Com. v. Artis-Bryan, J. ( 2015 )

J. A32039/14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
v. :
:
:
JAMES ANTON ARTIS-BRYAN, :
:
Appellant : No. 209 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 17, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division No(s).: CP-45-CR-0001225-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2015
Appellant, James Anton Artis-Bryan, appeals from the judgment of
sentence1 entered in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas following a
jury trial and convictions for criminal accomplice to possess heroin,2 criminal
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Appellant purports to appeal from the orders entered on August 13, 2013,
September 20, 2013, and January 6, 2013. The August 13th order granted
in part and denied in part Appellant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion to Suppress.
See Order, 8/13/13. On September 20, 2013, the jury returned its verdict.
On January 6, 2014, the court, following consideration of Appellant’s Motion
for Reconsideration of Sentence, entered an order modifying his judgment of
sentence.
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 306(b)(1).
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accomplice to possess cocaine,3 possession of heroin,4 possession of
cocaine,5 possession of drug paraphernalia,6 false identification to law
enforcement officer,7 and exceeding posted speed limit.8 Appellant contends
the trial court erred in (1) finding police had reasonable suspicion to stop
either of two vehicles for speeding, (2) sending out with the jury certain
letters written by Appellant, and (3) sentencing Appellant to a state
correctional facility. We affirm.
We adopt the facts as set forth in the trial court’s opinion denying
Appellant’s omnibus pre-trial motion seeking suppression of evidence and
the dismissal of charges against him. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/13/13, at 1-4.
The trial court summarized the procedural posture of this case as follows:
[Appellant] was sentenced on December 17, 2014 to 44 to
96 months in a state correctional institution. His RRRI
minimum sentence was calculated to be 36 months and 20
days.
[Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion seeking
reconsideration of sentence. On January 6, 2014, his
sentence was reconsidered and modified. His new
sentence was for a total of not less than 38 months nor for
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 306(b)(1).
4
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
5
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
6
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
7
18 Pa.C.S. § 4914(a).
8
75 Pa.C.S. § 3362(a)(2).
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more than 84 months. His RRRI alternative minimum
sentence was calculated to be 31 months and 20 days.
Trial Ct. Op., 3/19/14, at 1. This timely appeal followed. Appellant filed a
court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on
appeal9 and the trial court filed a responsive opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
A. Did the Pennsylvania state police have appropriate
reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop on either of two
vehicles for speeding where the trooper used one radar
device to clock both vehicles at the same time in violation
of the laws of science?[10]
9
The trial court entered an order on January 27, 2014, directing Appellant to
file and serve his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement “no later than February 18,
2014.” Order, 1/27/14. Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on
February 21, 2014. We need not find the late filing results in waiver. In
Commonwealth v. Veon, 109 A.3d 754 (Pa. Super. 2015), this Court held:
First, the trial court maintains that [the appellant] has
waived all of his issues on appeal by failing to file a timely
statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to
Rule 1925(b) of our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Waiver
is no longer the remedy under such situations.
Where the trial court does not address the issues raised in
an untimely 1925(b) statement, we remand to allow the
trial court an opportunity to do so. On the other hand,
where, as here, the trial court has addressed the issues
raised in an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, we need not
remand and may address the issues on their merits.
Id. at 762 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
10
We note that in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of
on appeal, Appellant raised the issue as follows: “That the trial court erred
and abused its discretion by not suppressing the traffic stop of the
Appellant’s vehicle, as well as another vehicle, for speeding where the
Trooper used one radar device to clock both vehicle [sic] at the same time in
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B. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by
sending out with the jury letters which were allegedly
written to a co-defendant by the Appellant where such
could be seen as a [sic] being a confession of the crimes
alleged against him?
C. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by
sentencing the Appellant to a state correctional facility
where the highest graded offense for which he was
convicted was a misdemeanor of the third degree and no
appropriate approval had been received from the secretary
of the department of corrections for such sentence?
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
First, Appellant argues the trial court erred in not suppressing the
traffic stop of his vehicle because the radar device used by Trooper Nicholas
Cortes was not capable of determining the speeds of two motor vehicles at
the same time. Trooper Cortes stopped Appellant based upon the radar gun
reading and the fact that he was tailgating a vehicle driven by Zarinah
Muhammad. Appellant avers that the testimony of his expert witness, Neil
Shirk, established
that it was impossible for Trooper Cortes to have clocked
the two vehicles at one time in the fashion he suggested
that he had. Effectively, if the cars were as close together
as Cortes suggests they were, and were traveling one
behind the other, as he also indicated, it would be
impossible to differentiate which vehicle the signal
returned from, or if it was a confused reflection from both.
