Wells v. 99 Cents Only Stores CA1/5 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 1/20/22 Wells v. 99 Cents Only Stores CA1/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
    8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
    purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    JUDITH WELLS,
    Plaintiff and Appellant,
    A161335
    v.
    99 CENTS ONLY STORES,                                            (Alameda County
    Defendant and Respondent.                               Super. Ct. No. RG19032061)
    Judith Wells appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of her
    personal injury complaint, contending that the court incorrectly
    concluded that her complaint was filed after the expiration of the
    statute of limitations. Because we find no error in the court’s
    ruling, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Wells alleges that on August 20, 2017, she was severely
    injured and required hospitalization and surgery after she
    tripped and fell over a bread crate at a 99 Cents Only Store. She
    asserts causes of action against 99 Cents Only Stores based on
    negligence and premises liability. The statute of limitations for
    her personal injury action was two years (Code Civ. Proc., §
    335.1), and it expired on August 20, 2019.
    Wells sent her complaint by facsimile transmission to the
    Alameda County Superior Court at 8:13 p.m. on August 20, 2019,
    1
    the final day of the limitations period. The clerk of the court
    processed the filing the next day and stamped the complaint with
    a filing date of August 21, 2019. Rule 1.8(a)(3) of the Superior
    Court of Alameda County, Local Rules (rule 1.8(a)(3) or Alameda
    County rule) provides that “[d]ocuments may be faxed to the
    court 24 hours a day, although filings received after 4 p.m. or on
    court holidays or weekends will be deemed filed on the next court
    day.”
    After 99 Cents Only Stores demurred to the complaint, the
    trial court sustained the demurrer because the face of the
    complaint indicated it was barred by the statute of limitations.
    (See Lee v. Hanley (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 1225
    , 1232 [statute of
    limitations bar may be raised by demurrer where “ ‘ “ ‘the defect .
    . . clearly and affirmatively appear[s] on the face of the
    complaint[.]’ ” ’ ”].) However, the court granted leave to amend to
    give Wells an opportunity to plead around the limitations
    problem. Wells filed a first amended complaint alleging that her
    original complaint was timely because she faxed it to the court on
    the last day of the limitations period. She further asserted that
    the clerk erred by failing to stamp her complaint with a filing
    date of August 20, 2019. The court subsequently granted a
    second demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that,
    notwithstanding the new allegations, the action was barred by
    the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court dismissed her
    first amended complaint with prejudice.
    DISCUSSION
    A.
    In considering Wells’s challenge to the trial court’s decision
    granting the demurrer to her first amended complaint, we apply
    a de novo standard of review, “ ‘exercising our independent
    judgement as to whether, as a matter of law, the complaint . . .
    states a cause of action on any available legal theory.’ ” (Saint
    Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health (2021)
    2
    
    59 Cal.App.5th 965
    , 973.) We accept as true the facts alleged in
    the operative complaint. (Id. at p. 969.) With respect to a court’s
    decision not to grant leave to amend, we consider whether the
    court abused its discretion. (Long v. Forty Niners Football Co.,
    LLC (2019) 
    33 Cal.App.5th 550
    , 554.)
    B.
    Wells contends that state law requires the court clerk to
    stamp her complaint with a filing date of August 20, 2019,
    because she faxed her complaint to the court before midnight on
    that date. We disagree.
    Trial courts may, but are not required to, accept filings by
    fax. The Code of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he Judicial
    Council may adopt rules permitting the filing of papers by
    facsimile transmission[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.5.) The
    California Rules of Court, in turn, provide that “[a] party may file
    by fax directly to any court that, by local rule, has provided for
    direct fax filing.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.304(a).) Under
    California Rules of Court, rule 2.301(4), “ ‘[f]ax filing’ means the
    fax transmission of a document to a court that accepts such
    documents.”
    State law does not specify the filing date for a fax filing
    received after a court’s regular business hours have ended. State
    law does address the timing of documents served by fax or
    electronically, applying different rules to each. (Compare Cal.
    Rules of Court, rule 2.306(g) [fax “[s]ervice that is completed after
    5 p.m. is deemed to have occurred on the next court day”], with
    Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(5) [“Any document that is
    served electronically between 12:00 a.m. and 11:59:59 p.m. on a
    court day shall be deemed served on that court day”].)
