Com. v. Schmocker, K. ( 2022 )

J-A29032-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KEITH ROBERT SCHMOCKER :
:
Appellant : No. 527 WDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 20, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0010612-2016
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: JANUARY 12, 2022
Keith Robert Schmocker (Schmocker) appeals from the order entered
by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (PCRA court). Following
a jury trial, Schmocker was convicted of indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 3126(a)(1), and acquitted of three other related offenses. He was
sentenced to a prison term of 6 to 23 months, followed by 30 days of
probation. This Court affirmed on direct appeal, and Schmocker timely filed
a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective
in failing to challenge the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction on indecent
assault. The PCRA court denied Schmocker’s petition and he now seeks
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A29032-21
review. Because there is merit to Schmocker’s claim, the PCRA court’s order
must be reversed.
I.
In Schmocker’s underlying criminal case, he was accused of sexual
offenses against Erin Huttenhower. It was alleged that in 2016, Schmocker
went out drinking with Huttenhower, his wife, and his sister-in-law. After
several hours of socializing at a bar, Schmocker drove the women back to his
nearby residence, as he was the designated driver for the evening.
Huttenhower fell asleep on a chair and ottoman in the living room, and
when she woke up later that night at about 12:45 a.m., Schmocker was next
to her. According to Huttenhower, she was woken up by the touch of
Schmocker’s fingers inside her vagina. She yelled at Schmocker to get away
from her, but he instead turned her on her stomach and said quietly that there
was a bedroom upstairs.
Huttenhower yelled at Schmocker again and pushed him away as she
left the residence to go back to her own home. After reporting the incident to
police, Huttenhower went to a hospital for a sexual assault examination. At
about 4:00 a.m., police interrogated Schmocker and collected a sample of his
D.N.A.
Schmocker admitted that he had touched Huttenhower when she was
asleep in his home. However, he denied that the touching was sexual,
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insisting that he was only trying to readjust Huttenhower’s body because she
was falling out of the chair she was sleeping in.
No forensic evidence corroborated the allegations against Schmocker.
At trial, the testimonial evidence conflicted as to Huttenhower’s level of
inebriation and the manner in which the touching occurred. Ultimately, the
jury was forced to render its verdict by weighing the credibility of the
witnesses’ disparate accounts of what had transpired.
The jury acquitted Schmocker of two counts of aggravated indecent
assault (18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3125(a)(1), 3125(a)(4)) and one count of indecent
assault with forcible compulsion (18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(2)). As to the fourth
count which is at issue here – indecent assault without victim consent (18
Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1)) – the critical factual issues for the jury to resolve were
whether Schmocker touched the victim as she alleged and, if so, whether
Schmocker intended to touch the victim for sexual gratification. The jury was
instructed on the elements of the latter offense as follows:
[Schmocker] has been charged at Count 3 with Indecent Assault.
To find [Schmocker] of this offense, you must find that the
following three elements have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt:
First, that [Schmocker] indecent contact with [the victim], or
caused [the victim] to have indecent contact with him; Second,
that the defendant had or caused this contact without the consent
of [the victim]; And third, that [Schmocker] knowingly or at least
recklessly regarding [the victim’s] non-consent.
I would like to explain some of the elements and terms I used
when I gave you the elements. What do I mean by indecent
contact? Two things are necessary for a defendant to have
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or to cause indecent contact with the alleged victim of an
indecent assault: First, that the defendant must bring
about a touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of
the body of one of them by the other: Or two, the
defendant must bring about this contact for the purpose of
arousing or gratifying his own or the victim’s sexual desire.
Trial Transcript, at pp. 693-95 (emphasis added).1
Schmocker’s trial counsel did not object to the trial court’s use of the
word “or” instead of “and” when reading the elements of “indecent contact.”
However, it is undisputed that the correct definition of “indecent contact”
includes an improper touching and an intent to make such contact for the
purpose of sexual gratification. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1) (indecent assault
statute); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101 (defining “indecent contact” as “[a]ny
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of
arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any person.”).
Additionally, it is worth noting that the jury had required over a full day
of deliberations before issuing its verdict, and during that time, the jury
specifically requested a clarification of the elements of indecent assault. After
a verdict was entered and Schmocker was sentenced, this Court affirmed the
judgment of sentence in Commonwealth v. Schmocker, 673 WDA 2018
(Pa. Super. December 7, 2019); see also Commonwealth v. Schmocker,
294 WAL 2019 (Pa. January 22, 2020) (denying further review).
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1For unknown reasons, the written instructions provided to the jury do not
appear in the certified record.
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Schmocker timely filed a PCRA petition asserting that his trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to object to the trial court’s erroneous instruction on
indecent assault. At an evidentiary hearing, Schmocker’s trial counsel
admitted that he had no reasonable basis for failing to object to the incorrect
jury instruction. See PCRA Hearing Transcript, 2/11/2021, at pp. 20-23.
Nevertheless, the PCRA court found that Schmocker failed to establish
prejudice and denied relief on that basis. The PCRA court ruled that
Schmocker bore the burden of proof to establish his claim, and that since there
was no showing of exactly what the written jury instructions contained,
Schmocker had failed to carry that burden. See Trial Court Opinion, at 10-
11.
Schmocker timely appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying
his post-conviction claim because all the elements of ineffectiveness had been
met. In response, the Commonwealth conceded in its brief that the trial court
read an incorrect instruction on indecent assault, but proposed that
Schmocker could not show prejudice because the jury also received accurate
written instructions as to that charge. The Commonwealth argued
alternatively that Schmocker could not show prejudice because he had failed
to prove that the written instructions were inaccurate. See Appellee’s Brief,
at 10-11.