In other words, the radar signal could bounce back from
the first vehicle only or be confused between bounces off
the two, but there would be no way for the device to
violation of the laws of science.” Appellant’s Concise Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal, 2/21/14, at 1.
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differentiate between the two and provide an accurate
speed for each.
Id. at 14.
Appellant argues that because “Cortes cannot reasonably say which
vehicle was speeding or offer any scientifically valid indication that both
were” there was no basis for a traffic stop pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308.11
Id. at 12, 14.12 We hold Appellant is due no relief.
11
Section 6308 provides:
(b) Authority of police officer.─Whenever a police
officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking
vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a
violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may
stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of
checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial
responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other
information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). We note that the reference to 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(a)-
(b) is the only citation to legal authority offered in support of this issue.
12
We note Appellant summarily avers as follows:
In that the alleged illegal substances were found in the
vehicle Muhammad was driving, the lack of legal cause to
pull over her vehicle is fatal to her being stopped and
therefore any evidence found in her vehicle must be
suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search. Without the
evidence from her car, there are no illegal substances in
this case and the charges against Appellant should have
been dismissed for lack of evidence.
Anticipating an argument that Appellant lacks standing
to challenge the stop of the Muhammad vehicle, Appellant
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Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a
trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are correct. Where the prosecution prevailed in
the suppression court, we may consider only the
Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the evidence for
the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the record
supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
In re J.E., 937 A.2d 421, 425 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
In evaluating the legal conclusion drawn by the suppression court, this
Court may also consider uncontradicted testimony from the suppression
contends that he was given such standing by the actions of
the Commonwealth in this matter. The Commonwealth
pulled over two vehicles travelling close together using one
radar gun. . . .
Appellant’s Brief at 14-15.
. . . Rule 2119(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires a properly developed argument for each question
presented. This requires, among other things, a discussion
of and citation to authorities in the appellate brief and “the
principle for which they are cited.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a),
(b). Failure to conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure
results in waiver of the underlying issue. See
Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1262
(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).
Veon, 109 A.3d at 774. Instantly, Appellant’s argument is devoid of any
discussion of and citation to legal authority. Therefore, this issue is waived.
See id.
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hearing not included in the suppression court’s findings of fact.13
Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 715 A.2d 1117, 1119 n.1 (Pa. 1998). “It
is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”
Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Instantly, the trial court opined:
I made findings of fact following the suppression hearing
that:
1[214] The Dodge Caravan driven by Zarinah
Muhammad and the Impala driven by [Appellant]
came through the radar and were determined by the
trooper to be speeding. The Dodge Caravan came
through the radar zone at 70 and the Chevy Impala
was also clocked at 70 miles per hour in a 55 mile
per hour zone.
* * *
[Appellant] was convicted of speeding, based upon the
testimony of the arresting troopers and their use of radar.
[Appellant] called an expert, Neil Shirk, during the
suppression hearing who gave testimony about the
unreliability of the use of radar where two vehicles pass
13
We acknowledge the holding of In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013), that
after October 30, 2013, the scope of review for a suppression issue is limited
to the record available to the suppression court. Id. at 1085, 1089 (stating
holding applies to “all litigation commenced Commonwealth-wide after the
filing of this decision”). Because the instant omnibus pre-trial motion was
filed prior to October 30, 2013, In re L.J. does not apply.
14
We note the trial court denominates this as finding of fact number 17,
however, it was finding of fact number 12. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/13/13, at 2-
3.
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the radar operator at approximately the same time. Mr.
Shirk testified that the radar signal would reflect from the
first car, but would not show both cars where they were
traveling in the same lane, close to one another. However,
Trooper Cortes testified on rebuttal that Mr. Shirk was
describing a different kind of radar unit. Cortes’ unit gave
a separate visual and an audible signal for each car as they
passed through the radar, both registering 70 miles per
hour. I found Trooper Cortes’ testimony to be more
credible than the defense expert testimony.
Trial Ct. Op., 3/19/14, at 2 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
At the suppression hearing, Trooper Cortes testified he was operating
a Genesis handheld radar unit. N.T., 4/15/13, at 6. He was shown a radar
unit certificate of accuracy which indicated when it was calibrated. Id. at 6-
7. “It was calibrated January 9th, 2012 by Decatur, manufactured by
Decatur Electronics, certified by Simco Electronics, testing station R9.” Id.
at 7. The Commonwealth asked the court to take judicial notice of the fact
that the “speed timing device and testing station was approved by the
Pennsylvania Bulletin, Volume 41 dated Saturday, December 31st, 2011.”
Id. The certification document was admitted into evidence without
objection. Id. at 16.
Appellant’s expert, Mr. Shirk, testified that he had experience with “a
lot of military type radar systems, ground radar systems as well as
shipboard and also aircraft and missile type radars, devices and systems to
be built, tested and delivered.” Id. at 38. He had seen a Genesis handheld
radar unit operated at a demonstration. Id. at 40. He did not operate it.
Id. He never attended a Pennsylvania State Police academy training
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regarding Genesis handheld radars. Id. at 40-41. The radar system is
“reliable. It’s used pretty extensively throughout many police departments.”
Id. at 42. He opined that there was “no way you can clock both cars.” Id.
at 45. He was asked how a trooper operates the radar. Id.
Well, he has a few different buttons on the radar, and it
depends on which one it is. I know there’s a fast─there’s a
button, a fast button. I’m not sure if his had it, but there
was one─one of these models has a fast button, which,
what it does is you can switch to a faster mode. So if you
have a Mustang passing a trailer truck, you can hit the
faster mode, but you’re only going to see the trailer truck,
which is the biggest signal, but if you want the fastest
object of the second strongest signal, you hit the fastest
mode, and that will switch you over to get the Mustang
passing the trailer truck. I’m not sure he had that on the
handheld device, but that is in the same product line of
these folks.
Id. at 45-46.
Trooper Cortes testified on rebuttal that his radar gun was not
equipped with a fast button. Id. at 68. He testified as follows regarding the
operation of the Genesis handheld radar unit that he used:
[The Commonwealth]: How do you operate the type of
device that you have?
A: Squeeze the trigger. You squeeze the trigger and point
it at a vehicle.
Q: What is the indication for you when a vehicle is coming
through your zone of influence at a high rate of speed?
A: You get a reading on the screen and a high-pitched
tone. For every vehicle that comes in, it will squeal in
other words. You have the visual, and you get an audible
signal.
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Q: In this instance, how many audible signals did you get?
A: The Dodge Caravan came through at 70. It beeped.
Immediately behind it was the Chevy Impala. The reading
was 70, and it beeped again. So it was two separate high-
pitched tones.
Id. Trooper Cortes testified he was a trooper for eleven years and had
pulled over thousands and thousands of vehicles using radar in similar
situations as in the case at bar. Id. at 70-71.
Appellant is asking this Court to reweigh the evidence. This we cannot
do. See Clemens, 66 A.3d at 378. Instantly, the record supports the
factual findings of the suppression court. See In re J.E., 937 A.2d at 425.
We discern no abuse of discretion. See id.
Next, Appellant contends the trial court erred and abused its discretion
by sending out with the jury letters alleged to have been written by
Appellant to Muhammad, his co-defendant, which could be interpreted as
being a confession of the crimes charged. Appellant’s Brief at 17.
As a prefatory matter, we consider whether Appellant has waived this
issue on appeal. Instantly, the notes of testimony from the jury trial held on
September 19, 2013, and September 20, 2013 are not in the certified record
on appeal. The trial court noted:
The Notice of Appeal, filed on January 22, 2014, contained
no request for a transcript. See Pa.R.A.P. 904(c)[15] and
15
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 904 provides:
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1911;[16] Pa.R.J.A. 5000.5.[17] The court issued an order
sua sponte on February 18, 2014 directing the court
reporter to transcribe the notes of testimony at issue
based upon [Appellant’s] statement in the Notice of
Appeal[18] itself. [Appellant] was directed to deposit $240
(c) Request for transcript.─The request for transcript
contemplated by Rule 1911 ( request for transcript) or a
statement signed by counsel that there is either no
verbatim record of the proceedings or the complete
transcript has been lodged of record, shall accompany the
notice of appeal, but the absence of or defect in the
request for transcript shall not affect the validity of the
appeal.
Pa.R.A.P. 904(c).
16
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1911 provides:
(a) General rule. The appellant shall request any
transcript required under this chapter in the manner and
make any necessary payment or deposit therefor in the
amount and within the time prescribed by Rules 5000.1 et
seq. of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration
(court reporters).
Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a).
17
Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 5000.5 provides: “(b) For an
appeal, the transcript request shall be made part of the notice of appeal.”
Pa.R.J.A. 5000.5(b).
18
The notice of appeal stated as follows:
Notice is hereby given that [Appellant] hereby appeals to
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania from the Sentencing
Orders dated the 6th day of January, 2014 and the 17th
December, 2013, the trial Order of the 20th day
September, 2013 and the pretrial Order of the 13th day of
August, 2013, together with the trial and pretrial motions
relating to the same. These Orders have been entered in
the docket as evidenced by the attached copy of the
docket entries.
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within ten days as a condition precedent to the court
reporter’ commencement of transcription. The court
reporter advises that no deposit was made. She therefore
did not transcribe the notes of testimony.
Trial Ct. Op., 3/19/14, at 3 n.1.
This Court has stated:
[W]ell-settled Pennsylvania law makes clear “an appellate
court is limited to considering only the materials in the
certified record when resolving an issue.”
Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super.
2006) (en banc), [ ]. Where the appellant has not made
the transcript of the proceedings at issue a part of the
certified record, we have said:
With regard to missing transcripts, the Rules of
Appellate Procedure require an appellant to order
and pay for any transcript necessary to permit
resolution of the issues raised on appeal. Pa.R.A.P.
1911(a). . . . When the appellant . . . fails to
conform to the requirements of Rule 1911, any
claims that cannot be resolved in the absence of the
necessary transcript or transcripts must be deemed
waived for the purpose of appellate review.
Id. at 7.
Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 456 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Instantly, the trial court opined:
The second issue raised by [Appellant] on appeal is that
the court erred in sending letters out with the jury which
were “allegedly written to a co-defendant by the Appellant
where such could be considered as a confession of
wrongdoing.” [Appellant] has not ordered the trial
transcript so it is impossible to determine the merits of the
claimed error and whether an appropriate defense
objection was made at the time.
Notice of Appeal, 1/22/14.
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Trial Ct. Op., 3/19/14, at 2-3. Appellant’s claim cannot be resolved in the
absence of the trial transcript, therefore it is waived.19 See Houck, 102
A.3d at 456.
Lastly, Appellant contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to a
state correctional facility where the highest graded offense for which he was
convicted was a misdemeanor of the third degree and no appropriate
approval had been received from the secretary of the department of
corrections for the sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant avers such
approval is required pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9762(i).20 Id. at 18.
19
We remind counsel, “Our law is unequivocal that the responsibility rests
upon the appellant to ensure that the record certified on appeal is complete
in the sense that it contains all of the materials necessary for the reviewing
court to perform its duty.” Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 372
(Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).
20
The statute provides in pertinent part:
(i) Prohibition.─Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no person sentenced to total or partial confinement
after the effective date of this subsection [August 6, 2012]
shall be committed to the Department of Corrections
unless:
(1) the aggregate sentence consists of a conviction for
an offense graded as a misdemeanor of the second
degree or higher; or
(2) the Secretary of Corrections or the secretary’s
designee has consented to the commitment.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9762(i). The effective date of this subsection was August 6,
2012.
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The notes of testimony from the reconsideration of sentence hearing
are not in the certified record on appeal.21 In the absence of the transcript,
this issue is waived. See Houck, 102 A.3d at 456.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Panella joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/24/2015
21
We note that the trial court stated the following in its January 6, 2014
order imposing sentence: “The District Attorney’s office has checked with the
Department of Corrections and has obtained correspondence that the
Department of Corrections has consented to [Appellant] serving this
sentence in a state correctional institution pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9762(i).”
Order, 1/6/14, at 2-3.
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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY
FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1225 CR 2012
vs.
JAMES ANTON ARTIS-BRYAN,
Defendant
OPINION
Defendant James Artis-Bryan flied an omnibus pre-trial motion on December 18,
2012, seeking suppression of evidence and dismissal of the charges against him. A
hearing was scheduled for January 25, 2013. The hearing was rescheduled to February
25, 2013 on the Commonwealth's motion. Testimony was taken that day, but the
defendant requested a continuance and the matter was again rescheduled to March 25,
2013. The defendant failed to appear for the March 25, 2013 hearing and it was
rescheduled to April 15, 2013. Testimony was concluded on that date and the parties
requested the notes of testimony and the opportunity to file briefs.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Zarinah Muhammad became romantically involved with Defendant James
Artis-Bryan in April, 2012.
2. On May 12, 2012. she and Mr. Artis-Bryan left Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvanla in a
Chevrolet Impala driven by Mr. Artis-Bryan. She was going to New Jersey for Mother's
Day. and she believed that Mr. Artis-Bryan was going there because he had business to
attend to.
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3. They went shopping when they arrived and stayed in a hotel in Belleville, New
Jersey.
4. That night, Mr. Artis-Bryan went out at approximately 10:00 p.m., leaving Ms.
Muhammad alone in the hotel room. He returned sometime during the night while she
was sleeping. NT 9.
5. When Ms. Muhammad woke in the morning, Mr. Artis-Bryan had parked a
Dodge Caravan outside the hotel. The Chevrolet Impala in which they had travelled to
New Jersey was also there. NT 10. Ms. Muhammad had seen the Dodge Caravan
before when the defendant was driving it in Wilkes-Barre on a couple of occasions. NT
19.
6. Ms. Muhammad saw the defendant put shopping bags inside the van when
they were leaving the hotel. NT 20.
7. That same morning, on May 13, 2012, Ms. Muhammad visited her mother,
using the van.
8. Mr. Artis-Bryan used the Chevrolet Impala to attend to business he had
elsewhere.
9. Ms. Muhammad and Mr. Artis-Bryan agreed to meet later for their return trip to
Wilkes-Barre at a gas station in New Jersey.
10. Ms. Muhammad drove the van back to Pennsylvania; Mr. Artis-Bryan drove
the Impala.
11. Trooper Cortes was operating radar on Route 80 on May 13, 2012.
12. The Dodge Caravan driven by Zarinah Muhammad and the Impala driven by
the defendant came through the radar and were determined by the trooper to be
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speeding. The Dodge Caravan came through the radar zone at 70 and the Chevy
Impala was also clocked at 70 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone.
13. Trooper Cortes then followed and stopped the Chevrolet Impala and Trooper
Conrad followed and stopped the Dodge Caravan.
14. During the stop, Ms. Muhammad received phone messages from Mr. Artis-
Bryan telling her not to allow a search of the van.
15. When Trooper Cortes made contact with the defendant, the defendant stated
that he did not have a driver's license or any identification with him. The defendant
identified himself with a false name and date of birth. NT 9.
16. The defendant denied that he was traveling with Zarinah Muhammad and he
denied knowing her. NT 26.
17. The Dodge Caravan was rented by a third party. NT 24, April 15, 2013.
18. The Chevy Impala was a rental car rented in the name of Tishawna Dixon,
the only authorized driver. An examination of the rental does not make clear when the
agreement was to expire.
19. Trooper Cortes asked for permission to search the defendant's person which
was granted. NT Preliminary hearing, p. 8. He found a Pennsylvania identification card
in the waistband of the defendant's pants.
20. When the trooper checked the name the defendant gave him. he determined
that it was an alias, and that the defendant had a significant criminal history that
included involvement with illegal drugs.
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21. When Ms. Muhammad was pulled over by Trooper Conrad, the trooper asked
her for the rental agreement for the vehicle. She told him that "Church" had it. NT 30.
"Church" was the defendant.
22. The state police had the vehicles searched by a dog, which reacted to what
the police believed to be the presence of illegal drugs in both vehicles.
23. The troopers searched the vehicles. The defendant did not consent to the
search of the Chevrolet Impala rental vehicle. NT 25.
24. The police found an open brown paper shopping bag on the floor of the
Dodge Caravan behind the driver's seat and the front passenger's seat that contained
2,500 packets of heroin and a quarter kilo of crack cocaine. Defendant's clothing, mail,
New Jersey criminal charges and mail to him from the Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole were found in the Dodge Caravan. Preliminar; hearing, NT 13. April 15,
2010 hearing, NT 10.
25. No illegal substances were found in the Impala being driven by the
defendant.
26. A plastic bag was found in the Impala that had hundreds of small black
rubber bands, commonly used to wrap bundles of heroin. Preliminary hearing, NT 13.
The same type of rubber band was found in the Dodge Caravan along with the packets
of heroin. Id.
DISCUSSION
The Defendant has filed an omnibus pretrial motion in which he includes a
Motion to Suppress the rubber bands that were seized during the traffic stop of the
vehicle he was driving and the contraband seized after the stop of the vehicle Zarinah
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Muhammad was driving. He also seeks a dismissal of the charges against him due to
an alleged lack of a prima facie case.
The Defendant has challenged the warrantless police search of the rental cars
that he and Zarinah Muhammad were driving. "Warrantless searches and seizures
are ... unreasonable per se, unless conducted pursuant to a specifically established and
well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement." Commonwealth v. Burgos, 64
A.3d 641, 648 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted). Under Pennsylvania law, a
defendant charged with a possessory offense has automatic standing to challenge a
search. Commonwealth v. Perea, 791 A.2d 427 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 568
Pa. 736, 798 A.2d 1288 (2002); Commonwealth v. Strickland, 707 A.2d 531
(Pa.Super.1998), appeal denied, 556 Pa. 675, 727 A.2d 130 (1998). "However, in order
to prevail, the defendant, as a preliminary matter, must show that he had a privacy
interest in the area searched." Perea, supra at 429 (citing Commonwealth v. Sell, 470
A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983)).
An expectation of privacy is present when the individual, by his conduct, exhibits
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and that the subjective expectation
is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The constitutional
legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not dependent on the subjective intent
of the individual asserting the right but on whether the expectation is reasonable
in light of all the surrounding circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. 1993) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Defendant Artis-Bryan thus had the preliminary burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
vehicles. Com v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa. Super. 2009). The evidence presented
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established that the vehicle Artis-Bryan was driving was rented in the name of
Tishawna Dixon. NT 16, April 15, 2013, Rental agreement, Commonwealth's Exhibit 7.
She was the only authorized driver. Id. At the time of the stop, Defendant told Trooper
Cortes that the car was rented by his girlfriend, for him. NT 53, April 15, 2013. He also
told the trooper that he was "coming back from Newark, New Jersey, going to see the
girl who rented the car." NT 7, Preliminary Hearing Transcript, Commonwealth Exhibit 1,
February 25, 2013. Further, while Trooper Cortez asserted that the rental agreement
was expired when he examined it at the scene of the stop. NT 14, 4/15/2013, an
examination of the rental agreement is inconclusive as to the date the vehicle was to be
returned. The only clear date on the rental agreement is May 11, 2012 which was the
"Car Out" date in the upper left hand corner and the date the rental agreement was
signed. The total charge for the rental appeared to be $923.99, which was more than
the monthly rental amount of $799.99 per month. Rental agreement.
The Commonwealth contends that Defendant had no expectation of privacy in
the Chevrolet Impala. In making that assertion, Commonwealth relies on
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 14 A.3d 907 (Pa. Super. 2011) and Commonwealth v.
Jones, 874 A.2d 108 (Pa. Super. 2005). In Jones, the Superior Court found that the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car that he was
driving, based on the surrounding circumstances. The Jones court stated: "(a)ppellant's
subjective expectation of privacy was not reasonable where he was the operator of a
rental car but not the named lessee, was not an authorized driver, the named lessee
was not present in the vehicle, Appellant offered no explanation of his connection to the
named lessee, and the return date for the rental car had passed." Jones, 874 A.2d at
6
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120. Based on those facts, the Superior Court determined that the evidence found in the
car Jones was driving was properly admitted.
The Superior Court reached a similar result in Maldonado. There, defendant was
held to lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle being searched. The
circumstances in Maldonado were similar to those in Jones. The Court stated: "We
conclude that Maldonado failed to establish an expectation of privacy in the vehicle he
was driving, which "he did not own, that was not registered to him, and for which he has
not shown authority to operate." Maldonado, 14 A.3d at 911 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Burian, 973 A.2d 428, 436 (Pa. Super. 2009)).
This case can be distinguished from the Jones and Maldonado decisions. Here
Artis-Bryan has provided uncontradicted evidence that he was operating the vehicle
with the consent of the vehicle lessee, Tishawna Dixon. Although the trooper believed
that the rental agreement was expired, that is not obvious from an examination of the
contract. The trooper did not contact Enterprise, the vehicle owner, to determine the
status of the agreement, or for permission to search the vehicle. Rather Trooper Cortes
testified that he did not need permission to search:
Q: (Mr. Saurman) So what was your basis to say you had cause to search
his car?
A: Well, neither vehicle was rented by either operator, so it's a third party
rental vehicle.
Q: Trooper, you'll agree with me that if there's a valid rental agreement in
place, you have no right to search that car without the permission of either the
renter or the car company?
A: No. They have - the rental companies permit us. They actually want us
to search the vehicles. They don't want - they want the vehicle impounded, and
they don't want it returned to them where there could be potential contraband.
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Q: Do you have a standing order from Enterprise to search anyone's car
when someone else's name who is driving it is not the one on the rental
agreement?
A: That's what - every time we had contacted them in the past, that's what
they expressed 4s to do.
Q: So in the past, they have said to do this. So your assumption is that
every time you pull over a car, you should just search it if it's Enterprise and the
driver is not the same?
A: If it's a rental vehicle and the driver, the occupants of the vehicle,
nobody is on the rental agreement, it's a third party rental vehicle where it's not
rented by someone else that it says no other driver is permitted, then yes, we
search the vehicle. There's no expectation of privacy. NT 24, 25, April 15, 2013.
The defendant established a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in the
rental vehicle. Unlike the Maldonado and Jones situations, there was an explanation of
how Artis-Bryan came to be in possession of the vehicle. The rental agreement was not
clearly expired. Although Artis-Bryan was not a named driver, the vehicle was not
reported stolen and the police did not have a reasonable suspicion of theft. Our courts
have never approved a non-consensual vehicle search only because a rental contract
does not list the driver as an authorized driver.
"[W]here a motion to suppress has been filed, the burden is on the
Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged
evidence is admissible." The Commonwealth has not met its burden here. Defendant
explained his authority to drive the rental vehicle. This, coupled with the unclear status
of the rental vehicle agreement, should have led the Trooper to take further steps.'
I In Jones, the Superior Court relied on the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Montana in State v. Hill, 94
P.3d 752 (2004). While the Court in Hill ultimately upheld the search, under very similar factual
circumstances, the officer there requested and received permission from the rental car company, Avis, to
impound the car and conduct a search. Such a step is notably absent here.
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When confronted with a driver of a rental car who claims to have authority to drive the
vehicle, an Officer must obtain the consent of a party with authority to give the same (be
it the rental car company on an expired contract, the driver or the named lessee) absent
evidence that the car is stolen or abandoned. Defendant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the car. Trooper Cortes did not have a search warrant and did not receive
consent to conduct the search. Therefore, the evidence recovered from the Chevrolet
Impala will be suppressed.
The evidence seized during the search of the Dodge Caravan, which was driven
by Ms. Muhammad, will not be suppressed. Artis-Bryan clearly had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the Caravan. He was not operating the vehicle at the time of
the search. He was not the owner or lessee of the same. He did not even contend that
he knew the Caravan was on the road near him. NT 4, Transcript of Preliminary
Hearing, NT 62-64.
Artis-Bryan is attempting to suppress the evidence obtained from the Caravan by
asserting the Constitutional rights of Ms. Muhammad, the driver of the Caravan at the
time of the search. However:
Article 1, Section 8, of our state constitution, as well as the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, does not permit a defendant to vicariously assert
the privacy rights of others:
The polestar of the expanded protection afforded by Article 1, Section 8, which
distinguishes it from its federal counterpart, is its emphasis upon personal privacy
interests. In keeping with the historical intention of Article 1, Section 8, this Court
has repeatedly refused to recognize the vicarious assertion of constitutional
rights.
[l]n consistently declining to recognize derivative standing, this Court has spoken
directly to the policy considerations underlying Article 1, Section 8:
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The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons. houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. To
the same effect is Pa. Const. art. [1]. § 8, P.S. These rights are personal in
nature. There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one person in order to
protect the rights of another. No rights of the victim of an illegal search are at
stake when the evidence is offered against some other party. In order to obtain
standing to challenge the legality of the search, a defendant must establish that
he, rather than another, was the victim of an invasion of privacy.
Commonwealth v. Powell, 994 A.2d 1096, 1107-08 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). In other words, '[sjuppression of product of a Fourth
Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were
violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of
damaging evidence. Coconspirators and codefendants [are accorded] no special
standing." Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969). Artis-Bryan has not shown
that the search of the car driven by Ms. Muhammad violated his own personal privacy
interests in any way. Therefore, the evidence gathered from that search will not be
suppressed.
As the Court has suppressed the evidence found in the car driven by Artis-Bryan,
and determined that Artis-Bryan has no standing to challenge the actions of the police
regarding Ms. Muhammad, his contention that the police lacked valid legal cause to
initiate the traffic stop is moot.
Finally, Defendant asserts that the Commonwealth has failed to make out a
prima facie case against him. This contention is essentially summarized as follows:
It is undisputed that the alleged contraband in this case was found in the vehicle
driven by Muhammad and that nothing illegal was found in the Artis-Bryan
vehicle. Therefore, in order to establish a prima facie case against Artis-Bryan,
the Commonwealth must establish a connection between him and the drugs. In
this case the Commonwealth has failed to make such a connection.
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Defendant's Brief in Support of His Omnibus Pretrial Motions, Section C Part 4.
"At the pre-trial stage of a criminal prosecution, it is not necessary for the
Commonwealth to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, its
burden is merely to put forth a prima facie case of the defendant's guilt." Commonwealth
v. Huggins, 836 A:2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003). "To sustain that burden it is well settled that
the Commonwealth must produce evidence, such as to present sufficient probable
cause to believe that the person charged has committed the offense stated."
