J.E. Eddington v. Det. D. Bixler ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •               IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Jason Edward Eddington,                :
    Appellant             :
    :    No. 1040 C.D. 2019
    v.                        :
    :    Submitted: January 31, 2020
    Detective David Bixler, Detective      :
    Sergeant Jeffrey Snell, West           :
    Manchester Township Police             :
    Department, Senior Deputy              :
    Prosecutor Seth Bortner, Office of The :
    District Attorney York County,         :
    Administrator George Jacobs,           :
    York County Drug Task Force,           :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania           :
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    PER CURIAM                                                 FILED: May 11, 2020
    Jason Edward Eddington (Eddington) appeals, pro se, from the March 11,
    2019 order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County (trial court), which sustained
    the preliminary objections to Eddington’s “Petition for Writ of Replevin” (Complaint)
    for legal insufficiency, based on the statute of limitations, filed by Detective David
    Bixler, Detective Sergeant Jeffrey Snell, West Manchester Township Police
    Department, Senior Deputy Prosecutor Seth Bortner, Office of The District Attorney
    of York County, Administrator George Jacobs, York County Drug Task Force, and the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (collectively, Defendants). The trial court also denied
    the motion for summary judgment filed by Eddington.
    On May 21, 2018, Eddington filed his Complaint against Defendants in
    the trial court. As alleged in the Complaint, on July 25, 2012, Eddington had personal
    property items located inside of a locked vehicle that was parked at a parking lot on
    Bannister Street in York, Pennsylvania. (Complaint ¶10.) Eddington averred that the
    personal property items in the vehicle included (1) a pair of size 10 Reebok sneakers;
    (2) colostomy supplies; and (3) a “zipped closed camouflaged medication/travel bag
    containing [his] camouflaged wallet that contained [$4,770.00] dollars cash that was
    nudged under the passenger side seat.” Id. ¶11. According to Eddington, the total
    value of his personal items was $5,145.00. Id. ¶12.
    Eddington asserted that on July 25, 2012, “one or more of the
    Defendant[s] . . . unlawfully searched and seized [Eddington’s] said personal/private
    property/items from the inside cab of the . . . vehicle, and have continued to maintain
    the unlawful retention of [his] said property/items.” Id. ¶13. Eddington averred that
    he has made numerous requests for the return of his personal items, including
    submitting motions for return of the property, but that Defendants have refused to
    return his items “despite numerous requests.” Id. ¶15. Eddington also asserted that on
    March 23, 2015, Senior Deputy Prosecutor Seth Bortner and Administrator George
    Jacobs “acted together with the knowledge and intent to conspire and commit the
    criminal offenses of [p]erjury and/or [f]raud with intent to deceive” when they filed a
    “[p]etition for [f]orfeiture and [a]ffidavit based upon allegations that are documented
    and proven to be false, [] which includes but is certainly not limited to the date and
    year [Eddington’s] personal/private/property items were unlawfully searched and
    seized by the Commonwealth.” Id. ¶21.
    In the Complaint, Eddington alleged that Defendants’ seizure of and
    failure to return his items constituted an unreasonable search and seizure and
    infringement of his due process rights in violation of the United States and
    Pennsylvania Constitutions. Id. ¶¶14, 16-20. He also stated that the “Commonwealth
    [] ha[d] failed to seek and/or institute a [c]ivil [c]laim for [f]orfeiture in a timely manner
    as required” and, therefore, that the “[p]etition for [f]orfeiture must fail as a [m]atter of
    2
    [l]aw.” Id. ¶22. Eddington asserted that his personal property items should be
    immediately returned to him; accordingly, he sought an order granting the “immediate
    RETURN OF ALL [HIS] PROPERTY,” as well as monetary damages. Id. ¶¶ 23-24
    (emphasis added). Attached to the Complaint were two affidavits, dated July 30, 2015,
    and September 17, 2015, respectively, in which Eddington verified that his personal
    items were seized on July 25, 2012. (Complaint, Ex. Nos. A-B.)
    Thereafter, Defendants filed preliminary objections to the Complaint, in
    the nature of a demurrer, on the grounds that Eddington’s claims were barred by the
    applicable statute of limitations and/or sovereign immunity and that Eddington could
    not recover monetary damages on his claims. Eddington filed a response to the
    preliminary objections. Moreover, before the trial court decided the preliminary
    objections, Eddington filed a motion for summary judgment containing a number of
    allegations that were not raised in the Complaint.
