Com. v. Wright, E. ( 2022 )


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  • J-A18025-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    EDWARD E. WRIGHT                           :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 988 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 22, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
    Criminal Division at CP-42-CR-0000204-2020
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                           FILED: SEPTEMBER 7, 2022
    Edward E. Wright (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed after he pled guilty to indecent assault (without consent), indecent
    assault (complainant less than 16), and corruption of minors.1 We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the case history as follows:
    A.A. … began working at Wright’s Music Shed, which is
    owned by [Appellant], [in 2017,] when she was 14.              She
    considered [Appellant] as “somewhat of a mentor.” When she
    was 15 and still working at Wright’s Music Shed[, Appellant] began
    complimenting her, including calling her “beautiful.” He then
    began touching and massaging her. This led to him touching, or
    as [A.A.] described it, “cupping,” her breasts. He also “rubbed”
    her inner thigh. This behavior took place in a secluded upstairs
    office. [Appellant] told A.A. that he wanted to have a relationship
    with her when she turned 18. At the time [Appellant] committed
    these offense[s,] he was 66 or 67 years old.
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(1) and (8), and 6301.
    J-A18025-22
    [Appellant] was previously convicted at McKean County
    Docket [] 128 CR 1986 of: three (3) counts of corruption of
    minors, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301; three (3) counts of indecent exposure,
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3127; and four (4) counts of indecent assault, 18
    Pa.C.S. § 3126. At the time the Appellant committed these prior
    offenses, he was a band director at the Bradford Area High School.
    His responsibilities as a band director included instructing and
    supervising male and female teenage students. He formed
    relationships with several of his female students and thereafter
    sexually assaulted them. There were three teenage victims at 128
    CR 1986, with separate incidents of sexual assault, indecent
    exposure and corruption of minors involving each of them.
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/11/21, at 3-4.2
    Appellant entered his guilty plea on January 7, 2021. That same day,
    the trial court ordered Appellant to undergo an assessment as to whether he
    met the statutory requirements for classification as a sexually violent predator
    (SVP).
    The trial court held an SVP hearing on July 11, 2021. Gregory A. Henry,
    Esquire (Trial Counsel), appeared on Appellant’s behalf. The Commonwealth
    presented testimony from (1) the investigator assigned to Appellant’s case,
    an agent of Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB); and
    (2) Appellant’s SOAB evaluator, Brenda Manno, MSW, LCSW (Ms. Manno).
    The court qualified Ms. Manno as an expert in the field of sex offender
    assessment without objection by Appellant. N.T., 7/11/21, at 18.
    ____________________________________________
    2Appellant also committed sex offenses against a fourth minor female in the
    1980s.
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    Ms. Manno testified that she evaluated Appellant and made findings with
    respect to each of the SVP assessment factors set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9799.24(b)(1)-(4). See N.T., 7/11/21, at 18-28. She opined that Appellant
    “met the diagnostic criteria for unspecified paraphilic disorder as is found in
    the DSM-5.”3 Id. at 28-29; see also id. at 25 (“[I]n the DSM-5, paraphilia
    involves intense thoughts, fantasies or behaviors spanning at least a six-
    month period.”). Ms. Manno further testified that Appellant posed a risk for
    reoffending:
    [H]aving the paraphilic diagnosis indicat[es] we do have an
    established pattern of sexually deviant behavior with children,
    that increases [Appellant’s] likelihood of offending versus other
    offenders who do not have such diagnoses.
    Id. at 28. Noting the significant age difference between Appellant and A.A.,
    Ms. Manno stated, “recidivism tends to decline with age, [but Appellant]
    clearly recidivated even after he was over 60 years of age.” Id. at 23; see
    also id. at 39-42, 44-47 (Trial Counsel cross-examining Ms. Manno about
    recidivism and elderly offenders). Ms. Manno concluded Appellant “does meet
    the criteria to be deemed a sexually violent predator under statute.” Id. at
    30.
    A dispute arose with respect to the qualification of Appellant’s expert,
    Robert Maiden, Ph.D. (Dr. Maiden), a licensed clinical psychologist and
    ____________________________________________
    3 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition
    (DSM-5) is a widely used manual for psychiatric diagnosis. See, e.g.,
    Commonwealth v. Woeber, 
    174 A.3d 1096
    , 1107 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2017).
