Com. v. Rhoads, T. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TIMOTHY RANDALL RHOADS :
:
Appellant : No. 60 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 15, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-
06-CR-0004507-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 8, 2022
Appellant, Timothy Randall Rhoads, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on December 15, 2020, as made final by the denial of
post-sentence motions on December 30, 2020, following his jury trial
convictions for aggravated assault and strangulation.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
[O]n July 17, 2018, [A.S.2] and [] Appellant got into an
argument [during which he stabbed A.S.] in the arm with a
boxcutter. Subsequently, on September 1, 2018, [] Appellant
smacked [A.S.] across the face and grabbed her hand and
twisted it in a way that made her think he was trying to break it.
He then grabbed her by the neck and shoved her face down onto
a bed, which impeded her breathing. [] Appellant then slammed
[A.S.’s] head against the wall. Next, [] Appellant picked up an[]
eight-inch wall shelf and hit [A.S.] in the head with it. Finally,
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1) and 2718(a)(1), respectively.
2 We use the victim’s initials to protect her identity.
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after punching [A.S.] multiple times, [] Appellant wrapped his
hands around her neck.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/19/2021, at 7-8 (record citations omitted).
Following a trial on October 26, 2020, the jury found Appellant guilty
of the aforementioned charges. On December 15, 2020, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of six to 12 years of
imprisonment.3 Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on December 24,
2020. The trial court denied relief by order entered on December 30, 2020.
This timely appeal resulted.4
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s
post-sentence motion to quash the information and
dismiss the charges[?]
II. Whether the trial court erred [as a matter of law] in
providing a supplemental jury instruction that diminished
the Commonwealth’s burden of proof[?]
III. Whether the trial court abused [its] discretion in denying
Appellant’s request for a jury instruction regarding missing
audio[?]
IV. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the
elements of [] [a]ggravated [a]ssault[?]
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3 The trial court imposed a sentence of six to 12 years’ imprisonment for
aggravated assault with a concurrent term of five to 10 years for
strangulation.
4 On January 7, 2021, Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court issued an
opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on February 19, 2021.
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V. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in accepting
the jury’s verdict, where the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence[?]
VI. Whether the sentencing court abused [its] discretion in
imposing a sentence at the top of the standard range[?]
Appellant’s Brief, at 13-14 (numerals added).
In Appellant’s first issue presented, he contends “that the trial court
erred in denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion to quash the [criminal]
information and dismiss the charges because the information was defective.”
Id. at 24. Appellant argues that he was charged with two counts of
aggravated assault, but it was not clear which count applied to the July 17,
2018 incident or the September 1, 2018 incident. Id. at 29-31.
Our standard of review is as follows:
The decision to grant a motion to quash a criminal information or
indictment is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and
will be reversed on appeal only where there has been a clear
abuse of discretion.
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
and due consideration.
Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the
issue for decision, it misapplies the law or rules in a manner
lacking reason.
Additionally, we note:
A motion to quash is an appropriate means for raising
defects apparent on the face of the information or other
defects which would prevent prosecution. It is neither a
guilt determining procedure nor a pre-trial means for
determining the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's
evidence. Neither the adequacy nor competency of the
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Commonwealth's evidence can be tested by a motion to
quash the information.
Commonwealth v. Finley, 860 A.2d 132, 135 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal
citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted). Furthermore, “[a]
request to quash an information must be made in an omnibus pretrial
motion for relief or it is considered waived.” Commonwealth v. Martin,
694 A.2d 343, 344 (Pa. Super. 1997). Here, as set forth above, Appellant
concedes that he raised this claim in a post-sentence motion. See
Appellant’s Brief at 24. Upon review of the certified record, Appellant filed a
pre-trial motion in limine on January 27, 2020, which did not request
quashal of the criminal information. Thus, because Appellant did not seek
quashal of the information by way of an omnibus pre-trial motion,
Appellant’s first claim is waived.
Moreover, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 560, the Commonwealth prepares
and files a criminal information that “shall be valid and sufficient in law if it
contains … the date when the offense is alleged to have been committed if
the precise date is known, and the day of the week if it is an essential
element of the offense charged, provided that if the precise date is not
known or if the offense is a continuing one, an allegation that it was
committed on or about any date within the period fixed by the statute of
limitations shall be sufficient[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(B)(3). This Court has
stated:
It is the duty of the prosecution to fix the date when an alleged
offense occurred with reasonable certainty. The purpose of so
advising a defendant of the date when an offense is alleged to
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have been committed is to provide him with sufficient notice to
meet the charges and prepare a defense.
However, due process is not reducible to a mathematical
formula, and the Commonwealth does not always need to prove
a specific date of an alleged crime. Additionally, indictments
must be read in a common-sense manner and are not to be
construed in an overly technical sense. Permissible leeway
regarding the date provided varies with, inter alia, the nature of
the crime and the rights of the accused.
Case law has further established that the Commonwealth must
be afforded broad latitude when attempting to fix the date of
offenses which involve a continuous course of criminal conduct.
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 857–858 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(internal citations, quotations, ellipses, and original brackets omitted).
In this case, the trial court determined:
[O]n May 15, 2019, the Commonwealth, by agreement,
amended the information to reflect that the offenses occurred
between July 16, 2018 and September 1, 2018. [] Appellant had
been aware of the charges since at least the time that the
original information was filed [] in October of 2018. There was
nothing misleading or surprising that occurred.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/19/2021, at 4-5.
Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s assessment.
The dates used by the Commonwealth to fix the period of time within which
Appellant’s offenses occurred corresponded to the dates on which the
attacks occurred. The Commonwealth alleged that the boxcutter incident
occurred on July 17, 2018 and the shelf episode occurred on September 1,
2018. As such, the Commonwealth provided Appellant with sufficient notice
to meet the charges and prepare his defense. Accordingly, not only did
Appellant fail to object to the criminal information by pre-trial motion and
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thereby waive his request to quash, but his first issue is otherwise without
merit.
In his second issue presented, Appellant claims that the trial court’s
supplemental jury instruction regarding the two charges of aggravated
assault were erroneous. Appellant’s Brief at 31-33. As briefly explained
above, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of aggravated
assault5 for incidents which occurred between July 16, 2018 and September
1, 2018. During deliberations, the jury raised questions for consideration by
the trial court. N.T., 10/26/2020, at 157. The jury asked which aggravated
assault charge applied to each incident. Id. The trial court determined that
the charge for aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1)
(attempt/cause serious bodily injury) could apply to both incidents, but the
charge for aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4)
____________________________________________
5 The Commonwealth charged Appellant under two separate subsections of
the aggravated assault statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702(a)(1) and 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2702(a)(4). Those provisions provide that a person is guilty of
aggravated assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes
such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life;
* * *
(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon;
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) and (4).
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(attempt/cause bodily injury with deadly weapon) only applied to the July
2018 incident involving the box cutter. Id. at 158; 167-168. After the trial
court expressed its understanding of which aggravated assault charge(s)
applied to each criminal episode, counsel for both the Commonwealth and
Appellant agreed with the trial court that it was within the jury’s purview to
find Appellant guilty of aggravated assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2702(a)(1) for both incidents. N.T., 10/26/2020, at 160. Hence, in
response to the jury’s request for clarification, the trial court instructed the
jury that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4) (attempt/cause bodily injury with deadly
weapon) only applied to the July incident involving the box cutter. N.T.,
10/26/2020, at 167. The trial court further explained that 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2702(a)(1) (attempt/cause serious bodily injury) could apply to either or
both incidents in July or September. Id. Appellant did not object to the
supplemental instruction as given. In fact, prior to the trial court giving the
supplemental jury instruction, Appellant agreed with the trial court’s
proposed clarification. Id. at 163.
Appellant’s second claim is so poorly framed and developed in his brief
on appeal that it is difficult to discern the precise errors about which he
complains. Appellant seems to suggest that the trial court should have
required the jury to identify an episode date for each subsection of
aggravated assault for which Appellant was found guilty. Appellant also
seems to argue that the trial court erred in instructing the jury it could
consider more than one subsection or definition of aggravated assault for a
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particular criminal episode. After careful consideration, we conclude that
Appellant did not properly preserve these claims and, alternately, that these
claims lack merit.
Initially, we consider whether Appellant properly preserved his
challenge to the trial court’s jury instructions. Appellant claims that he
“object[ed] to this instruction prior to the instruction being given” and “also
requested that the verdict slip indicate which date the jury would find
Appellant guilty of, should they convict on either.” Appellant’s Brief at 32.
Next, Appellant asserts that “[e]ven if there [were] no proper objection,
[because] the trial court instructed the jury that two separate offense[s] are
charged under one count, there is a question [as] to the sufficiency of the
evidence, as the jury could have mixed and matched elements from each
alleged incident.” Id.
“Whether [a party] waived [its] challenge to the jury instruction
presents a question of law for which our standard of review is de novo; our
scope of review is plenary.” Passarello v. Grumbine, 87 A.3d 285, 291
n.4 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has stated:
A general exception to the charge to the jury will not preserve
an issue for appeal. Specific exception shall be taken to the
language or omission complained of. Pa.R.A.P. 302(b).
Additionally, [our Supreme] Court has held that, in the criminal
trial context, the mere submission and subsequent denial of
proposed points for charge that are inconsistent with or omitted
from the instructions actually given will not suffice to preserve
an issue, absent a specific objection or exception to the charge
or the trial court's ruling respecting the points.
Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 225 (Pa. 2005).
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Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 978 (Pa. 2013) (quotations
omitted). “Generally, a defendant waives subsequent challenges to the
propriety of the jury charge on appeal if he responds in the negative when
the court asks whether additions or corrections to a jury charge are
necessary.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 178 (Pa. Super.
2010).
Upon review of the record, Appellant failed to contemporaneously
object to the jury charge given at the time of trial. The certified record
reveals that, while Appellant filed a request for points of charge on October
23, 2020, he only requested an unrelated jury instruction regarding the
failure to produce “the audio portion of a recorded interview by law
enforcement with the alleged victim.” Appellant’s Request for Points for
Charge, 10/23/2020, at 1-2. At no time, whether before, during, or at the
conclusion of trial, did Appellant request points for charge regarding the
precise jury instructions challenged on appeal. As such, Appellant waived
his challenge to the supplemental jury instruction as given.
Even if we were to conclude that Appellant preserved his challenge by
asking the court to prepare a verdict slip that directed the jury to match a
criminal episode date with each conviction for aggravated assault, we would
hold that it is not clear how the jury could have mixed and matched
elements of the two counts of aggravated assault as Appellant suggests.
The trial court instructed the jury to determine Appellant’s guilt based upon
the statutory elements of the crimes as the trial court explained them in its
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initial instructions. N.T., 10/26/2020, at 167. The trial court instructed the
jury regarding the definition and elements of aggravated assault under both
subsections of the statute. Id. at 137-142 (“[Appellant] was charged with
two different sections under the [C]rimes [C]ode and those sections have
very specific requirements and elements.”). The trial court also instructed
the jury that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving Appellant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 137. As discussed above, the court’s
supplemental instructions explained which version(s) of aggravated assault
could apply to each criminal episode sub judice. Since the jury found
Appellant guilty of one count each of aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(1)
(attempt/cause serious bodily injury) and § 2702(a)(4) (attempt/cause
bodily injury with deadly weapon), there is no basis in the record to suggest
that the jury impermissibly mixed and matched elements of aggravated
assault as Appellant argues.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s citation to court rules and
principles pertaining to the joinder of offenses in a criminal information to
challenge the jury instructions regarding aggravated assault in this case.
We have addressed and rejected Appellant’s claim regarding the criminal
information. Furthermore, Appellant does not argue that the trial court gave
the jury erroneous legal definitions of aggravated assault.6 Appellant does
____________________________________________
6 Our standard of review in regard to a trial court's decisions on jury
instructions is one of deference; an appellate court will reverse a trial court's
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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not clearly explain how the clarified jury instruction was problematic or
which portion of the instruction was erroneous. Finally, to the extent that
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s supplemental jury instruction, Appellant fails to specify how the
Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient in relation to the statutory
definitions for the two subsections of aggravated assault as charged.7 For all
of the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err as a matter of law or
abuse its discretion in issuing a supplemental jury instruction regarding the
aggravated assault charges. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue fails.
In his third issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a jury instruction regarding the
Commonwealth’s failure to provide the audio portion of a recorded interview
between the police and the complainant. Appellant’s Brief at 33. He claims
that the prosecution withheld evidence favorable to him and he was entitled
to a jury instruction regarding a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.83
(1963). Id. at 33-37. More specifically, Appellant maintains that while the
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.
Commonwealth v. Cannavo, 199 A.3d 1282, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2018).
“We further note that, it is an unquestionable maxim of law in this
Commonwealth that a trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its
instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly,
adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration.”
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014).
7We address and reject Appellant’s fourth appellate issue pertaining to the
sufficiency of the evidence below.
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Commonwealth did not willfully or maliciously destroy the audio recording,
the Commonwealth “had access to [the recording] and Appellant was not
given that same access.” Id. at 36. Appellant argues that he was
prejudiced and is entitled to a new trial. Id. at 36-37.
Again, “our standard of review when considering the denial of jury
instructions is one of deference—an appellate court will reverse a court's
decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.”
Cannavo, 199 A.3d at 1286. Our Supreme Court has determined previously
that “[t]he crux of the Brady rule is that due process is offended when the
prosecution withholds material evidence favorable to the accused.”
Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 158 (Pa. 2018) (citation
omitted). To establish a Brady claim, an appellant must prove that the
Commonwealth willfully or inadvertently suppressed evidence favorable to
the accused and that prejudice ensued. Id. The burden rests with
Appellant to “prove, by reference to the record, that evidence was withheld
or suppressed by the prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d
431, 451 (Pa. 2011).
Here, the trial court noted that “[d]ue to technical difficulties, audio
was not recorded” and “the Commonwealth was not at fault[.]” Trial Court
Opinion, 2/19/2021, at 6. Upon review, we agree. The police officer who
conducted the interview with the complainant testified that he “thought the
entire conversation was [audio] recorded” but, because of “a technical
failure” he later learned “that all of [the police] department’s interviews were
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not audio recorded, so [the department] ended up purchasing a new audio
and video recording system.” N.T., 10/26/2020, at 114-115. Accordingly,
we conclude that Appellant has not met his burden of proving that the audio
portion of the videotaped police interview was suppressed or withheld by the
prosecution. Instead, based upon our review of the certified record, no
audio recording of the complainant’s interview was generated and, thus, no
audio portion of the recorded interview was withheld. Because the
Commonwealth did not have access to an audio recording of the
complainant’s interview, the Commonwealth cannot be faulted for failing to
disclose the recording to Appellant. Hence, Appellant was not entitled to a
jury instruction regarding missing evidence pursuant to Brady. Accordingly,
Appellant’s third appellate issue lacks merit.
In his fourth issue presented on appeal, Appellant contends that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault.
Appellant’s Brief at 37-47. More specifically, Appellant claims the
Commonwealth failed to prove an intent to cause serious bodily injury.
