In the Interest of: A.Y., Appeal of: L.M.Y. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S07002-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: A.Y.                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: L.M.Y.                          :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 1063 WDA 2020
    Appeal from the Order Entered September 9, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
    No(s): CP-02-AP-0000117-2019
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                            FILED: April 26, 2021
    L.M.Y. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered on September 9,
    2020, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, involuntarily
    terminating her parental rights to her daughter, A.Y. (“Child”), born in June of
    2013.1 Upon careful review, we affirm.
    The certified record reveals that Allegheny County Office of Children,
    Youth and Families (“CYF”) became involved with this family in 2017, after
    Father admitted to the rape of his stepdaughter when she was between the
    ____________________________________________
    1 By the same order, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the parental
    rights of Child’s natural father, P.Y. (“Father”). Father did not file a notice of
    appeal, and he is not a participant in this appeal.
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    ages of fourteen and twenty.2 N.T., 9/4/20, at 5. Father’s stepdaughter was
    Mother’s older daughter and Child’s half-sister.       Id.   Mother was aware of
    Father’s admission, but she did not believe that Father was guilty of the
    offenses. Id.
    On September 7, 2017, Child was placed in the custody of CYF due to
    Father3 remaining in the home with Mother and CYF being unable to ensure
    Child’s safety.4     N.T., 9/4/20, at 5.       The Honorable Duane D. Woodruff
    adjudicated Child dependent on November 29, 2017. Id.
    In furtherance of Child’s permanency goal of reunification, Mother was
    required to successfully complete “coached visitation” through Holy Family
    Institute, which involved working with Mother on her parenting skills. N.T.,
    9/4/20, at 7. In addition, Mother was required to successfully complete non-
    ____________________________________________
    2 Father pleaded guilty to the following felonies related to the rape of his
    stepdaughter: 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), 6318(a)(1), and
    2718(a)(2). N.T., 9/4/20, at 6–7; Petition for the Involuntary Termination of
    Parental Rights, 7/8/19, at Exhibit F-2.
    3 On February 7, 2018, Father was sentenced to a term of incarceration for
    three to six years and five years of probation. N.T., 9/4/20, at 175;
    Involuntary Termination Petition, 7/8/19, at Exhibit F-2. Father is registered
    as a Tier III Megan’s Law offender, which prohibits him from being in the
    presence of children under the age of eighteen. N.T., 9/4/20, at 7.
    4 CYF caseworker, Stephanie Schmidt, testified that Child was four years old
    and “extremely developmentally delayed” at the time of her placement. N.T.,
    9/4/20, at 3, 19. Ms. Schmidt testified that Child’s developmental delays were
    not caused by a medical problem, and her delays have been addressed by her
    foster parents. Id. at 20.
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    offenders therapy, related to Father’s rape of her older daughter, through the
    Center for Victims of Violent Crimes; complete in-home services, which
    “assisted her with housing and connected her with individual therapy and non-
    offenders therapy”; obtain and maintain suitable housing; and undergo a
    mental health evaluation. Id. at 8–10.
    On July 8, 2019, CYF filed a petition for the involuntary termination of
    Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and
    (b). Judge Woodruff also presided over the related evidentiary hearing on
    September 4, 2020, via Microsoft Teams, an internet technology application.5
    CYF presented the testimony of caseworker, Stephanie Schmidt, 6 and
    the court-appointed licensed psychologist, Dr. Beth Bliss. Mother testified on
    her own behalf, and she presented the testimony of her Holy Family Institute
    visitation coaches, Emily MacKowiak and Jeanine Lemarie. Child’s therapist,
    Stephanie Davis, and Mother’s therapist, Sheri Robinson, a licensed
    professional counselor from Family Resources, also testified.
    In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the orphans’ court set forth
    its findings of fact. Our review of the record reveals that the findings are
    supported by the testimonial evidence.           Therefore, we adopt the orphans’
    court’s factual findings. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/7/20, at 6–12.
    ____________________________________________
    5   Child’s legal interests were represented by Gary D. Ludin, Esquire.
    6 The orphans’ court erroneously labeled Ms. Schmidt as the visitation coach
    for the family. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/7/20, at 6; N.T., 9/4/20, at 3–4.
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    The orphans’ court determined that CYF’s witnesses were credible.
    Specifically, CYF caseworker, Ms. Schmidt, testified that the Center for Victims
    of Violent Crimes discharged Mother on two separate occasions for
    unsuccessful completion of her required non-offenders therapy. N.T., 9/4/20,
    at 8–9.   Mother had completed five sessions of non-offenders therapy by
    January 22, 2018, and she was discharged in March of 2018. Id. at 9. Mother
    restarted the therapy on August 18, 2018, but she was again discharged for
    non-completion in February of 2019. Id. Caseworker Schmidt testified on
    direct examination, “On January 22nd, of 2018, [Mother] had completed five
    sessions at which time that was to determine which services would best meet
    her needs. Due to [Mother’s] avoidance regarding the veracity of her [older]
    daughter’s disclosure, she would not have benefitted from their program at
    that time.” N.T., 9/4/20, at 8. Ms. Schmidt further testified:
    Q. [C]ould you please tell us without stating anything that you
    learned from The Center for Victims, could you just please state
    whether [Mother] was discharged without successful completion?
    A. Yes, she was discharged without successful completion.
    Q. You said that happened twice?
    A. Twice.
    N.T., 9/4/20, at 8–9. By the time of the subject proceeding, Mother had not
    re-enrolled in non-offenders therapy.
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    It is undisputed that at least until February of 2019, Mother remained
    in contact with Father, but she denied such contact to CYF and Dr. Bliss. N.T.,
    9/4/20, at 87. Further, Ms. Schmidt testified that Mother:
    stated to myself that she did not believe [her older daughter].
    She had stated that [Father] was innocent until proven guilty. She
    stated that her [older] daughter was jealous of her. And [she]
    just continued to really go on for months even at this point that
    she just did not believe her [older] daughter.
    Id. at 23.
    Ms. Schmidt testified that Mother was referred for “coached visitation” 7
    in October of 2017, and it was ongoing at the time of the hearing.          N.T.,
    9/4/20, at 7. Ms. Schmidt testified that Mother made minimal progress in her
    parenting skills. Id. at 12.
    Mother’s supervised visitation was reduced during Child’s dependency.
    Ms. Schmidt testified that Mother was granted supervised visits with Child
    three times per week for a total of ten hours every week from October of 2017
    through April 10, 2019. N.T., 9/4/20, at 13. Following a permanency review
    hearing on April 10, 2019, Mother’s visits were reduced to twice per week for
    a total of six hours.       Id.    Mother’s visits were again reduced after the
    permanency hearing on October 7, 2019, to once per week for a total of three
    ____________________________________________
    7 Coached visitation is not specifically defined in the record, but the testimony
    of the two “coaches,” Ms. MacKowiak and Ms. Lemarie from Holy Family
    Institute, reveals that they observed visitation and guided Mother by giving
    her tips on how to handle issues as they came up during visits. N.T., 9/4/20,
    at 113, 135–136.
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    hours. Id. On January 27, 2020, Mother’s visitation schedule remained the
    same, but the court scheduled them at Child’s discretion.           Id. at 13.
    Ms. Schmidt explained that Child “oftentimes . . . would state she did not want
    to go to visits[.] [S]he would want to leave early.” Id. at 13–14. In addition,
    she stated that Child demonstrated behavioral issues before visits. Id. at 14.
    Ms. Schmidt did not recommend reunification of Child with Mother for
    the following reasons:
    [CYF’s] greatest concern is [Mother] has not been able to identify
    a family plan on how she can keep [Child] safe. Another concern
    is [Mother] has not been able to show consistency where [Child’s]
    medical needs are [sic]. [Child] at the time when she came into
    care . . . had not been seen by a medical professional since she
    had been two years old.
    There’s also concerns [Mother] seems to struggle with being able
    to engage with [Child] on an age[-appropriate] level. There are
    concerns that [Mother] is unable to ensure that the needs and
    welfare of [Child] are maintained.
    N.T., 9/4/20, at 20.
    Dr. Bliss recommended that Child be adopted.8      N.T., 9/4/20, at 80.
    Dr. Bliss found Mother “less than honest and forthcoming in her interviews
    and answers to testing.” Id. at 71. In addition, Dr. Bliss testified that during
    her evaluation of Mother in 2018, Mother told her she “was having no contact
    ____________________________________________
    8 Dr. Bliss completed four separate evaluations of Mother beginning in
    September of 2017 and concluding in July of 2020. N.T., 9/4/20, at 57, 60–
    61. Dr. Bliss prepared reports in December of 2017, February and August of
    2018, March and September of 2019, and July of 2020, all of which were
    submitted as evidence; none of the reports are included in the certified record
    before this Court. Id. at 108–109.
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    whatsoever with [Father] anymore.” Id. at 87. Dr. Bliss explained that CYF
    did not believe Mother, so CYF obtained jail records which “showed she was
    having pretty much . . . daily contact with” Father. Id. Dr. Bliss confronted
    Mother at her next evaluation, and “she admitted that she had been having
    that contact with him.” Id. at 88.
    Dr. Bliss diagnosed Mother with unspecified personality disorder with
    narcissistic traits, which she described as a “pattern of chronic pervasive traits
    across settings, across times that cause problems in at least . . . relationships
    with others, emotional regulation or thought patterns.” N.T., 9/4/20, at 67–
    68. She explained that Mother’s diagnosis affects her parenting as follows:
    One is her apparent lack of empathy. It seems to impact how
    she’s approached these allegations and eventual conviction of her
    husband. She can’t seem to put herself in essentially her older
    daughter’s shoes with regard to how it impacts her children if she
    would continue to have this relationship [with Father]. Or even
    with [Child], how it would impact [Child] that she is doing things
    to make it so [Child] can’t be returned to her care. . . .
    Also she tends to lack complete accountability. She never
    really takes full accountability for her actions at all. She is
    frequently blaming others and that continues. I saw that very
    strongly from the very beginning and it has continued up until the
    most recent evaluation. So, for instance, . . . she said she’s never
    attended any medical appointments of [Child]’s because she was
    never told of any appointments. But this has been [an] ongoing
    claim she had throughout all the years.
    She claims she is not in non-offenders treatment because
    she can’t get ahold of them. She claims that she has tried to say
    [sic] the safety plan. . . . Initially it was that no one told what she
    needed for a safety plan, so she could come up with one[,] and
    then she had one and [she stated] it falls on deaf ears.
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    So it is a constant blaming [of] everyone. Although . . . any one
    of those things alone could be true in a case, . . . it is unlikely
    every single problem in her case and her life is due to other people
    and never due to herself.
    Id. at 70–71.
    By order dated September 4, 2020, and entered on September 9, 2020,
    the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant
    to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). On October 8, 2020, Mother
    filed a timely notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained
    of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On December 7,
    2020, the orphans’ court issued an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a).
    On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:
    1.    Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err[] as
    a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate
    Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5),
    and (8)?
    2.    Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err[] as
    a matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving
    by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s
    parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child
    pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
    Mother’s Brief at 6.
    We review this appeal according to the following standard:
    [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
    when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
    termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
    standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
    findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
    they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 
    608 Pa. 9
    , 
    9 A.3d 1179
    , 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported,
    appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
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    error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [
    614 Pa. 275
    ,
    284, 
    36 A.3d 567
    , 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality)]. As has been often
    stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
    reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.;
    see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 
    613 Pa. 371
    , 
    34 A.3d 1
    , 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 
    575 Pa. 647
    ,
    
    838 A.2d 630
    , 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be
    reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
    manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
    
    Id.
    As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an
    abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
    observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
    equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
    record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
    relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
    hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
    Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,
    as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
    appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court
    and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;
    instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual
    findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal
    conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
    discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 
    539 Pa. 161
    , 
    650 A.2d 1064
    , 1066 (Pa. 1994).
    In re Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826–827 (Pa. 2012).
    Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
    Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which requires a bifurcated analysis:
    Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
    must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
    rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
    party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
    for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
    determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
    or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
    the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
    needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
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    of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
    concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
    parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
    of permanently severing any such bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The
    burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
    asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are
    valid. In re R.N.J., 
    985 A.2d 273
    , 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    We review the order pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), 9 which
    provide as follows:
    (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
    may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    * * *
    (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
    by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
    agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
    removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
    removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
    termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
    and welfare of the child.
    * * *
    (b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
    ____________________________________________
    9 We must agree with the orphans’ court as to only one subsection of Section
    2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
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    control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
    to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
    efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
    which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
    To terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), the
    following factors must be demonstrated: “(1) the child has been removed from
    parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist;
    and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
    of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 
    825 A.2d 1266
    , 1275–1276 (Pa.
    Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).
    “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy
    the conditions that led to the child[]’s removal by the court.” In re A.R., 
    837 A.2d 560
    , 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the twelve-month period has been
    established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that led to
    the child’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith efforts
    of CYS supplied over a realistic time period. 
    Id.
     The “relevant inquiry in this
    regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and
    thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the
    hearing.”   In re I.J., 
    972 A.2d 5
    , 11 (Pa. Super. 2009).       This Court has
    recognized:
    [T]he application of Section (a)(8) may seem harsh when the
    parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems
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    that had led to removal of her children.           By allowing for
    termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to
    exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s
    life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to
    perform     the    actions   necessary to      assume     parenting
    responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate
    indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
    parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.
    
    Id.
     at 11–12 (citations omitted).
    With respect to the “needs and welfare” analysis pertinent to Sections
    2511(a)(8) and (b), we have observed:
    [I]nitially, the focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent,
    under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is
    on the child. However, Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an
    evaluation of the “needs and welfare of the child” prior to
    proceeding to Section 2511(b), which focuses on the
    “developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
    child.” Thus, the analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for
    the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of the parent.
    Moreover, only if a court determines that the parent’s conduct
    warrants termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to
    Section 2511(a), does a court “engage in the second part of the
    analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs
    and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
    child.” Accordingly, while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section
    2511(b) direct us to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,”
    we are required to resolve the analysis relative to Section
    2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the
    child], as proscribed by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct
    in that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section
    2511(b).
    In re Adoption of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d 999
    , 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)
    (citations omitted).
    With respect to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), this Court has stated: “Intangibles
    such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into
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    the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 
    884 A.2d 1284
    , 1287 (Pa.
    Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also discern
    the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the
    effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    On appeal, Mother asserts the orphans’ court abused its discretion in
    relying on the testimony of CYF caseworker, Ms. Schmidt, and court-appointed
    psychologist, Dr. Bliss. Mother’s Brief at 26–28. Thus, Mother suggests that
    the orphans’ court abused its discretion in its credibility determinations. 
    Id.
    We disagree.
    We note that the orphans’ court considered Mother’s testimony, along
    with that of the visitation coaches, Ms. Lemarie and Ms. MacKowiak; Mother’s
    therapist, Sheri Robinson; and Child’s counselor, Stephanie Davis. Orphans’
    Court Opinion, 12/7/20, at 10–12.       The orphans’ court credited Mother’s
    testimony that she had been in weekly therapy since January 12, 2018, and
    noted that Mother “provided scenarios on how she would respond if [F]ather
    was to come to her home, if [Child] was present.” Orphans’ Court Opinion,
    12/7/20, at 11–12 (citing N.T., 9/4/20, at 146–147). Mother testified, “I have
    the police on call, I will not open up that door, and I will reach out however I
    can to make sure that [Father] is never allowed in my presence at all. I don’t
    want nothing [sic] to do with him, that’s why I filed for the divorce.” N.T.,
    9/4/20, at 156.
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    The orphans’ court also credited the testimony of the visitation coaches
    regarding Mother’s goals of safety issues in the home and working with her to
    bond with Child.     N.T., 9/4/20, at 113, 135–136.          The orphans’ court
    underscored that Ms. MacKowiak began working with the family approximately
    three months before the subject proceeding.            Orphans’ Court Opinion,
    12/7/20, at 10; N.T., 9/4/20, at 112. Ms. MacKowiak testified that she has
    “no safety concerns or supervision concerns or anything at the visits I’ve
    seen.” N.T., 9/4/20, at 116. Ms. MacKowiak testified on direct examination:
    Q. In your opinion, is [coached visitation] still needed to continue
    at this point?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Is it being productive in any way?
    A. Yes, I think it is.
    
    Id.
     at 116–117.
    Similarly, Ms. Lemarie, Mother’s visitation coach from December of 2019
    until July of 2020, testified, “With my experience with [Mother,] she did make
    progress.” N.T., 9/4/20, at 137. She explained:
    I think [Mother] is absolutely able to keep [Child] safe in the
    house. I never saw anything that any interaction or anything that
    could’ve possibly been a safety hazard for [Child] that [Mother]
    did not address with her. And I also believe that increased
    bonding has also been met, that is not to say she is perfect, that
    is not to say all interactions are perfect, but I believe there’s signs
    of progress toward those goals.
    
    Id.
     at 139–140.
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    With respect to Mother’s therapist, Sheri Robinson, the orphans’ court
    found as follows:
    Ms. Robinson testified that [Mother] has been able to stabilize her
    emotions, accept her past[.] [S]he has increased frustration
    tolerance, and has learned a lot of developmental education
    pertaining to [Child] and her oldest daughter. [N.T., 9/4/20,] at
    192–193. Ms. Robinson testified:
    In [Mother’s] case regarding her treatment, it has been
    steady, it has been consistent due to her consistent weekly
    participation. You know, she has grown with being able to
    let go of the guilt and denial. And she has been able to be
    honest with herself and with others which is a tremendous
    change from, you know, a year ago, a year and a half
    ago[,] which definitely affects her behavior, the way she
    thinks, the way she perceives things [,] and the way she
    parents. Id. at 194.
    Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/7/20, at 12.
    Finally, the orphans’ court considered the testimony of Stephanie Davis,
    Child’s therapist, who first met Child in October of 2018. N.T., 9/4/20, at 121.
    The court referenced Ms. Davis’s testimony that Child “shared with Ms. Davis
    that ‘[Child’s] been crying a lot because she has not been able to see her
    mother and [older] sister . . . as often as she would like.’” Orphans’ Court
    Opinion, 12/7/20, at 10 (citing N.T., 9/4/20, at 126). Further, the orphans’
    court noted:
    Ms. Davis also expressed that [Child] became “anxious related to
    changing environments,” when they were discussing what could
    possibly happen as a result of [the termination] hearing.
    Ms. Davis and [Child] discussed the possibility of moving back
    with Mother versus remaining with her foster family. Ms. Davis
    also testified, in regards to the anxiety, “It was based on
    friendship (with peers). It wasn’t based directly on caretakers. It
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    seemed to be based more on where she was living . . . than a
    personal preference.” [N.T., 9/4/20,] at 131.
    Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/7/20, at 10–11.
    After considering all of the evidence, the orphans’ court set forth its
    conclusions as follows:
    CYF has met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence
    that grounds for termination of parental rights exist as to Mother,
    who had made minimal progress throughout the life of this case.
    She has not demonstrated her ability to provide care, control, nor
    the ability to protect [Child]. This [c]ourt acknowledges Mother’s
    love and desire to maintain a relationship with [Child]. This
    [c]ourt also applauds Mother[’s] continuous involvement with
    therapy since 2018. However, Mother’s progress throughout the
    case has been minimal[,] and she has never completed the non-
    offender treatment.       Testimony from the caseworker, Ms.
    Schmidt[,] and Dr. Bliss, who has worked with the family
    throughout the life of the case, both believe Mother has not made
    much progress. They both believe that Mother knows what to say
    and when to say it, but she still has yet to learn how to interact
    with [Child] in an age[-]appropriate manner. Most importantly, is
    a continuous concern that Mother does not have the ability to keep
    [Child] safe and protected. Dr. Bliss testified that there was not
    a strong bond between Mother and [Child].[10] There was a level
    of comfort between [Child] and Mother. Nonetheless, [the]
    licensed psychologist recommended adoption by the Foster
    Parents.     Mother’s inability to empathize with her children
    continues to be a grave concern of CYF and this [c]ourt.
    Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/7/20, at 12–13.
    ____________________________________________
    10 Despite testifying that the bond between Mother and Child was weak, N.T.,
    9/4/20, at 104, Dr. Bliss testified, somewhat contradictorily, that termination
    of Mother’s parental right would be traumatic for Child. Id. at 80–81. We
    observe, however, that severance of contact between a parent and child
    understandably could be “traumatic,” but it does not necessarily equate to the
    existence of a strong parental bond. We discuss this further infra.
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    J-S07002-21
    We discern no abuse of discretion; the court’s conclusions are based on
    its credibility findings, and it weighed the evidence in favor of Dr. Bliss over
    that of Ms. Schmidt. See Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826 (“[A]ppellate
    courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
    record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant
    hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child
    and parents.”).
    The record demonstrates that on the date of the subject proceeding,
    seven-year-old Child had been removed from Mother’s care for three years,
    far in excess of the minimum twelve-month statutory requirement. 23 Pa.C.S.
    § 2511(a)(8). The conditions which led to Child’s removal continued to exist
    because Mother made minimal progress developing her parenting skills and
    never successfully completed the prescribed non-offenders treatment. To the
    extent Mother’s therapist and visitation coaches testified that in the past year,
    Mother progressed in her parenting skills and acknowledged Father’s crimes
    against   her   older   daughter,   the   record   demonstrates   that   Mother’s
    reunification with Child still was not imminent.     Indeed, Mother’s visitation
    remained supervised and coached, and it had not been increased during the
    life of the case. This Court has recognized that Section 2511(a)(8) implicitly
    recognizes that “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is
    unable to perform the actions necessary to assume parenting responsibilities.
    This Court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for
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    J-S07002-21
    permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
    future.” In re I.J., 
    972 A.2d at 11
    .
    With respect to the third element of Section 2511(a)(8), whether
    termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
    child, the orphans’ court weighed the testimony of Dr. Bliss, a licensed
    psychologist, over that of Stephanie Davis, Child’s therapist. The court stated
    that Ms. Davis “was not qualified as an expert and therefore her diagnosis of
    [Child] was not considered by the [c]ourt when making its determination to
    grant” the involuntary termination petition.11      Orphans’ Court Opinion,
    12/7/20, at 11.
    Dr. Bliss testified regarding her virtual observations of Child with
    Mother, as follows.
    ____________________________________________
    11  Upon review, Ms. Davis did not testify regarding her diagnosis of Child.
    Mother’s counsel introduced into evidence, and the court admitted, a letter
    from Ms. Davis dated August 31, 2020, wherein she listed the following goals
    for Child’s treatment:
    Increased communication of needs and feelings through exposure
    to emotional vocabulary; Eliminate enuresis; Eliminate
    encopresis; Rule out medical causes of enuresis/encopresis with
    pediatrician; Reduced argumentative behaviors with caretakers
    through behavioral charting with rewards; Improved strategies for
    organization during the school year; Improved strategies for
    addressing high activity levels, inattention/poor concentration,
    and impulsivity, especially during school year.