    On March 11, 2019, the trial court sustained Defendants’ preliminary
    objections based on the statute of limitations, denied Eddington’s motion for summary
    judgment, and dismissed the Complaint. In its opinion, the trial court noted that on
    July 25, 2012, the West Manchester Police Department (WMPD) arrested Eddington
    for theft by deception, criminal conspiracy to commit theft by deception, and theft by
    unlawful taking in relation to a roofing and tree trimming scam. (Trial court op., March
    11, 2019, at 2.) The trial court found that Detective David Bixler of the WMPD
    acquired a warrant for the search of a white Dodge Ram pick-up truck, and the items
    inventoried in the search were listed in Exhibit B to the Complaint. Id. The trial court
    observed that Eddington previously filed motions for return of property in the
    underlying criminal proceedings on May 6, 2013, September 20, 2013, December 31,
    2013, January 27, 2014, and March 25, 2014. Id. The court also noted that on March
    23, 2015, Senior Deputy Prosecutor Seth Bortner filed a petition for forfeiture
    3
    regarding Eddington’s personal items. According to the trial court, the prior motions
    for return of property and petition for forfeiture remain unresolved. Id.
    With respect to the instant matter, the trial court concluded that the
    defense of the statute of limitations may be raised via preliminary objections when the
    defense appears on the face of the pleading. Id. at 5. Although the trial court noted
    that Eddington argued in his response that preliminary objections are not the proper
    place to raise affirmative defenses, the trial court determined that “when a defense is
    so clear on the face of the pleading, the court may rule on it during the preliminary
    objection stage.” Id.
    The trial court concluded that the statute of limitations for replevin actions
    is two years and that the statute “does not begin to run until the right to bring an action
    arises; and the right to bring an action arises only upon an act by the possessor that is
    inconsistent with the owner’s rights.” Id. (citing Fenton v. Ballick, 
    821 F. Supp. 2d 755
    , 761 (E.D. Pa. 2011)). The trial court also determined that a replevin claim arises
    when a “defendant’s possession is ‘open, notorious, and under claim of right.’” (Trial
    court op., March 11, 2019, at 5) (quoting Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric
    Institute of the Medical College of Pennsylvania, 
    103 F.3d 294
    , 300 (3d Cir. 1996)).
    The trial court held that “[n]ot only ha[d] the statute of limitations run, but
    [Eddington’s] claim exceed[ed] it by three years, nine months, and twenty-seven days.”
    (Trial court op., March 11, 2019, at 5.)
    The trial court also observed that Eddington argued in his response that
    his claim was timely because the statute of limitations on a conversion claim does not
    begin to run until the plaintiff has made a demand for the property and the defendant
    has refused to deliver the property. Id. at 5-6. However, the trial court concluded that
    Eddington was mistaken because his claim was for replevin, rather than conversion.
    Id. at 6. Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that even if Eddington had made a
    conversion claim, Eddington had “made numerous demands for the return of his
    4
    property to which Defendants [had] ignored or refused” and, therefore, the statute of
    limitations had run on either a conversion or replevin claim. Id.
    Finally, the trial court recognized that Eddington argued that the “trigger
    date” starting the running of the statute of limitations occurred on April 26, 2017, when
    the Superior Court denied his appeal in the criminal matter. Id. However, the trial
    court determined that Eddington was mistaken and that the statute of limitations began
    when Eddington “could have first maintained a successful action.” Id. According to
    the trial court, the “correct start of the statute of limitations would have been when the
    Defendants exerted control over [Eddington’s] property that was inconsistent with [his]
    ownership” and that Eddington “could have chosen to pursue his [r]eplevin [a]ction at
    that point” but “chose not to.” Id. The trial court held that the “correct time to file the
    action would have been from July 25, 2012 to July 25, 2014,” but that Eddington “did
    not file until May 21, 2018, almost four years beyond that date.” Id. Thus, the trial
    court sustained Defendants’ preliminary objections.
    After Eddington filed his appeal, the trial court directed him to file a
    statement of errors complained of on appeal (Statement). Eddington filed his Statement
    on April 23, 2019. In addition to contending that the trial court erred in concluding
    that the statute of limitations had run, Eddington argued, inter alia, that the trial court
    erred in not conducting a hearing, issuing an order, and dismissing the
    Commonwealth’s petition for forfeiture, and in failing to conduct a return of property
    hearing pursuant to Eddington’s motions for return of property.
    On April 24, 2019, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Rule
    1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), which
    relied on and incorporated its earlier opinion. (Trial court op., April 24, 2019, at 1.)
