Penn Film Group LLC v. Com. of PA, SEC ( 2023 )


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  •           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Penn Film Group LLC,                     :
    Petitioner   :
    :
    v.                  :   No. 827 C.D. 2021
    :   Argued: December 15, 2022
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,            :
    State Ethics Commission,                 :
    Respondent       :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
    HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
    HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER               FILED: April 18, 2023
    Penn Film Group LLC (PFG) petitions for review of the June 23, 2021 Order
    of the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission (Commission) finding that PFG
    negligently violated the Lobbying Disclosure Law,1 by failing to file its quarterly
    expense reports for the first and second quarters of 2020.           As a result, the
    Commission imposed on PFG the maximum administrative penalty of $117,800.00.
    On appeal, PFG asserts that it did not receive notice of the delinquency or the
    opportunities to cure until June 3, 2021, and upon receipt it immediately cured the
    noncompliance by filing statements indicating that it did not meet the threshold to
    report any expenses. PFG argues that the Commission’s findings are not supported
    by substantial evidence, the Commission’s imposition of the maximum penalty was
    arbitrary, and that the Commission violated PFG’s due process rights by imposing
    such an excessive fee when PFG had no actual notice and no meaningful opportunity
    1
    65 Pa.C.S. §§ 13A01-13A11.
    to defend itself. Upon review, we agree, and accordingly vacate the Commission’s
    Order and remand for further proceedings.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    PFG is a registered principal under the Lobbying Disclosure Law.2 (Final
    Adjudication, Finding of Fact (FOF) ¶ 1.) As a registered principal, PFG is required
    to file quarterly expense reports or statements. Section 13A05 of the Lobbying
    Disclosure Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A05.3 See also 
    51 Pa. Code § 51.3
    (b) (identifying
    the quarters as January through March, April through June, July through September,
    and October through December). Quarterly reports are due no later than the 30th
    day after each quarterly reporting period has ended. 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A05(a).
    PFG filed a quarterly expense report for the fourth quarter of 2019 but did not
    file one for the first or second quarter of 2020. (FOF ¶10.) Both reports were due
    by July 30, 2020.4 (Id.) When PFG did not file its quarterly expense reports, the
    Commission issued a warning letter on August 27, 2020. (Id. ¶ 13; Reproduced
    Record (R.R.) at 24a-26a.) The warning letter was mailed to 2740 Smallman Street,
    Suite 200, Pittsburgh, PA 15222, which is the same address listed on PFG’s
    registration statement. (FOF ¶ 13(a), (b).) The warning letter provided PFG an
    opportunity to cure the alleged noncompliance within 30 days to avoid proceedings
    2
    “Principal” is defined as “[a]n individual, association, corporation, partnership, business
    trust or other entity: (1) on whose behalf a lobbying firm or lobbyist engages in lobbying; or
    (2) that engages in lobbying on the principal’s own behalf.” Section 13A03 of the Lobbying
    Disclosure Law, 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A03. Section 13A04 of the Lobbying Disclosure Law governs
    registration of lobbyists, lobbying firms, and principals. 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A04.
    3
    An expense report is due if total expenses for lobbying exceeded $2,500, whereas a
    statement is acceptable if total expenses were less than $2,500. 65 P.S. § 13A05(d).
    4
    Because of COVID-19, the deadline for the first quarter was extended from April 30 to
    July 30, 2020. (FOF ¶ 10 n.1.)
    2
    being instituted. (Id. ¶ 15.) The 30-day deadline passed, and no expense reports or
    statements were filed. (Id. ¶ 22.)
    On April 12, 2021, the Commission issued a Notice of Alleged
    Noncompliance.     (FOF ¶¶ 18-20; R.R. at 2a-14a.)         A formal administrative
    proceeding was instituted. (R.R. at 32a.) PFG did not file an answer, appeal, or
    request a hearing. (Id.) Thus, the Commission concluded PFG was deemed to have
    admitted the allegations and waived its right to a hearing. (Id.) When neither party
    requested a hearing, the matter was submitted to the Commission for disposition.
    (Id. at 33a.) By letter dated May 20, 2021, Chief Legal Counsel for the Commission
    advised the parties they had until 5:00 p.m. on June 3, 2021, to submit any position
    statements in support of their respective positions. (Id.) On June 3, 2021, the
    Investigative Division of the Commission submitted its position statement, stating,
    until that date, PFG had “made no effort to contact [the Commission] to resolve this
    matter and has not responded to [] counsel’s emails to [PFG]’s authorized
    representative[] on February 9, 2021[,] and May 19, 2021.” (Id. at 34a.) The position
    statement also outlined the other efforts of the Commission, including an email on
    July 31, 2020, and a “robocall” on an unspecified date. (Id. at 35a.) The position
    statement also indicates that PFG’s authorized representative called counsel for the
    Investigative Division that same afternoon after receiving the May 20, 2021 letter.
    (Id.) At 3:32 p.m. that day, PFG’s authorized representative emailed Chief Counsel
    for the Commission requesting until June 8, 2021, to file its position statement. (Id.
