D.M. Williams v. Penn DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Darnell M. Williams, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 697 C.D. 2020
: Submitted: March 17, 2023
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Transportation, :
Bureau of Driver Licensing :
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: July 14, 2023
Darnell M. Williams (Licensee) appeals from the February 26, 2020 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denying his appeal
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing’s (DOT), one year suspension of his operating privilege under
Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i), commonly
referred to as the Implied Consent Law,1 based on Licensee’s refusal to submit to a
1
The Implied Consent Law, Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code, states in relevant part:
(1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 [relating to
driving under the influence] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses
to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer,
[DOT] shall suspend the operating privilege of the person as follows:
(Footnote continued on next page…)
chemical blood test. Licensee argues DOT failed to prove the arresting officer had
reasonable grounds to believe Licensee was operating his vehicle under the influence
of alcohol or a controlled substance. Upon review, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Kalle Baxley (Trooper Baxley) arrested
Licensee for driving under the influence (DUI) on July 9, 2019. Trial Ct. Op. at 2.
At the time of his arrest, Licensee refused to submit to a chemical blood test. Id. By
notice mailed August 12, 2019, DOT warned Licensee that his driving privilege
would be suspended for one year, effective September 16, 2019, due to his refusal
to submit to chemical blood testing on July 9, 2019. Licensee timely appealed to the
trial court.
On February 26, 2020, the trial court conducted a de novo trial and found the
following relevant facts. While patrolling on July 9, 2019, Trooper Baxley
responded to a two-vehicle crash on Interstate 76. Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Upon his
arrival at the scene, he observed Licensee standing next to his vehicle. Id. at 4.
Because the vehicles were blocking an off-ramp, Trooper Baxley requested both
drivers move their vehicles. Id. Trooper Baxley then spoke with Licensee and
observed Licensee had difficulty standing and was leaning on his vehicle’s door to
remain steady and upright. Id. After speaking with the other driver, Trooper Baxley
returned to Licensee’s vehicle and found Licensee had fallen asleep. Id. Trooper
Baxley tapped on the window to wake Licensee and, while speaking with him,
(i) . . . for a period of 12 months.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i).
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observed Licensee had slurred speech. Id. At that point, Trooper Baxley requested
Licensee perform field sobriety tests. Id.
Trooper Baxley had Licensee perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN),
the walk-and-turn test, and the one-leg stand. Id. at 5. During these field sobriety
tests, Trooper Baxley observed numerous indicators of impairment, which the trial
court summarized as follows:
The first test was a[n HGN] test which consisted of Trooper Baxley
placing his pen approximately one foot in front of [Licensee’s] face and
having him hold his head still while following Trooper Baxley’s pen
with his eyes from left to right. Trooper Baxley observed that
[Licensee’s] pupils were constricted and that his eyes jerked, indicating
nystagmus. [Licensee] met six out [of] six indicators for intoxication
during the HGN test. Trooper Baxley then asked [Licensee] to perform
a walk-and-turn test. Trooper Baxley instructed [Licensee] to walk for
nine paces then turn around and walk nine paces back, following an
imaginary line. He also demonstrated the necessary steps for
[Licensee]. [Licensee] walked for a short distance but was not able to
maintain his balance and therefore not able to complete the test.
[Licensee] indicated on eight out of eight intoxication indicators for the
walk-and-turn test. [Licensee] then informed Trooper Baxley that he
had previously suffered a gunshot wound to the leg. Trooper Baxley
instructed [Licensee] to perform the one-leg stand test. He allowed
[Licensee] to choose which leg to accommodate his prior leg injury.
[Licensee] briefly stood with one foot raised off the ground. [Licensee]
swayed and indicated on four out of four cues for intoxication during
his one-leg stand test.
Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5 (internal citations omitted).
Based on Trooper Baxley’s observations, he concluded Licensee was too
intoxicated to safely operate a vehicle and arrested him for DUI. Id. Trooper Baxley
read Licensee the Implied Consent warnings2 and Licensee responded several times
that he was not taking the test. Id.
2
The Implied Consent warnings, as outlined in DOT’s DL-26B form, are as follows:
(Footnote continued on next page…)
3
The trial court denied Licensee’s suspension appeal on February 26, 2020.
