K.K. v. C.L.S., IV ( 2021 )

J-S07032-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
K.K. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
C.L.S., IV :
:
Appellant : No. 1044 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Dated September 4, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 10618 of 2017 C.A.
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: APRIL 19, 2021
Appellant, C.L.S., IV (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in the
Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas, which modified the custody
agreement between Father and Appellee, K.K. (“Mother”), as it relates to their
minor children, A.M.S. and R.L.S. (“Children”). We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history if this case are as follows.
Father and Mother are the parents of Children. On June 26, 2017, Mother
filed a complaint seeking primary physical and legal custody of Children.
Following a hearing, the court entered a custody order on August 1, 2017,
providing for shared legal custody and awarding Mother primary physical
custody of Children. Father received partial physical custody with two
overnights in the first week and three overnights on the next week, with the
exact days and times to be determined by Father’s work schedule. Each
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parent was awarded a three-hour custody session with Children while the
other parent was exercising his or her custody rights.
Mother became involved in a relationship with J.I. and is currently
engaged to him. Father learned about allegations that J.I. had inappropriately
touched J.I.’s own daughter. On March 27, 2019, the parties entered into a
consent order prohibiting J.I. from residing at Mother’s residence or being in
the presence of Children.
On May 28, 2019, Mother filed a petition for special relief, seeking to
suspend Father’s partial physical custody due to her suspicion that Father was
using drugs and alcohol. The court suspended Father’s custody and ordered
him to undergo a drug test. On June 18, 2019, following a hearing, the court
found that Father had violated the prior custody order by consuming alcohol
during his custodial period. The court removed Father’s overnight custodial
periods but agreed to reconsider if Father completed counseling.
On August 26, 2019, Father filed a request for a custody modification,
claiming that he had been evaluated for alcoholism. On September 27, 2019,
Mother filed a petition for special relief, requesting that the court vacate the
consent order prohibiting J.I. from living with Mother. Mother contended that
J.I. was not a threat to Children and that he presently had unsupervised
custody of his son and was attending reunification therapy with his daughter.
On October 10, 2019, the court issued an interim custody order that
awarded parents shared legal custody, Mother primary physical custody, and
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Father partial custody, with one overnight per week. The order provided that
Children would have no contact with J.I., and that Father was prohibited from
consuming alcoholic beverages during, or 24 hours prior to, his custodial
periods.
The court held a custody trial on August 12, 2020. At the trial, Mother
testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Shannon Edwards, who had
conducted a parental capacity evaluation of J.I. Father also testified, and
presented the testimony of M.S., and Father’s girlfriend, E.K.
Following the custody trial on September 4, 2020,1 the court issued
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a new custody order which awarded
Mother primary physical custody and Father partial physical custody of
Children every other weekend during the school year and a period of evening
custody on his non-custodial weeks, as well as periods of summer custody,
holidays, and birthdays per the court’s schedule. The court ordered that
neither parent was to consume any alcoholic beverage or use any non-
prescribed drug during or 12 hours prior to his/her custodial period. The court
permitted Children to have contact with J.I., but J.I. was not to be alone with
Children or drive a car with Children in it.
On September 23, 2020, Mother filed a motion for clarification and
reconsideration regarding Father’s off week after-school custody and the
____________________________________________
1The order is dated August 24, 2020, but was not filed until September 4,
2020.
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specifications regarding J.I.; that same day, the court entered a modification
order, explaining that Father would have custody on Thursday evenings during
the weeks that he does not have weekend custody. Father timely filed a notice
of appeal on October 2, 2020;2 Father filed a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal on October 8, 2020.3
Father raises the following issues for our review:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting
[Mother’s] boyfriend, [J.I.], supervised contact with the
children, where [J.I.] has an admitted history of sexual
[deviant] behavior for which no treatment has ever been
sought and [Mother] has a standing history of failing to
abide by court order?