    at 36a-37a.) Chief Counsel acknowledged receipt of the request, advised it had been
    submitted to the Commission Chairman for consideration, and suggested PFG
    “submit any position statement as soon as possible” because Chief Counsel did not
    know the Commission’s position concerning the extension. (Id. at 36a.) PFG filed
    3
    its first and second quarter 2020 expense reports that same day. (FOF ¶¶ 19(a),
    21(a); see also R.R. at 83a-86a.) It filed a position statement the following day,
    advising the delinquent expense reports had been filed and there were no expenses
    to report. (R.R. at 39a.) PFG also requested “waiver of any penalties and other
    administrative actions due to extenuating circumstances created by the C[OVID]-19
    pandemic and the resulting orders issued by Governor Wolf.” (Id.) PFG explained
    in its position statement that it “decided to pause lobbying efforts due to film
    inactivity” at the end of 2019, at which time it was fully compliant with its filing
    requirements. (Id.) In March 2020, the executive orders closing non-essential
    businesses, combined with COVID-19 itself, “resulted in a cessation of the film
    industry not just in Pennsylvania but nationwide,” resulting in PFG closing its doors
    and suspending all business activities. (Id.) As a result, PFG claimed no one was
    monitoring emails or in the office to accept mail. (Id.) In January 2021, PFG’s
    sublease ended and it “consolidated space with various sister companies,” although
    PFG had not yet resumed business activities. (Id.) Therefore, its mailing address
    changed from Suite 200 to Suite 205. (Id.) PFG claimed it did not receive the
    certified mail sent to its prior address but had since updated its address in the
    reporting system. (Id.)
    On June 23, 2021, the Commission issued its Final Adjudication and
    accompanying Order. After setting forth the facts, as outlined above, and reviewing
    the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, the Commission concluded the
    failure to file the quarterly expense reports was negligent in nature.        (Final
    Adjudication, Conclusion of Law (COL) ¶ 3.) The Commission explained it has the
    discretion to impose administrative penalties but found “[t]here are no mitigating
    circumstances concerning [PFG]’s failure to timely file [its] [quarterly expense
    4
    reports or statements . . . for the first and second quarters of 2020.]” (FOF ¶ 25; see
    also Final Adjudication at 14 (“[T]here is no basis in the record for imposing less
    than maximum administrative penalties against [PFG].”).) The Commission stated
    Section 13A09(c)(1) provides the administrative penalty for negligent failure to
    report as $50 each day for the first 10 days late, $100 each day for days 11 through
    20, and $200 each day after 20 days late. (Final Adjudication at 15 (citing 65 Pa.C.S.
    § 13A09(c)(1)).)       Accordingly, based on PFG’s 307-day delinquency, the
    Commission calculated the administrative penalty as $58,900 for each quarterly
    report for a total of $117,800.00. (COL ¶ 5; Final Adjudication at 15.) The
    Commission issued its Order to this effect. (R.R. at 56a.)
    Thereafter, PFG sought reconsideration, which the Commission denied. (R.R.
    at 58a-62a, 91a.) PFG filed a timely Petition for Review.
    II.    PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
    Before this Court,5 PFG raises two issues. First, it asserts the Commission’s
    imposition of the maximum fine lacks substantial evidentiary support as PFG’s
    delayed response was due to an unprecedented public health crisis, and immediately
    upon notice of the noncompliance, PFG filed its delinquent quarterly report showing
    no lobbying activity. Second, PFG argues the imposition of the maximum penalty
    under these circumstances violates its due process rights or the Eighth Amendment
    prohibition against excessive fines.
    5
    In reviewing the Commission’s June 23, 2021 Order, this Court’s scope of review “is
    limited to determining whether necessary factual findings are supported by substantial evidence,
    an error of law has been committed or constitutional rights have been violated.” R.H. v. State
    Ethics Comm’n, 
    673 A.2d 1004
    , 1009 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
    5
    As to its first argument, PFG acknowledges the Commission has discretion to
    impose penalties but asserts “it also has a duty to consider each case reasonably and
    fairly to ensure that the severity of any violation fits the chosen penalty.” (PFG’s
    Brief (Br.) at 13 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 
    745 A.2d 1277
    , 1281-82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)).)                  PFG argues the Commission’s
    regulations set forth the factors to consider when fashioning a remedy, and the
    Commission erred in making a “blanket statement” that none of those factors
    existed.    (PFG’s Br. at 14.)        PFG asserts that it immediately contacted the
    Commission once it received actual notice. (Id. at 15.) PFG also asserts that it
    explained its failure to timely file the reports or respond to the Commission’s
    correspondence was the result of the “cessation of its business operations in the face
    of the COVID-19 pandemic.” (Id.) Moreover, PFG contends this was the first time
    it had been involved in disciplinary proceedings related to missing quarterly reports.
    (Id.) Finally, it asserts “that while the reports were late, PFG had nothing to report”
    as there was no money spent on lobbying activity in 2020. (Id.) Thus, PFG asserts
    “[t]here is [] no factual support, let alone substantial support, to justify the
    Commission’s imposition of the maximum statutory fine.” (Id. at 16.)
    PFG further argues that “[t]he arbitrary and excessive nature of [the] penalty
    becomes even more stark upon examination of a substantially similar adjudication
    issued the same day in [In re: Connections Education, 21-005-L].”6 (Id.) According
    6
    A copy of the final adjudication in Connections Education is attached to PFG’s Brief as
    Appendix A. Following argument in this matter, PFG filed a letter indicating there had been a
    change in status of authorities under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2501(b), Pa.R.A.P.
    2501(b). Therein, PFG asserted that the Commission issued a decision on January 24, 2023, in In
    re Allies for Children, No. 22-007-L, that PFG claimed “materially affects the decision in . . .
    Connections Education.” (PFG’s Letter dated Feb. 14, 2023.) The Commission responded Allies
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    6
    to PFG, similar to here, Connections Education did not file the first or second quarter
    2020 lobbying expense reports and did not respond to warnings. While it ultimately
    filed its reports in April 2021 indicating there were no expenses to report,
    Connections Education contacted the Commission two months earlier to indicate
    they would be filed, whereas PFG immediately filed their reports upon actual notice.
    Yet, PFG contends the Commission only imposed a $7,000 fine on Connections
    Education based upon a consent agreement between the parties. (Id. at 16-17.)
    With regard to its due process/excessive fine argument, PFG argues that the
    penalty imposed by the Commission “bears no rational relationship to the gravity of
    the offense it is designed to punish.” (Id. at 19.) PFG asserts that it was assessed a
    “six-figure fine” for “a first-time offense resulting in $0 of unreported lobbying
    activities.” (Id.) PFG argues that “[i]t is also extraordinarily unreasonable to fine
    an entity for failing to adhere to a reporting requirement when the cause of that
    failure is an unprecedented global pandemic.” (Id.) Accordingly, PFG requests that
    this Court vacate the Commission’s Order. In the alternative, the Commission asks
    for Children “does not mention, nor does it have any legal or practical effect on Connections
    Education.” (Commission’s Letter dated Feb. 24, 2023.) Under Rule 2501(b),
    [i]f any case or other authority relied upon in the brief of a party is expressly
    reversed, modified, overruled or otherwise affected so as to materially affect its
    status as an authoritative statement of the law for which originally cited in the
    jurisdiction in which it was decided, enacted or promulgated, any counsel having
    knowledge thereof shall file a letter, which shall not contain any argument,
    transmitting a copy of the slip opinion or other document wherein the authority
    relied upon was affected.
    Pa.R.A.P. 2501(b). Upon review of the Commission’s decision in Allies for Children, we find that
    it does not “expressly reverse[], modif[y], overrule[] or otherwise affect[]” Connections
    Education. Allies for Children makes no mention of Connections Education and is based upon a
    different set of facts. Accordingly, we decline to consider Allies for Children.
    7
    that the fine be modified “to reflect a reasonable penalty that is proportionate to the
    violation and properly accounts for all mitigating circumstances.” (Id. at 1.)
    The Commission points out that PFG, after shutting down for the pandemic,
    neglected to check either its mail or email, failed to change its address on file, and
    failed to file its Expense Reports. (Commission’s Br. at 6-7.) It argues that the
    Lobbying Disclosure Law sets forth the procedure for Notices of Alleged
    Noncompliance, as does its regulations, and failure to file an answer or otherwise
    appeal constitutes a deemed admission, which entitles it to impose a penalty. (Id. at
    7-8 (citing 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.4
    (6), (8).)) Here, the Commission asserts it mailed
    notice to PFG at its registered address and even emailed its authorized representative
    twice, all of which went unanswered. (Commission’s Br. at 8.) The Commission
    asserts that while PFG denied getting the earlier notices, it did receive the last letter,
    which was mailed to the same address. (Id.)
    The Commission further responds that the regulations provide it “may
    consider” the factors set forth in Section 63.6(3) of the Regulations, but it is not
    required to do so. (Commission’s Br. at 9 (emphasis in original).) Even assuming
    the Commission was required to consider these factors, the Commission maintains
    that it was correct in finding that “no factors existed in any meaningful way to lower
    the penalty.” (Id.) Addressing the factors in its brief, the Commission asserts that
    PFG “did not contact the Commission or take any meaningful measures to attempt
    to remedy the delinquency” because PFG ignored email and mail sent to it and failed
    to update its address. (Id. at 10.) The Commission also asserts that the pandemic
    was not a justifiable excuse because PFG makes no allegation as to “how the
    pandemic made it impossible for [PFG] to file [its] expense reports online with the
    Department of State.” (Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).) Moreover, while the
    8
    Commission acknowledges that PFG had not previously violated the Lobbying
    Disclosure Law, it “committed two [] violations in concurr[e]nce.” (Id.) Further,
    the Commission asserts that the facts of the instant matter are distinguishable from
    those in Connections Education because there the principal “was responsive.” (Id.
    at 10.)
    The Commission classifies the issue as one of first impression, noting that the
    cases cited by PFG in support of the alleged unreasonableness of the penalty
    imposed are not Lobbying Disclosure Law cases.              (Id. at 11.)   Even so, the
    Commission asserts that Westinghouse Electric, cited by PFG in its brief, supports
    the imposition of the penalty in this case due to the “protracted failure to comply
    with its duties.” (Id.) The Commission argues PFG is asking the Court “to ignore
    the plain language of the Lobbying Law,” which it cannot do, by requiring the
    Commission to consider the factors in its regulations when there is no requirement
    to do so. (Id. at 11-12.)
    The Commission also argues that it appropriately found that PFG violated the
    Lobbying Disclosure Law by blatantly failing to file expense reports for two
    consecutive quarters, and that the administrative penalty was consistent with the
    Lobbying Disclosure Law and regulations and, as such, neither unreasonable nor
    unconstitutional. The Commission further argues that the facts of the instant case
    are distinguishable from those in Commonwealth v. Heggenstaller, 
    699 A.2d 767
    (Pa. Super. 1997), which PFG cites in support of its claim, because that matter
    involved a criminal statute, the Lobbying Disclosure Law does not recognize
    de minimis violations, and “failing to file expense reports is much more severe than
    failing to pay $28.75,” which was the amount of 911 phone charges underlying the
    $6,550 fine in Heggenstaller. (Commission’s Br. at 12-13.) The Commission
    9
    explains that by failing to timely file its expense reports, PFG thwarted the intent of
    the Lobbying Disclosure Law and “undermined the confidence and integrity of our
    lobbying system.” (Id. at 13.)
    In its reply brief, PFG acknowledges it is not “without fault” and did not
    timely file the quarterly expense reports but asserts its “oversight was reasonable
    given the unprecedented circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the gravity
    of the offense at issue does not warrant the imposition of the maximum allowable
    fine.” (PFG’s Reply Br. at 1.) PFG argues it “halted all operations” meaning: “PFG
    had no lobbying activity to report because it was not engaged in any activity of any
    kind. PFG was not monitoring emails because there was no business activity to
    monitor. PFG was not receiving mail because it had no one present in the office.”
