A. Mason v. Philadelphia Parking Authority ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Alice Mason, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 117 C.D. 2022
:
Philadelphia Parking Authority : Submitted: August 12, 2022
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: August 4, 2023
Alice Mason (Appellant) appeals from the orders entered by the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) on December 27 and 30, 2021,
which together granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee Philadelphia Parking
Authority (PPA) and dismissed Appellant’s promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment
claims.1 After review, we affirm.
I. Facts
This case has once before been before this Court, see Mason v.
Philadelphia Parking Authority (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1242 C.D. 2019, filed August 12,
2020), 239 A.3d 1143 (Table), 2020 WL 4641646 (Mason I), and there we summarized
1
The trial court initially granted PPA’s motion by the order entered on December 27, 2021
(dated December 23, 2021). To correct certain typographical errors, the trial court entered an
amended order on December 30, 2021 (dated December 29, 2021). The amended order did not
otherwise modify the trial court’s original disposition or rationale.
the material facts of the underlying dispute. See id., slip op. at 1-4. We reiterate them
below only to the extent necessary to dispose of the matters at issue in this appeal.
Appellant was employed with PPA for approximately 30 years. She held
various titles and last worked in PPA’s Taxi and Limousine Division (TLD), which
regulates taxis and limousines within the City of Philadelphia (City). (Supplemental
Reproduced Record (S.R.) at 185b-86b.)
In 2015, Transportation Network Companies (TNCs), such as UberX and
Lyft, began operating within the City. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 79.) Anticipating
shortfalls, PPA attempted to reduce budgetary issues within the TLD by asking
retirement age “J-Plan” employees to either transfer their employment to another
department within PPA or to enter the Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP)2
retirement program. Id. at 80. J-Plan employees were singled out because the retro-
pension contributions that TLD paid to the City were much higher than those of other
employees’ pension plans. Id.
On January 29, 2015, Appellant spoke with then-Executive Director of
PPA, Vincent J. Fenerty, Jr. (Fenerty), to discuss her employment and retirement
options in the face of these budgetary issues. Id. The next day, Appellant received a
memorandum from Fenerty memorializing in writing the contents of their
conversation. Id. at 81-82. In relevant part, Fenerty wrote:
If you agree to enter the DROP program, enabling [PPA] to
eliminate the extraordinarily high pension payments, I will
[e]nsure that you remain at the TLD for the remainder of your
employment with [PPA]. . . . [If] you do wish to enter DROP,
you will keep [your] current TLD position for the duration of
your four[-year] DROP period.
2
See the Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act, Act of December 18,
1984, P.L. 1005, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 895.101-895.1131.
2
Id. at 190. Appellant formally entered DROP on June 19, 2015, and continued working
at the TLD until June 16, 2017, when she was informed that, effective July 1, 2017, her
employment with TLD would be terminated. Appellant was advised to consider other
employment and to apply for other open positions with PPA, which she did not do. She
instead retired and currently is collecting her pension from PPA. (Id. at 85; S.R. at 76b,
89b.)
II. Procedural History
Appellant filed a complaint against PPA in the trial court on March 26,
2018, asserting breach of contract, civil rights, and employment discrimination claims.
(R.R. at 18.) On April 30, 2018, PPA removed the action to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (District Court). Id. at 19. After
Appellant moved to dismiss the federal claims, the District Court remanded the matter
to the trial court. Appellant then filed an Amended Complaint asserting claims for
breach of contract (Count I), promissory estoppel (Count II), unjust enrichment (Count
III), and violation of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL)3
(Count IV). Id. at 20. On April 29, 2019, PPA filed preliminary objections to the
Amended Complaint, which the trial court overruled on July 9, 2019. Id. at 20, 23.
PPA appealed to this Court on August 8, 2019. On August 12, 2020, we
dismissed PPA’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the trial court’s July 9,
2019 order was interlocutory and not otherwise appealable under the collateral order
doctrine. See Mason I, slip op. at 13.
PPA thereafter filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the
trial court granted, in part, and dismissed Counts I (breach of contract) and IV (WPCL)
3
Act of July 14, 1961, P.L. 637, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 260.1-.13, .45.