    Mother’s Exhibit A-2.     Dr. Bliss performed an individual psychological
    evaluation of Child and diagnosed her with unspecified elimination disorder
    related to her recent defecations. N.T., 9/4/20, at 77.
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    J-S07002-21
    Q. [I]n your most recent July 2020 evaluation, can you tell us
    about your observations of the interaction between [Child] and
    [Mother]?
    A.     Yes. So [Child] didn’t appear uncomfortable or distressed
    at all with [Mother]. She is clearly familiar with her, seemed
    comfortable enough; but she didn’t seem very interested in
    [Mother’s] presence either. The entire interaction was them
    playing side by one side with each other. Kind of . . . parallel play
    that you see with little kids together.
    * * *
    They were building Legos that [Mother] had brought for [Child].
    There was nothing negative about their play, but there was
    nothing positive either. They were just kind of sitting side-by-side
    building with each other, occasionally commenting on the building,
    but not really playing together at all or working on it together at
    all.
    [Child] at the beginning indicate[d] she didn’t remember
    me. I did ask her since I had seen her before. But again, it is
    virtual, it had been some time. She did not remember me
    supposedly, but she was much more interested in me, making
    contact with me, sharing experiences with me, showing me the
    things that she built, rather than [Mother, who] was right there
    with her in the room.
    And throughout the appointment [Mother’s] affect, her
    emotional expression, it was very flat when responding to me in a
    direct way. So she would say appropriate comments or talk to
    [Child] during the play, but in a very non-energetic, flat manner.
    [She] wasn’t really giving [Child] a whole lot to work with. She
    did set her parental boundaries with [Child,] and [Child] complied
    when she did. But yet there were also times that [Mother] did not
    have an understanding of age-appropriate behaviors or held [Child
    to] higher standards.
    [Mother] was overly critical [in an] incident like [Child] dropping
    a [L]ego on the floor. Or she told [Child] to calm down when
    [Child] didn’t appear hyper or upset or anything, something minor
    happened. [Mother] was like okay, okay, calm down. . . . [Child]
    wasn’t worked up in any way. It seemed [Mother] had a hard
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    J-S07002-21
    time reading [Child’s] cues or knowing what is normal age-
    appropriate behavior.
    N.T., 9/4/20, at 72–74. On cross-examination by Child’s counsel, Dr. Bliss
    testified that the parental bond between Mother and Child “appears weak and
    of a neutral [e]ffect. As I mentioned, [Child] doesn’t [appear] distressed by
    [Mother’s] presence, but she’s not really interested in her . . . presence. She’s
    just kind of there and okay with that. . . . [Child] views her foster parents as
    her psychological parents, especially the foster mother.” 
    Id. at 104
    .
    Dr. Bliss also testified regarding her virtual observations of Child with
    her foster parents, as follows.
    So again, similarly, I was remote or virtual, but they were together
    obviously. And so in this interaction they were sitting at a table
    together playing with Play-Doh. So it is a similar type of activity
    as to what she was doing with [Mother], but very different types
    of interactions that you will see from [Child].
    So [Child] appeared to enjoy the interactions a lot. She
    turned toward them and show them things when she built with
    Play-Doh. Chose to primarily interact with them. And once or
    twice she’d show me something, but even though now she is much
    more familiar and had seen me just a week prior, she was much
    more attuned to them and showing them things and talking to
    them. They were building things together with their Play-Doh, as
    well as separately. She called them mommy and daddy. She
    refers to [Mother] in the session as mommy [L.]. She was
    comfortable interrupting her foster parents. She felt that level of
    comfort with them. She answered [a] majority of the questions
    herself, describing what their life is like together and [her]
    description of it was age-appropriate as far as schedules,
    expectations, consequences, and everything.