Schmocker, in turn, filed a reply brief pointing out that the written
instructions were trial exhibits, making it the responsibility of the clerk of court
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to enter them into the trial court’s record. He contended that the absence of
the written instructions necessarily precludes a presumption that the error in
the trial court’s oral instructions was cured.
II.
We begin our analysis by remarking on the Commonwealth’s somewhat
dubious argument for affirmance. Essentially, the Commonwealth admits that
the trial court read an erroneous instruction to the jury on indecent assault
which would have allowed Schmocker to be convicted of the offense without
the jury finding that both central elements of the crime had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather than further concede that this was
prejudicial to Schmocker, the Commonwealth echoes the trial court in arguing
that the error was cured by written jury instructions that do not appear in the
certified record.
Following the Commonwealth’s suggestion to its logical conclusion would
require us to assume (a) that the jury indeed received complete written
instructions as to all the elements of indecent assault, (b) that these written
instructions were correct, and (c) that the jury was not confused by the
conflicting oral and written instructions, such that it was able to discern the
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law correctly when arriving at its verdict.2 As the Commonwealth well knows,
these are not assumptions that an appellate court is permitted to make.
“It is black letter law in this jurisdiction that an appellate court cannot
consider anything which is not part of the record in this case.” Bennyhoff v.
Pappert, 790 A.2d 313, 318 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted). “Any
document which is not part of the official certified record is considered to be
nonexistent, which deficiency may not be remedied by inclusion in the
reproduced record.” Eichman v. McKeon, 824 A.2d 305, 316 (Pa. Super.
2003) (citing Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 1921).
This Court is, therefore, prohibited from adopting any of the
assumptions advanced by the Commonwealth as grounds to affirm the denial
of post-conviction relief in this case.3 Schmocker cannot be blamed or
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2 The Commonwealth’s logical leap is made all the more precarious by the trial
court’s directive to the jury not to “put any more emphasis or any less
emphasis on these sections [of written instructions], simply because they are
in writing[.]” Trial Transcript, 8/2/2017, at p. 734. So even if it were
permissible for us to assume that the jury indeed received correct written
instructions, the jury would have still been confused or misled by the
instructions as a whole for lack of a specific clarification about the error in the
oral version. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 904 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (“A jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge as
a whole is inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse,
rather than clarify, a material issue.”).
3 “[T]he record on appeal, including the transcript and exhibits necessary for
the determination of the appeal, shall be transmitted to the appellate court
within 60 days after the filing of the notice of appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1).
This administrative task is to be carried about by the clerk of court, and the
appellant cannot be faulted for the failure of court staff to compile the record
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punished for the administrative breakdown that resulted in the loss of the
written jury instructions. On appeal, we must presume that those written
instructions do not exist, focusing this Court’s inquiry on whether trial
counsel’s failure to object to incorrect oral instructions caused Schmocker
prejudice for the purposes of the PCRA.4
For a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner has the
burden of establishing three elements: (1) there is underlying merit to the
claim of asserted error, (2) counsel has no reasonable basis for failing to
remedy the error, and (3) counsel’s inaction or inaction caused prejudice. See
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987). Prejudice in
this context is defined as having a “reasonable probability” of affecting the
trial verdict. See Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 693-94 (Pa.
2008); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 957 A.2d 237, 244 (Pa. 2008)
(A “reasonable probability” is a degree of likelihood “sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.”).
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on appeal as the appellate rules require. In this case, although the written
jury instructions were marked as a court exhibit at trial, they were inexplicably
not made part of the court file.
4 If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or
accident, this Court, on proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct
that the omission be corrected and a supplemental record be certified and
transmitted if necessary. See Pa.R.A.P. 1926. However, this rule is
unavailing in this case because it appears that the written instructions
provided to the jury in Schmocker’s trial have been irretrievably lost.
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The reasonable probability “test is not a stringent one,” as it is “less
demanding than the preponderance standard.” Commonwealth v.
Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002). Where a jury has received
incorrect instructions due to counsel’s ineffectiveness, a court must assess
PCRA prejudice by weighing the error “against the overwhelming strength of
the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 317 (Pa. 2014). “In
reviewing the grant or denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA
court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1283-84 (Pa. 2016). The PCRA
court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See id.The parties in this case agree that the jury in Schmocker’s trial received
an erroneous instruction on indecent assault, and that there was no
reasonable basis for trial counsel to allow that error to go unremedied. The
only dispute here is whether the erroneous instruction caused Schmocker
prejudice – we find that it did.
As previously discussed, the jury’s verdict necessarily hinged on
whether it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Huttenhower’s accusations
were credible. The jury could find Schmocker guilty only if it believed
Huttenhower’s allegations about what he did on the night of the alleged
offenses. Because the jury acquitted Schmocker of three of the four charges,
it is clear that at least some of Huttenhower’s allegations were discounted. By
the same token, the jury found Schmocker guilty as to the only count for which
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it was incorrectly instructed, doing so after more than a day of deliberations
and after asking for clarification on the elements of that count. The weight of
the evidence was by no means overwhelming.
On these facts, there was a reasonable probability that the erroneous
oral jury instructions could have prejudiced Schmocker. “[T]he inclusion of
an erroneous mens rea reducing the level of culpability required to find
[petitioner] guilty . . . was a critical mistake that ‘could have reasonably had
an adverse impact on the outcome of the proceedings.’” Commonwealth v.
Domek, 167 A.3d 761, 766-67 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Spotz, 84 A.3d at
317). Thus, the PCRA court’s order denying Schmocker relief must be
reversed.
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/12/2022
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