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding
[Father] had consumed alcohol, left the children with
responsible adults to go drink alcohol, and drove the
children after imbibing in alcohol based on prior testimony
of the minor child in which there was evidence that the
minor child lied to the court and using such evidence as a
substantial factor in not awarding [Father] primary physical
custody?
(Father’s Brief at 15).
____________________________________________
2 The trial court’s September 23, 2020 order served only to clarify a clerical
error on the September 4, 2020 order, which is a final order for purposes of
this appeal.
3 Although Father failed to file his concise statement contemporaneously with
his notice of appeal, we decline to quash or dismiss the appeal on this basis.
See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745 (Pa.Super. 2009) (holding that failure of
appellant in children’s fast track case to file concise statement along with
notice of appeal results in defective notice of appeal to be decided on case by
case basis; declining to quash or dismiss appeal where defect did not prejudice
other parties and to expedite disposition of children’s fast track cases).
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Our standard and scope of review in custody cases are as follows:
In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest
type and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must
accept findings of the trial court that are supported by
competent evidence of record, as our role does not include
making independent factual determinations. In addition,
with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the
evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who
viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we
are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences
from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the
trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the
trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are
unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial
court.
C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa.Super. 2012) (internal citation
omitted). This Court has consistently held:
[T]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody
matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the
special nature of the proceeding and the lasting impact the
result will have on the lives of the parties concerned.
Indeed, the knowledge gained by a trial court in observing
witnesses in a custody proceeding cannot adequately be
imparted to an appellate court by a printed record.
Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal citation
omitted). In addition:
Although we are given a broad power of review, we are
constrained by an abuse of discretion standard when
evaluating the court’s order. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment, but if the court’s judgment is
manifestly unreasonable as shown by the evidence of
record, discretion is abused. An abuse of discretion is also
made out where it appears from a review of the record that
there is no evidence to support the court’s findings or that
there is a capricious disbelief of evidence.
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M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11, 18-19 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) (internal
citations omitted). Further:
The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial
court places on the evidence. Rather, the paramount
concern of the trial court is the best interest of the child.
Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s
consideration of the best interest of the child was careful
and thorough, and we are unable to find any abuse of
discretion.
R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa.Super. 2009).
For purposes of disposition, we combine Father’s issues. In his first
issue, Father argues the court erred and abused its discretion in permitting
J.I. to have supervised contact with Children. (Father’s Brief at 21).
Specifically, Father contends that J.I. is a danger to Children due to his history
of drug and alcohol abuse; sexual deviant behavior; and continued use of
alcohol and medical marijuana. (Id. at 22-23). Father asserts that J.I. did
not provide documentation that he had been treated for his sexually deviant
behavior and did not testify at the custody hearing. (Id. at 23-24). Father
maintains that the forensic report prepared in this case determined only J.I.’s
parental capacity but did not specifically address his sexual deviant conduct.
(Id. at 24). Father contends that because Mother previously violated the no-
contact orders, Children will be exposed to potential sexual abuse by J.I. (Id.
at 25).
In his second issue, Father argues that the court erred and abused its
discretion in finding that Father consumed alcohol; left Children with other
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adults to drink alcohol; and drove with Children after imbibing alcohol. (Id.
at 26). Father claims the court based this finding on the prior testimony of
one of the children, and there was evidence that child had lied to the court.
(Id.). Thus, Father insists that using this evidence as a substantial factor in
its custody decision was in error. (Id.) Father concludes the court’s custody
decision was erroneous, and this Court must reverse. We disagree.
Section 5328(a) of the Child Custody Act sets forth the best interest
factors that the trial court must consider in awarding custody:
§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody
(a) Factors.−In ordering any form of custody, the
court shall determine the best interest of the child by
considering all relevant factors, giving weighted
consideration to those factors which affect the safety of the
child, including the following:
(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
frequent and continuing contact between the child and
another party.
(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party
or member of the party’s household, whether there is a
continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party
and which party can better provide adequate physical
safeguards and supervision of the child.
