conclusion
We conclude, based on our review of the record, that (1) Mr. Talbert has not
established a clear right to relief, and (2) DOC has established a clear right to relief.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). Accordingly, this Court denies Mr. Talbert’s Application
for Summary Relief and grants DOC’s Cross-Application for Summary Relief.
____________________________
ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Charles Talbert, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 125 M.D. 2022
:
Department of Corrections; :
George Little, :
Respondents :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of March, 2023, this Court hereby DENIES the
Application for Summary Relief filed by Charles Talbert and GRANTS the Cross-
Application for Summary Relief filed by the Department of Corrections and George
Little.
____________________________
ELLEN CEISLER, Judge