Com. v. House, C. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CARL EUGENE HOUSE A/K/A SAMUEL :
HOUSE :
: No. 968 WDA 2020
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered September 14, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0011199-2011
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: April 22, 2021
Carl Eugene House a/k/a Samuel House (Appellant) appeals from the
order denying his “amended motion to enforce plea agreement” (Motion to
enforce plea). In accordance with our decisions in Commonwealth v.
Fernandez, 195 A.3d 299 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), and Commonwealth
v. Moose, 2021 Pa. Super. 2 (Pa. Super. Jan. 4, 2021) (en banc), we reverse
and remand.
In August 2011, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count
of indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age, and two counts of
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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corruption of minors.1 Pertinent to this appeal, Appellant and the
Commonwealth entered into a negotiated plea agreement. At Appellant’s
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor explained the plea agreement:
There is a plea agreement, Your Honor, to – [Appellant] has a
period of time served already in [jail]. That would be the standard
range [sentence], then an additional period of probation to be set
by the court. [Appellant] would also have to be under the
conditions of Megan’s Law for the next ten years.[2]
N.T., 1/30/12, at 2-3 (emphasis and footnote added). The trial court
colloquied Appellant about his understanding of the 10-year registration
obligation.3 Id. at 6; see also id. (inquiring whether Appellant had been
promised anything other than, inter alia, “the requirement that you register
as a Megan’s Law offender for a period of ten years”).
The trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea to one count of indecent
assault and two counts of corruption of minors. The court sentenced Appellant
to 5 to 10 months of incarceration (with immediate parole), plus 3 years’
probation. The sentencing order, pursuant to the plea agreement, also
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1See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7), 6301(a)(1)(ii). The Commonwealth alleged
Appellant sexually assaulted a minor over a two-year period.
2 Appellant’s registration requirement was mandated by former 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9795.1(a)(3) (expired), which was then in effect. Megan’s Law was replaced
in December 2012 by the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10 – 9799.42.
3 Appellant also signed a written Megan’s Law colloquy, which specified that
Appellant’s sex offender registration period would be 10 years — as opposed
to Appellant’s lifetime.
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required Appellant to register as a sex offender for 10 years. Appellant waived
a presentence SVP assessment, and the trial court subsequently determined
that Appellant met the requirements for classification as a sexually violent
predator (SVP). Order, 5/3/13. Appellant did not appeal.
A prior panel of this Court summarized the procedural history that
followed:
[In June 2013], the trial court found Appellant violated his
probationary terms by failing to comply with his treatment
programs at Mercy Behavioral Health, insomuch as Appellant did
not disclose information regarding his past conduct to the
provider. See N.T., 6/3/13, at 2, 4. As a result of the foregoing,
on June 3, 2013, Appellant’s probation was revoked and he was
resentenced to an aggregate term of 18 to 36 months of
incarceration, followed by three years of probation and lifetime
sex offender registration. [Appellant did not appeal his sentence.]
In June 2018, Appellant pro se filed a [Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA)] petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.] Counsel
was appointed, and he filed a Turner/Finley[4] letter and petition
to withdraw on August 15, 2018, [asserting that] Appellant’s PCRA
petition was time-barred. On August 20, 2018, the PCRA court
issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition
without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The PCRA court
also indicated that it would permit counsel to withdraw. On
September 10, 2018, counsel for Appellant filed a response to the
notice of intent to dismiss, alleging that Appellant has a
meritorious claim outside of the PCRA based on Fernandez,
supra,FN4 and therefore, [counsel] filed simultaneously a motion
to enforce plea agreement to limit Appellant’s sex offender
registration to the ten-year term imposed originally. On
September 12, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA
petition because it was time-barred[. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1) (providing that any PCRA petition must be filed within
one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final)].
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4 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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FN4 In Fernandez, an en banc panel of this Court consolidated
several appeals where the defendants were found to have violated
the terms of their probation and were ordered to comply with new
sex offender registration requirements under [SORNA]. In doing
so, the lower courts relied on Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d
245 (Pa. Super. 2014), which held that a defendant could not seek
specific performance of his plea bargain where he effectively
rescinded the bargain by violating the terms of his probation.
After Partee, our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v.
Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), that certain provisions of
SORNA are punitive and retroactive application of those provisions
violates the ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania constitution.
Applying Muniz, this Court held in Fernandez that Muniz
abrogated the holding in Partee. As such, this Court concluded
that “the trial court may not increase [defendants’] registration
requirements under SORNA[,]” and “the original periods of sexual
offender registration and conditions imposed in each case [were]
reinstated.” Fernandez, 195 A.3d at 301.