3
of the Amended Complaint, leaving only Counts II (promissory estoppel) and III
(unjust enrichment) to proceed. (R.R. at 31, 163.)
After discovery was completed, PPA filed a motion for summary
judgment seeking dismissal of Counts II and III. Id. at 35. By order and amended
order entered December 27 and 30, 2021, the trial court granted PPA’s motion and
dismissed Counts II and III. Id. at 37-38.
On January 3, 2022 Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the trial court denied by order dated February 9, 2022, and entered on February 15,
2022. Id. at 38-39. In the interim, on January 27, 2022, Appellant timely filed a notice
of appeal to this Court. Id. at 39.
III. Discussion
Although Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting PPA’s
motion for summary judgment and dismissing her promissory estoppel and unjust
enrichment claims, it is unclear whether Appellant contends that genuine issues of
material fact remain on those claims or, alternatively, that the question before us
regarding the viability of the claims is a pure question of law. See Appellant’s Br. at
3, 10, 23. However, and in any event, we conclude that, under the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 166 A.2d 278(Pa. 1960), and its progeny, Appellant’s promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment
claims fail as a matter of law and the entry of summary judgment was appropriate.
We acknowledge that this result may appear harsh and, in some
circumstances, might work contrary to the apparent equities of a particular case. See
Scott, 166 A.2d at 283-85 (Bell, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, and as Appellant at times
appears to concede, see Appellant’s Br. at 23, we are bound by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision in Scott and subsequent Pennsylvania appellate decisions,
4
all of which have concluded that, absent legislative authorization, contractual and
quasi-contractual guarantees of tenured employment for public, at-will employees are
not enforceable and are void ab initio as ultra vires actions of a municipal corporation.
See Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Municipal Authority, 658 A.2d 333, 335 (Pa. 1995); Bolduc
v. Board of Supervisors of Lower Paxton Township, 618 A.2d 1188, 1190-91 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1992); Guerra v. Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia, 27
A.3d 1284, 1292 (Pa. Super. 2011);4 Mason I, slip op. at 7-11 & n.10; Terrick v.
Munhall Sanitary Sewer Municipal Authority (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 151 & 526 C.D. 2018,
filed December 18, 2018), 2018 WL 6613749, slip op. at 11-13 & n.11;5 Wilson v.
County of Montgomery (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2463 C.D. 2020, filed November 17, 2011),
2011 WL 10876908, slip op. at 5-7 & n.2.
Contrary to Appellant’s arguments in this appeal, we have not recognized,
and indeed have rejected, the creation of exceptions to the at-will employment rule via
quasi-contractual legal theories like promissory and equitable estoppel and unjust
enrichment. Thus, even assuming that Appellant otherwise had alleged in her
Amended Complaint and established in the record sufficient facts to support her
promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims (which we need not here decide),
the claims may not proceed in this context.6 As long as Scott remains good law, as it
4
Although not binding, opinions of our sister appellate court are valid persuasive authority.
See In re Superior-Pacific Fund, Inc., 693 A.2d 248, 253 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).
5
Unreported decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited for their
persuasive value but not as binding precedent. See section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s
Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
6
We note that this case does not involve, as do the bulk of the cases relied upon by Appellant,
“professionals specifically hired to perform special services pursuant to a contract, explicit
employment contracts offered by private sector employers, civil service employees[,] or collective
bargaining agreements.” Wilson, slip op. at 5 n.2; see also Scott, 166 A.2d at 282.
5
now unquestionably does, we are constrained to follow it. We may not, as Appellant
suggests, conclude that “[Scott] is wrong in both law and fact” and “move towards the
dissent in [Scott] as controlling.” Appellant’s Br. at 23. That conclusion and move are
prerogatives of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
IV. Conclusion
Both Appellant’s promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims,
which sound in quasi-contract, fail as a matter of law. We accordingly affirm the trial
court’s orders for the reasons set forth in its well-reasoned opinion.
________________________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
6
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Alice Mason, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 117 C.D. 2022
:
Philadelphia Parking Authority :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 4th day of August, 2023, it is ORDERED that the
orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania (C.C.P.
Philadelphia, March Term No. 03110, filed December 27, 2021, and December 30,
2021), are AFFIRMED.
________________________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge