North Hills S.D. v. UCBR ( 2022 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    North Hills School District,                     :
    :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                                : No. 700 C.D. 2021
    : Submitted: March 4, 2022
    Unemployment Compensation                        :
    Board of Review,                                 :
    :
    Respondent         :
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                                      FILED: April 13, 2022
    North Hills School District (Employer) petitions for review of the order
    of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming the
    decision of a Referee who determined that Erin Traynor (Claimant) is not ineligible
    for benefits under Section 402.1(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law
    (Law).1 We affirm.
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, added by the
    Act of July 6, 1977, P.L. 41, 43 P.S. §802.1(1). Section 402.1(1) of the Law states, in pertinent
    part:
    (1) With respect to service performed after December 31, 1977, in
    an instructional . . . capacity for an educational institution, benefits
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    On August 10, 2020, Claimant filed an online application for benefits
    for the waiting week ending August 15, 2020. Certified Record (CR) at 3, 6-10. On
    December 10, 2020, the Department’s Office of Unemployment Compensation
    Benefits issued a Notice of Determination (Determination) in which it found that
    Claimant was not ineligible for benefits under Section 402.1 of the Law because
    “Claimant d[id] not have reasonable assurance of returning [to work] following the
    [summer] break.” Id. at 14. On December 23, 2020, Employer appealed the
    Determination alleging, in relevant part:
    shall not be paid based on such services for any week of
    unemployment commencing during the period between two
    successive academic years . . . to any individual if such individual
    performs such services in the first of such academic years or terms
    and if there is . . . a reasonable assurance that such individual will
    perform services in any such capacity for any educational
    institution in the second of such academic years or terms.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    In turn, Section 65.161(a) of the Department of Labor and Industry’s (Department)
    regulations states, in relevant part:
    (a) For purposes of [S]ection 402.1 of the [L]aw (43 P.S. §802.1), a
    . . . reasonable assurance that an individual will perform services in
    the second academic period exists only if both of the following
    conditions are met:
    (1) The educational institution . . . provides a bona fide offer of
    employment for the second academic period to the individual.
    (2) The economic terms and conditions of the employment offered
    to the individual for the second academic period are not substantially
    less than the terms and conditions of the individual’s employment
    in the first academic period.
    
    34 Pa. Code §65.161
    (a).
    2
    The reasonable assurance issue states that [C]laimant did
    not return following the school break. The included
    [September 4, 2020] letter [from Employer’s
    Superintendent] demonstrates that [C]laimant was, in fact,
    rehired as a substitute teacher for the 2020-2021 school
    year.
    CR at 20.
    On January 28, 2021, a hearing was conducted before the Referee
    during which Claimant testified, and Employer offered the testimony of Pamela
    LaBrasca, Employer’s Administrative Assistant of Human Resources, along with
    the Superintendent’s September 4, 2020 letter offering Claimant employment as a
    substitute teacher for the 2020-2021 school year, effective August 25, 2020, and call
    logs regarding Claimant’s substitute assignments during the 2020-2021 school year.
    CR at 58-61, 65, 69-71, 74-81.2 LaBrasca testified, inter alia, that Claimant resigned
    her employment as a teacher with Employer on January 10, 2020, and that she began
    substitute teaching for Employer on January 13, 2020. 
    Id. at 74
    . LaBrasca stated
    that Claimant’s last day of work for Employer in the 2019-2020 school year was
    March 11, 2020. 
    Id.
     With respect to the Superintendent’s September 4, 2020 letter,
    LaBrasca testified:
    This letter is a letter that we send out to all of our
    substitutes, they get a reasonable assurance letter over the
    2
    Specifically, the Superintendent’s September 4, 2020 letter states, in pertinent part:
    Please accept this letter as an administrative appointment to the
    position of substitute teacher at the rate of $95/day effective August
    25, 2020, through the end of the 2020-21 school year. . . .
    Your appointment was ratified at the September 3, 2020 meeting by
    the Board of School Directors.
    CR at 65.
    3
    summer, stating that they are planning on coming back,
    unless we do not hear from them at that time, we terminate
    them, and [if] we do hear from them, then we Board
    approve them and Board Administrative [sic] appoint
    them to the position of a substitute teacher. We send them
    this note to let them know that they were appointed to [be]
    a substitute teacher for the entire school year and give
    them their rate.