    -3-
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    professor at Alfred University in New York. Id. at 53. The trial court issued
    a “split decision,” qualifying Dr. Maiden as an expert as to whether an
    individual has “unspecified paraphilic disorder,” but not as to whether
    an individual is an SVP. Id. at 70-71.
    As we discuss in greater detail below, Dr. Maiden testified that Appellant
    did not meet the diagnostic criteria for “unspecified paraphilic disorder.” Id.
    at 74-75; see also id. at 79-80.       In particular, Dr. Maiden opined that
    Appellant did not exhibit the requisite “irresistible urge” symptoms. See id.
    at 74-75.
    The trial court found the Commonwealth proved that Appellant met the
    requirements for classification as an SVP. Id. at 120. The court explained its
    reasoning as follows:
    Each side has really had me thinking today. And a big
    reason for that is we have two good professionals in their field
    provide different opinions. And it’s difficult because they both
    have good qualifications[.] …
    So it comes down to [] whose opinion should the court
    accept … from these two veteran, qualified individuals. … And it
    comes down to a couple points that I’m going to outline.
    First, it was appropriate … [for] the defense to
    emphasize that the rate of recidivism goes down with age.
    That was brought up through the direct testimony of expert [Ms.]
    Manno. And she provided those numbers. They’re in the record.
    They’re … very low. … Almost … down to zero. But not zero. So
    … that’s a factor here because I have to decide does [Appellant]
    have unspecified paraphilic disorder, and will he re-offend.
    ….
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    [A]ge is a relevant factor here[.] ... There’s no dispute
    about it, that the likelihood of re-offending goes way down
    with age. The studies show, as was said several times here.
    ….
    [Appellant is] 66 and he committed the offense[s]. So
    to get into the statistics, the statistics say that’s unlikely
    for him to have … done that. But he did.
    ….
    I will accept that [Appellant] will be into his 70s, or close to
    it when his period of confinement is done. But if he’s this age and
    he offended, the statistics from the general group don’t have a lot
    of meaning because if he’s 66, when he’s 75 or 72 or whatever, is
    there a lot of difference between when he was 66[?] … So the
    reference to studies and the low numbers of re-offending
    doesn’t have a lot of bearing as it would if [Appellant] was
    30 because considering his age now, it’s difficult to apply
    the statistical analysis here. …
    ….
    And one thing that I really struggled with [is] how I should
    [] analyze the assertion that well, in 1986 there were several
    victims. And now we’re 30 years out and [until this case] there’s
    no other victims. Now, [Dr. Maiden made] … reference to
    there’s no other reports. And then I really struggled with that.
    Well, that’s true, there are no other reports. [Appellant] wasn’t
    convicted of any offenses since … 1986. And the court certainly
    can’t consider something that isn’t in the record. So there’s no
    reports. That’s a factor. I agree it is. But then [Dr. Maiden]
    even went further. [] Dr. Maiden went way out on that and said
    well, … in today’s world with the internet and everything, we’d
    know. [W]e’d know if there w[ere] other victims. And I reject
    that assertion completely. There are many victims who do not
    come forward for a variety of reasons.
    ….
    So I can’t find here that there were other victims. But
    I certainly can’t find that I have to 100 percent conclude
    there weren’t because no one else reported an offense. And
    -5-
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    that isn’t as much a factual issue as it goes to the understanding
    of sexual offenses and whose opinion to accept or not.
    That … really drew me to the conclusion that I’m going to
    accept the opinion of expert [Ms.] Manno, her history,
    training, experience. I’m not downplaying … Dr. Maiden. …
    You know, his experience as outlined in his curriculum vitae shows
    he does have great experience.
    However, as [Dr. Maiden] said, [he is] like [a] general
    practitioner. [He has] to cover a lot of areas. It’s different with
    [Ms.] Manno. She’s covered this area, treatment of sex offenders,
    understanding them, training regarding them, [and she has
    performed] … thousands of [SVP] evaluations. More where
    individuals were found not to be sexually violent predators than
    where they were. So again, I accept her opinion. I believe [Ms.
    Manno] has much broader and specific knowledge
    regarding … sex offenses and a specific diagnosis.
    I also had a real hard time with the assertion[, by Dr. Maiden
    on direct examination,] that if someone has a disorder, … they
    would act out all the time. Even individuals with disorders, there
    are certainly those that can’t control [urges] at all, period. But
    there are others that will look for opportunities and not take
    risks[.] …
    So I had a real problem with well, because someone doesn’t
    act out all the time, they wouldn’t have this condition. I didn’t
    accept that. I felt that the explanation of what is required for [an
    SVP] diagnosis was clear, and more acceptable from [Ms.] Manno.
    ….
    So I find [Appellant] is an SVP, sexual violent predator. I
    find that the Commonwealth has demonstrated that by
    clear and convincing evidence.
    Id. at 115-20 (emphasis added).
    On July 22, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 1
    – 2 years of imprisonment, followed by 4 years of probation. The court also
    ordered Appellant to register as a sex offender for life, pursuant to
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    Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42
    Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10—9799.42.4 Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant
    and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant presents eight issues for review:
    1.) Did the lower court err in ruling that the Appellant’s expert
    could testify about whether, under the DSM-5, the Appellant
    has unspecified paraphilic disorder – but could not testify
    about how the Appellant’s age affected his likelihood of
    reoffending?
    2.) Did the lower court err in ruling that only the
    Commonwealth’s expert, who it questioned on the issue,
    could testify about how the Appellant’s age affected his
    likelihood of reoffending?
    3.) Did the lower court err in prohibiting the Appellant’s expert
    from testifying about a particular study … of which he was
    aware that challenged the Commonwealth’s expert’s
    knowledge of recidivism rates in offenders over 60 and over
    70 years of age?
    4.) Did the lower court err in ruling that the Appellant’s expert
    could not testify whether or not the Appellant was an SVP,
    that the Appellant’s expert was not qualified to testify about
    most all SVP assessment factors recited at Title 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9799.58(b)(1) through (b)(4),[5] and that he could not, in
    particular, testify about the assessment factor at Title 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.58(b)(4)?
    5.) Did the lower court err in assuming, and in concluding, that
    the Appellant may have re-offended from 1986 through
    ____________________________________________
    4 Appellant is subject to SORNA Revised Subchapter H, as he committed the
    offenses against A.A. after December 20, 2012. See Commonwealth v.
    Torsilieri, 
    232 A.3d 567
    , 573-74 (Pa. 2020) (explaining amendments).
    5 Appellant cites SORNA Revised Subchapter I, despite being subject to
    Revised Subchapter H. Regardless, the 15 statutory SVP factors apply to both
    subchapters.
    -7-
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    November/December 2018 – even though no evidence to this
    effect was introduced – thereby improperly shifting the
    burden of proof from the Commonwealth to the Appellant and
    diluting the clear and convincing burden of proof required?
    6.) Did the lower court err in concluding that the Appellant’s
    expert’s review of relevant statutes and cases demonstrated
    his lack of qualifications to testify about the assessment
    criteria at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.58 and about the Appellant’s
    alleged SVP status?
    7.) Did the lower court err in concluding that the Appellant’s
    expert could not testify about the Appellant’s likelihood of
    reoffense, about the assessment factor at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9799.58(b)(4), and about how the Appellant’s age was
    relevant to his likelihood of re-offense – after the
    Commonwealth opened the door for the Appellant’s expert
    testimony on those issues?
    8.) Did the lower court err in questioning why the Appellant even
    wanted his expert to challenge the Commonwealth’s expert’s
    opinion on the recidivism rates of offenders past 70 years of
    age – because the rates of recidivism recited [by] the
    Commonwealth’s expert were “very low”?
    Appellant’s Brief at 6-8 (footnote 5 added, some citations modified).
    Though Appellant presents eight issues, he makes one argument,
    without subheadings or distinction. See id. at 11-32. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    2119(a):
    The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are
    questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part--
    in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the particular
    point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of
    authorities as are deemed pertinent.
    Id. We overlook this defect, and like Appellant, address the issues together.
    -8-
    J-A18025-22
    Each of Appellant’s issues implicate the trial court’s evidentiary rulings
    and its qualification of Dr. Maiden. We review these claims mindful of the
    following:
    The admission of evidence is a matter vested within the
    sound discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be
    reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its
    discretion. The standard for qualification of an expert witness is
    a liberal one. The test to be applied when qualifying an expert
    witness is whether the witness has any reasonable pretension to
    specialized knowledge on the subject under investigation. If he
    does, he may testify and the weight to be given to such testimony
    is for the trier of fact to determine. A witness does not need
    formal education on the subject matter of the testimony, and may
    be qualified to render an expert opinion based on training and
    experience.
    Expert testimony is permitted as an aid to the jury when the
    subject matter is distinctly related to a science, skill, or occupation
    beyond the knowledge or experience of the average layman.
    Conversely, expert testimony is not admissible where the issue
    involves a matter of common knowledge.
    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    206 A.3d 551
    , 560 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations
    omitted). Further, evidence is only admissible if relevant, i.e., where it has
    probative value with respect to a material fact. Pa.R.E. 402.
    Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702:
    A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
    experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
    opinion or otherwise if:
    (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
    knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average
    layperson;
    (b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
    knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
    evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and
    -9-
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    (c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the
    relevant field.
    Pa.R.E. 702. The burden of proof is on the proponent to establish the expert
    meets the criteria of Rule 702. Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    92 A.3d 766
    ,
    790 (Pa. 2014).
    Finally, expert testimony in a criminal proceeding implicating sex
    offenses is governed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920, which provides:
    (b) Qualifications and use of experts.—
    (1) In a criminal proceeding subject to this section, a
    witness may be qualified by the court as an expert if the
    witness has specialized knowledge beyond that possessed
    by the average layperson based on the witness’s experience
    with, or specialized training or education in, criminal justice,
    behavioral sciences or victim services issues, related to
    sexual violence, that will assist the trier of fact in
    understanding the dynamics of sexual violence, victim
    responses to sexual violence and the impact of sexual
    violence on victims during and after being assaulted.
    (2) If qualified as an expert, the witness may testify to facts
    and opinions regarding specific types of victim responses
    and victim behaviors.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920(b)(1)-(2).
    Appellant argues the trial court erred regarding its limited qualification
    of Dr. Maiden. See Appellant’s Brief at 10-33. Appellant claims:
    The lower court’s rulings: 1) that Dr. Maiden was not qualified
    regarding sexual predator evaluations and the factors (see 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9799.58(b)(1) through (b)(4)) that go into them; 2)
    that Dr. Maiden was not qualified as an expert to say whether the
    Appellant is, or is not, a violent sexual predator; 3) that he was
    qualified only as an expert in the DSM-5 and about whether or not
    the Appellant has an unspecified paraphilic disorder; and 4) that
    - 10 -
    J-A18025-22
    Dr. Maiden was not qualified to testify about recidivism rates in
    elderly offenders and their application to the Appellant –
    effectively permitted Dr. Maiden to testify only about [the] SVP
    assessment factor [at] § 9799.58(b)(3)(iii) [(“Characteristics of
    the individual, including … mental illness, mental disability or
    mental abnormality”)], and no others. Most particularly, the lower
    court’s rulings prohibited Dr. Maiden from testifying about any
    factor, such as age, (see [id.] § 9799.58(b)(4)) that would be
    reasonably related to the risk of re-offense.
    Appellant’s Brief at 24-25. Appellant requests “remand[] to the lower court
    for the conduct of a new SVP hearing where the Appellant’s expert is qualified
    to offer an opinion and report about all assessment criteria recited at [] 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.58.” Id. at 33.
    In response, the Commonwealth argues:
    Appellant’s complaints that the trial court would not accept
    testimony about recidivism at older ages is misplaced. The trial
    court accepted it a[s] true but found [Appellant] did, in fact,
    reoffend in his late 60s, even if that fact is inconsistent with
    general statistics.
    ***
    [D]espite finding [Dr. Maiden] an expert in some areas but
    not others, the court actually did consider Dr. Maiden’s testimony,
    but it made it clear [that the court] found the opinion of Ms. Manno
    to be more accurate and her qualifications more significant. This
    determination was within the discretion of the court and was
    supported by the record.
    Commonwealth Brief at 5, 8. Upon review, we conclude the record supports
    the Commonwealth’s assessment.
    SORNA requires a trial court to order a defendant convicted of a
    “sexually violent offense” to be assessed by the SOAB.         42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9799.24(a); see also id. § 9799.12 (defining sexually violent offense). The
    - 11 -
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    SOAB is responsible for conducting an assessment to determine whether the
    individual should be classified as an SVP. Id. § 9799.24(b). The assessment
    involves 15 factors, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4). See also
    Commonwealth v. Brooks, 
    7 A.3d 852
    , 863 (Pa. Super. 2010) (all 15 factors
    need not be present to support an SVP designation).
    Under SORNA, an SVP is an individual who has been convicted of one of
    the enumerated sex offenses, and “who is determined to be a[n SVP] under
    section 9799.24 (relating to assessments) due to a mental abnormality or
    personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory
    sexually violent offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12.        An act is considered
    “predatory” if it is “directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a
    relationship has been initiated, established, maintained or promoted, in whole
    or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.” Id.
    After the SOAB completes its assessment, the trial court holds a hearing
    to “determine whether the Commonwealth has proved by clear and convincing
    evidence that the individual is a[n SVP].” Id. § 9799.24(e)(3).
    The specific question for … any [] expert who testifies at an SVP
    hearing[] is whether the defendant satisfied the definition of
    sexually violent predator set out in the statute, that is, whether
    he or she suffers from “a mental abnormality or personality
    disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory
    sexually violent offenses.”
    Commonwealth v. Dixon, 
    907 A.2d 533
    , 536 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
    omitted).
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    Here, Appellant sought to present Dr. Maiden as an expert with respect
    to whether Appellant was an SVP. N.T., 7/11/21, at 53. Dr. Maiden testified
    that he performed a psychological evaluation of Appellant, and reviewed Ms.
    Manno’s SOAB report concerning Appellant.          Id. at 59-60.    Dr. Maiden
    responded in the affirmative to Trial Counsel asking: “[A]re you sufficiently
    qualified to evaluate Ms. Manno’s conclusion about whether or not [Appellant]
    has a mental abnormality or personality disorder as set forth in the DSM?”
    Id. at 62. Trial counsel then sought to
    qualify Dr. Maiden as an expert in the … psychological evaluation
    of individuals, including individuals that have been convicted of
    sex crimes, and as an expert sufficient to evaluate the conclusions
    of Ms. Manno as set forth in her report …, specifically the
    conclusion that [Appellant] has a mental abnormality or a
    disability, that specifically being unspecified paraphilic
    disorder as set forth in the DSM-5.
    Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added).
    Dr. Maiden testified that he resides in New York State and has “not had
    any training regarding the Pennsylvania sexual assessment.” Id. at 63; see
    also id. at 66 (stating he never performed an SVP assessment). Dr. Maiden
    testified he had some experience evaluating sex offenders in New York. Id.
    at 64-65; see also id. at 65 (Dr. Maiden testifying, “New York State has a
    different type of law.    But I have made … evaluations in terms of [sex
    offenders’] likelihood of re-offending and their threat to society.”). In further
    questioning by Trial Counsel, Dr. Maiden confirmed he had reviewed
    information including case law on Pennsylvania law that dealt with
    the definition of the terms mental disability and mental
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    abnormality, all for the purpose of permitting [Dr. Maiden] to
    assess [Appellant] and to evaluate the report of Ms. Manno[.]
    Id. at 68.
    The Commonwealth objected to the qualification of Dr. Maiden as an
    SVP expert, arguing:
    [T]his is a very particular area that [Dr. Maiden] is not
    qualified to give an opinion on. By his own admission, it sounds
    like he read some case law. But we’re talking about whether
    somebody has … experience, knowledge, [or] something above
    what other people have. And he doesn’t have any education or
    experience regarding this particular issue.
    There may be other things that he could be qualified as an
    expert on and probably has. But what he’s being asked to give
    an expert opinion [on] here is beyond his area of expertise as has
    been presented.
    Id. at 69. Trial Counsel argued to the contrary. See id. at 69-70.
    The trial court then decided:
    THE COURT: Okay. This is going to be a split decision. …
    [Dr. Maiden] has never … made an SVP determination. He
    indicated, … while we don’t have Megan’s Law in New York, [] I
    believe that we have similar things here, the tiers and things. So
    he’s not an expert, he’s not qualified regarding sexual violent
    predator evaluations, the factors that go into them. So I’m not
    qualifying him in that area.
    What I will qualify him in … as an expert is whether
    an individual, in particular [Appellant], has unspecified
    paraphilic disorder. That’s part of the conclusion that [Ms.]
    Manno looked at[.]
    And [Dr. Maiden] is qualified as an expert in the DSM-
    5 … [and] whether someone [does] or … does not have an
    unspecified paraphilic disorder. He is an expert in in that field.
    He can render an opinion on that. But he’s not qualified as an
    expert to say [Appellant] is or isn’t [a] sexual[ly] violent predator.
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    Id. at 70-71 (emphasis added). We discern no error or abuse of discretion.
    On direct examination, Trial Counsel asked Dr. Maiden whether
    Appellant met the criteria for “unspecified paraphilic disorder, as that term is
    defined in DSM-5[.]” Id. at 74.         Dr. Maiden responded:
    It’s my opinion or belief that [Appellant] does not meet
    that diagnosis, and because he lacks certain really key
    symptoms that characterize such people.
    ….
    [W]e do not see the intensity or the irresistible urge
    symptoms in [Appellant]. I’m not in any way saying or supporting
    or anything that he did was normal or acceptable. I’m just stating
    that it does not meet the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-5.
    Id. at 74-75 (emphasis added).            Dr. Maiden agreed with Ms. Manno that
    unspecified paraphilic disorder is a “lifetime, chronic condition[.]” Id. at 80.
    Unlike Ms. Manno, however, Dr. Maiden opined Appellant did not suffer from
    this condition and stated, “I do not believe that [Appellant] would have been
    able to function for 35 years … living a normal lifestyle and maintaining a
    marriage with all kinds of children … around him” without incident. Id.;6 cf.
    ____________________________________________
    6 Regarding Appellant’s offenses involving A.A., Dr. Maiden emphasized on
    direct
    the fact that [A.A.] remained [working at Appellant’s music store]
    for months afterwards, after those [inappropriate] encounters,
    and he did not approach her or attempt to do any kind of sexual
    act. That would be almost impossible in my opinion as somebody
    that has that diagnosis[, i.e., unspecified paraphilic disorder].
    Id. at 76.
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    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12, supra (defining an SVP as an individual, convicted
    of one of the enumerated offenses, who has “a mental abnormality or
    personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory
    sexually violent offenses.”).
    Trial Counsel then asked Dr. Maiden whether he was “familiar with
    literature on recidivism rates for individuals in their late 50s, 60s, and 70s?”
    Id. at 81. The Commonwealth objected to this question as “beyond the scope
    of [Dr. Maiden’s] expertise.”   Id.   The trial court sustained the objection,
    agreeing it was “outside of [Dr. Maiden’s] qualification as an expert.” Id. at
    82. Trial counsel noted his exception to the ruling. Id.
    On cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked Dr. Maiden, “how do
    you know [Appellant] did not attempt to victimize young women” between his
    sex assaults in the 1980s and his assaults of A.A.      Id. at 83. Dr. Maiden
    answered:
    Well, we don’t know that for 100 percent sure, right? But
    we would know if criminal cases came up for people who filed
    charges or complained about [Appellant’s] inappropriate
    approaches. And in today’s world, I think that would occur.
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Regarding the DSM-5 definition for unspecified paraphilic disorder, the
    Commonwealth asked Dr. Maiden:
    Q.    Do you agree with me that having five victims of a similar
    age in a similar inferior position would denote a preferential sexual
    interest in that group of characteristics?
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    J-A18025-22
    A.    I don’t think you could say that that is his preferential area
    of interest because [Appellant] states that he’s been happily
    married and [has] a good sex life with his second wife.
    Id. at 95.
    Trial Counsel subsequently argued to the trial court:
    [P]articularly since [Dr. Maiden has] been allowed to testify about
    the likelihood of re-offense, if he were not permitted to testify
    about studies with which he is familiar as to how [Appellant’s] age
    after he is done with probation would impact upon the likelihood
    of reoffense, that seems terribly illogical to me.
    Id. at 100.
    The trial court responded:
    I’m not changing my ruling. There’s already evidence in the
    record that it’s 3.8 percent in your 60s[, i.e., the statistical
    recidivism rate]. And then there’s evidence that it goes down one
    point to 2.8 [percent]. So why you’d want to question [Dr.
    Maiden] anyway when that’s already in the record and isn’t in
    dispute, I’m not sure.
    Id.
    The Commonwealth questioned Ms. Manno on re-direct. See id. at 102-
    05.   With respect to Dr. Maiden’s testimony regarding Appellant’s 35-year
    period of not re-offending, Ms. Manno testified, “to say [Appellant] would
    victimize anyone he had access to that was, let’s say a postpubescent female,
    I think is a very inaccurate statement to make.”         Id. at 103-04.      The
    Commonwealth asked, “does it say anything to you about [Appellant’s]
    impulse control that he had been punished previously, yet did it again?” Id.
    at 104. Ms. Manno replied:
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    J-A18025-22
    Yes. And … we have no idea about [Appellant’s] urges or fantasies.
    All we know about is behavior. So we know that he engaged in this
    behavior again and recidivated because we’re here today. That
    doesn’t mean[] that there were urges and behaviors that he had
    that perhaps were controlled over time.
