Washington Twp. Municipal Authority v. K.L. McCauley ( 2023 )


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  •          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Washington Township                     :
    Municipal Authority                     :
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    Kevin L. McCauley,                      :   No. 372 C.D. 2022
    Appellant               :   Submitted: November 23, 2022
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                     FILED: June 13, 2023
    Kevin L. McCauley (Appellant) appeals pro se from the March 16,
    2022 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County (trial court) overruling
    Appellant’s preliminary objections to a Declaration of Taking filed by the
    Washington Township Municipal Authority (Authority). The Authority seeks to
    acquire a temporary construction right-of-way and a permanent right-of-way over
    Appellant’s land for the purpose of extending an existing public sewer system and
    appurtenances thereto. The Authority has filed a “Motion to Quash or Dismiss
    Appeal” (Motion to Dismiss). The Motion to Dismiss was not answered and the
    facts that have developed making it moot are not challenged. For the reasons stated
    below, we grant the Motion to Dismiss and dismiss the appeal with prejudice.
    In October of 2021, Appellant owned property located at 749
    Dempseytown Road, Fryburg, Clarion County, Pennsylvania (Property), which is
    located within the boundaries of Washington Township (Township). See Property
    Deed, Supplemental Reproduced Record (SRR) at 30a. On October 25, 2021, the
    Authority authorized a Declaration of Taking, to which the Property was subject, for
    the purpose of “acquir[ing] a temporary construction right-of-way and permanent
    right-of-way over a piece of land to extend the public sanitary sewer system and
    appurtenances that are part of the [Township’s sewer s]ystem.” See Declaration of
    Taking at 2, SRR 25a. The Authority filed the Declaration of Taking and served
    notice of the same on Appellant on November 5, 2021. See Declaration of Taking,
    SRR at 23a-28a; see also Notice to Condemnee, SRR 21a-22a; Notice of Filing of
    Declaration of Taking, SRR at 36a-39a. On December 16, 2021, Appellant filed
    preliminary objections to the Declaration of Taking, which raised four claims that
    the trial court restated1 as:
    1
    In their entirety, paragraphs 3-6 of the Preliminary Objections stated Appellant’s
    objections to the Declaration of Taking as follows:
    3. The Condemnor has not acted in the best interest of the residents
    of Washington Township as pursuant to the April 2011 Act 537 and
    September 2018 Act 537 revision of sanitary sewage extension of
    Washington Township.
    4. The Condemnor has knowingly deceived, lied, and falsified
    records. Whom has not acted by required guidelines and laws
    enacted by the state of Pennsylvania and the Department of
    Environmental Protection in application and approval of the 537
    Sanitary Sewage Extensions.
    5. The Condemnor and the EADS GROUP purposely and
    deliberately “leveraged” and bullied residents into signing
    easements for the purpose of sewage extensions.
    6. The Condemnee along with other Resident easement holders
    have exhausted all financial and legal means to adjudicate the
    Washington Township Authority 537 extensions only to have this
    dismissed solely upon the 30 days requirement for appeal.
    2
    (1) The Authority has not acted in the best interest of the
    residents of the Township; (2) the Authority has
    knowingly deceived, lied, and falsified records, (3) the
    Authority and its engineers have leveraged and bullied
    residents into signing easements, and (4) [Appellant] and
    other respondents have exhausted financial and legal
    means to adjudicate the sewer extensions only to have
    their claims dismissed upon the 30 day requirement for
    appeal.
    Opinion and Order of Court dated March 16, 2022 (Trial Court Order) at 1-2; see
    also Condemnee Objection to Declaration of Taking (Preliminary Objections), SRR
    at 41a-43a.
    On January 10, 2022, the Authority filed an answer to the Preliminary
    Objections, to which Appellant replied on January 27, 2022.                    See Reply to
    Condemnee Objection to Declaration of Taking, SRR at 47a-58a; Reply to
    Condemnor Declaration of Taking, SRR at 59a-61a. The trial court conducted a
    hearing on the Preliminary Objections on February 25, 2022. At the hearing,
    Appellant argued that the Authority’s proposed easement “on his land is not a public
    use or for a public purpose because his land is the last in line and the right-of-way is
    not needed to serve other properties.” Trial Court Order at 2. Appellant also argued
    at the hearing that he has his own sewage system and therefore does not want to
    connect to the public sewer system. See id.
    On March 16, 2022, the trial court issued the Trial Court Order
    overruling the Preliminary Objections. See Trial Court Order. In the Trial Court
    Order, the trial court treated Appellant’s first objection as a challenge to the power
    Preliminary Objections at 1-2 (pagination supplied) (all errors in original). The “Act 537”
    mentioned in the Preliminary Objections refers to the Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act, Act of
    January 24, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1535, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 750.1-750.20a.
    3
    or right of the Authority to appropriate a right-of-way on the Property, which
    objection the trial court overruled. See id. at 2-4. The trial court noted, however,
