Inquiry Concerning Judge Jadawnya Baker ( 2022 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 8, 2022
S20Z1070. INQUIRY CONCERNING JUDGE JADAWNYA
BAKER.
PER CURIAM.
This judicial discipline matter was submitted to this Court
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Judicial Qualifications
Commission (“JQC”), seeking approval of the discipline by consent
agreement between the Director of the JQC and JaDawnya Baker,
Judge of the Municipal Court of Atlanta, to resolve the formal
charges brought against Judge Baker with the issuance of a public
reprimand. The agreement, entered into between the JQC Director
and Judge Baker, was submitted to the JQC’s Hearing Panel, which
approved the agreement and filed it with this Court for approval.
Because Judge Baker’s admitted violations of periodically
dismissing cases without the legal authority to do so justifies the
recommended, and agreed-to, discipline of a public reprimand, we
approve the agreement. We do so despite our reservations, explained
below, about whether, based on the substance of the allegations
within the consent agreement, all of the agreed-to violations
constitute violations of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct.
After a complaint against Judge Baker was filed with the JQC,
the Investigative Panel authorized a full investigation, which
included consideration of Judge Baker’s written responses and a
meeting in person with her before the panel. At the direction of the
Investigative Panel, the Director then filed formal charges against
Judge Baker, and she filed an answer. Following further
investigation and evaluation of the evidence, as well as extensive
discussions with counsel for Judge Baker, the Director amended the
formal charges in anticipation of reaching an agreement with Judge
Baker on discipline by consent.
Pursuant to JQC Rule 23, Judge Baker and the Director then
entered into an agreement to resolve the formal charges with a
public reprimand. In authorizing this resolution, the Investigative
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Panel considered in mitigation Judge Baker’s lack of prior
disciplinary complaints; her relative inexperience on the bench1; her
seeking out guidance of various mentors within the judiciary; her
admission that she made mistakes and engaged in activities which
she recognizes were inappropriate; her expressed willingness to
learn from her mistakes and receive guidance regarding how to
improve as a judge; and her history of public service and positive
and active role in the legal community. The agreement was
submitted to the Hearing Panel, which voted unanimously to accept
the agreement and file it with this Court for approval. See JQC Rule
23 (A).
1. Counts 1 through 12 of the formal charges allege that in
her interactions with court security officers and her chambers staff,
Judge Baker violated Rule 1.2 (A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which requires judges to “act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
1Judge Baker was appointed to the Municipal Court of Atlanta in 2015
and sworn in on March 23, 2015.
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the judiciary,” and Rule 1.3, which says that “[j]udges shall not lend
the prestige of their office to advance the private interests of the
judge or others.” As to Rule 1.2 (A), the discipline by consent
agreement focuses on “integrity,” which the Terminology section of
the Code defines as “probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, and
soundness of character.”
As for the facts underlying these charges, Judge Baker
acknowledges in the discipline by consent agreement that in May
2015, she had a court security officer drive his personal vehicle to a
store to pick up alcoholic beverages and deliver them to a private
event celebrating Judge Baker’s appointment to the bench; that
around September 2016, she had a court security officer drive his
personal vehicle from the courthouse to a store in Cobb County to
pick up a chair and deliver it to the judge’s personal residence in
Atlanta; that the following month, she had a staff member assist her
in returning the chair by driving to the judge’s residence, where the
judge loaded the chair into the staff member’s vehicle, and then
driving to the store while the judge followed in her own vehicle,
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which the staff member claimed caused her to get behind on her
daily work assignments2; and that on a Friday afternoon in June
2018, Judge Baker emailed two staff members and requested that
one of them bring her robe, robe bag, and a stole from the courthouse
to her personal residence for an event “unrelated to court business”
that Sunday, and that a staff member delivered the items later that
afternoon.
Judge Baker also acknowledges that from May 2015 through
October 2019, she periodically asked staff members to contribute
their own money to an office fund, to which Judge Baker also
contributed, to purchase food and other items for communal use in
chambers, to shop for the items, and, on one occasion, to return an
item. Judge Baker further acknowledges that evidence exists with
which the Director could properly prove that from July through
November 2016, she had the staff member who helped her return
the chair use the staff member’s personal vehicle to drive Judge
2 The agreement states that Judge Baker offered to pay the staff member
for her assistance, but the staff member declined the offer.
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Baker to attend private events and to run errands unrelated to court
or city business.3
We are hesitant to conclude that Judge Baker violated Rule
1.2 (A) or 1.3 and to impose discipline based on these facts alone, for
several reasons.4 First, the discipline by consent agreement does not
state that the occasional assistance with personal matters that court
security officers and chambers staff provided to Judge Baker
occurred during their work hours – something that was alleged in
the formal charges, which are not incorporated by reference in the
agreement. Notably, all the cases cited in the agreement in support
of finding a violation involved personal tasks done for a judge during
work hours. See, e.g., Gentry v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 612
SW3d 832, 849 (Ky. 2020); In re Brennan, 929 NW2d 290, 311 (Mich.
3 The agreement notes that Judge Baker disputes this allegation,
although she acknowledges that the Director could prove it. See JQC Rule 23
(A) (“At any time after the filing of formal charges and before final disposition,
the respondent may agree with the Director in writing that a stated sanction
should be imposed in exchange for the judge’s admission of some or all of the
formal charges or the judge’s admission that evidence exists with which the
Director could properly prove some or all of the formal charges. . . .”).