    
    Id. at 75-76
    . Claimant denied that she received such reasonable assurance to return
    to the same or similar position following the school break. 
    Id. at 80-81
    .
    On February 2, 2021, the Referee issued a Decision/Order affirming the
    Determination that Claimant is not ineligible for benefits under Section 402.1 of the
    Law. CR at 87-92. On February 17, 2021, Employer appealed the Referee’s
    Decision/Order to the Board. 
    Id. at 94-101
    .
    On May 28, 2021, the Board issued a Decision and Order affirming the
    Referee’s Decision/Order in which it made the following pertinent findings of fact:
    1.    [C]laimant was last employed as a substitute teacher
    by [Employer] from January 13, 2020, at a final rate of
    $95/day, and her last day of work was March 11, 2020.
    2.    [C]laimant previously worked for [E]mployer as a
    teacher, resigned as a teacher effective January 10, 2020,
    but continued to work as a substitute teacher beginning
    January 13, 2020.
    3.   [E]mployer’s 2020-2021 school year began on
    August 25, 2020.
    4.     [C]laimant did not receive reasonable assurance of
    continuing work for [E]mployer as a substitute teacher in
    the 2020-2021 school year until she was informed, by
    letter dated September 4, 2020, that [E]mployer’s Board
    of School Directors ratified her appointment as a substitute
    teacher on September 3, 2020.
    CR at 103.
    4
    Based on the foregoing, the Board determined:
    Critically, this case involves [C]laimant’s eligibility for
    benefits during the summer school break, beginning with
    the week ending August 15, 2020-and not the weeks
    beginning with the new school term. The computerized
    call logs submitted by [E]mployer to show that [C]laimant
    was contacted about substitute assignments from August
    25, 2020-January 4, 2021, are not relevant to [C]laimant’s
    eligibility for benefits for the waiting week ending August
    15, 2020, under Section 402.1(1) of the Law, other than to
    possibly prove that a previous offer of reasonable
    assurance was not illusory. The real question in this case
    is whether [E]mployer offered [C]laimant, who had been
    in her first year as a substitute teacher, reasonable
    assurance of returning to employment before or over the
    summer break of returning to work in the same or similar
    capacity in the next school year.
    [E]mployer both maintained that its September 4, 2020
    letter to [C]laimant establishes that she had reasonable
    assurance that “all substitutes get a reasonable assurance
    letter over the summer.” The reasonable assurance letter,
    alluded to by [E]mployer’s witness, does not appear in the
    record. Moreover, [C]laimant denied receiving reasonable
    assurance of returning to work with [E]mployer in the
    same or similar position.
    The Board gives greater weight to [C]laimant’s testimony
    on the question of reasonable assurance. A letter offering
    reasonable assurance would seem to be critical in this type
    of case. Therefore, the Board is unwilling to infer
    reasonable assurance through a general reference to an
    earlier letter not appearing in the record. As such,
    [C]laimant cannot be denied benefits during the period
    between two successive academic years or school terms,
    as the record lacks credible or sufficient proof of
    reasonable assurance having been extended to [C]laimant
    before the beginning of the new school year.
    CR at 104.     Accordingly, the Board issued an order affirming the Referee’s
    Decision/Order, 
    id. at 105
    , and Employer filed the instant petition for review.
    5
    On appeal,3 Employer claims that the Board erred as a matter of law in
    affirming the Referee’s Decision/Order and that the Board’s Decision and Order are
    not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the entirety of Employer’s
    argument is as follows:
    In the instant matter, []Claimant received a letter
    dated September 4, 2020[,] confirming that she had been
    offered the position of a substitute teacher, as well as the
    pay rate satisfying the economic terms as required by
    statute. The September 4, 2020 letter states that the offer
    is effective August 25, 2020 (CR 65), which corresponds
    directly with the first day of school according to
    [Employer’s] academic calendar. (CR 63) Boards of
    education meet monthly, and in this matter [it] took
    official action at [its] earliest opportunity to do so to
    approve the substitute position and made the assurance of
    the same effective the same day as the start of the
    academic year.
    Brief of Petitioner at 1.
