M.M.F. v. V.A.F. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S83032-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    M.M.F.                                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee              :
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    V.A.F.                                  :
    :
    Appellant             :          No. 945 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order February 14, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
    Domestic Relations at No(s): DR-36710,
    PACSES Case #922111536
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                     FILED JANUARY 18, 2018
    Appellant, V.A.F. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in the
    Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, which finalized the November
    10, 2016 order that dismissed Father’s petition to modify the existing
    support order. We affirm.
    In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant
    facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to
    restate them.
    Father raises the following issues for our review:
    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED [AN] ERROR OF
    LAW AND/OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
    ADJUST THE PRESENT SUPPORT ORDER AS TO THE
    AMOUNT [FATHER] IS TO PAY IN MONTHLY CHILD
    SUPPORT RETROACTIVELY TO MAY 2015 TO REFLECT THE
    FACT THAT APPELLEE [(“MOTHER”)] HAS BEEN RECEIVING
    AN ADDITIONAL $1,201.47 PER MONTH AS: (A) HER PRO
    J-S83032-17
    RATA PORTION OF FATHER’S PENSION IN THE AMOUNT OF
    $701.47; PLUS (B) A PENALTY PROVISION FROM
    [FATHER’S] PENSION OF $500 PER MONTH, AND MOTHER
    IS PERMITTED TO BE CHARGED RETROACTIVELY DUE TO
    THE FACT THAT MOTHER FAILED TO REPORT THIS
    ADDITIONAL INCOME AS REQUIRED BY 23 PA.C.S. §
    4353(A)?
    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT [COMMITTED] AN ERROR OF
    LAW AND/OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ESSENTIALLY
    CHARGING FATHER WITH THREE (3) FULL-TIME INCOMES:
    (A) FOR A MONTHLY PRO RATA PORTION OF HIS FORMER
    LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTION FROM A FORMER WORKERS
    COMPENSATION SETTLEMENT; (B) FOR A MONTHLY
    DISTRIBUTION FROM HIS PENSION OF $201.24; AND (C)
    FOR HIS FULL-TIME JOB WITH AMAZON.COM, ANY OF
    WHICH SITUTATIONS ALONE WOULD NORMALLY BE
    CONSIDERED A “FULL-TIME” JOB AND THUS THIS
    “TAKING” REPRESENTS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL
    PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW?
    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF
    LAW AND/OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY NOT
    BIFURCATING THE PRESENT CHILD SUPPORT ORDER
    GIVEN THAT [FATHER] DID NOT…START HIS POSITION
    WITH AMAZON.COM FOR OVER A MONTH, I.E.[,] UNTIL
    OCTOBER 21, 2016, AFTER HE HAD FILED HIS PETITION
    FOR MODIFICATION ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2016, YET THE
    PRESENT ORDER DOES NOT REFLECT HIS REDUCED
    INCOME FOR THE PRIOR FIVE (5) WEEKS?
    (Father’s Brief at 4).
    Preliminarily, we observe that appellate briefs must conform in all
    material respects to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.   Pa.R.A.P. 2101.   See also Pa.R.A.P. 2114-
    2119 (addressing specific requirements of each subsection of brief on
    appeal). Regarding the argument section of an appellate brief, Rule 2119(a)
    provides:
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    J-S83032-17
    Rule 2119. Argument
    (a) General rule.—The argument shall be divided
    into as many parts as there are questions to be argued;
    and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type
    or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point
    treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of
    authorities as are deemed pertinent.
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). “[I]t is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are
    sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with
    pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal
    authorities.”   Commonwealth v. Hardy, 
    918 A.2d 766
    , 771 (Pa.Super.
    2007), appeal denied, 
    596 Pa. 703
    , 
    940 A.2d 362
    (2008) (internal citations
    omitted). “This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments
    on behalf of an appellant.” 
    Id. If a
    deficient brief hinders this Court’s ability
    to address any issue on review, we shall consider the issue waived.
    Commonwealth v. Gould, 
    912 A.2d 869
    , 873 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding
    appellant waived issue on appeal where he failed to support claim with
    relevant citations to case law and record). See also In re R.D., 
    44 A.3d 657
    (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 
    618 Pa. 677
    , 
    56 A.3d 398
    (2012)
    (holding appellant waived issue, where argument portion of appellant’s brief
    lacked meaningful discussion of, or citation to, relevant legal authority
    regarding issue generally or specifically; appellant’s lack of analysis
    precluded meaningful appellate review).
    Instantly, the argument section of Father’s brief is significantly
    underdeveloped. All three of Father’s issues lack meaningful discussion of
    -3-
    J-S83032-17
    his position, and instead Father mostly restates the facts of his case. See
    In re 
    R.D., supra
    . The citations to authority Father included in his brief fail
    to strengthen any argument.        Although the authorities Father cited do
    involve child support orders, they are not pertinent to Father’s case.      See
    Hardy, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Therefore, Father waived his issues for
    appellate review. See 
    Gould, supra
    .
    Moreover, even if Father properly preserved his issues, we would
    affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed
    May 16, 2017, at 12-19) (finding: (1) Father filed his most recent petition
    for modification of support on September 12, 2016, and sought to have
    support order modified retroactively to May 2015, when Father claims
    Mother began “misrepresenting” her income by failing to report her receipt
    of portion of Father’s pension; court denied Father’s request because Father
    had direct knowledge of pension payments made to Mother since May 2015,
    and could have petitioned to modify support at any point after May 2015,
    but Father failed to seek modification of support until September 12, 2016;
    thus, Father did not promptly file his most recent support modification
    petition; moreover, Father presented no compelling reason for retroactive
    application of any modification order to May 2015; further, record does not
    indicate Mother misrepresented her income, and Father did not proffer any
    other reason to support his retroactivity request; to extent Father disputes
    Mother’s entitlement to portion of Father’s pension, this issue has already
    -4-
    J-S83032-17
    been litigated; record is devoid of any evidence requiring court to change
    effective date from date of filing of modification petition; (2) court correctly
    considered Father’s three sources of monthly income when calculating his
    child support obligation; at October 26, 2016 conference, Father reported he
    had been hired by Amazon and provided wage certification; Father’s income
    from Amazon position constitutes “income” for purposes of child support;
    income assessed from Father’s pension and worker’s compensation have
    been previously litigated; both funds are “income” for purposes of child
    support; Father’s assertion that court violated his equal protection rights in
    calculating Father’s income lacks legal basis; (3) regarding Father’s effort to
    “bifurcate” current support order to reflect Father’s reduced income between
    September 12, 2016, and October 21, 2016, when he was not yet employed
    with Amazon, Conference Officer decided there was no basis for Father’s
    requested support modification; rather, Conference Officer saw basis for
    increase in Father’s support obligation, but she decided against any increase
    because it would create undue hardship for Father; given that finding,
    bifurcation was unwarranted). Accordingly, Appellant waived his issues for
    appeal, and we affirm the court’s order dismissing Father’s petition to modify
    the existing support order.
    Order affirmed.
    -5-
    J-S83032-17
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/18/2018
    -6-
    Circulated 12/27/2017 04:42 PM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
    DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION
    ·,         No.: DR-36710
    PASCES No.: 922111536
    Plaintiff,              Super. Ct. No.: 945 EDA 2�7
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    PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
    1925(a} STATEMENT
    AND NOW, this 15th day of May, 2017, the court issues the following
    statement:
    On March 15, 2017, Defendant       v, \�.i::,     ("Defendant") filed and
    served upon the court a timely Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
    Pennsylvania from the Order of Court dated February 14, 2017. See Notice
    of Appeal,                       , DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. February
    14, 2017). On April 10, 2017, pursuant to our request under Pa.R.C.P. No.
    1925(b), Defendant filed and served upon the court a Concise Statement of
    Matters Complained of on Appeal. See Concise Statement,
    , DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Apr. 10, 2017). For the
    reasons that follow, we respectfully suggest that the Defendant's appeal
    lacks merit.
    BACKGROUND
    I.      Factual and Procedural History
    On March 17, 2010, Plaintiff M.(v\,y,        ("Plaintiff") filed a
    Complaint for Support seeking support for three children and spousal
    support.1 See Complaint for Support,                         , DR-0036710 (C.P.
    Northampton Co. Mar. 17, 2010). On May 10, 2010, following a May 5,
    2010 hearing, the undersigned entered an Order of Court requiring
    Defendant to pay support for three children in the amount of $1,038.00 per
    month, spousal support in the amount of $498.00 per month, and $154.00
    per month in arrears. See Order of Court,                           DR-0036710
    (C.P. Northampton Co. May 10, 2010). Defendant filed objections to the
    May 10, 2010 Order and a hearing was held on June 2, 2010. See
    Objections,.                      ), DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. May 10,
    2010). On June 8, 2010, the undersigned entered an Order of Court
    requiring Defendant to comply with the May 10, 2010 Order. See Order of
    Court,                     J,   DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Jun. 8, 2010).
    On June 14, 2011, the Honorable Paula A. Roscioli entered an Order of
    Court modifying the child support based upon one of the three children
    having reached the age of majority. See Order of Court,
    1
    Plaintiff filed a Complaint in divorce against Defendant on September 28, 2007.
    See Complaint, Ferraro v. Ferraro, C-48-CV-2007-08484 (C.P. Northampton Co.
    September 28, 2007). The parties' divorce was granted on July 18, 2016. See
    Decree, Ferraro v, Ferraro, C-48-CV-2007-08484 (C.P. Northampton Co. July 18,
    2016).
    2
    DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Jun. 14, 2011). Pursuant to this Order,
    Defendant was required to pay child support in the amount of $761.34 per
    month for the support of two children, allocated $692.00 per month for
    current support and $69.34 for arrears, effective June 8, 2011. See 
    id. On October
    21, 2013, Defendant filed a Petition for Modification
    seeking to decrease his child support payments. See Petition for
    Modification,                  . DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Oct.
    21, 2013). On November 26, 2013, the parties appeared for a Support
    Conference with Conference Officer Brad Umholtz ("Umholtz"). See
    Summary of Trier of Fact,                     DR-0036710 (C.P.
    Northampton Co. Nov. 26, 2013). Umholtz noted that Defendant reported
    that he had worked for Northampton County for twenty years and retired on
    January 20, 2012. See 
    id. Defendant was
    receiving income from his
    pension in the amount of $1,402.20 per month. See 
    id. Defendant also
    indicated that he received a $120,000.00 lump sum monetary settlement
    from a Worker's Compensation claim. See 
    id. Umholtz noted
    that
    Defendant's income calculation was pending submission of Defendant's
    Worker's Compensation compromise paperwork by December 4, 2013. See
    
    id. Upon Defendant's
    submission of the necessary paperwork, Umholtz
    determined that Defendant actually received a lump sum payment of
    $135,000.00. See Conference Officer Note, .                   >, DR-0036710
    3
    (C.P. Northampton Co. Dec. 6, 2013). Umholtz noted that Defendant's
    attorneys received, 20°/o or $27,000.00, of the lump sum payment.
    Therefore, in calculating the support obligation, the conference officer
    divided the remaining sum of $108,000.00 over sixty-one months, the time
    until the youngest child on the support order would reach the age of
    majority. See 
    id. This calculation
    resulted in an attributed monthly income
    of $1,770.49 to Defendant per month in each of those sixty-one months,
    from the date he entered into the Worker's Compensation Compromise until
    the youngest child reached the age of majority. See 
    id. Based upon
    this
    $1,770.49 attributed monthly income, plus the $1,402.20 monthly payment
    from his pension, Defendant's total monthly income was calculated as
    $3,713.00. See 
    id. Applying the
    statutory formulas, Umholtz calculated
    Defendant's adjusted monthly net income as $3,115.80. See 
    id. On December
    6, 2013, the Honorable Paula A. Roscioli 'entered an
    Order setting Defendant's child support obligation at $982.00 per month,
    allocated as $893.00 for current support and $89.00 for arrears. See Order
    of Court,                      DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Dec. 6,
    2013). The support obligation was based upon Plaintiff's adjusted monthly
    net income of $1,588.94 per month/ and Defendant's adjusted monthly net
    income of $3,115.80. See 
    id. The Order
    was effective retroactively to the
    2Plaintiff's income was based upon six months of paystubs submitted to the
    Conference Officer. See Order dated Dec. 6, 2017.
    4
    date of Defendant's petition for modification, and arrears were set at
    $1,107.96. See 
    id. On January
    6, 2014, Defendant filed a timely written demand for a de
    novo hearing of the December 6, 2013 Order. See Demand for De Novo
    Hearing,                   , DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Jan. 6,
    2014) The de novo hearing was originally scheduled for April 2, 2014,
    however, the hearing was subsequently rescheduled several times at the
    request of Defendant's counsel to allow the parties to take depositions. See
    Order of Court,                   :, DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Feb.
    26, 2014); Order of Court,·                   ·, DR-0036710 (C.P.
    Northampton Co. Jul. 1, 2014).
    !.
    On July 3, 2014, while the de novo hearing was still pending,
    Defendant filed a "Petition for Review seeking a Reallocation Order due to
    Emancipation, effective June 10, 2014." See Petition, .
    DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Jul. 3, 2014). On July 11, 2014, the
    court entered a Modified Order of Court setting the amount of child support
    for one child, at $688.00 a month. See Order of Court,
    DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Jul. 11, 2014). The July 11, 2014 Order
    was based upon an adjusted monthly net income for Plaintiff of $1,599.00
    and an adjusted monthly net income for Defendant of $3, 115.80. See 
    id. The effective
    date of the July 11, 2014 Order was June 10, 2014, the high
    school graduation date of the now emancipated child. See 
    id. The total
    5
    support amount was $688.00, allocated $626.00 for current support and
    $62.00 for arrears. See 
    id. On January
    28, 2015, the parties appeared before the Honorable
    Leonard N. Zito for a de novo hearing on Defendant's objections to the
    December 6, 2013 support order, as modified by the July 11, 2014 Order.
    See Notes of Transcript, .                    , DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton
    Co. Mar. 16, 2015) ("N.T. Jan. 28"). On March 27, 2015, Judge Zito entered
    an Order of Court, making the Order of December 6, 2013 final. See Order
    of Court,                     DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Mar. 27,
    2015). The stipulations in the Order of Court dated July 11, 2014 were to
    remain in effect and Defendant was granted the opportunity to petition for
    modification upon any change in his pension distribution or other financial
    circumstances. See 
    id. On May
    11, 2015, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal to the
    Pennsylvania Superior Court from the Order of Court dated March 27, 2015.
    See Notice of Appeal,                       , DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton
    Co. May 11, 2015). Defendant timely filed his "Concise Statement of Errors
    Complained of on Appeal," pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 1925(b). See Concise Statement,                        , DR-0036710
    (C.P. Northampton Co. Jun. 2, 2015). Defendant alleged the following four
    errors:
    A. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law
    and/or an abuse of discretion in falling to adjust the
    6
    $135,000 gross amount of Father's Worker's
    Compensation Settlement & Release of January 23,
    2013, by properly reducing it by not only the
    attorney's fees he paid in the amount of $27 ,000,
    but also by $13,500 set aside for Father's potential
    future medical expenses as well as an offset of
    $934.66 that was paid to DRS for child support at
    the time of pay-out of the lump sum, so that Father's
    net should have been reduced to $93,565.347
    B. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law
    or abuse of discretion in not recognizing that the
    remaining net balance of Father's $93,565.34 net
    determined hereinabove at Issue A, was determined
    by the extremely competent Worker's Compensation
    Judge to replace Father's earnings during the
    remainder of his work-life expectancy of 402 months
    at a rate of payment of $232. 75/month?
