In the Int. of: C.A., Appeal of: J.O. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.O., MOTHER :
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: No. 2860 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered October 2, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-45-DP-0000108-2016
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.O., MOTHER :
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: No. 2861 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered October 2, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Orphans’ Court at
No(s): No. 48 O.C.A. 2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2020
Appellant, J.O. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered October 2,
2019, at Docket Number 48 O.C.A. 2018 (“No. 48-18”) that terminated her
parental rights to her child, C.A. (“Child”), born 2016, and from the order
entered that same day in the related dependency action, Docket Number CP-
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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45-DP-0000108-2016 (“No. 108-16”) that continued Child’s dependency and
placement in a pre-adoptive foster home. After careful review, we quash both
appeals.
Monroe County Children and Youth Service (“CYS”) had been involved
with this family prior to Child’s birth. In July 2011, CYS --
received a referral that Mother’s home was deplorable, replete
with urine and feces all over the floor, and that Child’s brother,
A.O., who was 10 [years old] at the time, was not receiving proper
nourishment. . . . [O]n May 9, 2013, A.O. was adjudicated
dependent and ultimately removed from the home. . . .
Unfortunately, despite two more years of efforts, Mother was not
able to remedy the conditions that caused A.O. to come into care.
. . . Accordingly, on November 2, 2015, after four years of [CYS]
involvement, dependency was terminated with legal and physical
custody of A.O. being granted to his guardian through a
Subsidized Permanent Legal Custodian arrangement.
Trial Court Opinion, filed November 26, 2019, at 2-3.
Child first came to CYS’s attention when he was three months old – less
than a year after A.O.’s dependency ended. CYS “received a referral that
Mother had been incarcerated for non-payment of support for A.O., and Child’s
Father, who had been indicated by CYS for sexual abuse was acting as Child’s
caretaker.” Id. at 3. In September 2016, “Child was adjudicated dependent
and placed with his paternal great aunt”; “[a]s in A.O.’s case, the deplorable
condition of Mother’s home was [also] a substantial reason why Child was
adjudicated dependent and placed in foster care.” Id. at 3, 10. CYS
established goals for reunification, including Mother obtaining sanitary and
stable housing and completing parenting classes, and put in place
“[s]ubstantial services . . . in an attempt to help” Mother achieve her goals.
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Id. at 3-4. “Throughout the case, three month review hearings were
conducted.” Id. at 4.
On April 2, 2018, believing that Mother had failed to complete most of
her objectives, CYS filed a petition requesting that Child’s permanency goal
be changed from reunification to adoption. The trial court held a hearing on
the petition on May 22, 2018, but never explicitly stated during the hearing
that it was granting CYS’s petition. See generally N.T., 5/22/2018. A written
permanency review order (“PRO”) was entered the next day but provided
contradictory information, as follows:
CURRENT PERMANENT PLACEMENT GOAL
The current placement goal for the child is return to parent or
guardian.
CONCURRENT PLACEMENT PLAN
The concurrent placement plan for the child is Adoption. . . .
PERMANENT PLACEMENT - Change of Goal
The Court Orders, the new permanent placement goal hereby
determined to be Adoption.
PRO, 5/23/2018, at 1-2.
On July 11, 2018, CYS initiated No. 48-18 by filing a petition to
terminate Mother’s parental rights.
Meanwhile, the trial court scheduled another permanency review
hearing in No. 108-16 for August 22, 2018. On August 17, 2018, the court
continued the hearing until October 17, 2018.
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Following the hearing on October 17, 2018, the trial court entered a
written PRO. Under the heading “Current Permanent Placement Goal,” the
PRO stated: “The current placement goal for the child is Adoption.” PRO,
10/17/2018, at 1. This PRO is the first one to list a goal of adoption under
the “Current Permanent Placement Goal” heading.
That same day, Mother filed a notice of appeal from No. 108-16. In it,
Mother stated that she was appealing from the “order . . . given on Aug. 18
2018[.]” However, there was no order entered on August 18, 2018, and the
order dated August 17, 2018, merely granted a continuance.