    (Id. at 2.) PFG disputes that it did not act until after a large fine was levied, as the
    Commission asserts, stating within hours of receiving a letter indicating its position
    statement was due, PFG had cured the default by filing the reports, phoned and
    emailed the Commission’s chief counsel, requested additional time to respond, and
    filed a position statement the next day. (Id. at 3-4.) It claims Westinghouse Electric
    does not support the penalty here because the violation there spanned several years,
    involved repeated failure to notify the agency, and resulted in harm to the public, all
    of which were aggravating circumstances. (Id. at 4-5.) PFG acknowledges the
    Commission’s regulations listing factors to consider are permissive, but “the very
    existence of such a list supports the principle that the imposition of the maximum
    fine is not always appropriate or should not be used as a default position.” (Id. at 5.)
    “Regardless of whether the Commission ‘may’ or ‘must’ consider these factors, the
    Commission’s conclusion that none existed (after explicitly citing them) is not
    supported by substantial evidence.” (Id.)
    10
    PFG further replies that “[t]he Commission’s attempt to distinguish
    Heggenstaller is [] misguided.” (Id. at 7.) PFG argues that “[r]egardless of the
    specific statutory scheme that applies, the Constitutional requirement of
    proportionality remains unchanged.”       (Id.)   As for undermining the public’s
    confidence and trust in the lobbying system, PFG asserts that interest is not served
    by mechanically imposing the maximum penalty, and “[t]he responsibility of the
    Commission must be weighed against the rights of PFG as a citizen of the
    Commonwealth.” (Id.)
    III.   DISCUSSION
    Before turning to the merits of PFG’s arguments, a brief overview of the
    statutory and regulatory provisions applicable to the filing of expense reports under
    the Lobbying Disclosure Law, the violation of those provisions, and the concomitant
    penalties associated with such violations will be helpful.
    The intent of the Lobbying Disclosure Law is as follows:
    The Constitution of Pennsylvania recognizes that all free governments
    are founded upon the authority of the people. It further provides that
    the power to make law in this Commonwealth is vested in the General
    Assembly, and the power to enforce law is vested in the Executive
    Department. The Constitution also guarantees the people the right to
    petition those invested with the powers of government for redress of
    grievances. The ability of the people to exercise their fundamental
    authority and to have confidence in the integrity of the processes
    by which laws are made and enforced in this Commonwealth
    demands that the identity and scope of activity of those who are
    paid to influence the actions of the General Assembly and the
    Executive Department be publicly and regularly disclosed.
    Section 13A02(a) of the Lobbying Disclosure Law, 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A02(a)
    (emphasis added). In furtherance of that goal, lobbyists, lobbying firms, and
    principals are required to register with the Department of State (Department).
    11
    Section 13A04 of the Lobbying Disclosure Law, 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A04(a). As part of
    the registration statement, a principal or lobbying firm is required to provide certain
    information to the Department including its permanent address, daytime phone
    number, and the email address of the authorized representative or agent, if available.
    65 Pa.C.S. § 13A04(b)(1). Registration is biennial. 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A04(a).
    Also in furtherance of that goal, there are certain reporting requirements.
    Section 13A05(a) of the Lobbying Disclosure Law provides:
    A registered principal shall, subject to the penalties under 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities), file quarterly
    expense reports with the [D]epartment electronically using the
    computerized filing system developed by the [D]epartment that is
    consistent with the purpose of this chapter no later than 30 days after
    the last day of the quarter.
    65 Pa.C.S. § 13A05(a). Section 13A05(b) of the Lobbying Disclosure Law provides
    for the content of expense reports, stating in pertinent part:
    (1) Each expense report must list the names and registration numbers
    when available of all lobbyists by whom lobbying is conducted on
    behalf of the principal and the general subject matter or issue being
    lobbied.
    (2) Each expense report shall include the total costs of all lobbying for
    the period. The total shall include all office expenses, personnel
    expenses, expenditures related to gifts, hospitality, transportation and
    lodging to State officials or employees, and any other lobbying costs.
    The total amount reported under this paragraph shall be allocated in its
    entirety among the following categories:
    (i) The costs for gifts, hospitality, transportation and lodging
    given to or provided to State officials or employees or their
    immediate families.
    (ii) The costs for direct communication.
    12
    (iii) The costs for indirect communication.
    (iv) Expenses required to be reported under this subsection shall
    be allocated to one of the three categories listed under this section
    and shall not be included in more than one category.
    65 Pa.C.S. § 13A05(b).7
    Section 13A05(d) provides that an expense report is required if total expenses
    for lobbying exceed $2,500 for a registered principal in the reporting period; if where
    a registered principal does not meet the $2,500 threshold for filing an expense report,
    a registered principal shall file a statement to that effect within 30 days of the end of
    the quarter.8 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A05(d). Section 13A06 of the Lobbying Disclosure
    Law sets forth certain exemptions from registration and reporting, which are not
    applicable in the instant matter. 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A06. Pursuant to Section 13A08(g),
    the Commission has the authority to initiate investigations and hold hearings
    concerning any alleged violations. 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A08(g).
    Under the noninvestigative process outlined in the Commission’s regulations,
    prior to issuing a notice of alleged noncompliance for failure to report, the
    Commission will issue a warning notice, giving the recipient 30 days to cure the
    alleged noncompliance. 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.4
    (1)-(2). If not cured within that time
    period, the Commission issues a notice of alleged noncompliance to the authorized
    representative, employee, or agent, identifying the nature of the alleged
    noncompliance and advising of the administrative and criminal penalties possible.
    Section 13A09(a)(1.1), (2) of the Lobbying Disclosure Law, 65 Pa.C.S.
    § 13A09(a)(1.1), (2); 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.4
    (2). If a person disagrees with the alleged
    7
    The Board’s regulations also provide what the quarterly expense report should include.
