Com. v. Bonson, C. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHRISTOPHER WAYNE BONSON
Appellant No. 2096 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 19, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County
Criminal Division at No: CP-44-CR-11-2015
BEFORE: STABILE, J., PLATT,* and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 11, 2016
Appellant, Christopher Wayne Bonson, appeals from the November 19,
2015 judgment of sentence imposing nine to eighteen months of county
incarceration for possession of a prohibited offensive weapon (18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 908). We affirm.
The record reveals that Lewistown Police Officer Samuel Snyder
responded to a parking lot after receiving a report that Appellant was there.
Appellant was the subject of several outstanding arrest warrants. As Snyder
prepared to handcuff Appellant, Snyder noticed Appellant discard an item to
the seat of his car. Snyder retrieved the item, which turned out to be metal
knuckles. Section 908(c) designates metal knuckles as a prohibited
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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offensive weapon. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(c). Appellant claims he obtained the
metal knuckles at an Army Navy store and used them as a belt buckle.
Appellant also claims the knuckles were in his pocket at the time of his
arrest because the belt broke earlier that day. The case proceeded to trial
on September 11, 2015. A jury found Appellant guilty of possessing a
prohibited offensive weapon. The trial court imposed sentence as set forth
above, and this timely appeal followed. On appeal, Appellant asserts that
the metal knuckles had a lawful purpose because he purchased them as a
belt buckle and used them as such. On that basis, Appellant claims the
Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence that Appellant violated
§ 908.
Our well-settled standard of review when evaluating a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence mandates that we
assess the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner. We
must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to enable
the fact-finder to have found every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established
by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received
must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon
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the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 69 A.3d 259, 262 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 83 A.3d 168 (Pa. 2013).
Section 908(c) defines offensive weapons as implements “for the
infliction of serious bodily injury which serve[] no common lawful purpose.”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(c). “Section 908 was ‘intended to establish a prohibition
very nearly absolute aimed at the implements or weapons themselves,
whether enumerated or falling within the general definition which are
offensive by nature.’” Commonwealth v. Hitchon, 549 A.2d 943 (Pa.
Super. 1988) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 495 A.2d 584, 594
(Pa. Super. 1985)), appeal denied, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa. 1989). “While some
conceivable lawful use could be found for almost every object otherwise
proscribed by Section 908, the statute does not prohibit only items with no
conceivable lawful purpose, but, more broadly, items with no common lawful
purpose.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 400 A.2d 1284, 1288 (Pa. 1979)
(capitalization in original).
In Fisher, the defendant threw away an object while a police officer
was questioning the defendant and two others. Id. at 1286. “The object
[…] consisted of a metal handle, with two finger holes, which incorporates
two cutting blades, one facing outward, the other inward.” Id. The
defendant produced an advertisement describing the object as a “Wyoming
Knife” useful for skinning and cleaning fish and game. Id. Since the
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Wyoming Knife was not among the items specifically enumerated in § 908,
we analyzed whether it was an implement for the infliction of serious bodily
injury which served no common lawful purpose. Id. at 1287. We observed
a distinction between §§ 908 and 907 (possessing instruments of crime) of
the Crimes Code, that being § 907’s requirement that the Commonwealth
prove the defendant’s criminal intent. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(b). The
Fisher Court concluded that “a hunting implement which has a common
lawful purpose is not within the scope of the prohibition of Section 908[.]”
Id. at 1288. Thus, we vacated the defendant’s conviction.
In Hitchon, the defendant possessed a pen with a retractable pointed
steel shaft. Hitchon, 549 A.2d at 945. The pointed shaft opened
automatically at the push of a button. Id. The defendant, a machinist,
claimed he used the implement as a metal scriber and/or a center punch.
Id. at 946. The defendant presented the expert testimony of a precision
toolmaker who testified that he owned a similar implement and used it as a
scriber and center punch. Id. at 947. The Commonwealths’ expert
countered that he had never seen a spring-loaded scriber and that the
design was impractical for that purpose. Id. An advertisement described
the implement as a discreet defensive tool known as the “guard father.” Id.
The Hitchon Court upheld the defendant’s conviction, concluding that an
automatic-open pointed steel shaft had no common lawful purpose and was
capable of inflicting serious bodily injury.
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Appellant relies on Fisher to support his argument that his metal
knuckles have a lawful purpose, in this case a belt buckle. We discern
several significant distinctions between this case and Fisher. First, § 908
expressly defines metal knuckles as a prohibited offensive weapon. Second,
the defendant in Fisher produced an advertisement from a sporting goods
magazine marketing the defendant’s knife as useful for skinning and
cleaning fish and game. Knives and other implements with cutting edges
have numerous common lawful uses, and thus § 908 limits its prohibition to
automatic-open knives, or switchblades. Section 908 expressly prohibits
metal knuckles, and the record is devoid of any evidence that metal
knuckles have a common lawful purpose. Officer Snyder explained:
Well, because the idea is that you place your fingers in the
holes, the flat part goes against the palm of your hand
(demonstrating), and this is used for what we call as an impact
weapon. It’s something that you are hitting somebody with
because obviously – there is a reason boxers wear gloves, it’s to
not hurt your hands. What this does is by wearing these if you
were to strike an individual, you are not going to hurt your
hands, and you are going to do more damage to the individual
than with just your fist.
N.T. Trial, 9/11/15, at 34.
Appellant claimed he bought the metal knuckles at an Army Navy store
as a belt buckle, and when the belt broke he threw it away and kept the
knuckles. Id. at 32-33. Appellant claimed the belt broke earlier on the day
of his arrest and he threw it away but kept the metal knuckles in his pocket.
Id. at 63. He claimed he intended to buy another belt to use with the
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knuckles. Id. Appellant’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the jury
was entitled to find his testimony not credible. Second, Fisher teaches that
a conceivable lawful purpose for an item is not sufficient to avoid a
conviction under § 908. Rather, a defendant must demonstrate a common
lawful purpose. In Fisher, the defendant established that the knife in
question was designed for skinning fish and game. Instantly, the record is
devoid of evidence that metal knuckles are commonly used as belt buckles.
As in Hitchon, the Commonwealth produced evidence that the implement in
question is designed for use as a weapon. We therefore affirm the judgment
of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/11/2016
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