This appeal was assigned Docket Number 3136 EDA 2018, and, on
March 18, 2019, Mother, who had been represented by counsel, filed a motion
with this Court to proceed pro se. On March 25, 2019, this Court denied
Mother’s motion without prejudice to seek the requested relief with the trial
court.
On April 12, 2019, pursuant to both No. 108-16 and No. 48-18, the trial
court held a hearing on Mother’s motion to represent herself, during which the
trial court engaged in the following colloquy with Mother:
THE COURT: So then [Mother], do you understand that you
have a right to an attorney in both of those cases?
[MOTHER]: Yes. . . .
THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
[MOTHER]: High school senior.
THE COURT: So you graduated?
[MOTHER]: Yes.
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THE COURT: Do you understand that if I allow you to
represent yourself even though you are a layperson not an
attorney you would still be bound and required to follow all of the
court rules that apply in Pennsylvania?
[MOTHER]: Yes. . . .
THE COURT: Do you also understand that there would be
briefs due in the appeal or appeals?
[MOTHER]: Yes. . . .
THE COURT: When someone represents themselves they get
cut no special breaks. I’m trying to keep this very simple. And
so if there is a rule that you miss or if you fail to file something on
time or if you do not make an objection where an attorney might
nobody steps in to help you; not in this [c]ourt, not in the
Appellate Courts, not at the Supreme Court if you get there. Do
you understand that?
[MOTHER]: Yes I do.
THE COURT: That you’re held to the same standard, the
same rules, etc., as an attorney and if you make a mistake, to use
again a common term, it would be on you. Do you understand
that?
[MOTHER]: Yes.
THE COURT: So knowing all that is it your desire to represent
yourself in both -- let’s take them one at a time; in the
dependency case both here in this [c]ourt and on appeal in two
appeals?
[MOTHER]: Yes.
THE COURT: And then you did not include I do not believe in
your filings a request to represent yourself in the termination of
parental rights case however since I’m going to ask, as I told you
before, everybody to provide that information and argument to
me and because you've expressed today you want to represent
yourself in all matters I want to take care of that today as well if
that’s okay with you.
[MOTHER]: Yes it is, thank you.
THE COURT: And you would like to represent yourself in the
termination of parental rights case?
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[MOTHER]: Yes I would. . . .
THE COURT: Now the other thing I want to do on the record,
I’ll indicate that you satisfied me that you understand the
proceedings, you understand your right to an attorney and that
you are making a conscious and knowing decision to elect to
represent yourself.
N.T., 4/12/2019, at 8-9, 12-13. The trial court also entered written orders at
both docket numbers and instructed the Clerk of Courts to transmit the order
for No. 108-16 to this Court.
On June 19, 2019, this Court dismissed Mother’s appeal from underlying
Docket No. 108-16 (Superior Court Docket Number 3136 EDA 2018), because
Mother failed to file a brief, despite the trial court’s warning that a brief was
due in the appeal. N.T., 4/12/2019, at 9.
The [termination] hearing, together with the next dependency
review hearing reconvened on September 4, 2019. . . . The
evidence presented over the course of the three-day [termination]
hearing, as well as intervening permanency hearings, was
reminiscent of A.O.’s case and tracked and confirmed the evidence
presented during the goal change hearing.
Trial Court Opinion, filed November 26, 2019, at 10.
On September 4, 2019, the trial court entered an order terminating
Mother’s parental rights to Child at No. 48-18 and a second order continuing
Child’s dependency and placement in his pre-adoptive foster home at No. 108-
16. On October 3, 2019, Mother filed timely notices of appeal at both docket
numbers, each with its own statement of errors complained of on appeal. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), (b).