    State law also provides timing rules for some modes of
    filing, again employing different approaches. For example, “[a]ny
    document deposited in a court’s drop box is deemed to have been
    deposited for filing on the next court day if . . . [¶] . . . [i]t is
    deposited on a court day after 4:00 p.m.,” unless the local court
    3
    provides for a later time. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.210(c)(1);
    see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.210(b) [“[a]ny document
    deposited in a court’s drop box up to and including 4:00 p.m. on a
    court day is deemed to have been deposited for filing on that
    day”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(e) [a motion paper
    “submitted before the close of the clerk’s office to the public on
    the day the paper is due is deemed timely filed”].) In contrast,
    “[a]ny document received electronically by the court between
    12:00 a.m. and 11:59:59 p.m. on a court day shall be deemed filed
    on that court day.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (b)(3), italics
    added.)
    As explained in Rosenberg v. Superior Court (1994) 
    25 Cal.App.4th 897
    , 900, “the absence of a single statewide deadline
    for filings by fax leaves the matter of time limits to the practice of
    each court as embodied in its existing rules governing deadlines
    for filing. . . . Absent statewide directions to the contrary, each
    court determines when it accepts documents for filing, and it may
    apply those deadlines created by its existing rules to filings made
    by fax.”
    We therefore reject Wells’s contention that the Alameda
    County rule is preempted by state law. State law expressly
    confers authority on the local courts to make their own rules
    governing fax filing (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.304(a)), and the
    Alameda County rule does not conflict with any state rule.1
    Wells also asserts that the rule concerning electronic filings
    (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (b)(3)) renders her fax filing
    timely. Wells is incorrect. The Code of Civil Procedure treats
    1  In support of her preemption argument, Wells cites
    California Rules of Court, rule 3.20, which provides that “No trial
    court . . . may enact or enforce any local rule” concerning
    “pleadings, demurrers, ex parte applications, motions, discovery,
    provisional remedies, and the form and format of papers.”
    However, Alameda County’s rule 1.8(a)(3) on fax filing does not
    intrude upon these fields.
    4
    electronic transmission and facsimile transmission as distinct.
    (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(2)(A)(i) [providing
    that “if a document may be served by . . . facsimile transmission,
    electronic service of the document is not authorized unless”
    specified requirements are met].) The procedure for electronic
    filings in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision
    (b)(3) is inapplicable to fax filings. Instead, the Code of Civil
    Procedure addresses fax filings in a separate provision, Code of
    Civil Procedure section 1010.5, and they are subject to a different
    set of rules. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.300, 2.301, 2.302,
    2.303, 2.304, 2.305, 2.306.)
    Wells incorrectly contends that the Alameda County rule is
    incompatible with the statute of limitations for personal injury
    actions (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1) because she is entitled to two
    full years (including 24 hours in each day) in which to file her
    claim. As the rule for drop box filings reflects (Cal. Rules of
    Court, rule 2.210(c)(1)), there is no uniform state law
    requirement that the courts must be open 24 hours a day to
    process documents for filing or that all documents received by the
    court after hours must be deemed filed the same day. Instead, as
    discussed, each mode of filing is subject to separate rules, and
    state law confers authority on the local courts to make rules
    governing fax filings.
    Wells fares no better in citing to cases holding that a clerk’s
    office may not refuse to file a complaint based on a technical
    defect making the filing noncompliant with a local rule. For
    example, in Carlson v. Department of Fish & Game (1998) 
    68 Cal.App.4th 1268
     (Carlson), the court concluded that the clerk of
    the court erred by rejecting a complaint that was received by the
    court within the limitations period but lacked a certificate
    required by local rule; by the time the defect was corrected, the
    applicable limitations period had expired. (Id. at pp. 1271, 1276.)
    The court held that so long as a document is presented to the
    court in a form that complies with state law, the clerk has a
    5
    ministerial duty to file it. (Id. at pp. 1270, 1276.) Here, the clerk
    did file the document, and the only question is the proper filing
    date when a complaint is fax-filed after business hours. That was
    not the issue in Carlson. In any event, Carlson states that, “[f]or
    purposes of the statute of limitations, ‘filing’ means delivery to
    the clerk during business hours”—which certainly does not help
    Wells. (Id. at p. 1273.)