4 We note that the consent agreement does not indicate if any of the
security officers or chambers staff at issue in the formal charges were
complainants to the JQC.
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2019). Second, the agreement does not say whether the officers and
staff members voluntarily assisted Judge Baker or instead felt
compelled to perform the tasks to maintain their jobs. Third, with
one exception, the agreement does not suggest that the personal
assistance provided to Judge Baker interfered with an employee’s
job duties. Fourth, the agreement cites no authority, and we have
found none, to support the view that maintaining a small common
office fund for food and similar items, to which chambers staff and
the judge alike contribute, constitutes a violation of Rule 1.2 (A) or
Rule 1.3. In any event, we need not address these issues further,
because whether or not we consider these counts, we would conclude
that a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction in this matter for
the reasons stated below. See Inquiry Concerning Judge Anderson,
304 Ga. 165, 167 n.2 (816 SE2d 676) (2018).
2. Counts 13 through 15 allege that by “periodically and
improperly” dismissing cases that were presented to her for guilty
pleas, Judge Baker violated Rule 1.1, which requires judges to
“respect and comply with the law”; Rule 1.2 (A); and Rule 2.5 (A),
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which requires judges to “perform judicial and administrative duties
competently, diligently, and without bias or prejudice.” As for the
facts underlying these charges, Judge Baker acknowledges that
from time to time between May 2015 and February 2020, when cases
were presented to her for guilty pleas and she was dissatisfied with
the factual basis provided by the assistant city solicitor, instead of
rejecting the plea, she would improperly dismiss the case. For
example, at a plea hearing on February 19, 2020, an assistant city
solicitor presented a negotiated guilty plea to Judge Baker. The
defendant orally announced his plea of guilty to driving with an
expired tag, and the assistant city solicitor recited a brief factual
basis, including when and where the offense occurred and the make
and model of the car for which the tag had previously been
registered. Judge Baker asked when the tag expired, and the
assistant city solicitor said that she did not know. At that point,
without further discussion or comment, Judge Baker dismissed the
case over the assistant city solicitor’s objection.
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Judge Baker acknowledges that her dissatisfaction with the
factual basis for guilty pleas presented by the assistant city solicitor
was not a legal basis for dismissing criminal charges, that she
instead should have simply rejected the pleas, and that her failure
to do so violated clearly established law. See State v. Benton, 305 Ga.
App. 332, 336 (699 SE2d 767) (2010) (holding that trial court was
authorized to reject guilty plea where prosecutor failed to identify
factual basis for essential element of crime but that it was error to
dismiss case on that ground). Moreover, Judge Baker acknowledges
that her improper dismissal of cases presented to her for guilty pleas
occurred “periodically” over the course of several years. See In re
Judicial Qualifications Commission Formal Advisory Opinion No.
239, 300 Ga. 291, 298 (794 SE2d 631) (2016) (explaining that “legal
error amounts to judicial misconduct where ‘a legal ruling or action
[is] made contrary to clear and determined law about which there is
no confusion or question as to its interpretation and where this legal
error was egregious, made in bad faith, or made as part of a pattern
or practice of legal error’” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, Judge
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Baker failed to respect and comply with the law, to act in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary, and to perform her judicial duties
competently. See id. at 297-298 & n.16 (construing predecessor
provision to Rule 1.1 in former version of Code and citing Rule 2.5
(A) of current Code); Rule 1.2 cmt. [1] (“Although judges should be
independent, they shall comply with the law . . . .”).
Finally, Count 16 alleges that Judge Baker violated Rule 1.2
(A) in her communications with the City Solicitor. As for the facts
underlying this charge, Judge Baker acknowledges that she
periodically contacted the Solicitor to provide both positive and
negative feedback on the performance of prosecutors in her
courtroom and on several occasions requested that he remove
prosecutors from assignment to her courtroom. The discipline by
consent agreement characterizes these communications as improper
“meddling” with the personnel decisions of the Solicitor. But there is
no indication that Judge Baker took, or threatened to take, any
adverse action on cases unless the Solicitor took some specific action.
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The agreement cites no authority, and we have found none, to
support the view that the communications as alleged violate Rule
1.2 (A). In the absence of additional information, we are unable to
conclude that Judge Baker violated the requirement that she act at
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary in this
regard.5 But we do not see the failure to establish this count as
affecting our determination of the appropriate discipline in this case.
Having reviewed the record, the Court now accepts the
discipline by consent agreement and orders that Judge JaDawnya
Baker receive a public reprimand for her periodic improper
dismissal of cases presented to her for guilty pleas. The reprimand
shall be imposed on her in person in open court by a judge
designated by this Court. Upon the issuance of this opinion, all
filings made in this Court in this matter shall be unsealed. See JQC
5To the extent that the Director was concerned about the tone of Judge
Baker’s comments to the Solicitor, we note that Judge Baker was not charged
with a violation of Rule 2.8 (B), which requires judges to “be patient, dignified,
and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom
they deal in their official capacity.”
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Rule 23 (D). Any motion for reconsideration must be filed within ten
days of the date of this opinion.
Discipline by consent accepted. Public reprimand. All the
Justices concur, except Colvin, J., disqualified.
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