    See 
    51 Pa. Code § 55.1
    (g).
    8
    According to the Final Adjudication, the Department increased the threshold for reporting
    under Section 13A05 of the Lobbying Disclosure Law from $2,500 to $3,000 in 2017. (R.R. at
    40a.)
    13
    noncompliance, the person may appeal the determination to the Commission. 65
    Pa.C.S. § 13A09(3); 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.4
    (3). The failure to file an answer or request
    a hearing results in the alleged noncompliance being deemed admitted. 65 Pa.C.S.
    § 13A09(5); 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.4
    (6)-(8).
    Section 13A09(b)(3) provides that “[i]f the [C]ommission finds that failure to
    register or report was negligent, it shall determine the amount of the administrative
    penalty to be imposed.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A09(b)(3). “At least four members of the
    Commission . . . must find a violation by clear and convincing proof.” 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.4
    (15). Section 13A09(c)(1) sets forth that a registered principal’s negligent
    failure to report as required under the Lobbying Disclosure Law, “is punishable by
    an administrative penalty not exceeding the following:”
    (i) For the first 10 late days, $50 for each late day.
    (ii) For each late day after the first 10 late days through the 20th late
    day, $100 for each late day.
    (iii) For each late day after the first 20 late days, $200 for each late day.
    65 Pa.C.S. § 13A09(c)(1). The administrative penalty is levied by the Commission,
    following a hearing upon majority vote of all members. 65 Pa.C.S § 13A09(c)(2).
    Relevant to this matter, in determining whether to impose less than the
    maximum penalty, Section 63.6(3) of the Commission’s regulations sets forth
    several factors which the Commission may consider. Section 63.6(3) provides:
    In determining whether to impose an administrative penalty that is less
    than $50-per-day, the Commission may consider factors including the
    following:
    (i) Whether the respondent contacted the Commission or took
    any meaningful measures to attempt to remedy the delinquency,
    deficiency or false statement.
    14
    (ii) Whether the respondent has raised any justifiable excuse such
    as, for example, the following:
    (A) The unavailability of records due to loss, theft or
    destruction through no fault of the respondent.
    (B) Incapacitating physical or mental illness,
    hospitalization, accident involvement, or death of a person
    required to register or report, a person whose participation
    is essential to the filing, or a member of the immediate
    family of the person.
    (iii) Whether the record establishes that the matter involved the
    first instance that the respondent was subject to the
    registration/reporting requirements of the act.
    (iv) Whether Commission records indicate that the Commission
    has previously notified the respondent, in writing, of other
    delinquent, deficient, or false registration statements or reports.
    (v) Whether proceedings have previously been initiated against
    the respondent under the act, either by the Commission or by the
    Office of Attorney General.
    (vi) Whether there are any other factors that should be considered
    as aggravating or mitigating factors in the case.
    
    51 Pa. Code § 63.6
    (3).
    “[T]he primary purpose of a fine or a penalty is twofold[:] to punish violators
    and to deter future or continued violations.” Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 
    98 A.3d 1268
    , 1283 (Pa. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Church, 
    522 A.2d 30
    , 34 (Pa.
    1987)). “[A]dministrative bodies having expertise in specific professional areas are
    to be entrusted to fashion administrative remedies that are fair and appropriate.
    Eckhart v. Dep’t of Agric., 
    8 A.3d 401
    , 407 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing Slawek v.
    State Bd. of Med. Educ. & Licensure, 
    586 A.2d 362
    , 366 (Pa. 1991)) (emphasis
    added). “Remedies and accompanying sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal
    absent a showing of a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion or purely arbitrary
    15
    execution of the agency’s duties or functions.” 
    Id.
     “If a sentence imposed is within
    the statutory limits, there is no abuse of discretion unless the sentence is manifestly
    excessive so as to inflict too severe a punishment.” 
    Id.
     (citing Borough of Kennett
    Square v. Lal, 
    643 A.2d 1172
    , 1175 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)). If there is “no proof of
    fraud, collusion, bad faith or abuse of power, a reviewing court will not substitute
    judicial discretion for administrative discretion.” 
    Id.
     (citing Council of Plymouth
    Twp. v. Montgomery County, 
    531 A.2d 1158
    , 1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987)).
    With this backdrop in mind, we turn to the first of PFG’s issues.
    A. Whether the Commission’s decision imposing the maximum fine on PFG is
    supported by substantial evidence and/or arbitrary.
    PFG first argues that the Commission’s finding that there are no mitigating
    circumstances to warrant imposition of anything less than the maximum fine lacks
    substantial evidence. PFG also argues the Commission’s Order is arbitrary under
    the circumstances.
    As discussed above, Section 13A09(b)(2) of the Lobbying Disclosure Law
    requires that “[i]f the [C]ommission finds that failure to register or report was
    negligent, it shall determine the amount of the administrative penalty to be
    imposed.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A09(b)(2) (emphasis added). The administrative penalty
    cannot exceed the amounts set forth in Section 13A09(c). In other words, the
    Commission has the obligation to make a determination as to the amount of an
    administrative penalty, and while there is a maximum limitation, there is no
    minimum amount.
    To assist the Commission in determining the amount of the administrative
    penalty, it promulgated regulations that contain various factors which the
    Commission may consider in rendering its determination. 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.6
    (3).
    16
    The existence of the delineated factors, and the requirement that the Commission
    make a determination, support that the maximum administrative penalty permitted
    should not be the default. Yet, that appears to have been the Commission’s approach
    here in imposing the maximum administrative penalty for, essentially a paper
    violation of the Lobbying Disclosure Law, as PFG had no lobbying expenses to
    report as it has ceased all operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
    The Commission found “[t]here are no mitigating circumstances concerning
    [PFG]’s failure to timely file” the two quarterly expense reports or statements and
    “there is no basis in the record for imposing less than maximum administrative
    penalties against [PFG].” (FOF ¶ 25; Final Adjudication at 14.) Notably, the
    Commission cites 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.6
    (3), but the Commission provides no discussion
    of those factors or explanation as to why they do not apply in the Commission’s
    view. Thus, it is not clear the Commission actually considered the factors set forth
    in its regulations. It would appear the Commission did not, as a review of the record
    reveals evidence that would be relevant to consideration of these factors, which, if
    accepted, would mitigate PFG’s liability.
    For instance, on the first factor set forth in Section 63.6(3), which inquires as
    to whether the principal took “meaningful measures” to remedy delinquency when
    it became aware thereof, the record and arguments reflect that this factor militates to
    imposing a lesser penalty. There is no dispute that PFG filed its statements the same
    day it received the Investigative Division’s position statement on June 3, 2021, the
    date PFG asserts it first had notice of the delinquent statements and potential penalty.
    (FOF ¶¶ 19(a), 21(a); see also R.R. at 39a, 83a-86a.) That same day, PFG also
    contacted the Commission’s Counsel via phone and emailed the Commission’s
    Chief Counsel informing him that it had filed the no expense statements and
    17
    requesting an additional five days to file its position statement. (R.R. at 34a-37a.)
    PFG was instructed to “submit any position statement as soon as possible,” and it
    prepared and submitted a position statement the next day. (Id. at 36a.) PFG
    performed all these measures within 24 hours of receiving the Investigative
    Division’s position statement. Notwithstanding that the Commission acknowledged
    that PFG filed its “no expense statements” on June 3, 2021, (R.R. at 50a-51a), the
    Commission still found no evidence that would support a lesser penalty on this basis.
    On the second factor, PFG has raised a “justifiable” excuse for its
    delinquency, which should have been considered. See 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.6
    (3)(ii).
    PFG does not dispute that it did not timely file its statements. Rather, PFG’s position
    is that its oversight, in consideration of the unprecedented circumstances of the
    COVID-19 pandemic, the closure orders, and PFG’s decision to cease all business
    operations in light of the inactivity of the film industry business, was reasonable and
    should have been considered by the Commission in determining an appropriate
    penalty. The Commission contends that, in light of all the correspondence sent to
    PFG without response and PFG’s failure to advise the Commission of its change of
    address, the pandemic cannot be used as an excuse for PFG’s failures. Although the
    Commission would like to discount the role the pandemic played, the types of
    justification cited in this factor relate to things that are generally beyond the control
    of the filer. For example, Section 63.6(3)(ii) provides, as examples of valid
    justifications, “[t]he unavailability of records due to loss, theft or destruction through
    no fault of the respondent,” and “[i]ncapacitating physical or mental illness,
    hospitalization, accident involvement, or death of a person required to register or
    report, a person whose participation is essential to the filing, or a member of the
    immediate family of the person.” 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.6
    (3)(ii). These are but a few
    18
    examples and are not intended to be the only circumstances that can be considered.
    Moreover, it is notable that, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Department
    itself extended the deadline to file first quarter 2020 expense reports from April 30,
    2020, to July 30, 2020, thereby recognizing the pandemic’s impact on timely filing.
    (R.R. at 46a.) While certain things may have been within PFG’s control, the
    pandemic and the associated closure orders were, indisputably, beyond the control
    of PFG, and thus, should have been considered.
    The third factor is “[w]hether the record establishes that the matter involved
    the first instance that the respondent was subject to the registration/reporting
    requirements of the act.” 
    51 Pa. Code § 63.6
    (3)(iii). This factor likely militates
    against PFG, as the record establishes that this was not the first instance PFG was
    subject to the reporting requirements under the Lobbying Disclosure Law. PFG has
    been registered as a principal since January 31, 2017, and PFG filed its fourth quarter
    expense report for 2019 on February 3, 2020. (R.R. at 17a-18a, 21a.)
    As to the fourth factor, which inquires whether there have been prior
    delinquencies, there is no dispute that this is the first instance in which PFG has been
    delinquent in its filings. This factor clearly militates against imposing the maximum
    penalty, but the Commission did not even address or consider it when imposing the
    maximum penalty.
    As to the fifth factor, any other aggravating or mitigating factor, the parties do
    not dispute that PFG had no expenses to report for the first and second quarters of
    2020 because it suspended its lobbying efforts at the end of 2019. When PFG filed
    its statements on June 3, 2021, the records reflect that PFG, in fact, had $0 lobbying
    expenses to report. Thus, because PFG did not meet the threshold reporting
    requirement to file expense reports for the relevant periods, under Section 13A05(d)
    19
    of the Lobbying Disclosure Law, and PFG was only required to file a statement to
    that effect. 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A05(d). Although PFG may have violated the Lobbying
    Disclosure Law, it was not by unlawfully lobbying or hiding its lobbying efforts
    from the Commission. Rather, PFG’s violation was a paper one – PFG failed to
    timely advise the Commission that it had engaged in no lobbying. This could be a
    mitigating circumstance that the Commission failed to consider or explain why it
    would not warrant a reduction in the penalty. Given the evidence in the record before
    it, we cannot conclude the Commission’s finding that there was no such evidence to
    militate against imposition of the maximum administrative remedy is supported by
    substantial evidence.
    PFG further argues that the Commission’s imposition of the maximum fine
    against it is arbitrary when it is compared to the decision it issued on the same day
    in Connections Education. Procedurally, PFG argues that the two matters are nearly
    identical – both principals failed to file their expense reports for the first and second
    quarters of 2020 and received Warning Notice Letters to that effect on August 27,
    2020. However, the Commission argues the matters are distinguishable.
    Reviewing the two matters reveals that they are not sufficiently
    distinguishable so as to warrant such a drastically different result and supports
    PFG’s contention that the Commission’s actions against it were arbitrary. Like PFG,
    Connections Education did not timely file its expense reports for the first and second
    quarter of 2020. The violations were the same in the two cases, as was the initial
    lack of response to the Department’s correspondence.           The only difference is
    Connections Education filed its quarterly reports 271 days late, whereas PFG’s
    quarterly reports were 307 days late. While Connections Education eventually
    reached out to the Department and resolved the matter slightly more quickly than
    20
    PFG did, which certainly could warrant a lesser penalty, this does not support the
    Commission’s position that PFG’s violation and actions warranted a penalty of
    $117,800.00, that was more than 15 times greater than the $7,000.00 penalty paid
    by Connections Education for the same violation.
    In sum, the record and arguments show that it is possible that some of the
    Section 63.6(3) factors weighed against imposing the maximum penalty. However,
    it is not apparent that the Commission considered any of those factors as it found
    “[t]here are no mitigating circumstances” and “there is no basis in the record for
    imposing less than maximum administrative penalties against [PFG],” (FOF ¶ 25;
    Final Adjudication at 14), even those that cannot really be disputed, such as the lack
    of prior delinquencies and that PFG immediately resolved the delinquency once it
    became aware thereof. Thus, we cannot conclude the Commission’s findings are
    supported by substantial evidence. This is not to say that no penalty may be imposed.
    Rather, the Commission’s Order is vacated, and the matter is remanded for the
    Commission to render a new adjudication.
    B. Whether the Commission imposed an unconstitutionally excessive fine.9
    The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
    “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
    unusual punishments inflicted.”            U.S. CONST.      AMEND.    VIII.     “The Eighth
    Amendment is made applicable to the [S]tates through the Fourteenth Amendment.”
    Commonwealth v. Real Prop. & Improvements Commonly Known as 5444 Spruce
    St., 
    832 A.2d 396
    , 399 (Pa. 2003). Article I, section 13 of the Pennsylvania
    Constitution is almost identical to the Eighth Amendment, stating that “[e]xcessive
    9
    Given our disposition of the first issue, it may be unnecessary to reach PFG’s second
    issue related to whether the penalty is an excessive fine. However, since we are remanding for a
    new adjudication, as a matter of efficiency, we will address the argument.
    21
    bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments
    inflicted.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 13. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held article
    I, section 13 to be coextensive with the Eighth Amendment. 5444 Spruce St., 832
    A.2d at 399. “To determine whether the excessive fines clause has been violated,
    ‘[a] court must consider whether the statutory provision imposes punishment; and if
    so, whether the fine is excessive.’” Eckhart, 
    8 A.3d at 407
     (quoting 5444 Spruce
    Street, 832 A.2d at 399).
    “[T]he primary purpose of a fine or a penalty is twofold[:] to punish violators
    and to deter future or continued violations.” Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1283 (quoting
    Church, 522 A.2d at 34). “Since it serves not only as a punishment but also as a
    deterrent, the amount of the fine can be raised to whatever sum is necessary to
    discourage future or continued violations, subject of course, to any restriction
    imposed on the amount of the fine by the enabling statute or the Constitution.” Id.
    However, “[a] fine[] must be reasonably proportionate to the crimes which occasion
    them.” Id. at 1287. A fine is excessive “if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity
    of a defendant’s offense.” U.S. v. Bajakajian, 
    524 U.S. 321
    , 334 (1998). Both this
    Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “have rejected the notion that there must
    be strict proportionality between the harm resulting from the offense and the penalty
    imposed.” Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1281.
    Administrative penalties may be assessed by the Commission against
    registered principals for negligent failure to register or report.         65 Pa.C.S.
    § 13A09(c)(1). The penalties imposed against PFG were calculated based upon
    specific guidelines established by Section 13A09(c) of the Lobbying Disclosure
    Law, which sets the maximum penalties at $50 per day for the first 10 days, plus
    $100 per day for the next 10 days, plus $200 per day for the remainder of days until
    22
    the noncompliance is cured. 65 Pa.C.S. § 13A09(c). The Commission imposed those
    maximum penalties.
    Although there is a dearth of case law directly addressing fines imposed
    pursuant to the Lobbying Disclosure Law, there are a number of other decisions that
    address excessive fines or penalties under other statutory schemes, which inform the
    Court’s decision. For instance, in Eckhart, this Court upheld the imposition of
    administrative penalties in the amount of $151,200 and $1,700 imposed against a
    kennel operator for failure to comply with conditions of a revised notice. Citing the
    kennel operator’s history of violations, including animal cruelty allegations and the
    fact that, after an order requiring the operator to remove over 200 dogs from the
    property, the operator actually acquired approximately 30 more dogs, the Court held
    that the Department of Agriculture was authorized to impose the maximum fine
    allowed per dog. 
    8 A.3d at 408
    . Here, there is no evidence PFG, following actual
    notice of the alleged noncompliance, did anything contrary to the notice; rather, PFG
    immediately took steps to do exactly what it was asked to do – file the delinquent
    quarterly reports.
    In Westinghouse Electric, which both parties cite, Westinghouse was fined
    $3.2 million for a violation of The Clean Streams Law 10, and its implementing
    regulations promulgated by the Department of Environmental Protection.
    Westinghouse argued that the fine was excessive as there was no evidence that its
    management knew of its violation or attempted to conceal it. Westinghouse Elec.,
    
    745 A.2d at 1281
    . We rejected this argument and, upholding the penalty, explained
    that “the penalties imposed . . . are linked to the number, seriousness[,] and duration
    of the violations involved here.” 
    Id.
     Westinghouse further argued the fine was
    10
    Act of June 22, 1937, P.L. 1987, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 691.1-691.1001.