(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)
(relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
with protective services).
(3) The parental duties performed by each party on
behalf of the child.
(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
education, family life and community life.
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(5) The availability of extended family.
(6) The child’s sibling relationships.
(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based
on the child’s maturity and judgment.
(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against
the other parent, except in cases of domestic violence
where reasonable safety measures are necessary to
protect the child from harm.
(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving,
stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the
child adequate for the child’s emotional needs.
(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
physical, emotional, developmental, educational and
special needs of the child.
(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or
ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements.
(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with
one another. A party’s effort to protect a child from
abuse by another party is not evidence of unwillingness
or inability to cooperate with that party.
(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
member of a party’s household.
(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
member of a party’s household.
(16) Any other relevant factor.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).
Instantly, the trial court addressed each custody factor as follows. The
court found that the first custody factor favored Father, because Mother had
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used the Covid-19 pandemic as an excuse to deny Father his custody time.
(See Trial Court Opinion and Order, filed 9/4/2020, at 4).
With regard to the second factor, the court found this factor favored
neither parent. (Id. at 6). The court observed that Mother’s ability to protect
Children should J.I. act inappropriately was in doubt, and also emphasized
that Father had driven with Children while drinking and placed his enjoyment
before the best interests of Children. The court explained:
While there have been allegations that [J.I.] improperly
touched his own daughter, no proof of these allegations has
been established. [J.I.] is the fiancée of [M]other and
[M]other continued to allow [J.I.] to have frequent contact
with [C]hildren for at least a several month period of time
in direct violation of this [c]ourt’s order. Despite the fact
that [J.I.] has had serious problems with alcohol and drugs
and at least when he was an adolescent child, has acted out
inappropriately, [M]other has stated that she has no
concerns at all about [J.I.] having contact with [C]hildren
and living in the same home with them. She also had no
concerns that despite drug and alcohol abuse in the past,
[J.I.] uses medical marijuana and continues to consume
alcohol, at least socially. [M]other is now pregnant with
[J.I.]’s child and due to deliver in September of 2020.
[M]other has violated [c]ourt [o]rders in the past, and
cannot be trusted to put [C]hildren’s own welfare in front of
her own welfare and desire to live with [J.I.]. There is no
indication that [M]other has ever abused [C]hildren, the
question is whether or not she would protect [C]hildren if
they were ever subject to abuse. The only reason [J.I.] is
not living in the home with [M]other is the current [c]ourt
[o]rder forbidding it.
[F]ather has not abused [C]hildren and there is no indication
that he is likely to abuse [C]hildren. Nonetheless, he has
driven with [C]hildren in the car when he has been
consuming alcohol and during his periods of custody has left
[C]hildren with others while he has gone out to drink.
[F]ather also testified that he has known [J.I.] since [J.I.]
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was fifteen and was aware of [J.I.]’s drug problems and his
having a reputation as a heroin addict. Despite that
knowledge, [F]ather testified that he had no problem with
[J.I.] being around [C]hildren, until [J.I.’s] ex-wife told him
about allegations that [J.I.] had inappropriately touched his
own daughter and had admitted to sexual misconduct when
he was an adolescent. [J.I.’s] ex-wife found a confidential
Alcoholics Anonymous list, made by [J.I.], of conduct that
[J.I.] regretted in his past and she disclosed the information
from the confidential form to [F]ather.
* * *
This [c]ourt has serious concerns about [M]other’s
willingness to protect [C]hildren, if [J.I.] should act
inappropriately. On the other hand, [F]ather has driven
with [C]hildren when he has been drinking and has placed
his enjoyment before the best interest of [C]hildren….