    Similarly unavailing is Wells’s reliance on cases holding
    that trial courts may not impose dismissal as a sanction for
    counsel’s failure to comply with a local rule. (See, e.g., Garcia v.
    McCutchen (1997) 
    16 Cal.4th 469
    , 475 [section 575.2, subdivision
    (b) prohibits courts from imposing dismissal sanction where
    noncompliance with local rule is due to attorney negligence].)
    Here, the court did not dismiss the complaint as a sanction for
    failure to comply with any local rule. Instead, the court
    dismissed the complaint because Wells filed it after the statute of
    limitations had run.
    Although Wells asserts that dismissal is a “drastic
    sanction” and public policy favors resolution of cases on their
    merits, it is in the nature of statutes of limitations that untimely
    complaints ordinarily result in dismissal. (See Hanooka v. Pivko
    (1994) 
    22 Cal.App.4th 1553
    , 1561 [“Statutes of limitations are
    generally regarded as inflexible, and are ‘ “ ‘ upheld and enforced
    regardless of personal hardship’ ” ’ ” ].) However, equitable
    tolling of a limitations period may be available “ ‘ “to serve the
    ends of justice where technical forfeitures would unjustifiably
    prevent a trial on the merits.” ’ ” (Saint Francis Memorial
    Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 710
    , 724-
    725 (Saint Francis).) We turn to this issue next.
    C.
    Wells argues that equitable tolling precludes her complaint
    from being dismissed as untimely. However, her complaint fails
    to allege facts that satisfy the elements of equitable tolling.
    6
    Equitable tolling is a judge-made doctrine that “applies
    ‘occasionally and in special situations’ to ‘soften the harsh impact
    of technical rules which might otherwise prevent a good faith
    litigant from having a day in court.’ ” (Saint Francis, supra, 9
    Cal.5th at p. 719.) The parties agree the doctrine is available in
    cases involving the two-year limitations period in section 335.1.
    (See, e.g., Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 
    155 Cal.App.4th 397
    , 407-409.)
    The three requisite elements for equitable tolling are “ ‘[(1)]
    timely notice, and [(2)] lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and
    [(3)] reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the
    plaintiff.’ ” (Saint Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 724.) When, as
    here, “a claim is time-barred on its face, the plaintiff” bears the
    burden of “specifically plead[ing] facts that would support
    equitable tolling.” (Long v. Forty Niners Football Co., LLC,
    supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.)
    Wells fails to meet her burden of establishing the
    applicability of equitable tolling. Contrary to 99 Cents Only
    Stores’ contention, to satisfy the notice requirement Wells was
    not required to plead that she had filed another claim within the
    limitations period (see Saint Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 726).
    However, her first amended complaint did not plead any facts at
    all indicating that 99 Cents Only Stores received timely notice of
    her claims or her plan to litigate. The complaint alleged that the
    original complaint and summons were faxed to the court at 8:13
    p.m. on the last day of the limitations period. There is no
    allegation suggesting that 99 Cents Only Stores somehow
    received the summons that same day, or that Wells had
    otherwise provided notice prior to the expiration of the
    limitations period, such as by communicating with corporate
    counsel. (See, e.g., Saint Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 727
    [plaintiff’s communications with defense counsel, together with
    other actions, provided timely notice to defendants for purposes
    of equitable tolling].) Indeed, in her briefs, Wells makes no
    7
    attempt to explain how the facts alleged in the complaint satisfy
    the requirements for equitable tolling. Neither does she assert
    any new facts that she could allege to establish equitable tolling
    if she were granted leave to amend her complaint. (See Saint
    Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health, supra,
    59 Cal.App.5th at p. 974 [“ ‘[i]t is the plaintiff’s burden on appeal
    to show in what manner it would be possible to amend a
    complaint to change the legal effect of the pleading[.]’ ”].)
    We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in
    sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
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    _______________________
    BURNS, J.
    We concur:
    ____________________________
    JACKSON, P.J.
    ____________________________
    NEEDHAM, J.
    A161335
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A161335

Filed Date: 1/20/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/21/2022