    The trial court also noted that the issues Eddington raised regarding his motions for
    return of property and the Commonwealth’s petition for forfeiture were “not before
    [the court], and therefore were not addressed” and that “[t]hese matters complained of
    5
    were part of [Eddington’s] criminal matters originally addressed by the [trial court]
    [c]rimnial [d]ivision docketed at CP-67-CR-7170-2012, CP-67-CR-7172-2012, CP-
    67-CR-7173-2012, and CP-67-CR-8156-2012.” Id. at 1-2.
    On appeal,1 Eddington argues that (1) the trial court erroneously dismissed
    his Complaint; (2) the dismissal of his Complaint violated the United States and
    Pennsylvania Constitutions and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal and Civil
    Procedure; and (3) the trial court erroneously calculated the date when Eddington had
    an opportunity to file his Complaint and erroneously calculated the statute of
    limitations. Throughout his brief, Eddington makes a multitude of arguments that are
    somewhat indecipherable, but appears to argue in support of the merits of his
    Complaint, as well as to attack his underlying criminal conviction.                          Despite
    Eddington’s many contentions, the only issue germane to his appeal is whether the trial
    1
    “Our review of a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing a
    complaint is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error
    of law.” Szoko v. Township of Wilkins, 
    974 A.2d 1216
    , 1219 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). When
    “reviewing preliminary objections, all well pleaded relevant and material facts are to be considered
    as true, and preliminary objections shall only be sustained when they are free and clear from doubt.”
    
    Id.
     Moreover, “such review raises a question of law as to which our standard of review is de novo
    and our scope of review is plenary.” 
    Id.
    The question presented by a demurrer “is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with
    certainty that no recovery is possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be
    sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it.” MacElree v. Philadelphia
    Newspapers, Inc., 
    674 A.2d 1050
    , 1054 (Pa. 1996). “In determining whether the trial court properly
    sustained preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine the averments in the complaint,
    together with the documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to evaluate the sufficiency of the
    facts averred.” Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 
    87 A.3d 1014
    , 1025 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
    6
    court erred in sustaining Defendants’ preliminary objections and dismissing the
    Complaint based on the statute of limitations.2, 3
    We now turn to whether the trial court correctly concluded that the statute
    of limitations had run on Eddington’s claim.4 As Eddington filed an action in replevin,
    2
    In his appeal, Eddington appears to attack the constitutionality of his underlying criminal
    conviction. He also repeatedly raises issues relating to the motions for return of property he filed in
    his underlying criminal proceedings. However, because the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.
    §§9541-9546, is the exclusive state law remedy for persons challenging allegedly illegal convictions,
    we are unable to address the constitutionality of issues relating to his conviction. See Commonwealth
    v. Hall, 
    771 A.2d 1232
    , 1234 (Pa. 2001) (holding that the Post Conviction Relief Act is the exclusive
    state law remedy for challenging allegedly illegal convictions). Additionally, because Eddington filed
    the several motions for return of property in conjunction with his underlying criminal proceedings,
    they are not part of the instant civil matter. Hence, the only issue presently before this Court is
    whether the trial court erred in sustaining Defendants’ preliminary objections to Eddington’s replevin
    action.
    3
    After the parties submitted briefs in this matter, Eddington filed a letter with this Court
    seeking to update this Court regarding supposedly newly received relevant issues of fact. However,
    because this was not the proper method to communicate with the Court, we will not consider it. See
    Rule 2501(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 2501(a) (providing that
    after a case has been submitted on briefs, no communications may be made to the Court “except upon
    application”).
    4
    We observe that Defendants raised the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations in
    their preliminary objections to Eddington’s replevin action. Eddington’s brief contains no argument
    or discussion regarding whether it was improper for Defendants to raise a statute of limitations
    defense in their preliminary objections; accordingly, the issue is waived. See City of Philadelphia v.
    Berman, 
    863 A.2d 156
    , 161 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (holding that a party’s failure to develop an
    issue in the argument portion of his brief constitutes waiver of the issue). However, even if Eddington
    had not waived the issue, we would conclude that the trial court did not err in permitting Defendants
    to raise a statute of limitations defense in their preliminary objections.