(Id. at 4-5). In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the court further elaborated:
During a dispute over custody between [J.I.], [M]other’s
boyfriend, and his ex-wife, [J.I.]’s ex-wife found and gave
[Father] a copy of a confidential Alcoholics Anonymous form
on which [J.I.] made a list of people that he had offended in
the past and to whom he should make amends. In that list
[J.I.] noted inappropriate sexual behavior during puberty or
early adolescence. At the custody trial in the current case,
[Mother] called as a witness Dr. Shannon Edwards, who
conducted a psychological evaluation of [J.I.] on January
10, 2020 and January 20, 2020. Dr. Edwards testified that
[J.I.] reported inappropriate sexual behavior in his youth for
which he had therapy as a teenager. She also testified that
he had participated in therapy in his 20’s and 30’s for
depression and anxiety and substance abuse. According to
Dr. Edwards, she conducted several psychological tests and
found all of the test results to be within the normal range.
She said that there were no red flags and that she found
nothing troubling and found no psychiatric illness. While she
noted that [J.I.] had been treated for anxiety and
depression, she testified that there was nothing to indicate
that he was unable to parent unsupervised.
As noted in the August 24, 2020 [order and findings of fact],
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during the custody dispute between [J.I.] and his ex-wife,
an allegation was raised that he had on one occasion
inappropriately touched his daughter. Evidence was
presented that that allegation of abuse was reported to
Lawrence County Children and Youth Services and to the
Child Abuse Hotline and that the report was determined not
to be founded. No charges were ever filed regarding the
allegation. And in the case now before the [c]ourt, [F]ather
did not call any witnesses or present any evidence to prove
this allegation.
In the [August 24, 2020 order], this [c]ourt detailed its
concern with the history of both [F]ather and [M]other of
disobeying [court orders]. While the allegation made in
[J.I.]’s custody dispute with his ex-wife [was] being
explored, the [c]ourt ordered that [C]hildren not have
contact with [J.I.]. [M]other blatantly disobeyed that order
at least until December 2019. Because of alcohol abuse
allegations, on May 25, 2019, this [c]ourt ordered both
parties not to consume alcohol during their periods of
custody. In this [c]ourt’s June 18, 2019 [o]rder, this [c]ourt
made a finding that, “testimony is clear, including [F]ather’s
own admission, that [F]ather has consumed alcohol during
periods of his custody of [C]hildren. [F]ather claims that he
has consumed alcohol but only when he has been out of the
house while his mother or another responsible adult is
watching [C]hildren. [A.M.S.] has testified that she has
seen her father consume alcohol during times that he has
been exercising custody of both her and her brother.” And
as the [c]ourt noted in the August 24, 2020 [findings of
fact,] both [M]other and Father have attempted to influence
the testimony of [C]hildren by discussing matters
concerning custody that they were forbidden from
discussing with [C]hildren.
(Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 12/4/20, at 1-3).
The court found that factor 2.1 favored neither party as the allegations
of J.I.’s alleged misconduct were not proven and there was no indication the
allegations were founded. (See Trial Court Opinion and Order, filed 9/4/2020,
at 6). The court found that factor three favored Mother, because she had
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been the primary caregiver all of Children’s lives, and Father was not very
involved with Children’s education. (Id. at 7). The court found that factor
four favored Mother, as she was the primary caregiver for most of Children’s
lives and due to Father’s inconsistency with his custody periods. (Id.) The
court found that the fifth factor favored neither party, as both parents had
extended family who were willing to assist with child care. (Id.) With regard
to the sixth factor, the court found it favored neither party as Children have a
strong sibling bond with each other and a continuing bond with Father’s adult
son, their half-brother. (Id.) Children would have an additional half-sibling,
as Mother was due to give birth to J.I.’s child in September 2020. (Id.)
The court found that the seventh and eighth factors favored neither
parent, as the preference of Children was impossible to discern due to the
conduct of the parents where both parents had attempted to turn Children
against the other parent. (Id. at 7-8). Similarly, the court found that the
ninth factor favored neither parent because both parents had put their own
desires ahead of Children’s needs. (Id. at 8). The court found the tenth factor
favored Mother, as she was more involved in the daily physical, emotional,
developmental and educational needs of Children. (Id.)