Commonwealth v. Wodjak, 466 A.2d 991, 995-6 (Pa. 1983) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). "[l]n other words, it should make out a prima facie case of guilt. It
should be such that if presented at the trial in court, and accepted as true, the judge
would be warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury." Id. (citing Commonwealth ex
rel Scolio v. Hess, 27 A.2d 705, 707 (Pa. Super. 1942) (emphasis in original)).
Further, "[i]nferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would
support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth's case." Huggins, 836 A.2d at 866.
Additionally, "[t]he weight and credibility of the evidence are not factors at this stage,
and the Commonwealth need only demonstrate sufficient probable cause to believe the
person charged has committed the offense." Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177,
1180 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Defendant has been charged with "Possession with Intent to Deliver" and
Criminal Conspiracy to do the same. Defendant correctly asserts that no contraband
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was found in the Chevrolet Impala, and instead all the contraband was found in the
Caravan driven by Ms. Muhammad.
"When contraband is not found on the defendant's person, the Commonwealth
must establish constructive possession.... " Commonwealth v. Haskins, 677 A.2d 328,
330 (Pa. Super. 1996), appeal denied, 692 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1997). "Constructive
possession is the ability to exercise conscious control or dominion over the illegal
substance and the intent to exercise that control." Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 831 A.2d
607, 610 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 847 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 2004) (citing
Commonwealth v. Maco/ino, 469 A.2d 132 (Pa. 1983)). "[T]wo actors may have joint
control and equal access and thus both may constructively possess the contraband."
Haskins, 677 A.2d at 330. 'The intent to exercise conscious dominion can be inferred
from the totality of the circumstances." Kirkland, 831 A.2d at 610.
Here, the Commonwealth has presented evidence in the form of testimony from
Ms. Muhammad. She stated that she saw Defendant put shopping bags into the
Caravan. NT 20. It was in a similar shopping bag that the police found the contraband
when searching the car. Additionally, Artis-Bryan's mail, clothes, New Jersey criminal
charges and mail to him from the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole were
found in the Dodge Caravan. Preliminary hearing, NT 13, April 15, 2010 hearing, NT 10.
Taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence shows that
Defendant placed the contraband in the Caravan and intended to exercise dominion
and control over the same, as it was placed with his personal effects which he
presumably intended to recover at a later time. This evidence, if taken as true, would be
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sufficient to send the case to the jury. Therefore the Commonwealth has made a prima
facie case as to Artis-Bryan's constructive possession of the narcotics.
To establish the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
possessed a controlled substance with the intent to deliver it." Kirkland, supra at 611
(citing Commonwealth v. Conaway, 791 A.2d 359 (Pa. Super. 2002); Commonwealth v.
Aguado, 760 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. 2000)).
The trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to deliver a controlled
substance from an examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
Factors to consider in determining whether the drugs were possessed with the intent to
deliver include the particular method of packaging, the form of the drug, and the
behavior of the defendant. Kirkland, supra at 611. 'Thus, possession with intent to
deliver can be inferred from the quantity of the drugs possessed and other surrounding
circumstances, such as lack of paraphernalia for consumption." Commonwealth v.
Torres, 617 A.2d 812, 814 (Pa. Super. 1992), appeal denied, 629 A.2d 1379 (Pa. 1993).
Given the amount of narcotics seized from the Dodge Caravan (2,500 heroin
packets and % kilo of crack cocaine) a reasonable inference can be drawn that
Defendant possessed the narcotics with the intent to deliver the same. The
Commonwealth has made a prima facie case against Defendant for possession with
intent to deliver.
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COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY
FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1225 CR 2012
vs.
JAMES ANTON ARTIS-BRYAN,
Defendant
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of August, 2013, upon consideration of
Defendant Artis-Bryan's Omnibus Pretrial Motion, and the arguments and briefs of the
Defendant and the Commonwealth, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. The request to suppress the evidence seized from the car driven by Mr. Artis-
Bryan, the Chevrolet Impala, is granted.
2. The request to suppress the evidence seized from the Dodge Caravan is denied.
3. The defendant's request for habeas corpus relief is denied. ~--:.
. ·-·
BY THE COURT:
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ARTHUR L. ZULIC~{ J.
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cc: Mark S. Matthews, Esq. C• C) .. _.:,
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Robert Saurman, Esq.
ALZ2013-035
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