    Although an affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations typically must be raised in
    new matter, where the defense is clearly applicable from the face of the pleadings and the opposing
    party has not filed preliminary objections to the preliminary objections, the defense may be raised in
    preliminary objections. McCulligan v. Pennsylvania State Police, 
    123 A.3d 1136
    , 1140 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2015), aff’d, 
    135 A.3d 580
     (Pa. 2016); Davis v. Commonwealth, 
    660 A.2d 157
    , 159 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1995); Factor v. Goode, 
    612 A.2d 591
    , 592 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). More specifically, we have held
    that while it is ordinarily improper to raise a statute of limitations defense in preliminary objections,
    7
    we initially provide a brief overview regarding replevin claims. “The action of replevin
    is founded upon the wrongful taking and detention of property and seeks to recover
    property in the possession of another.” Valley Gypsum Co. v. Pennsylvania State
    Police, 
    581 A.2d 707
    , 710 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). Thus, “[r]eplevin is a possessory action
    in which the issues are plaintiff’s title and right of possession. The primary relief
    sought is the return of the property itself, the damages being merely incidental.” 
    Id.
     In
    order to be successful in a replevin action, the plaintiff must show not only that he has
    title, but that he also has the right to immediate possession. International Electronics
    Co. v. N. S. T. Metal Products Co., 
    88 A.2d 40
    , 42-43 (Pa. 1952); Marinkovich v.
    Vitteck (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1079 C.D. 2018, filed March 27, 2019), slip op. at 3 n.3;
    Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Caiazzo, 
    564 A.2d 931
    , 933 (Pa. Super. 1989). Under
    Pennsylvania law, replevin actions have a two-year statute of limitations. Bundy v.
    “[w]here a party erroneously asserts substantive defenses in
    preliminary objections rather than to [sic] raise these defenses by
    answer or in new matter, the failure of the opposing party to file
    preliminary objections to the defective preliminary objections, raising
    the erroneous defenses, waives the procedural defect and allows the
    trial court to rule on the preliminary objections.”
    Borough of Nanty Glo v. Fatula, 
    826 A.2d 58
    , 64-65 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (quoting Preiser v.
    Rosenzweig, 
    614 A.2d 303
    , 305 (Pa. Super. 1992)); see also Scavo v. Old Forge Borough, 
    978 A.2d 1076
    , 1078-79 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (same). Moreover, a response to the preliminary objections is an
    inadequate mechanism to contest the manner by which the defendant asserted the statute of
    limitations; instead, to challenge the defense the plaintiff must file his own preliminary objection to
    strike the defense from the defendant’s preliminary objections. Schneller v. Prothonotary of
    Montgomery County (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1316 C.D. 2016, filed September 12, 2017), slip op. at 6-7;
    Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 
    87 A.3d 1014
    , 1022 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Pursuant to this
    Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, an unreported opinion of the Court filed after January 15,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value. 
    210 Pa. Code §69.414
    (a).
    In the instant matter, although Eddington challenged the manner by which Defendants raised
    the statute of limitations defense in his response to their preliminary objections, he did not file
    preliminary objections to Defendants’ preliminary objections. Accordingly, even if Eddington had
    not waived the issue of whether Defendants improperly asserted the statute of limitations defense by
    not developing it in his brief, he also waived any procedural defect by not properly raising the issue
    before the trial court. See Schneller, slip op. at 6-7; Borough of Nanty Glo, 
    826 A.2d at 64-65
    .
    8
    Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 553 M.D. 2016, filed April 12, 2019), slip op. at 12 n.7,
    appeal filed, (Pa., No. 27 WAP 2019, filed May 13, 2019); Robinson Coal Co. v.
    Goodall, 
    72 A.3d 685
    , 689-90 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    The trial court concluded that the two-year statute of limitations on
    Eddington’s replevin claim began when he could have first maintained a successful
    action, which in its view occurred when Eddington’s personal items were seized, i.e.,
    on July 25, 2012, and that Eddington filed the Complaint nearly four years beyond the
    expiration of the statute of limitations. We agree.
    “In Pennsylvania, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff could have
    first maintained the action to a successful conclusion.” Fine v. Checcio, 
    870 A.2d 850
    ,
    857 (Pa. 2005). Therefore, “the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right
    to institute and maintain a suit arises.” 
    Id.
     “Normally, a cause of action accrues at the
    time the injury is inflicted.” Pennock v. Lenzi, 
    882 A.2d 1057
    , 1060 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2005). For replevin actions, the cause of action accrues when a plaintiff’s property is
    wrongfully taken or detained. See Robinson Coal Co., 
    72 A.3d at 690
    ; Douglas v.
    Joseph, 656 F. App’x 602, 605 (3d Cir. 2016).
    Here, Eddington alleged that his property was wrongfully seized by
    Defendants on July 25, 2012. Therefore, his cause of action accrued on that date and
    his statute of limitations expired two years later on July 25, 2014. See Robinson Coal
    Co., 
    72 A.3d at 690
    ; Douglas, 656 F. App’x at 605. Yet, Eddington did not file his
    Complaint until May 21, 2018, which was nearly four years after the expiration of the
    statute of limitations.5
    5
    While the Complaint is styled as a replevin action, we note that Eddington also alleges in
    the Complaint that Defendants violated his rights under the United States and Pennsylvania
    Constitutions. However, where plaintiffs allege violations of the United States Constitution and seek
    relief pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. §1983
    , such claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations in
    Pennsylvania. Morgalo v. Gorniak, 
    134 A.3d 1139
    , 1149 n.13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016); Burger v.
    9
    Eddington argues that his cause of action did not accrue until April 2017,
    when the Superior Court denied his appeal in the underlying criminal matter. However,
    Eddington provides no legal authority to support his position that the instant replevin
    action did not accrue prior to the Superior Court denying his appeal in the separate
    criminal matter.6
    We recognize that the so-called “discovery rule applies to toll the statute
    of limitations in any case in which a party is reasonably unaware of his or her injury at
    the time his or her cause of action accrued.” Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 
    15 A.3d 479
    , 485 (Pa. 2011). Under the discovery rule, “the point at which a party should have
    been reasonably aware of his or her injury and its cause” fixes the commencement date
    of the statute of limitations period. 
    Id.
    There is nothing in the allegations of the Complaint to suggest that
    Eddington was unaware that his property was taken on the actual date of its seizure,
    July 25, 2012. Nevertheless, even if Eddington was initially unaware that his property
    was seized, the Complaint makes clear that Eddington was aware of the seizure
    relatively soon after it occurred.
    For example, Eddington alleged in the Complaint that he has made
    numerous requests for the return of his personal items, including submitting motions
    Borough of Ingram, 
    697 A.2d 1037
    , 1041 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). Similarly, claims brought under the
    Pennsylvania Constitution are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. Storch v. Miller, 
    585 A.2d 1173
    , 1174 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991); see also Metzger v. Pike County (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 432 C.D.
    2012, filed December 13, 2012), slip op. at 18-19; McGinness v. Nazareth Borough (E.D. Pa., No.
    CIV.A. 13-7087, filed April 2, 2015), slip op. at 11-12, 
    2015 WL 1511051
    , at *5. Thus, even if
    Eddington’s Complaint could be construed to contain constitutional claims, such claims would still
    be untimely under the two-year statute of limitations.
    6
    Of course, as noted previously, our decision only applies to the statute of limitations for
    Eddington’s instant replevin action and we do not address the statute of limitations for the motions
    for return of property that were filed in the underlying criminal matter.
    10
    for return of property. (Complaint ¶15.) In its opinion, the trial court observed that
    Eddington previously filed motions for return of property in his criminal proceedings
    on May 6, 2013, September 20, 2013, December 31, 2013, January 27, 2014, and
    March 25, 2014. (Trial court op., March 11, 2019, at 2.) Our review of the trial court’s
    docket in Eddington’s underlying criminal matters, at CP-67-CR-7170-2012, CP-67-
    CR-7172-2012, CP-67-CR-7173-2012, and CP-67-CR-8156-2012, confirms that
    Eddington did, indeed, file motions for return of property on these dates.7 Thus, even
    if Eddington was initially unaware that his property was taken, his filing of several
    motions for return of property in his criminal proceedings establishes that he was aware
    his property had been seized by March 25, 2014, at the latest, meaning the two-year
    statute of limitations for his replevin claim expired by March 25, 2016, or over two
    years before he filed the instant action.8
    7
    It is well-established that courts may take judicial notice of official court records, including
    public docket entries, when deciding preliminary objections. See Doxsey v. Commonwealth, 
    674 A.2d 1173
    , 1174 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); see also Barnes v. Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth.,
    No. 41 M.D. 2017, filed August 28, 2017), slip op. at 2 n.1; Pryor v. PA Dept. of Corrections (Pa.
    Cmwlth., No. 355 M.D. 2015, filed April 27, 2016), slip op. at 9-10.
    8
    Eddington also argues that the statute of limitations on a “conversion” claim does not begin
    to run until a plaintiff makes a demand for the property and the defendant refuses to deliver it, but
    that here, Defendants have not refused to return his property. The Complaint does not mention a
    conversion claim and there is nothing in the Complaint to remotely suggest that Eddington raised a
    claim sounding in conversion, as opposed to replevin. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that
    Eddington brought a conversion claim, we agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations on
    such a claim has run. See Trial court op. at 6.
    “Conversion is a tort by which the defendant deprives the plaintiff of his right to a chattel or
    interferes with the plaintiff's use or possession of a chattel without the plaintiff's consent and without
    lawful justification.” Pittsburgh Construction Co. v. Griffith, 
    834 A.2d 572
    , 581 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    “Although the exercise of control over the chattel must be intentional, the tort of conversion does not
    rest on proof of specific intent to commit a wrong.” L.B. Foster Co. v. Charles Caracciolo Steel &
    Metal Yard, Inc., 
    777 A.2d 1090
    , 1095 (Pa. Super. 2001). “A plaintiff has a cause of action in
    conversion if he or she had actual or constructive possession of a chattel at the time of the alleged
    conversion.” Pittsburgh Construction Co., 
    834 A.2d at 581
    . In Pennsylvania, conversion claims, like
    replevin claims, are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Mikkilineni v. Amwest Surety
    11
    Additionally, Eddington attached two affidavits to the Complaint, dated
    July 30, 2015, and September 17, 2015, respectively, in which he verified that his
    personal items were seized on July 25, 2012. (Complaint, Ex. Nos. A-B.) These
    affidavits demonstrate that Eddington knew that his property had been seized as of July
    2015 and September 2015, respectively. Consequently, even if we were to use the later
    of these two dates as the date when Eddington discovered that his property had been
    taken, the two-year statute of limitations would have expired on September 17, 2017,
    which was nearly a year before he filed the Complaint in this action.
    Although the Complaint does not contain any allegations suggesting that
    Eddington was unaware his property was seized on July 25, 2012, the Complaint’s
    averments and attachments, as well as official record in his criminal proceedings,
    establish that Eddington knew his property was taken by September 2015, at the latest.
    Accordingly, reliance on the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations would not
    salvage Eddington’s otherwise untimely claims.
    Insurance Co., 
    919 A.2d 306
    , 313 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Wm. B. Tenny, Builder and Developer v.
    Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 
    448 A.2d 1073
    , 1076 (Pa. Super. 1982). A conversion cause of
    action does not accrue until the plaintiff makes a demand for the property, and the defendant refuses
    to deliver it. Norriton East Realty Corp. v. Central-Penn National Bank, 
    254 A.2d 637
    , 639 (Pa.
    1969); Wm. B. Tenny, Builder and Developer, 448 A.2d at 1076.
    While Eddington argues that Defendants never refused to return his property, the Complaint
    alleges that Eddington “has made numerous requests for the return of” his property, including
    submitting motions for the return of his property, “and Defendants have refused to return said
    property/items back to [Eddington] despite numerous requests.” (Complaint ¶15.) Further, as the
    trial court correctly determined, Eddington’s numerous motions for return of his property in his
    criminal proceedings, which Defendants ignored, establish the demand and refusal requirements that
    triggered the running of the statute of limitations on a conversion claim. See, e.g., Serafini v. Mariani
    (M.D. Pa., No. 3:CV-08-0469, filed March 31, 2010), slip op. at 13-14, 
    2010 WL 1342926
    , at *5-*6
    (holding that the filing of a lawsuit is sufficient to satisfy the demand and refusal elements of a
    conversion action). Therefore, regardless of whether Eddington brought a replevin or conversion
    claim, the statute of limitations has run.
    12
    Because the statute of limitations has run on Eddington’s replevin action,
    we affirm the trial court’s order sustaining Defendants’ preliminary objections and
    dismissing the Complaint.9
    9
    Although we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the instant action was
    untimely, we do not address and do not decide whether Eddington’s motions for return of property,
    filed in his criminal matter, were timely.
    13
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Jason Edward Eddington,                :
    Appellant             :
    :   No. 1040 C.D. 2019
    v.                        :
    :
    Detective David Bixler, Detective      :
    Sergeant Jeffrey Snell, West           :
    Manchester Township Police             :
    Department, Senior Deputy              :
    Prosecutor Seth Bortner, Office of The :
    District Attorney York County,         :
    Administrator George Jacobs,           :
    York County Drug Task Force,           :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania           :
    PER CURIAM
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 11th day of May, 2020, the March 11, 2019 order of
    the Court of Common Pleas of York County is affirmed.