    23
    excessive when compared to others, which the court rejected, citing the difference
    in length of time the violations occurred and the lack of evidence of injury to the
    waters of the Commonwealth in the other matters. Id. As discussed above, the
    Commission imposed a drastically lesser penalty on the same day it issued its Order
    in this matter in a largely analogous case, Connections Education.
    In Commonwealth v. CSX Transportation, Inc., a derailed train car broke open
    and poured corn syrup into a river, killing approximately 10,000 fish. 
    653 A.2d 1327
    , 1329 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). This Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of
    the criminal information charging CSX with violating Section 2504(a)(2) of the Fish
    and Game Code, 30 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a)(2). This Court determined that a fine of $10
    per fish, amounting to a total fine of $100,000, did not violate CSX’s due process,
    noting the intent of the applicable section was “to protect fisheries and wildlife,” and
    the fine was appropriate for the harm caused. CSX, 653 A.2d at 1332-33. See also
    City of Philadelphia v. DY Props., LLC, 
    223 A.3d 717
    , 723 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)
    (indicating it would uphold a $243,200 fine as not being excessive as they were in
    accordance with the statute and arose from repeated and ongoing failure to correct
    violations that were hazardous); City of Philadelphia v. Joyce (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 896
    C.D. 2019, filed Dec. 4, 2020) (upholding $25,000 fine because it was an
    aggregation of fines based on daily violations arising from the failure to remediate
    dangerous conditions despite repeated notices).
    Overall, these cases do not support the Commission’s decision to impose the
    maximum penalty of $117,800.00, as in these cases the respective violations posed
    dangers to the public. Here, in contrast, there is no claim that there was a “danger”
    posed to the public as a result of PFG not filing its reports in which it would state
    that it had no lobbying expenses. While the Commission argues public trust in the
    24
    lobbying system would be undermined, as discussed more fully below, it does not
    explain how that trust is undermined when a quarterly expense report or statement
    showing there was no lobbying activity to report is filed late, particularly under
    the unique circumstances here.
    We conclude this case is more akin to Heggenstaller. There, the appellant
    failed to pay $1.25 per month on his telephone bill for 911 emergency services in
    violation of a county ordinance. The Superior Court determined that the $6,591.25
    fine imposed against the appellant was excessive in light of the $1.25 fee,
    recognizing that although a cumulative fine was in accord with the ordinance, “[a]
    fine should be sufficient enough to discourage the conduct, but not so excessive as
    to be punitive in nature.11 
    699 A.2d at 769
    . Because the fine at issue was
    unreasonable and excessive, in light of the amount of the fee itself, the Superior
    Court reversed its imposition and remanded for reimposition of a fine more in line
    with the violation.
    When the fine imposed against PFG is considered in light of the violation and
    the circumstances as a whole, including the pandemic, the $117,800.00 fine is not
    proportionate to PFG’s failure to timely file expense reports indicating that no
    expenses (and no lobbying) occurred during the two quarters at issue, and, therefore,
    is excessive. The Commission argues that the violation of the intent of the Lobbying
    Disclosure Law is sufficient harm in all cases to warrant the imposition of the
    maximum fine in a situation where no lobbying occurred.                   Such argument
    seemingly disregards that, under the Eighth Amendment and related precedent, the
    violation and the fine must be, essentially, weighed to determine if the latter is
    11
    In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer
    persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Rev., 
    180 A.3d 545
    , 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
    25
    proportionate to the former. In the above-cited cases, the courts examined the actual
    violation(s), the harm or injury (or potential for danger) involved, and the amount of
    the fine and, then, concluded whether the fine was not excessive. While the purpose
    of the Lobbying Disclosure Law is laudable, the fine imposed here is
    disproportionate to the actual violation at issue to survive a constitutional inquiry.
    Under these circumstances, the Commission abused its discretion because the fine
    was “manifestly excessive.” Eckhart, 
    8 A.3d at 407
     (“If a sentence imposed is within
    the statutory limits, there is no abuse of discretion unless the sentence is manifestly
    excessive so as to inflict too severe a punishment.”) For these reasons, Order
    imposing the administrative penalty is vacated, and the matter is remanded for the
    Commission to impose a more proportionate fine.
    IV.   CONCLUSION
    In summary, the Commission offers no explanation to warrant imposition of
    the maximum administrative penalty for failing to timely file a statement showing
    zero lobbying expenses to report for the relevant time periods. Although the
    Commission has discretion in imposing penalties, that discretion is not unfettered.
    The factors set forth in Section 63.6(3) provide guidelines, or factors, for the
    Commission to consider, where relevant, in the exercise of its discretion. The
    Commission found none of the factors militate against imposition of the maximum
    penalty, despite record evidence that some of the factors cannot reasonably be
    disputed. Thus, this finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore,
    in not explaining why the maximum penalty was warranted, but relying, essentially,
    on the fact of the violation, to impose the maximum penalty, it is as though the
    Commission did not exercise its discretion at all.         Lastly, under the unique
    circumstances of this case, the maximum administrative penalty imposed is
    26
    excessive. This is particularly so where the violation was not the failure to file an
    expense report, showing that lobbying had occurred, but a statement indicating,
    here, that no lobbying had occurred during the relevant quarters. Accordingly, the
    Commission’s Order is vacated, and this matter is remanded for the Commission to
    impose an administrative penalty that is more in line with the violation.
    __________________________________________
    RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
    Judge Wallace did not participate in the decision in this case.
    27
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Penn Film Group LLC,                    :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                    :   No. 827 C.D. 2021
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,           :
    State Ethics Commission,                :
    Respondent      :
    ORDER
    NOW, April 18, 2023, the Order of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State
    Ethics Commission, dated June 23, 2021, is VACATED, and this matter is
    REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    __________________________________________
    RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge