Com. v. Reynolds, M. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MISTY D. REYNOLDS :
:
Appellant : No. 927 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 23, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-60-CR-0000355-2019
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 8, 2022
Appellant, Misty D. Reynolds, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on March 23, 2021, as made final by the trial court’s denial of her
post-sentence motion on June 15, 2021. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:
On November 23, 2020, a jury found [Appellant] guilty of [s]imple
[a]ssault and [a]ggravated [a]ssault[1] for an incident that
occurred on June 12, 2019. The Commonwealth alleged that
[Appellant] pushed the victim from a car traveling on a bridge over
the Susquehanna River[.] The victim suffered cuts and scratches
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), and 2702(a)(1), respectively.
The record reveals that Appellant was also charged with one count of
harassment, graded as a summary offense pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2709(a)(1). By separate order, the trial court found the defendant guilty of
harassment. See Trial Court Order, 11/23/20; see also Commonwealth v.
Smith, 868 A.2d 1253, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2005) (recognizing that right to jury
trial does not apply to summary offenses).
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to his knees, elbow, and left hip. At trial[,] the victim testified
that he suffers from spina bifida and hydrocephalus caused by the
spina bifida.
* * *
At trial, the victim [further] testified that he met [Appellant] on a
dating app called Plenty of Fish. [Appellant] came to the victim’s
apartment and stayed the night. The victim stated that there was
no intimacy. He stated that the next morning[, Appellant] invited
him to go meet her family and he agreed. While traveling[,
Appellant] asked the victim for one hundred dollars because she
spent the night with him. He told her he did not have it.
[Appellant] became angry and told the victim she wanted his
sister’s phone number. She tried to call the [victim’s] sister and
left a voicemail message that if she did not find a way to get
[Appellant] one hundred dollars[,] the victim would be in really
big trouble.
The victim further testified that, after the phone call, [Appellant]
was still irate. She reached over with her right hand and opened
the door. The door flew open. Before he could turn his head to
the left to see what was going on, [Appellant] had her hand on his
shoulder and pushed him out the door. He stated that he hit the
cement and rolled three or four times. After he composed himself,
he walked and crawled back to his residence. In response to a
question from the district attorney, the victim stated that his
knees were bloody and scratched up[, and that his] left butt cheek
was “really messed up.” He had stones imbedded in his butt
cheek, sides, knees, and hands. He went to a hospital emergency
room for treatment for his injuries.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/23/21, at 1-2 (unpaginated). Appellant was sentenced
on March 23, 2021.2 Thereafter, she filed a post-sentence motion raising
claims challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. The trial court
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2 The trial court sentenced Appellant to 72 months to 15 years on the
aggravated assault conviction. The conviction of simple assault merged with
the aggravated assault conviction.
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denied her post-sentence motions by order entered June 15, 2021. This
appeal followed.3
Appellant raises the following issues:
1. Did error occur where it was never established that injuries
reportedly suffered by the alleged victim were the result of a fall
from a vehicle, as he testified that he dragged himself upon the
ground for a considerable distance in the aftermath of the reported
incident and this could have caused what he claimed as injuries?
2. Did error occur where it cannot be argued that Appellant
attempted to cause any injury, much less a serious one, as she
was accused of pushing another out of a moving vehicle, but the
speed of the vehicle was never firmly established and the alleged
victim claimed that the act occurred in the wake of a conversation
and voicemail, rendering the claim an impossibility?
3. Were the inaction of the alleged victim and family so contrary
to experience and common sense that they should be viewed as
incredible and should shock the conscience of the Court[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (reordered for ease of disposition). In Appellant’s first
two issues, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence introduced to show
that she caused the victim’s injuries and that she attempted to cause serious
bodily injury; thus, her first two issues both contest the sufficiency of the
evidence, and we will address them together.
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support her
convictions for simple assault and aggravated assault.4 More specifically,
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3 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
4 The Commonwealth conceded, before both the trial court and this Court, that
the victim did not sustain serious bodily injury; therefore, the prosecution
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to prove that she caused the
victim’s injuries. According to Appellant, because the victim did not describe
the injuries he sustained until after he testified that he crawled back to his
apartment, “[t]here is absolutely no evidence to suggest that any injury
happened when [the victim] was purportedly expelled from the car.”
Appellant’s Brief at 12. Moreover, Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed
to prove that she intended to cause “any injury, much less a serious one.” Id.
at 5. To support this contention, Appellant argues that the victim did not
sustain serious bodily injury, the speed of the vehicle was estimated, and that
“one would have to accept the notion that the offense itself occurred when
[Appellant] was driving a car, yet somehow able to reach across the vehicle,
open a passenger door[,] and eject another person.” Id. at 10.
“Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013).
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, we may not weigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
____________________________________________
proceeded on the charge of aggravated assault under the theory that
Appellant attempted to cause serious bodily injury. See Commonwealth’s
Brief at 4; N.T. Jury Trial, 11/23/20, at 79-80, 101-102.
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resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proof or proving every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying [this] test, the
entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the trier[-]of[-]fact while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 835-836 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 862 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2004); see also
Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1163 (Pa. 2012) (stating that, in
reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, “the relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier[-]of[-]fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis in original).