    As outlined above, Section 402.1(1) of the Law states, in pertinent part:
    [B]enefits shall not be paid based on such services for any
    week of unemployment commencing during the period
    between two successive academic years . . . to any
    individual if such individual performs such services in the
    first of such academic years . . . and if there is . . . a
    reasonable assurance that such individual will perform
    services in any such capacity for any educational
    institution in the second of such academic years or terms.
    43 P.S §802.1(1) (emphasis added).
    Considering Employer’s appellate claims, “[t]his case turns on the
    intent of Section 402.1(1) of the Law, as expressed in its words. 1 Pa. C.S.
    3
    Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
    whether an error of law was committed, and whether necessary findings of fact are supported by
    substantial evidence. Kirkwood v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    525 A.2d 841
    ,
    843-44 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
    6
    §1921(a).” Kolenich v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    269 A.3d 615
    , 623 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). With respect to disqualification under Section
    402.1(1), this Court has explained:
    The basic principle is that “service for educational
    institutions” qualifies for unemployment benefits. There
    is an exception in subsection (1) for benefits that would
    otherwise be payable during a school break, so long as the
    employee receives “reasonable assurance” of a job after
    the break. Where school employees are “reasonably
    assured of resuming employment in a learning institution”
    after a break, they are disqualified from receiving benefits
    during the break.        Penn Hills School District v.
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    437 A.2d 1213
    , 1217 (Pa. 1981).
    269 A.3d at 619.
    In construing Section 402.1(1)’s terms, this Court has observed:
    [T]he Board gives a broad construction to the exception in
    Section 402.1(1) from eligibility for benefits. However,
    exceptions in a statute are to be narrowly construed. See
    Phillips v. State Ethics Commission, 
    470 A.2d 659
    , 661
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) (stating that “remedial legislation [] is
    to be liberally construed . . . and exclusions under the [a]ct
    should be narrowly, rather than broadly, determined”); see
    also, e.g., Penn Hills School District, 437 A.2d at 1215
    (holding that an unemployed worker can be denied
    benefits only by explicit language in the Law that clearly
    and plainly excludes coverage).
    269 A.3d at 622-23.
    In light of the foregoing, it is clear that Employer’s construction of the
    exception in Section 402.1(1) is untenable. By its plain terms, in order for Claimant
    to be ineligible under Section 402.1(1), she must have received from Employer “a
    reasonable assurance” of continued employment in “the second of such academic
    years” before the expiration of “the period between two successive academic years,”
    7
    and before the commencement of “second of such academic years.” 43 P.S.
    §802.1(1). Based on the Board’s factual findings,4 Claimant did not receive from
    Employer any such “reasonable assurance” of continued employment in the 2020-
    2021 academic year during the period of unemployment between the 2019-2020 and
    the 2020-2021 academic years. Employer’s post hoc September 4, 2020 letter
    simply cannot be relied upon to render Claimant ineligible to receive benefits for the
    waiting week ending August 15, 2020, during the break between the academic years,
    and before the beginning of the 2020-2021 academic year on August 25, 2020.
    Accordingly, the Board’s order is affirmed.
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    4
    We will not accede to Employer’s request to review the Board’s credibility determinations
    or to make additional findings based on assertions in its appellate brief. As this Court has stated:
    [I]t is well settled that the Board is the ultimate finder of fact in
    unemployment compensation proceedings.             Thus, issues of
    credibility are for the Board which may either accept or reject a
    witness’ testimony whether or not it is corroborated by other
    evidence of record. Findings of fact are conclusive upon review
    provided that the record, taken as a whole, contains substantial
    evidence to support the findings. This Court must examine the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the party [that] prevailed
    before the Board, and to give that party the benefit of all inferences
    that can be logically and reasonably drawn from the testimony.
    Chapman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    20 A.3d 603
    , 607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)
    (citations omitted). As outlined above, the Board’s findings are amply supported by evidence in
    the certified record of this case, and these findings support the Board’s determination that Claimant
    is not ineligible for benefits under Section 402.1(1).
    8
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    North Hills School District,              :
    :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                           : No. 700 C.D. 2021
    :
    Unemployment Compensation                 :
    Board of Review,                          :
    :
    Respondent      :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 13th day of April, 2022, the order of the
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review dated May 28, 2021, is
    AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 700 C.D. 2021

Judges: Wojcik, J.

Filed Date: 4/13/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/13/2022