With regard to the eleventh factor, the court noted that although the
parties lived only fifteen minutes from each other, A.M.S. would need to
change schools if Father was awarded primary custody. (Id. at 8-9). With
regard to the twelfth factor, the court found that it favored neither party, as
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both parents were not always available to care for Children due to their work
schedules, but had family members who could assist with childcare. (Id. at
9). The thirteenth factor favored neither party, as both parties cooperated up
until the allegations of sexual impropriety but have not cooperated since.
(Id.)
The fourteenth factor favored neither party as the court expressed
concerns both about J.I.’s history of alcohol and drug abuse and Father’s
history of and potential present alcohol abuse. (Id. at 9-10). In its Rule
1925(a) opinion, with regard to Father’s drinking, the court observed:
[O]n June 18, 2019, following a hearing on a Petition for
Special Relief filed by [M]other, this [c]ourt made a finding
that, “testimony is clear, including [F]ather’s own
admission, that [F]ather has consumed alcohol during
periods of his partial custody of the children . . .” As detailed
in the August 24, 2020 Findings of Fact, [F]ather has a
history of alcohol problems. According to the testimony of
[M]other at the trial, their separation and ultimate breakup
was the result of [F]ather’s excessive alcohol consumption
that led to his firing from at least one job. Despite the May
25, 2019 [o]rder of [c]ourt that there be no alcohol
consumption during either party’s period of custody,
[F]ather violated that [c]ourt [o]rder.
As noted in the August 24, 2020 [o]rder, there was clear
evidence that both parties were attempting to influence
[C]hildren by asking them to lie or pressuring them with
questions about their testimony and the upcoming custody
case. [F]ather’s history of alcohol abuse and indicators that
[F]ather’s desire for alcohol continues to interfere with his
parenting are two factors considered along with many other
factors, as detailed in the [o]rder and [o]pinion of August
24, 2020….
(Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 12/4/20, at 3-4).
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The fifteenth factor favored either neither party, as neither biological
parent had a history of mental or physical illness, although J.I. suffered from
anxiety and depression. (See Trial Court Opinion and Order, filed 9/4/2020,
at 10). Finally, the court noted that all other relevant factors had been
discussed. (Id.)
Regarding Father’s first issue challenging the court’s findings related to
J.I., we note that Dr. Edwards described the purpose of the evaluation was to
“opine if mental health or substance abuse issues were present in [J.I.] and,
if present, the degree to which they may or may not impact his capacity to
parent [his minor daughter].” (See N.T., 8/12/20, at 7). Dr. Edwards noted
that J.I. mentioned his childhood sexual behavior during the evaluation,
recognized that the behavior was wrong, and began therapy from a young age
as a result. (Id. at 9-10). Dr. Edwards testified that J.I. had previously
received treatment at rehabilitation facilities for substance abuse and
depression and anxiety, but was unable to obtain records due to the amount
of time that had passed since treatment. (Id. at 14-15). Dr. Edwards noted
that she had spoken with J.I.’s daughter’s therapist and that following the
unfounded allegations, J.I.’s daughter expressed a desire to return to J.I.’s
custody; the therapist recommended supervised visitation not due to safety
concerns but to prevent further, presumably unfounded, allegations. (Id. at
16-17). Dr. Edwards’ evaluation of J.I.’s daughter was inconsistent with that
of other children who made sexual abuse allegations or disclosures, and she
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remained unaware of any criminal charges that had been brought as a result
of the allegations. (Id. at 42-43).
Dr. Edwards examined J.I. using a variety of clinical assessments and
his results did not raise any red flags; he did not have elevation on clinical
scales related to diagnoses. (Id. at 17-18, 20). Dr. Edwards testified that
J.I. had been diagnosed with adjustment disorder with anxiety by his therapist
and that she deferred to this diagnosis. (Id. at 21-22). Dr. Edwards described
J.I. as honest and forthcoming, having openly acknowledged his substance
abuse history and sexual issues in adolescence. (Id. at 22-23). Her overall
conclusions were that there was nothing in the data, testing, or collateral
documents to indicate that J.I. did not have the capacity to parent or to safely
provide care to any child unsupervised. (Id. at 23-24).