Licensee now appeals to this Court.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Licensee asserts the trial court erred in denying his suspension
appeal because DOT failed to prove Trooper Baxley had reasonable grounds to
believe Licensee was driving while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance. Licensee’s Br. at 9. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we are limited
to “determining whether the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, whether errors of law have been committed, or whether the trial court’s
determinations demonstrate a manifest abuse of discretion.” McCloskey v. Dep’t of
Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 722 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). The
trial court is fact-finder in license suspension appeals and determines credibility and
1. You are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code.
2. I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test of blood.
3. If you refuse to submit to the blood test, your operating privilege will be
suspended for at least 12 months. If you previously refused a chemical test or were
previously convicted of driving under the influence, your operating privilege will
be suspended for up to 18 months. If your operating privilege is suspended for
refusing chemical testing, you will have to pay a restoration fee of up to $2,000 in
order to have your operating privilege restored.
4. You have no right to speak with an attorney or anyone else before deciding
whether to submit to testing. If you request to speak with an attorney or anyone
else after being provided these warnings or you remain silent when asked to submit
to a blood test, you will have refused the test.
Original Record (O.R.) at 58 (page references are to electronic pagination).
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weight to be assigned to the evidence presented. Factor v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau
of Driver Licensing, 199 A.3d 492, 497 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citation omitted).
Before addressing Licensee’s specific claim, we note that to sustain a license
suspension, DOT bears the burden of establishing: (1) a police officer arrested a
licensee and the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the licensee was
operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance; (2) the
officer asked the licensee to submit to a chemical test; (3) the licensee refused to
take the chemical test; and (4) the officer specifically warned the licensee that
refusing the test would result in DOT suspending his or her driver’s license. Banner
v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 737 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Pa. 1999).
The sole issue in this case is whether DOT met its burden of proving Trooper Baxley
had reasonable grounds to believe Licensee operated his vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.
Whether reasonable grounds exist is a question of law reviewable by this
Court on a case-by-case basis. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 417 A.2d 867 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1980). In examining whether DOT has met its burden of proving
reasonable grounds, this Court considers the totality of the circumstances in order to
determine whether, as a matter of law, a person in the position of the arresting officer
could have reasonably reached this conclusion. See Yencha v. Dep’t of Transp.,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 187 A.3d 1038, 1044 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). This test is
not very demanding and requires even less proof than what is necessary to establish
probable cause for a criminal prosecution. Id. (citation omitted). In Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Dreisbach, 363 A.2d 870 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1976), this Court set forth the reasonable grounds test:
[F]or ‘reasonable grounds’ to exist, the police officer obviously need
not be correct in his belief that the motorist had been driving while
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intoxicated. We are dealing here with the authority to request a person
to submit to a chemical test and not with the admission into evidence
of the result of such a test. The only valid inquiry on this issue at the de
novo hearing is whether, viewing the facts and circumstances as
they appeared at the time, a reasonable person in the position of
the police officer could have concluded that the motorist was
operating the vehicle and under the influence [of alcohol or a
controlled substance.]
Id. at 872 (emphasis added). Courts should give deference to the investigating
officer’s experience and observations where reasonable grounds exist to support the
officer’s belief based on the totality of the circumstances. Yencha, 187 A.3d at 1045.
Here, the facts of record support the trial court’s finding that Trooper Baxley
had reasonable grounds to believe Licensee drove his vehicle while intoxicated.
Trooper Baxley observed that Licensee had been in a motor vehicle collision, had
difficulty maintaining his balance, and had slurred speech. Trooper Baxley also
discovered Licensee had fallen asleep in his vehicle while still at the scene.
Moreover, Trooper Baxley observed numerous indicators of impairment during
Licensee’s performance of the field sobriety tests.
In his brief, Licensee attempts to argue that each of Trooper Baxley’s
observations, individually, are not indicative of impairment or can be explained by
conditions other than intoxication. See Licensee’s Br. at 9-11. However, despite the
fact that other inferences may be made, that does not render Trooper Baxley’s belief
any less reasonable. See Riley v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 946
A.2d 1115, 1119-21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). The trial court accepted as credible
Trooper Baxley’s testimony concerning his observations of Licensee as he observed
Licensee’s demeanor, appearance, and behavior on the night of the incident. Given
the totality of these circumstances, Trooper Baxley could have reasonably concluded
6
that Licensee drove his vehicle while intoxicated and, therefore, was justified in his
request that Licensee submit to chemical testing.
For these reasons, we discern no error in the trial court’s dismissal of
Licensee’s statutory appeal challenging his drivers’s license suspension.
Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge
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IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Darnell M. Williams, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 697 C.D. 2020
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Transportation, :
Bureau of Driver Licensing :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of July 2023, the February 26, 2020 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is AFFIRMED.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge