In Re: L.N.D., a Minor ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: L.N.D., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: C.D. : No. 1629 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree, September 21, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Orphans’ Court Division at No. 1589-2017
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 20, 2018
C.D. (“Father”) appeals from the decree dated September 21, 2017,1
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, granting the petition of
Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency (the “Agency”)
and involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his minor, dependent
child, L.N.D. (the “Child”), a female born in August of 2015, pursuant to the
1 While the docket reflects a docket date of September 21, 2017, and the
decree indicates copies were sent, there is no notation on the docket that
notice was given and that the order was entered for purposes of
Pa.R.C.P. 236(b). See Frazier v. City of Philadelphia, 735 A.2d 113, 115
(Pa. 1999) (holding that “an order is not appealable until it is entered on the
docket with the required notation that appropriate notice has been given”).
See also Pa.R.A.P. 108(a) (entry of an order is designated as “the day on
which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the
order has been given as required by Pa.R.C.P. 236(b)”.). While we consider
the matter on the merits, we caution the Lancaster County Prothonotary’s
Office as to compliance with the rules with regard to the entry of orders.
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Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). 2, 3 After review,
we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and/or factual
history as follows:
Procedural History
On March 30, 2016, the [Agency] filed a
Petition for Temporary Custody of [Child]. A Shelter
Care Order was entered following a hearing on
March 31, 2016. Father failed to appear for the
Shelter Care Hearing despite receiving notice.
Mother appeared but waived the Shelter Care
Hearing without admitting any allegations. Following
a hearing on April 14, 2016, the [c]ourt adjudicated
the child dependent and approved a child
permanency plan with the goal of return to parents
and a concurrent placement goal of adoption.
Mother attended the Adjudication and Disposition
Hearing but Father did not. On July 20, 2017, the
Agency petitioned to terminate the parental rights of
[Father] and [Mother] to [Child] pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). A
hearing on the termination petition was held on
2By the same decree, the trial court additionally involuntarily terminated the
parental rights of Child’s mother, B.N.M. (“Mother”), pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). Mother filed a separate appeal
addressed by separate Memorandum at Superior Court Docket No. 1572
MDA 2017.
3 At the time of Child’s birth, Mother was married to N.M.
(“presumptive father”). Presumptive father’s parental rights were
terminated on August 24, 2017. (Notes of testimony, 9/21/17 at 62-63,
107; decree, 8/24/17.) Notably, paternity testing established Father’s
paternity in June 2016. (Notes of testimony, 9/21/17 at 107.)
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September 21, 2017[4, 5] and the [c]ourt issued a
decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s and
Father’s rights to L.N.D.[6] Mother and Father, on
October 13, 2017, and October 23, 2017,
respectively, filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania of the September 21, 2017
Orphans’ Court Order terminating their parental
rights.
Factual History
The Agency became involved with Mother and
Father since the birth of Child in August of 2015.
Due to the baby’s low birth weight and signs of
withdrawal symptoms due to morphine and other
medications Mother was taking during her
pregnancy, Child remained in the neonatal care unit
several weeks following her birth. The Agency
attempted to avoid placement of the Child but
Mother and Father did not participate in random drug
4 The Agency presented the testimony of Jonathan Gransee, Psy.D., clinical
psychologist, who performed a psychological evaluation of Mother and a
parenting capacity evaluation of Father; and Caitlin Hoover, Agency
caseworker. The Agency additionally offered Exhibits P-1 through P-5,
which, upon review, were never admitted on the record.
Notably, Mother, who was represented by counsel, was not present
due to alleged health issues, and no evidence was presented on her behalf.
Father, also represented by counsel, was present but did not testify or
present any evidence on his behalf.
5 Guardian ad litem, Cynthia L. Garman, Esq., also participated in these
proceedings. Ms. Garman argued and filed a brief in support of the
termination of parental rights. A Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”)
was additionally appointed. The record reveals that the CASA recommended
Child remain where placed and also favored termination of parental rights.
(Notes of testimony, 9/21/17 at 110.) We observe that this report was not
marked and admitted as part of the record.
6 While the decree only indicates termination pursuant to Subsections (a)(1),
(2), (5), and (8), not only was evidence presented with regard to
Subsection (b), the court addressed Subsection (b) both on the record and
in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. We therefore address Subsection (b) as well.
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screens and violated the safety plan. The Agency
took custody of the Child on March 30, 201[6]. At
the time of the termination hearing, Mother and
Father failed to make significant progress and,
neither parent had completed any goal on their
reunification plans.
Trial court opinion, 11/3/17 at 1-2.
On appeal, Father raises the following issue for our review:
I. Whether the court erred in terminating Father’s
parental rights?
Father’s brief at 11.7
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record.”
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id.7 We observe that Father states his issues somewhat differently than in his
Rule 1925(b) statement, but find that he preserved a broad challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence as to termination with his Rule 1925(b) statement
and statement of questions involved. However, as we read the argument
section of Father’s brief, although not explicitly stated, his argument appears
focused on Subsection (a)(1). (Father’s brief at 15-20.) While not specified,
Father references the law related to this subsection only. (Id. at 15-16.)
We, therefore, find that Father waived any challenge with regard to
Subsections (a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330,
339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011), quoting
In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa.Super. 2010) (“[W]here an appellate
brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant
authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion
capable of review, that claim is waived.”); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163
A.3d 462, 465-466 (Pa.Super. 2017).
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“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or
ill_will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however,
should not be reversed merely because the record
would support a different result. Id. at 827. We
have previously emphasized our deference to trial
courts that often have first-hand observations of the
parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re
R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis
of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the
child.
Our case law has made clear that under
Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated
process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially,
the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
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pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
In re C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201, quoting Matter of Adoption of Charles
E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998). In this case, the trial court
terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), and (8). We have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of
parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one
subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). See
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we
analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(1)
and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in
regard to a child may be terminated after a
petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing
for a period of at least six months
immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a
settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has
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refused or failed to perform
parental duties.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give
primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control
of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),
the court shall not consider any efforts by the
parent to remedy the conditions described
therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
We first examine the court’s termination of Father’s parental rights
under Section 2511(a)(1). We have explained this court’s review of a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the involuntary
termination of a parent’s rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) as follows:
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1),
the moving party must produce clear and convincing
evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the
six months prior to the filing of the termination
petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish
parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the
parent demonstrate both a settled
purpose of relinquishing parental claim to
a child and refusal or failure to perform
parental duties. Accordingly, parental
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rights may be terminated pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either
demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or
fails to perform parental duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform
parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental rights, the court must engage in three lines
of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her
conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect
of termination of parental rights on the child
pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted).
As it relates to the crucial six-month period prior to the filing of the
petition, this court has instructed:
[I]t is the six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition that [are] most critical to our
analysis. However, the trial court must consider the
whole history of a given case and not mechanically
apply the six-month statutory provisions, but instead
consider the individual circumstances of each case.
In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa.Super. 1999) (citations omitted). This
requires the court to “examine the individual circumstances of each case and
consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his or
her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.”
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872
A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted).
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Further, we have stated:
[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment]
contact must be steady and consistent over a period
of time, contribute to the psychological health of the
child, and must demonstrate a serious intent on the
part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child
relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness
and capacity to undertake the parental role. The
parent wishing to reestablish his parental
responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this
question.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1119 (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption
of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa.Super 2008) (en banc).
Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this court has stated:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental
duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation
to the needs of a child. A child needs love,
protection, guidance, and support. These needs,
physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child.
Thus, this Court has held that the parental obligation
is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a
financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in
the child and a genuine effort to maintain
communication and association with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor,
parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to
take and maintain a place of importance in the
child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act
affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and
not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the
parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent
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must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more
suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
responsibilities while others provide the child with
. . . her physical and emotional needs.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (internal citations omitted). Critically,
incarceration does not relieve a parent of the obligation to perform parental
duties. An incarcerated parent must “utilize available resources to continue
a relationship” with his or her child. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817,
828 (Pa. 2012), discussing In re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652 (Pa.
1975).
Instantly, in finding grounds for termination pursuant to
Subsection (a), the trial court stated as follows:
Father has failed to achieve his objectives. As
part of achieving his mental health objective, Father
needed to participate in a parenting capacity
evaluation. Dr. Gransee opined that Father does not
have the capacity to parent but had the possibility of
growing in capacity with proper support and
guidance. To gain capacity Father was to attend
outpatient therapy and anger management classes,
receive drug and alcohol treatment (intensive
outpatient) and medication, as well as be seen by a
personalized parent trainer. Father’s therapist
reported to the Agency that Father does attend his
therapy appointments when he manages to remain
sober and not be incarcerated. Recently, Father was
listed as a missing person for three weeks. During
this time he did not attend his therapy appointments
nor did he take his psychiatric medicine.
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Father was [sic] not completed his drug and
alcohol objective. On August 24, 2017, the [c]ourt
ordered Father to submit to an unscheduled drug
screen. Father did not submit to the screen at that
time. Instead, he returned to the agency five (5)
hours later and produced an invalid result.
Father has not completed his domestic violence
objective. He has not attend [sic] a domestic
violence program nor anger management therapy.
Regarding his crime free objective, Father is
currently on probation. Recently he missed his
probation officer appointment.
Father has not started his parenting objective.
He needs positive recommendations from his mental
health, drug and alcohol, and domestic violence
therapy providers to be recommended for the parent
educator program. These recommendations have
not been received by the Agency.
Father’s income, housing and commitment
objectives are not complete. Father is currently
unemployed and resides with his mother and brother
in a two-bedroom apartment. This residence is not
large enough to be deemed appropriate for Child to
reside in. Since June 1, 2017, Father attended
six (6) out of a possible fourteen (14) visits with
Child.
Trial court opinion, 11/3/17 at 6-7 (citations to record omitted).
Father, however, asserts that he was unable to commence work on his
plan until January 2017, upon release from prison. At that time, Father
indicates that he made efforts at completion of his plan. (Father’s brief at
16, 18-19.) Father further notes that Dr. Gransee indicated that, while
Father did not possess current parenting capacity, he may attain such
capacity in the future. (Id. at 18.) Father argues that, despite his efforts
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and Dr. Gransee’s recommendation of six months prior to reevaluation, the
Agency filed a petition to terminate parental rights after only four months,
as opposed to giving him more time. (Id. at 19.) Father also suggests that
any decline in his progress then came shortly after notification of the
Agency’s intent to proceed with termination. (Id. at 19-20.) Father states:
Since his release from prison in January 2017
until the filing of the Petition to Terminate Parental
Rights[,] Father demonstrated a commitment to
work on the Child Permanency Plan. In failing to
follow the recommendations of the Parenting
Capacity Assessment, permitting Father a full
six months with a reevaluation, the Agency failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Father’s parental rights should be terminated.
Id. at 20. We disagree.
A review of the record supports the trial court’s termination pursuant
to Subsection (a)(1). The evidence establishes that Father failed to make
efforts toward the requirements of his child permanency plan and parenting
Child and failed to maintain contact with Child until after release from
incarceration. Despite progress thereafter, Father failed to complete his plan
objectives and failed to maintain consistent contact with Child. Agency
caseworker, Caitlin Hoover, recounted Father’s objectives as: to remain free
from drugs and the misuse of alcohol, to improve mental health functioning
to the extent that he can care for his child, to remain free of domestic
violence, to remain crime free, to learn and use good parenting skills, to be
financially stable in order to provide for himself and his child, to obtain and
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maintain a home free and clear of hazards for himself and his child, and to
maintain an ongoing commitment to his child. (Notes of testimony, 9/21/17
at 76, 78, 80, 82-84.) Ms. Hoover testified that, despite the establishment
of paternity in June 2016, Father did not begin to engage in and work on his
plan objectives until January 2017, upon release from prison.8 (Id. at 99,
107.) Further, Father’s first visit with Child was not until January 30, 2017.
(Id. at 84.) Significantly, neither occurred until ten months after Child’s
placement. Father did not present evidence of any efforts toward parenting
Child and completing his objectives or contact prior to January 2017.
Ms. Hoover’s testimony further indicates that, despite some progress and
Dr. Gransee’s recognition of potential, Father failed to complete his
objectives thereafter. (Id. at 76-85.) Moreover, evidence was presented
that Father failed to maintain consistent contact with Child. Importantly,
since June 1, 2017, Father missed eight of fourteen visits with Child. (Id. at
84-85, 106.)
With his position, Father suggests that Child delay stability and
permanency while Father seeks to complete his plan requirements and attain
parental capacity. This is both speculative and unacceptable. As this court
8 As related by Ms. Hoover, Father “was incarcerated on two separate
occasions and then in addition . . . had reported some shame and
embarrassment with the case being open.” (Notes of testimony, 9/21/17 at
107.) While the exact dates are not clear from the certified record, the
Agency’s brief suggests that Father was incarcerated from June 20, 2016 to
July 21, 2016, followed by a 28-day rehabilitation program, and October 26,
2016 to January 17, 2017. (Agency brief at 4-5.)
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has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent
attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a
child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress
and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513
(Pa.Super. 2006). Child is in a stable and secure environment, where she
had been placed for approximately a year and a half at the time of the
hearing, almost her entire life. Thus, as the trial court’s termination
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) is supported by competent, clear and
convincing evidence in the record, we find no abuse of discretion. See In re
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267; In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d at 394.
As noted above, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we
need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of
Section 2511(a) before assessing the determination under Section 2511(b).
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384. We, therefore, need not address any further
subsection of Section 2511(a) and turn to whether termination was proper
under Section 2511(b). As noted, Father failed to preserve a challenge to
Subsection (b). However, had Father preserved a claim as to
Subsection (b), we would find such a claim lacked merit.
As to Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b).
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The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability.”
In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In
In re E.M., 620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this
Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the
emotional bonds between the parent and child. The
“utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the
effect on the child of permanently severing the
parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s
bonds is not always an easy task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on
the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,
762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-
interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many
factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the
trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the
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love, comfort, security, and stability the
child might have with the foster parent.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015), quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that
courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are
in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents.” T.S.M., supra at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the
bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the
ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court
observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have
an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail
. . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
In determining that termination of Father’s parental rights favored the
Child’s needs and welfare, the court reasoned as follows:
The Child’s best interest is served by her
remaining in foster care and being adopted. She has
been in care for eighteen (18) months, since
seven (7) months of age. The [c]ourt is convinced
that the parents will not resolve their significant
issues in a reasonable amount of time. Child is
thriving in a loving and healthy home which is a
potentially permanent resource. She has clearly
bonded with the resource parents, and the other
child in the home. By now, any bonding with parents
is very limited at best. Child cannot wait for an
indefinite period of time for the stability and care of
a permanent family in the hope that her biological
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parents will drastically change their behavior and
accomplish their goals. She is doing well and has
spent more time with their current family than with
anyone else. It is clear to this [c]ourt that the best
interest of Child is served by terminating the rights
of the parents and having her being adopted. The
[CASA] and the Guardian ad litem support the
termination of parental rights.
Trial court opinion, 11/3/17 at 7-8 (citations to record omitted). We agree.
Upon review, we again discern no abuse of discretion. The record
supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare favor termination of Father’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(b). There was sufficient evidence to allow the trial
court to make a determination of Child’s needs and welfare, and as to the
existence of a lack of a bond between Father and Child that, if severed,
would not have a detrimental impact on her.
While Ms. Hoover testified that Father’s visits with Child went well after
Child became comfortable with him (notes of testimony, 9/21/17 at 84), she
confirmed that Father’s visitation became inconsistent after June 1, 2017,
missing eight of fourteen visits. (Id. at 84-85). Moreover, Child was in the
same pre-adoptive home since placement and was doing well and bonded
with her resource family. (Id. at 85-86.) Ms. Hoover offered that Child “has
developed a close relationship and attachment with her resource parents and
their adopted daughter. [Child] also enjoys playing with resource parents’
two dogs.” (Id. at 86.) As such, Ms. Hoover opined that it was in Child’s
best interests to terminate parental rights. She stated:
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The [Agency] believes that termination of parental
rights would be in Child’s best interest so that she
may be adopted and have a stable permanent home.
Prolonging this child in foster care and not allowing
her stability and permanency in her life would cause
more harm than termination of parental rights.
Id. It was noted on the record that the CASA also recommended Child
remain in her resource home and favored termination of parental rights.
(Id. at 110.)
Thus, as confirmed by the record, termination of Father’s parental
rights serves Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare and was proper pursuant to Section 2511(b). While Father may
profess to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a
child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994
A.2d at 1121. As we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in
the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon
the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 856 (citation
omitted).
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Father’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).
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J. S04034/18
Decree affirmed.
Dubow, J. joins this Memorandum.
Shogan, J. concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/20/2018
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