Essentially, Father attacks the weight the court placed upon Dr.
Edwards’ expert report. Although Father characterizes the report as only a
parental capacity evaluation, the testimony makes clear that Dr. Edwards
considered J.I.’s self-reported sexual history and also conducted a series of
psychological tests to determine whether he presented a threat to any child if
allowed unsupervised contact. As the court noted, the allegations against J.I.
were ultimately determined to be unfounded and Dr. Edwards’ report raised
no red flags regarding J.I.’s current psychological state. Accordingly, despite
Father’s request that we reweigh the court’s finding on this factor in his favor,
the record supports the court’s conclusions. See C.R.F., supra (reiterating
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that where trial court's conclusions are reasonable as shown by record
evidence and those conclusions are not result of error of law, appellate court
is bound by those conclusions).
Further, with respect to Father’s second issue related to the court’s
findings about Father’s drinking, we disagree that the court relied solely on
A.M.S.’s testimony. Rather, Mother also testified that her marriage with
Father was “chaos” and that she “was the one picking up the pieces after his
drunken episodes.” (See N.T., 8/12/20, at 52). Mother testified that she
ended the marriage after Father went on alcoholic benders every weekend;
conducted an extramarital affair; and lost his job due to his drinking. (Id. at
53-54).
At an earlier hearing, Father admitted that he had been fired from his
job due to his drinking and failing an alcohol test. (Id.) Mother stated that
all of the prior custody orders had language prohibiting drinking, because
Father had previously been found in contempt by the court for driving and
drinking with Children in the car.4 (Id. at 55). Mother also testified that in
May 2019, she filed a petition for special relief averring that Father had been
drinking during his periods of custody. (Id. at 56-57). Following a hearing in
June 2019, the court noted in its order that Father had admitted to consuming
alcohol during his periods of custody, but claimed that he had only consumed
____________________________________________
4The court’s orders and Mother’s motions for special relief were admitted into
evidence as Plaintiff’s Exhibits D-G.
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alcohol when he was out of the house and another responsible adult was
watching Children. (Id. at 57). At that hearing, A.M.S. testified that she had
seen her father consume alcohol during custodial periods. (Id. at 57). Mother
further testified to a series of incidents on June 28, 2019, July 13, 2019, July
20, 2019, and July 27, 2019, when Father was supposed to have custody of
Children but either was drinking at a bar; had posted pictures on Facebook of
himself drinking alcohol; or had left Children with his mother to drink alcohol.
(Id. at 59-60). Additionally, Mother expressed concern that she found a
receipt for a 12-pack of beer purchased near Father’s house on the day of his
custodial period. (Id. at 62-63).
Father, however, denied drinking 24 hours prior to his custodial periods
or around Children. (Id. at 159). He averred that he had a drug and alcohol
evaluation and did not receive treatment. (Id.). Father denied that he had
left Children at home to drink, claiming, for example, that he had stayed late
at a Memorial Day cookout to help clean up. (Id. at 167-68). Father claimed
that the June 2019 order which took away his overnights was “based on a lie,”
because A.M.S. had first stated that she saw Father drinking, but then
changed her statement to aver that Mother had told her to say that. (Id. at
169, 171-72). Father claimed that he had not lost his job because of his
alcoholism, but because he “went to a Super Bowl party and … went to work
and … fell asleep and … still smelled like alcohol.” (Id. at 173).
Again, Father’s argument requests that we reweigh the court’s findings.
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Nevertheless, the court heard testimony from both parents regarding Father’s
drinking habits, as well as reviewed its own past orders regarding Father’s
drinking habits. Our review of the record supports the trial court’s analysis.
Thus, we accept the trial court's findings and decline to reweigh the evidence.
See C.R.F., supra. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s custody order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/19/2021
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