Appellant was convicted of simple assault and aggravated assault. A
person is guilty of simple assault if he or she “attempts to cause or
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he or she
“attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Id. at § 2702(a)(1). “Bodily
injury” is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain”
and “serious bodily injury” is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a
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substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement,
or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. Appellant specifically challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence offered to show that she caused bodily injury pursuant to
§ 2701(a)(1) (simple assault) or attempted to cause serious bodily injury
pursuant to § 2702(a)(1) (aggravated assault).
In the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence adduced
at trial established the following facts. While driving a vehicle with the victim
in the passenger seat, Appellant became angry when the victim did not give
her money. Appellant called the victim’s sister and left a voicemail threatening
that the victim “would be in really big trouble” if Appellant did not receive the
money. She then reached over the victim, opened the passenger side door,
and pushed the victim out of the vehicle. The victim hit the road surface,
rolled multiple times, and then alternately walked and crawled back to his
residence. As a result of this incident, he sustained injuries including bloody
and scratched knees, hands, buttocks, and side with stones imbedded in his
wounds. He required treatment at a hospital.
We conclude that sufficient evidence established that Appellant caused
bodily injury to the victim for purposes of sustaining a simple assault
conviction. It was well within the province of the jury as fact-finder to
determine that Appellant’s actions in opening the passenger side door and
pushing the victim out of a moving car caused the victim’s injuries when he
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fell out of the vehicle, hit the road surface, and rolled multiple times.
Appellant’s facile argument that the victim caused his own injuries while
crawling home fails to acknowledge that it was Appellant’s actions which
placed him in that situation. Thus, Appellant’s first issue is meritless.
Turning to aggravated assault, the Commonwealth need not prove that
serious bodily injury was actually inflicted; rather, it may prove that a
defendant acted with the specific intent to cause such injury.
Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 247 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Where the victim does not suffer serious bodily injury, the charge
of aggravated assault can be supported only if the evidence
supports a finding of an attempt to cause such injury. A person
commits an attempt when, with the intent to commit a specific
crime, he [or she] does any act which constitutes a substantial
step toward the commission of that crime. [In the context of
aggravated assault, an attempt] requires some act, albeit not one
causing serious bodily injury, accompanied by an intent to inflict
serious bodily injury. A person acts intentionally with respect to
a material element of an offense when it is his [or her] conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result. As intent is a subjective frame of mind, it is of necessity
difficult of direct proof. The intent to cause serious bodily injury
may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 948 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation, quotation, and corrections omitted). In determining whether intent
was proven from attendant circumstances, “a fact-finder may find that a
person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions.”
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 96 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted). Threats alone may be sufficient to conclude that an individual
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possessed the requisite intent to cause serious bodily injury.
Commonwealth v. Fortune, 68 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Under the applicable standard, we conclude that sufficient evidence
established that Appellant attempted to cause serious bodily injury to the
victim when she pushed him out of a moving vehicle and his injuries resulted
from her actions. It was well within the province of the jury as fact-finder to
infer from Appellant’s actions in demanding money, threatening harm to the
victim, proceeding to open the passenger side door and push the victim out
of a moving car, and immediately driving off, that she took a substantial step
towards deliberately inflicting serious bodily harm to the victim. It was equally
within the jury’s province to determine from these actions that it was her
conscious objective to cause serious bodily injury, irrespective of the actual
extent of the victim’s injuries. See Palmer, supra. The jury could properly
infer that Appellant harbored a conscious objective to inflict serious bodily
injury because the natural and probable consequences of pushing an individual
from a moving vehicle are that the individual will sustain serious bodily injury.
Importantly, while Appellant argues that the speed of the vehicle was
estimated rather than firmly established, such evidence goes to the weight of
the evidence rather than sufficiency. See Fisher v. Central Cab Co., 945
A.2d 215, 218-219 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting the admissibility of lay witness
estimations of speed which go to the weight of the evidence). Moreover, as
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to her suggestion that the Commonwealth’s theory of events was
unbelievable, the trial court opined:
In his [closing] argument, counsel for [Appellant] raised the same
arguments [as raised here]. The arguments did not persuade the
jury. The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that
[Appellant] attempted to cause serious bodily injury when she
pushed the disabled victim out of a moving automobile.
Fortunately, the victim’s injuries were not more serious.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/23/21, at 3. The jury was free to believe all, part, or
none of the Commonwealth’s evidence. Pappas, supra. Consequently,
Appellant’s arguments are of no avail.
In her final issue, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence.
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who
is free to believe all, none, or some of the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. Resolving contradictory
testimony and questions of credibility are matters for the finder of
fact. It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for
that of the trier of fact.
Moreover, appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
trial court's exercise of discretion in denying the weight challenge
raised in the post-sentence motion; this Court does not review the
underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence.
Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and
see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the
gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced
by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's
determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the
verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence
and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of
justice.
Furthermore, in order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to
the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous,
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vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the
court.
Commonwealth v. Delmonico, 251 A.3d 829, 837 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).
The entirety of Appellant’s argument challenges the credibility of the
Commonwealth witnesses’ testimony. After a hearing on Appellant’s
post-sentence motion, the trial court denied Appellant’s weight claim. See
Trial Court Order, 6/15/21.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence. The jury heard all of the
evidence introduced at trial and was free to determine the weight of the
evidence and testimony. It is the fact-finder’s duty to assess credibility and
we may not substitute our judgment for the jury’s findings. Moreover, the
evidence was not so tenuous, vague or uncertain that the verdict shocked the
conscious of the court. Accordingly, Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim
fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/08/2022
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