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Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement for No. 108-16 was four pages in
length and enumerated five issues. Her Rule 1925(b) statement for No. 48-
18 listed 28 issues across 23 pages, with some issues including up to 17 sub-
claims. In its entirety, the first issue was:
1.) Question of Motive: It is important to note the venue of this
case has been that of the Orphan’s Court, although it has not been
presided over by the Judge assigned to said court. However the
crux of the issue with this case and the choice of court is
stupefying in so much as the Children and Youth Services who
prompted this case and are alleging their concern for the wellbeing
of the Child in question and yet have placed “In rem” the Child’s
Living Estate (the funds in this case having been received solely
from the Social Security Department ) over the welfare and
humanity of the Child in question. The source of the Orphans’
Court’s jurisdiction being solely the money – the “Estate” of the
alive or dead person at issue.
Statement of Errors, No. 48-18, 10/3/2019, at 2 ¶ 1.
On November 4, 2019, this Court consolidated both appeals. The trial
court submitted a Rule 1925(a) opinion, which attempted to address both No.
108-16 and No. 48-18 on the merits but also urged us to find waiver based
upon the “rambling” nature of Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statements. Trial Court
Opinion, filed November 26, 2019, at 1. The trial court opinion did not address
whether the court believed that Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statements were filed
in bad faith. See id. at 14-19.
Preliminarily, before we can reach the trial court’s request that we find
Mother’s appellate challenges to be waived or reach the merits of those
challenges, we must first determine whether the trial court properly allowed
Mother to proceed pro se. “Parents in involuntary termination proceedings
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have a constitutionally-protected right to counsel.” In re C.A.S., 166 A.3d
353, 356 (Pa. Super. 2017). In In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014),
this Court analogized the right to counsel in a termination proceeding to that
of the right to counsel in a proceeding pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”).1 This Court noted that, during a PCRA matter, “when a party
‘was denied [his] right to counsel—or failed to properly waive that right—
this Court is required to raise this error sua sponte and remand for the PCRA
court to correct that mistake.’ Commonwealth v. Stossel, 17 A.3d 1286,
1290 (Pa. Super. 2011).” X.J., 104 A.3d at 4. In Stossel, 17 A.3d at 1290,
this Court stated that it is necessary for the lower court to conduct a hearing
to determine if the party were “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waiving his right to counsel.” In doing so, the court must ascertain if the party
“understands: (1) his right to be represented by counsel; (2) that if he waived
this right, he will still be bound by all normal procedural rules; and (3) that
many rights and potential claims may be permanently lost if not timely
asserted.” Id. at 1289.
Applying this framework for determining proper waiver of counsel in a
PCRA action, id., to the current termination of parental rights appeal, we find
that the trial court did ascertain that Mother understood that she had the right
to be represented by counsel, N.T., 4/12/2019, at 8, that she would still be
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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
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bound by all normal procedural rules despite being pro se, id. at 9, and that
she needed to make timely objections in order to prevent potential claims
from being lost, id. at 12. Accordingly, Mother’s waiver of her right to counsel
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and, consequently, the trial court’s
decision to allow Mother to proceed pro se, id. at 13, was properly granted.
See X.J., 104 A.3d at 4; Stossel, 17 A.3d at 1290.
Next, we consider whether Mother, as a pro se appellant, adhered to
our Rules of Appellate Procedure. “Pro se status does not relieve [an
appellant] of his duty to follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure.”
Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1037 (Pa. Super. 2018),
reargument denied (February 6, 2019), appeal denied, 217 A.3d 793 (Pa.
2019), cert. denied, No. 19-6894, 2020 WL 873220 (U.S. February 24, 2020).
Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed
by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon
the appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent
himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent,
assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his
undoing. Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the
procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court; if
there are considerable defects, we will be unable to perform
appellate review.
Id. at 1037-38 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). When an
appellant ignores the Rules, thereby “thwart[ing] appellate review[,] . . . the
only appropriate remedy is waiver of all issues” and dismissal of the appeal.
Id. at 1043.
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Hence, we turn to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 to determine whether Mother has
waived all issues for appeal based upon deficient Rule 1925(b) statements, as
the trial court encouraged us to do. Trial Court Opinion, filed November 26,
2019, at 1.
The fact th[at an appellant] filed a timely 1925(b) statement does
not automatically equate with issue preservation. . . . [T]he
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently “concise” and
“coherent” such that the trial court judge may be able to identify
the issues to be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not
suggest the existence of bad faith. . . . [A] Rule 1925(b) statement
is a crucial component of the appellate process because it allows
the trial court to identify and focus on those issues the party plans
to raise on appeal. A Concise Statement which is too vague to
allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the
functional equivalent to no Concise Statement at all. Even if the
trial court correctly guesses the issues appellants raise on appeal
and writes an opinion pursuant to that supposition the issues [are]
still waived.
Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1038 (internal brackets, citations, and quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis added). As the Rule itself explains:
The Statement shall set forth only those errors that the appellant
intends to assert. . . .
The Statement should not be redundant or provide lengthy
explanations as to any error. Where non-redundant, non-frivolous
issues are set forth in an appropriately concise manner, the
number of errors raised will not alone be grounds for finding
waiver.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(i), (iv).
In the current case, Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement for No. 108-16 is
arguably “concise” and “coherent,” listing only five issues across four pages
that specifically challenge the credibility and veracity of CYS caseworkers and
the propriety of Child’s original removal. Statement of Errors, No. 108-16,
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10/3/2019, at 2-4. Ergo, we disagree with the trial court that the issues raised
in Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement for No. 108-16 should be waived. See
Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1038.
Nonetheless, Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement for No. 48-18 cannot be
considered “concise” -- it is 23 pages in length and raises 28 distinct issues,
some of which have sub-claims, including one with 16 sub-claims and another
with 17 sub-claims. Statement of Errors, No. 48-18, 10/3/2019, at 2-22 ¶¶ 1-
28. Albeit that the total number of errors raised alone cannot be grounds for
finding waiver, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv), Mother’s challenges cannot be
considered “coherent,” either; for example, we cannot discern what issue
Mother is trying to raise her first claim, which appears in its entirety above.
Statement of Errors, No. 48-18, 10/3/2019, at 2 ¶ 1. Mother seems to be
accusing CYS of stealing Child’s money and questioning the Orphans’ Court’s
jurisdiction to hear a termination of parental rights action, but we are merely
guessing. Nevertheless, her next issue is entitled “Improper Jurisdiction,” id.
at 2 ¶ 2, which would mean that, if she were challenging jurisdiction in her
first issue, then her issues are redundant, which they are not permitted to be.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv). All of Mother’s other issues in her Rule 1925(b)
statement for No. 48-18 are likewise incoherent and/or redundant.
Yet, there is no evidence that Mother acted in “bad faith” when she filed
her inarticulate Rule 1925(b) statement in No. 48-18. See Vurimindi, 200
A.3d at 1038. In Vurimindi, the appellant was a “well-educated individual
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with a master’s degree” who thereby could not “plead ignorance.” Id. at 1042
(citation to the record and internal brackets omitted). Additionally, the
appellant had already been warned by the trial court that there were issues
that he could not raise on direct appeal, such as ineffective assistance of
counsel, but that he “deliberately raised” anyway. Id. Also, when the trial
court gave the appellant “a second opportunity to comply with Rule 1925(b)[,]
. . . [i]nstead of being more concise, [the appellant] added 8 more issues to
his already voluminous list of alleged errors.” Id. at 1040. For these reasons,
this Court concluded that the appellant in Vurimindi acted in bad faith and
“conclude[d] that the only appropriate remedy is waiver of all issues.” Id. at
1043.
As noted above, the trial court in the current action did not inquire into
whether Mother acted in bad faith when she filed her voluminous Rule 1925(b)
statement in No. 48-18. See Trial Court Opinion, filed November 26, 2019,
at 1, 12-19. However, we find that none of the circumstances that lead this
Court to find that the appellant in Vurimindi had acted in bad faith apply to
the current appeal. Unlike the appellant in Vurimindi, Mother is not “well-
educated” but, instead, only has a high school diploma. Compare 200 A.3d
at 1042 with N.T., 4/12/2019, at 9. Also unlike in Vurimindi, there is no
indication in the record that Mother had previously been warned that any of
her issues were impermissible on appeal, and the trial court did not give
Mother the opportunity to submit a revised Rule 1925(b) statement for No.
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48-18. See 200 A.3d at 1040, 1042. Therefore, in contrast to Vurimindi,
id. at 1043, we cannot determine that Mother acted in bad faith when she
filed her voluminous and rambling Rule 1925(b) statement, and, thus, we will
not find waiver of all issues at No. 48-18.
Although Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statements do not demand waiver, her
consolidated appellate brief fails to adhere to any of our Rules of Appellate
Procedure to the degree that we are unable to perform appellate review.
Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1038.
The briefing requirements scrupulously delineated in our appellate
rules are not mere trifling matters of stylistic preference; rather,
they represent a studied determination by our [Supreme] Court
and its rules committee of the most efficacious manner by which
appellate review may be conducted so that a litigant’s right to
judicial review as guaranteed by Article V, Section 9 of our
Commonwealth’s Constitution may be properly exercised.
Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 343 (Pa. 2011). According to
Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1)-(11):
The brief of the appellant, except as otherwise prescribed by these
rules, shall consist of the following matters, separately and
distinctly entitled and in the following order:
(1) Statement of jurisdiction.
(2) Order or other determination in question.
(3) Statement of both the scope of review and the standard
of review.
(4) Statement of the questions involved.
(5) Statement of the case.
(6) Summary of argument.
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(7) Statement of the reasons to allow an appeal to challenge
the discretionary aspects of a sentence, if applicable.
(8) Argument for appellant.
(9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(10) The opinions and pleadings specified in paragraphs (b)
and (c) of this rule.
(11) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of errors
complained of on appeal, filed with the trial court pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), or an averment that no order requiring
a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was entered.
Mother’s brief lacks the sections described in Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1)-(6).2
Instead, she leaps straight into her argument pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
2111(a)(8). Mother’s Brief at 2-40. While the brief does not include a
separate heading for her conclusion, the penultimate paragraph of her
argument begins “In Conclusion” and her final paragraph states the relief that
she is seeking, id. at 41; her brief therefore arguably satisfies Pa.R.A.P.
2111(a)(9). While the brief includes the trial court opinion, thus fulfilling
Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(10), she did not attach her Rule 1925(b) statements as
required by Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(11).
This Court has refused to review appeals where an appellant’s brief is
missing fewer sections than Mother’s. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spuck,
86 A.3d 870 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quashal where pro se brief lacking requiring
statement of jurisdiction to hear the appeal and statement of the questions
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2 Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(7) is inapplicable.
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involved stating concisely the issues to be resolved); Commonwealth v.
Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996) (appellant failed to provide brief
which would allow meaningful judicial review, where brief did not include
statement of scope and standard of review, order or determination sought to
be reviewed, summary of argument, and copy of lower court opinion; appeal
therefore quashed); Commonwealth v. Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1015-16 (Pa.
Super. 1993) (appeal quashed where brief “contain[ed] no statement of
jurisdiction, order, or other determination in question, summary of argument
or statement of the questions involved”; brief thus violated the Pennsylvania
Rules of Appellate Procedure to a degree that precluded us from conducting
meaningful review of claims). This Court has found the lack of a statement of
questions involved to be particularly egregious. Smathers v. Smathers, 670
A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996) (“the omission of a statement of questions
presented is particularly grievous since the statement defines the specific
issues this court is asked to review”; quashing pro se appeal); Maris, 629
A.2d at 1016 (this Court is not obliged to consider any of appellants’
arguments where none of those arguments were set forth in a statement of
questions involved).