    Id.
    At the close of testimony, Trial Counsel moved for admission of Dr.
    Maiden’s report. Id. at 105. The Commonwealth objected. Id. The trial
    court overruled the objection, explaining:
    I am going to allow it in. It’s up to [t]he [c]ourt to weigh the
    report and to distinguish the portions that were allowed to be
    presented, that [Dr. Maiden] was qualified as an expert for, and
    those that he wasn’t. Of course, if he wasn’t qualified as an expert
    in an area, and there’s an opinion in his report regarding that, it
    will be disregarded by the [c]ourt because it’s outside of the area
    that he was qualified as an expert in.
    Id. at 105-06.
    The trial court quoted Dr. Maiden’s expert report, admitted as Exhibit 6,
    in further explaining:
    The court did not accept the opinions and conclusions expressed
    by [Appellant’s] purported expert, Dr. Robert Maiden, Ph.D. Dr.
    Maiden had little prior experience regarding sexually violent
    predator evaluations. Further, he utilized troubling factors in
    reaching his conclusions, such as: 1) since [Appellant’s] victims
    were not minors[,] as they were not under the age of 12, the
    criteria to classify [Appellant] as a SVP have not been met. We
    reject this assertion. The significance of [Appellant’s] pattern
    here, of using his position as a supervisor over young females to
    isolate and sexually assault them, is not lessened by the fact that
    none of them were less than 12 years old. The goal of [SORNA]
    is to require registration and notification to protect all juvenile
    females, not just those under the age of 12; 2) [Appellant]
    stopped pursuing the victim, A.A., after she “ignored him and
    became angry;” and, “if [Appellant] was a person who suffers
    from paraphilia because of the persistence and intensity of his
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    J-A18025-22
    feeling, he would be unable to stop or control his behavior and
    would continue to pursue the Victim to engage in further and more
    intense sexual behavior with him.” Ex. 6 at 7-8. We reject his
    assertion.
    A.A., a 15-year-old, knew that something was wrong when
    a 66- or 67-year old individual was fondling her. Therefore, she
    cut off contact with him. At that point[, Appellant] recognized
    that, if he tried to maintain contact, it was likely A.A. would reach
    out for help and contact law enforcement. He knew there was no
    reason to contact A.A. because there was no chance of victimizing
    her again and it would only lead to being caught. In the past[,
    Appellant] moved on to other victims when the opportunity with
    one of them ended, and that pattern was repeated here; 3)
    “[Appellant] is a married man who is the father of four children
    whom he raised along with his wife. For over 35 years[, Appellant]
    maintained for all practical purposes a happy and normal marriage
    and family life.” (Ex. 6 at 8). We reject this assertion. First,
    other than [Appellant’s] self-serving statements to Dr. Maiden,
    there is nothing in the record to support these conclusions.
    Second, the assertion that [Appellant] has a good relationship
    with his family and wife supports the assertion that he is unable
    to control his desire to abuse juvenile females. With so much to
    risk, including harm to his spouse and family, he still acted on his
    urges, sexually assaulting yet another victim. His decision to act
    despite the consequences to himself and others demonstrates that
    he will likely act out again in the future – regardless of whether
    he has a good or bad family situation; 4) “It is well known the
    odds of recidivism are quite low for someone who is 69 years old
    who would be 71/72 once he is released into the parole system
    which would oversee him for another 6 years;” and “in fact, recent
    studies indicate that recidivism occurs at [a] rate of 2 percent for
    those over the age of 55 ….” (Ex. 6 at 8). [Appellant] was 66 or
    67 when he sexually assaulted A.A. Therefore, by the statistics
    set forth by Dr. Maiden, [Appellant] already falls in that very rare
    group, the “less than 2% group, that re-offends after the age of
    55.” Since [Appellant] did re-offend at a mature age already, it is
    unreasonable to assume that, in a few years the urges that were
    not controlled when he was 66 or 67 will suddenly vanish.
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/11/21, at 5-6 (citations modified).
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    J-A18025-22
    After careful review, we adopt the trial court’s analysis and conclusion,
    which is supported by the record and applicable law. We discern no abuse of
    the court’s broad discretion in its rulings with respect to Dr. Maiden’s expert
    qualification. Smith, supra. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/7/2022
    - 20 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 988 WDA 2021

Judges: Murray, J.

Filed Date: 9/7/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/7/2022