Commonwealth v. House, 220 A.3d 662 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished
memorandum at **2-3) (“House I”) (emphasis added and citations
modified). The House I panel affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of
Appellant’s petition, concluding it was untimely and did not meet any
exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-
(iii). House I, supra, at **6-7; see also id. at *7 (“insofar as Appellant
may be attempting to invoke Muniz, supra, via Fernandez, supra, as the
basis for a new constitutional right[, i.e., one of the PCRA exceptions], neither
the United States Supreme Court nor our Supreme Court has held that Muniz
applies retroactively.”).
On August 9, 2020, Appellant, through counsel, filed the
aforementioned Motion to enforce plea, which gave rise to this appeal.
Appellant asserted:
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Requiring [Appellant] to register . . . as a sex offender, for a period
in excess of the plea agreement, constitutes a violation of that
agreement for which [Appellant] seeks and is entitled to specific
performance requiring the Commonwealth . . . to comply with the
provisions of said agreement.FN3
FN3 SeeCommonwealth v. Nase, 104 A.3d 528 (Pa. Super.
2014) (defendant not required to register for period longer
than that set forth in plea agreement); Commonwealth v.
Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444, 447-50 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (same). See also Commonwealth v. LaCombe,
234 A.3d 602, 617 (Pa. 2020) (“This Court has not yet
required that sexual offender registration statutes be
challenged through the PCRA or some other procedural
mechanism. Indeed, we have consistently decided . . .
challenge[s] via different types of filings.”);
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 147 A.3d 517, 523 (Pa.
2016) (successful challenge to increase of registration term
through “Petition to Enforce Plea Agreement or for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus” where PCRA petition would have been
untimely”).
Motion to enforce plea, 8/9/20, at 3 (unnumbered) (citations modified).
By order entered September 14, 2020, the trial court denied the Motion
to enforce plea. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant now raises 2 issues for our review, which we will address
simultaneously:
1. Whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in denying
enforcement of the guilty plea agreement in this matter limiting
registration and [Appellant’s] other obligations under sex
offender registration law to 10 years?
2. Whether the Court of Common Pleas’ construction/interpretation
of the terms of the plea agreement is erroneous as inconsistent
with Commonwealth v. Martinez, 637 Pa. 208, 147 A.3d 517(2016)?
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Appellant’s Brief at 2.
Initially, we must determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction over
Appellant’s Motion to enforce plea. See Moose, 2021 Pa. Super. 2, at **12-
13 (stating, before reaching the merits of the claim – which is similar to
Appellant’s in this case, “[i]nitially, we resolve the parties’ dispute as to
whether [a]ppellant was required to challenge his sex offender registration
requirements in a PCRA petition, such that [a]ppellant’s failure to establish a
PCRA timeliness exception would preclude a court [from] entertaining the
merits of his claim.”); cf. House I, supra (holding that PCRA court lacked
jurisdiction to address Appellant’s PCRA petition based on the PCRA’s time bar
and Appellant’s failure to prove an exception). In Appellant’s Motion to
enforce plea, he correctly cites the applicable authority, which establishes
jurisdiction. See, e.g., LaCombe, supra; Moose, supra, at **13-17
(collecting cases). Accordingly, we address the merits of Appellant’s claims.
Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to enforce the 10-year
sexual offender registration term of the plea agreement, and improperly
required Appellant, upon violation of his probation in 2013, to register for his
lifetime. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-15. Appellant asserts the trial court erred
in finding that the registration period was not a material term of the plea
agreement. Id. at 13. Appellant emphasizes that his registration term was
explicitly and repeatedly mentioned on the record. Id. Appellant further
contends the 10-year registration period constituted the “sole benefit” he
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received in exchange for his plea. Id. (pointing out that Appellant pled guilty
to all charges and received a standard-range sentence); see also N.T.,
1/30/12, at 2-3, 6-7 (discussing the 10-year registration period). Accordingly,
Appellant argues that “[d]enial of enforcement of that explicit term limiting
registration obligations conflicts with the mandate of Martinez.” Appellant’s
Brief at 15. Finally, Appellant states, “in light of this Court’s en banc decision
in Fernandez, [Appellant’s] previous probation violation does not preclude
him from obtaining enforcement of the plea agreement in this matter.” Id. at
10. We agree.
We first note our standard of review: “Although a plea agreement
occurs in a criminal context, it remains contractual in nature and is to be
analyzed under contract-law standards.” Commonwealth v. Farabaugh,
136 A.3d 995, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Because contract
interpretation is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and the
scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Summers, 2021 Pa. Super.
11, at *19 (Pa. Super. 2021).
Regarding plea bargains, we have explained:
“The reality of the criminal justice system is that nearly all criminal
cases are disposed of by plea bargains: [n]inety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions
are the result of guilty pleas. Plea bargaining is not some adjunct
to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.
Accordingly, it is critical that plea agreements are enforced, to
avoid any possible perversion of the plea bargaining system.”
Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 449 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). “The disposition of criminal charges by
agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, . . . is an
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essential component of the administration of justice. Properly
administered, it is to be encouraged. In this Commonwealth, the
practice of plea bargaining is generally regarded favorably, and is
legitimized and governed by court rule. . . . A ‘mutuality of
advantage’ to defendants and prosecutors flows from the
ratification of the bargain.” Commonwealth v. Parsons, 969
A.2d 1259, 1267-68 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc).
Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill,
when the parties enter the plea agreement and the court accepts
and approves the plea, then the parties and the court must abide
by the terms of the agreement. Commonwealth v. Anderson,
995 A.2d 1184, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Specific enforcement
of valid plea bargains is a matter of fundamental fairness.”
Hainesworth, supra. “The terms of plea agreements are not
limited to the withdrawal of charges, or the length of a sentence.
Parties may agree to—and seek enforcement of—terms that fall
outside these areas.” Id.[D]isputes over any particular term of a plea agreement
must be resolved by objective standards. A determination
of exactly what promises constitute the plea bargain must
be based upon the totality of the surrounding
circumstances and involves a case-by-case adjudication.
Any ambiguities in the terms of the plea agreement will be
construed against the Government. Nevertheless, the
agreement itself controls where its language sets out the
terms of the bargain with specificity.
Commonwealth v. Kroh, 654 A.2d 1168, 1172 (Pa. Super.
1995) (internal citations omitted). Regarding the
Commonwealth’s duty to honor plea agreements, well-settled
Pennsylvania law states:
Our courts have demanded strict compliance with that
duty in order to avoid any possible perversion of the plea
bargaining system, evidencing the concern that a
defendant might be coerced into a bargain or fraudulently
induced to give up the very valued constitutional
guarantees attendant the right to trial by jury.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Farabaugh, 136 A.3d at 1001-02 (citations modified). Further, we have
stated that sex offender registration “obviously has serious and restrictive
consequences for the offender, including prosecution if the requirement is
violated. Registration can also affect the offender’s ability to earn a livelihood,
his housing arrangements and options, and his reputation.” Hainesworth,
82 A.3d at 449 (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court opined that Appellant was not entitled to the 10-
year registration term of the plea agreement:
Appellant must establish that the length of the registration
requirement was a material element of the plea agreement.
Nase, 104 A.3d at 532 [(where the appellant sought specific
enforcement of negotiated plea term regarding sexual offender
registration under Hainesworth, supra, stating “it is necessary
to determine whether the ten-year registration period was a
material part of the plea agreement.”)]. Appellant has failed to
meet this burden and provided no evidence in support of his
position. To the contrary, this court notes that Appellant pled to
the entire criminal information, in which only one charge required
registration under Megan’s Law. In contrast, when several
offenses which would increase registration are withdrawn in
exchange for pleas, the length of registration was deemed a
material element of the plea agreement. Fernandez, 195 A.3d
299. In the matter sub judice, however, the length of registration
was not a material element and therefore Appellant is not entitled
to relief.FN2
FN2Furthermore, this court notes that Appellant should
be precluded from specific performance, as he “broke the
contract” when he violated the terms of probation, and
subjected himself by his conduct to a resentencing
hearing wherein this court imposed lifetime registration.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/20, at 3-4 (citations modified).
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Upon review, we disagree with the trial court’s findings and application
of the law. See, e.g., Fernandez, 195 A.3d at 309-10 (where defendant
violated his probation and the terms of his original plea agreement, the trial
court erred in resentencing and retroactively increasing defendant’s sexual
offender registration period under SORNA). Here, the trial court’s reasoning
echoes Partee, which is no longer good law. See Muniz, supra; Martinez,
supra. Further, and contrary to the trial court’s determination, Fernandez
is not distinguishable because the Commonwealth did not withdraw any of the
charges against Appellant in exchange for his plea; indeed, we are persuaded
by Appellant that this fact supports a finding that the 10-year registration
period was a material term of the plea agreement. The 10-year term was
expressly discussed at the guilty plea hearing, and set forth in the sentencing
order. See N.T., 1/30/12, at 2-3, 6-7, supra; see also Commonwealth Brief
at 10 (conceding that at “points during the plea colloquy, the ten-year term
of registration appeared to be discussed as being a requirement of the terms
of [Appellant’s] probation. If the registration period is a material element,
then [A]ppellant is entitled to specific performance.” (citation omitted)).
Finally, and significantly, even if the 10-year registration period was not
a negotiated term of the plea agreement, it must be enforced under
Fernandez and its progeny. See Moose, 2021 Pa. Super. 2, at *23
(“Importantly, the Fernandez Court did not condition its conclusion on
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whether sex offender registration was a negotiated term of the appellants’
plea agreements.”).
Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the Motion to enforce plea
because Appellant is subject to the 10-year registration period negotiated as
part of the 2012 plea agreement. See Fernandez, 195 A.3d at 311. On
remand, the court shall correct this aspect of Appellant’s sentence.
Order reversed. Case remanded with instructions as to sex offender
registration. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Dubow joins the memorandum.
Judge Strassburger did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/22/2021
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