Raymond Edward Kitchen v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections , 571 F. App'x 930 ( 2014 )


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  •            Case: 13-11274   Date Filed: 07/11/2014   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-11274
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:10-cv-00237-LC-CJK
    RAYMOND EDWARD KITCHEN,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    SECRETARY, FLORIDA
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 11, 2014)
    Before PRYOR, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 13-11274      Date Filed: 07/11/2014    Page: 2 of 6
    Raymond Edward Kitchen, a Florida state prisoner, appeals the district
    court’s denial of his pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    In his petition, Kitchen contends that the inadequacy of the court-appointed
    interpreter at his jury trial rendered his trial unfair and violated his right to due
    process under the U.S. Constitution. We issued a certificate of appealability on the
    following two issues: “(1) Whether the district court erred when it found that
    Kitchen failed to exhaust his instant claim in the state courts, thereby procedurally
    defaulting it” and “(2) If the district court erred in its procedural ruling, whether it
    also erred when it denied, in the alternative, Kitchen’s instant claim on the merits.”
    Upon review, we conclude that Kitchen did exhaust his claim in state court but that
    the district court did not err in denying Kitchen’s claim on the merits. We
    therefore affirm.
    I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    When examining a district court’s denial of a § 2254 habeas petition, we
    review questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and we
    review findings of fact for clear error. Grossman v. McDonough, 
    466 F.3d 1325
    ,
    1335 (11th Cir. 2006). Exhaustion presents a mixed question of law and fact and
    thus is subject to de novo review. Fox v. Kelso, 
    911 F.2d 563
    , 568 (11th Cir.
    1990).
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    II. DISCUSSION
    A.    Exhaustion of State Remedies
    A district court cannot grant a habeas petition under § 2254 if the petitioner
    has not first exhausted the claims asserted therein in state court. See 28 U.S.C.
    § 2254(b)(1)(A); Gray v. Netherland, 
    518 U.S. 152
    , 162-63 (1996). To exhaust a
    claim in state court, a petitioner must “fairly present[]” the claim in a manner such
    that “a reasonable reader would understand [the] claim’s particular legal basis and
    specific factual foundation.” McNair v. Campbell, 
    416 F.3d 1291
    , 1302 (11th Cir.
    2005); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 
    526 U.S. 838
    , 845 (1999). We conclude
    Kitchen did so in the instant case.
    Kitchen appealed his conviction, filed a petition to vacate his conviction
    under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, and also appealed the denial of
    his Rule 3.850 petition in state court. In each of these proceedings, Kitchen fairly
    presented his federal claims by citing United States v. Joshi, 
    896 F.2d 1303
    , 1309
    (11th Cir. 1990), to establish that inadequacies in the translation of trial
    proceedings can violate federal due process if they render a trial “fundamentally
    unfair.” See Baldwin v. Reese, 
    541 U.S. 27
    , 32 (2004) (“A litigant wishing to raise
    a federal issue can easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a state-court
    petition or brief, for example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal
    source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal
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    grounds, or by simply labeling the claim ‘federal.’”). Kitchen also cited cases
    from states other than Florida, further indicating that he had not based his claims
    solely on Florida law, and, in his appeal of the state court’s denial of his Rule
    3.850 petition, Kitchen also cited Valladares v. United States, 
    871 F.2d 1564
    , 1566
    (11th Cir. 1989), and stated that the inadequate translation of the trial proceedings
    violated “the very foundation of due process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the
    United States Constitution.” Taken together, these references to federal rights did
    more than “scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court
    record.” 
    McNair, 416 F.3d at 1303
    (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Accordingly, we conclude Kitchen sufficiently presented his claims so
    as to exhaust his state court remedies for the purpose of seeking federal habeas
    relief.
    B.        Merits of the Claim
    The district court determined that, even if Kitchen had exhausted his claims
    in state court, his petition would fail on the merits, and on this basis we affirm. To
    succeed on the merits, a § 2254 habeas petitioner must establish that a state court’s
    adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
    unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
    Supreme Court,” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
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    determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. 28
    U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
    The state courts’ decisions in the instant case were not contrary to or
    unreasonable applications of clearly-established federal law because no Supreme
    Court precedent establishes that translations of court proceedings that are
    inadequate in the manner Kitchen alleges render a trial “fundamentally unfair.”
    Importantly, habeas review asks only whether the state court’s decision was
    contrary to or unreasonably applied federal law that has been clearly established by
    the Supreme Court, not whether a federal court, in its independent judgment,
    agrees with the state court’s application of federal law in an area that remains
    unsettled. See Hawkins v. Alabama, 
    318 F.3d 1302
    , 1307 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003)
    (“The state courts must fully, faithfully and reasonably follow legal rules already
    clearly established by the Supreme Court of the United States. . . . [S]tate courts
    are not obliged to widen the rules.” (emphasis added)); see also Renico v. Lett, 
    559 U.S. 766
    , 773 (2010) (“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply
    because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-
    court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)). Put simply, because the Supreme Court’s
    cases give no clear answer to whether the translation deficiencies Kitchen alleged
    rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, “it cannot be said that the state court
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    unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” Wright v. Van Patten, 
    552 U.S. 120
    , 126 (2008) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that regardless of whether Kitchen
    exhausted his claims in state court, the claims fail on the merits, and he is therefore
    not entitled to habeas relief under § 2254.
    AFFIRMED.
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