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    J-S07002-21
    
    Id. at 75
    . Finally, Dr. Bliss testified on direct examination that termination of
    Mother’s parental rights still could have a negative effect on Child. 
    Id.
     at 80–
    81.
    Despite the record evidence that Child missed seeing Mother, the
    orphans’ court concluded:
    [Child] remains with Foster Parents, and they have a positive
    parent-child relationship. [Child] follows Foster Mother’s and
    Foster Father’s directives. Foster Parents provide for [Child’s]
    emotional, medical and educational needs. [Child] expressed that
    she wishes to remain with her [f]oster family.[12] CYF has clearly
    established that a healthy bond exists between Foster Parents and
    Child. [Child] looks to Foster Parents to fulfill her parental needs.
    Foster parents are able to provide [Child] with a stable home
    environment. A child’s life does not remain in suspension while
    parents figure things out. [Child] has been in care for over three
    years; she has been in care almost[] as long as [she] lived with
    her parents. Every child deserves a stable and consistent home
    that will provide love, support, comfort[,] and ensure all of [her]
    needs are met. Mother has failed to [satisfy] the problem that
    brought [Child] into care. For that reason, this [c]ourt concludes
    that termination of parental rights serves the needs and welfare
    of Child.
    Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/7/20, at 13.
    Based on our careful review of the record evidence, we discern no abuse
    of discretion. See Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826–827 (stating, “[E]ven
    ____________________________________________
    12  At the conclusion of the testimonial evidence, Child’s counsel, Attorney
    Ludin, declared on the record that Child “stated unequivocally to me that she
    wants to stay with her foster parents. . . . She said she loves her mommy
    and daddy. She obviously was referring to [her foster parents].” N.T., 9/4/20,
    at 236. However, he stated that Child also “wants to continue to visit with
    Mother and her sister. That was unequivocal as well.” Id. Attorney Ludin
    recommended that Child remain with her foster parents. He stated, “She’s
    happy there. She is stable there.” Id.
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    J-S07002-21
    where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
    dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
    second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and
    judgment. . . .”) (citation omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the record
    supports terminating Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).
    With respect to Section 2511(b), we are guided by the following legal
    principles:
    While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
    aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
    nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
    court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
    In re K.K.R.S., 
    958 A.2d 529
    , 533-536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The
    mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
    termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 
    949 A.2d 910
     (Pa.
    Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ parental
    rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond
    against parents’ inability to serve needs of child). Rather, the
    orphans’ court must examine the status of the bond to determine
    whether its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and
    beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 
    835 A.2d 387
    ,
    397 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    In re N.A.M., 
    33 A.3d 95
    , 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).
    In considering the affection a child may have for her natural parents,
    this Court has stated:
    [C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent
    simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is
    not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s
    feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis,
    the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics
    as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect and
    abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage and
    completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the opinion
    that the biological connection between [the parent] and the
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    J-S07002-21
    children is sufficient in of itself, or when considered in
    connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to
    establish a de facto beneficial bond exists.           The
    psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in
    terms of the development of the child and its mental and
    emotional health than the coincidence of biological or
    natural parenthood.
    In re K.K.R.-S., 
    958 A.2d 529
    , 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and
    quotation marks omitted).
    In addition, our Supreme Court has advised: “Common sense dictates
    that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children
    are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
    parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The Court directed that in weighing
    the bond considerations pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), “[C]ourts must
    keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M.
    Court observed that “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and
    we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.        When
    courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted
    children.” Id.
    Mindful of these legal principles, we have thoroughly reviewed the
    testimonial evidence and discern no abuse of discretion by the court. The
    court carefully weighed the evidence in light of Child’s interests and concluded
    that terminating Mother’s parental rights serves the developmental, physical,
    and emotional needs and welfare of Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
    Accordingly, we affirm the order.
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    J-S07002-21
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/26/2021
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