    that the Eminent Domain Code (Code)2 does not authorize Appellant’s second, third,
    and fourth objections, which the trial court accordingly overruled. See Trial Court
    Order at 2. Additionally, the trial court noted that, although the Preliminary
    Objections included a section titled “Security/Just Compensation,” Appellant did not
    actually challenge the sufficiency of the bond posted by Authority, so the trial court
    did not consider such an objection. See id. at 2. This timely appeal followed.
    On April 24, 2023, the Authority filed the Motion to Dismiss, which
    alleges that the matter is moot because, during the course of the appeal, Appellant3
    sold the Property to Andrew McCullough and Marissa Hartzell (collectively,
    Buyers). See Motion to Dismiss at 2 (pagination supplied); see also Property Deed
    from Appellant to Buyers dated November 23, 2022, Motion to Dismiss Exhibit A.4
    The Motion to Dismiss explains that the Buyers do not contest the temporary
    construction right-of-way or the permanent right-of-way over the Property to extend
    the public sanitary sewer system and have entered into a written Right-of-Way and
    Easement Agreement with the Authority for the installation of the sewer line. See
    Motion to Dismiss at 2-4; see also Right-of-Way and Easement Agreement between
    2
    26 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-1106.
    3
    The Motion to Dismiss alleges that Appellant currently resides in Barbour County,
    Alabama. See Motion to Dismiss at 1 (pagination supplied).
    4
    We note that supporting papers are attached to the application for relief as required by
    Rule 123(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 123(a) (providing that
    “[i]f an application is supported by briefs, verified statements, or other papers, they shall be served
    and filed with the application”). This Court may, in its discretion, accept the facts set forth in the
    Motion to Dismiss without verification. See Pa.R.A.P. 123(c). Here, where Appellant does not
    challenge the averments of the Motion to Dismiss, and where the averments illustrate that the
    matter is now moot, we accept the allegations contained in the Motion to Dismiss.
    4
    Buyers and the Authority dated January 4, 2023, Motion to Dismiss Exhibit B.
    Appellant did not file an answer to the Motion to Dismiss.
    Before addressing the parties’ substantive contentions on appeal, we
    first consider whether this matter is moot. As a general rule, an actual case or
    controversy must exist at all stages of the judicial process or a case will be dismissed
    as moot. In re Gross, 
    382 A.2d 116
    , 119 (Pa. 1978). Cases that present an issue of
    mootness involve litigants that had standing to sue at the outset of the litigation but,
    after the lawsuit has gotten underway, changes in the facts or in the law occur that
    may deprive the litigants of the necessary stake in the outcome. 
    Id.
     As this Court
    has observed:
    The existence of a case or controversy requires
    (1) a legal controversy that is real and not
    hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy that affects an
    individual in a concrete manner so as to provide
    the factual predicate for a reasoned adjudication,
    and (3) a legal controversy with sufficiently
    adverse parties so as to sharpen the issues for
    judicial resolution.
    A controversy must continue through all stages of judicial
    proceedings, trial and appellate, and the parties must
    continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the
    lawsuit.
    Mistich v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    863 A.2d 116
    , 119 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)
    (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, if a change in facts or law
    renders it impossible for the court to grant relief, then the question is moot. Gross,
    382 A.2d at 120.
    5
    Here, Appellant has sold the Property to Buyers and thus no longer
    maintains a personal stake in the Property subject to the instant litigation. Further,
    to the extent Appellant’s personal stake could have transferred to Buyers as
    successors in interest through the sale of the Property, we note that Buyers do not
    continue Appellant’s challenge to the condemnation/easement on the Property for
    the purpose of the Authority extending the sewer system, but instead have
    acquiesced thereto and executed an agreement to accomplish the same. See Motion
    to Dismiss at 2-4 & Exhibit B. As such, a legal controversy requiring judicial
    resolution no longer exists between the parties, and the matter is moot. See Gross;
    Mistich.
    Accordingly, we grant the Motion to Dismiss and dismiss the matter
    with prejudice.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    6
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Washington Township                  :
    Municipal Authority                  :
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    Kevin L. McCauley,                   :   No. 372 C.D. 2022
    Appellant            :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 13th day of June, 2023, the “Motion to Quash or
    Dismiss Appeal” filed by the Washington Township Municipal Authority on April
    24, 2023 is GRANTED, and Appellant Kevin L. McCauley’s appeal of the March
    16, 2022 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County is DISMISSED
    with prejudice.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 372 C.D. 2022

Judges: Fizzano Cannon, J.

Filed Date: 6/13/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/13/2023