Given that Mother’s brief is so deficient, lacking so many required
sections, including the grievous omission of a statement of questions involved,
we are unable to conduct meaningful judicial review; thus, we are compelled
to quash Mother’s appeals. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1)-(6), (11); Spuck, 86
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A.3d 870; Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011; Smathers, 670 A.2d at 1160; Maris, 629
A.2d at 1015-16.
Assuming the absence of majority of the required sections under
Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a) from Mother’s brief did not entirely preclude our ability to
provide meaningful judicial review of Mother’s claims, Mother’s brief is also
flawed, because she fails to state the place of raising or preserving any of her
challenges before the trial court, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e). Given that
“[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal[,]” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), Mother is required to have raised
her issues below in order for this Court to be able to review them.
Nonetheless, we have been unable to discern any place in the record where
Mother raised many of her appellate issues -- including but not limited to
claims relating to discovery, warrantless entry, estoppel, the Adoption and
Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), and alleged bad faith by CYS – before the trial
court. See Mother’s Brief at 2-4 (discovery), 8-12 (warrant), 13-15
(estoppel), 30-38 (ASFA), 39-40 (bad faith).
In fact, not only does Mother’s brief fail to state where she raised or
preserved her challenges, it fails to provide any citations as to where any of
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the facts she alleges were established by evidence of record,3 in violation of
Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) and 2119(c)-(d).
The statement of the case shall contain . . .
A closely condensed chronological statement, in narrative
form, of all the facts which are necessary to be known in
order to determine the points in controversy, with an
appropriate reference in each instance to the place in the
record where the evidence substantiating the fact relied on
may be found.
Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4).
(c) Reference to record. If reference is made to the pleadings,
evidence, charge, opinion or order, or any other matter appearing
in the record, the argument must set forth, in immediate
connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the
place in the record where the matter referred to appears (see
Pa.R.A.P. 2132).
(d) Synopsis of evidence. When the finding of, or the refusal
to find, a fact is argued, the argument must contain a synopsis of
all the evidence on the point, with a reference to the place in the
record where the evidence may be found.
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c)-(d).
Where an appellant’s brief fails to cite any evidence in support of a claim,
we shall not become the appellant’s advocate and “scour the record to find
evidence to support an argument”; instead, we will deem that claim waived.
Wolf v. Santiago, 2020 PA Super 47, *11 (filed March 3, 2020); see
Commonwealth v. Cannavo, 199 A.3d 1282, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d)), reargument denied (January 29, 2019), appeal denied,
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3Although Mother attached some exhibits to her brief and then cited to those
exhibits therein, she failed to demonstrate that these exhibits were ever
admitted into evidence before the trial court. See, e.g., Mother’s Brief at 2,
14-15, 17, 26.
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217 A.3d 180 (Pa. 2019); see also J.J. DeLuca Co. v. Toll Naval
Associates, 56 A.3d 402 (Pa. Super. 2012) (appellant waived claim where
appellant did not present any citation to the record to support the claim nor
show how appellee’s evidence was deficient). Thus, by failing to cite to the
record anywhere in her brief, Mother has failed to preserve any of the issues
raised therein.
* * *
In general, “[a] decision to terminate parental rights [is] never to be
made lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent,” In re Adoption
of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012), and we are particularly loath to quash
an appeal from a matter as consequential and life-altering as a termination of
parental rights on technical, procedural grounds. See In re M.P., 204 A.3d
976, 981 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“We recognize the harsh – perhaps draconian –
consequence of quashing any appeal, and in particular an appeal involving a
party’s parental rights.”).
Nevertheless, even if we were to jettison all of our Rules of Appellate
Procedure due to Mother’s pro se status, the inadequacies of Mother’s brief
still could not be remedied. The ultimate problem is that Mother’s brief is so
disjointed and inarticulate that it is impossible for us to discern what Mother’s
challenges even are, beyond of the broadest of brushstrokes.
For the reasons given above, we are compelled to quash both of
Mother’s appeals.
Appeals quashed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/17/20
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