Appellant asserts that A.S. was not seriously injured when she was cut with
a boxcutter in the July 2018 incident, because she “testified that she
received stitches at the hospital and went home with Appellant the same
night.” Id. at 42. Appellant claims he did not intend to cause serious injury
during the July 2018 incident, as confirmed by A.S.’s testimony which
showed he halted his assault when A.S. wrapped a sweatshirt around her
arm once she noticed bleeding. Id. at 43. Regarding the September 2018
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incident, Appellant concedes that testimony “indicate[d] that Appellant had
punched [A.S.], choked her with both hands, twisted her arm, and hit her
head with a small shelf.” Id. at 43 and 45 (“Appellant hit [A.S.] once or
twice in the back of the head with a small decorative shelf.”). Instead,
Appellant contends that there was no evidence of “brain injury or broken
bones” pertaining to the September 2018 incident and that “[r]ed marks and
bruises” do not constitute serious bodily injury. Id. at 44. Appellant asserts
that “this was an assault that lasted over an extended period of time,”
Appellant was much larger than A.S. and, therefore, Appellant suggests that
“[w]ith the timing [of events] and Appellant’s size, he had more than enough
opportunity to cause serious bodily injury and did not.” Id. at 45-46.
Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is as
follows:
Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a
question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were
sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. The facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. It is within the province of the fact-finder to
determine the weight to be accorded to each witness's testimony
and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.
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Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 89 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
and original brackets omitted).
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life[.]
***
(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes
bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) and (4).
“Serious bodily injury” is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a
substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement,
or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. “Our decisional law [] includes cases of
aggravated assault in which the assailant landed multiple punches on the
victim.” Commonwealth v. Faulk, 928 A.2d 1061, 1070–1071 (Pa. Super.
2007) (citation omitted). For aggravated assault, an “attempt” is found
where an “accused who possesses the required, specific intent acts in a
manner which constitutes a substantial step toward perpetrating a serious
bodily injury upon another.” Commonwealth v. Fortune, 68 A.3d 980, 984
(Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted). “Where the injury actually
inflicted did not constitute serious bodily injury, the charge of aggravated
assault can be supported only if the evidence supports a finding that the
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blow delivered was accompanied by the intent to inflict serious bodily
injury.” Commonwealth v. Russell, 460 A.2d 316, 319 (Pa. Super. 1983),
citing Commonwealth v. Alexander, 383 A.2d 887, 889 (Pa. 1978). “An
intent ordinarily must be proven through circumstantial evidence and
inferred from acts, conduct or attendant circumstances.” Fortune, 68 A.3d
at 984. It is within the fact-finder’s province to determine whether the
failure to follow through on an opportunity to cause injury demonstrates a
lack of intent or merely a change of mind. See Commonwealth v.
Matthews, 909 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2006).
Upon review, we agree with the trial court that there was sufficient
evidence to support Appellant's convictions for aggravated assault.
Regarding the first incident, the Commonwealth presented evidence that
Appellant used a box cutter, a deadly weapon, to cut A.S.’s arm. She
described the “stab wound” as “a gash” which “was bleeding profusely.”
N.T., 10/26/2020, at 60. She received five stitches at the hospital. Id. at
63. It was within the jury’s province to determine whether the failure to
follow through or continue to cause further injury demonstrated a lack of
intent or merely a change of mind. We will not usurp the jury’s
determination in this regard. Moreover, evidence pertaining to the second
incident revealed that Appellant smacked A.S.’s face, slammed her head into
a wall, hit her “once or twice” in the head with an eight-inch, decorative wall
shelf, and punched her in the ribs. Id. at 67-74. Evidence of multiple blows
to the head was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence to support Appellant’s convictions for aggravated assault.
Appellant further contends that both of his convictions were against
the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 47-54. When considering
challenges to the weight of the evidence, we apply the following precepts:
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact,
who is free to believe all, none, or some of the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. Resolving
contradictory testimony and questions of credibility are matters
for the finder of fact. It is well-settled that we cannot substitute
our judgment for that of the trier of fact.
Moreover, appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
trial court's exercise of discretion in denying the weight
challenge raised in the post-sentence motion; this Court does
not review the underlying question of whether the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence.
Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear
and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will
give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons
advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's
determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting
or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that
the verdict was or was not against the weight of the
evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the
interest of justice.
Furthermore, in order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge
to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous,
vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of
the court.
Commonwealth v. Delmonico, 251 A.3d 829, 837 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).
The trial court determined:
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Here, the jury heard testimony from [A.S.]; David Wiand, the
emergency physician who treated [A.S.] on September 1, 2018;
and Officer James Matthews, who interviewed [A.S.] on
September 8, 2018. Contrary to Appellant’s assertions to the
contrary, the jury found [A.S.] to be credible. There was
nothing shocking here. Accordingly, [Appellant’s weight] claim is
also without merit.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/19/2021, at 9.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence. The jury was free to
determine the weight of the witnesses’ testimony and we may not substitute
our judgment for the jury’s findings. Moreover, the evidence was not so
tenuous, vague or uncertain that the verdict shocked the conscience of the
court. We give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons
advanced by the trial judge. Accordingly, Appellant’s weight of the evidence
claim fails.
Finally, Appellant posits that his sentence of six to 12 years of
imprisonment “was clearly unreasonable as it does not consider the
rehabilitative needs of Appellant or any other mitigating factors.”
Appellant’s Brief at 54. More specifically, Appellant maintains that the trial
court failed to consider his mother’s testimony at sentencing that
“incarceration never helped him and he needs more assistance with his
mental health” and that “Appellant coped with his tragic childhood with
substance abuse[.]” Id. at 28. Appellant further argues that the trial court
failed to consider his allocution at sentencing wherein “he talked about how
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this matter has caused him to become suicidal and depressed.” Id.
Appellant also suggests that the trial court failed to consider the
Commonwealth’s admission that the verdict was confusing. Id. Appellant
argues that “[t]o incarcerate Appellant at the top of the standard range
where he has already show[n] he is not any further threat to the protection
of the public is clearly unreasonable.” Id. at 56.
This Court has stated:
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must
invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether
appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
* * *
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial
question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable
argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1)
inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
sentencing process.
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
case citations and quotations omitted).
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Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, raised the sentencing
issue in a post-sentence motion, and complied with Pa.R.A.P. 2119. As such
we must examine whether Appellant raises a substantial question to
implicate our discretionary review. “[A]n allegation that the sentencing
court failed to consider mitigating factors generally does not raise a
substantial question for our review.” Rhoades, 8 A.3d at 918-919 (citation
omitted). “This Court has held that a substantial question exists when a
sentencing court imposed a sentence in the aggravated range without
considering mitigating factors.” Id., at 919 n.12 (citation omitted; emphasis
added). “Moreover, where [] the sentencing court had the benefit of a
pre-sentence investigation report, we can assume the sentencing court was
aware of relevant information regarding the defendant's character and
weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Id. at
919 (citation omitted). “[W]e are precluded from addressing [a] challenge
to the discretionary aspects of [a] sentence on this basis.” Id.
Here, there is no dispute that Appellant received concurrent
standard-range sentences and the trial court had the benefit of a pre-
sentence investigation report prior to sentencing. We may assume that the
sentencing court was aware of the relevant information pertaining to
Appellant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating
statutory factors. Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant failed to raise a
substantial question.
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Assuming Appellant did raise a substantial question, however, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing. Our
standard of review is as follows:
The proper standard of review when considering whether to
affirm the sentencing court's determination is an abuse of
discretion. An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of
judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment
exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. An abuse of discretion may
not be found merely because an appellate court might have
reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or
such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. The rationale
behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential
standard of appellate review is that the sentencing court is in the
best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular
offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances
before it.
Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
and ellipses omitted).
Here, before announcing Appellant’s sentence in open court, the trial
court stated it considered Appellant’s prior record score, the offense gravity
score, the standard range of the sentencing guidelines, the Commonwealth’s
recommendation, defense argument, the testimony of A.S., the testimony of
Appellant’s parents, and Appellant’s allocution, as well as a review of the
pre-sentence investigation report. N.T., 1/13/2021, at 35. The record
reflects that the trial court properly considered the mitigating factors
Appellant presented. Appellant’s sentence is not manifestly unreasonable or
the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or the result of a lack of
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J-A22030-21
support so as to be clearly erroneous. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled
to relief on his final claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/08/2022
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