    C. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law
    and/or an abuse of discretion by not further
    recognizing as an alternative theory for reduction,
    that Father had used the net balance of his Worker's
    Compensation Settlement & Release to not only pay
    off accumulated debts he accrued during a period of
    time immediately preceding his Settlement, but also
    to pay ongoing child support?
    D. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of
    Law and/or an abuse of discretion in miscalculating
    the net amount of Father's present monthly pension
    payment from its gross amount of $1,402.947
    [Father notes that the larger issue of future child
    support is complicated by the Trial Court's erroneous
    rulings regarding the only asset of the parties'
    marriage, i.e. his Correction Officer's pension that is
    the subject of Father's separate appeal filed April 13,
    205 @ docket #: C-48-CV-2007-8484.
    Id.3
    3   The appeal referenced in paragraph D of Defendant's Concise Statement,
    FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE
    7
    On June 8, 2015, Judge Zito filed a twenty-two page Pennsylvania
    Rule of Appellate Procedure No. 1925(a) Statement thoroughly addressing
    each of the issues raised by Defendant and respectfully suggesting that each
    of the issues raised by Defendant was without merit. See 1925(a)
    Statement,                         ·, DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Jun. 8,
    2015). On November 5, 2015, the Superior Court dismissed Defendant's
    appeal for failure to file a brief. See                    , 1450 EDA 2015 (Pa.
    Super. 2015).
    II.      Current Order
    On September 12, 2016, Defendant filed a "Petition for Modification of
    an Existing Support Order," seeking to reduce his current support obligation.
    See Petition for Modification,                      , DR-0036710 (C.P.
    Northampton Co. September 12, 2016). Defendant alleged that (1) he had
    a change in employment; (2) Plaintiff had failed to report income she had
    been receiving since April 13, 2015, and (3) the court had erred concerning
    Defendant's sources of income. See Petition for Modification,
    , DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Sept. 12, 2016). On October
    26, 2016, the parties appeared for a conference on the petition with
    conference officer Stacey A. Greaves ("Greaves"). See Conference Officer
    Notes,                      1,   DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Oct. 26,
    FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM THE PREVIOUS PAGE
    regarding the parties' spousal support order, was dismissed by the Superior Court
    after Defendant failed to file a brief. See                ,, 1471 EDA 2015 (Pa.
    Super. 2015).
    8
    2016) ("Conference Notes Oct. 26, 2016"). Greaves noted that Defendant
    was seeking an effective date for any modification of April 13, 2015, when
    Defendant alleged Plaintiff had started receiving unreported income. See 
    id. Ultimately, Greaves
    recommended an effective date of September 12, 2016,
    the date of Defendant's filing. See 
    id. Greaves noted
    that "nothing
    precluded either party from filing a Petition earlier ... ; both parties have
    employment that was not originally reported to this section by either party .
    . . ; and both parties knew, there was a change in ... [Defendant's]
    pension." 
    Id. Defendant reported
    to Greaves that he had been hired by Amazon as
    of October 14, 2016, earning $12.70 per hour and that he was working 40
    hours per week. See 
    id. Defendant was
    also receiving $201.47 gross per
    month from his pension. See 
    id. The lump
    sum settlement from the
    Worker's Compensation compromise remained as allocated at $1, 770.49 per
    month.4 See 
    id. Greaves required
    a wage certification for Defendant before
    entering a recommended order. See 
    id. Defendant subsequently
    provided Greaves with a wage certification
    from Amazon indicating Defendant was earning $12.75 per hour working 40
    4Greaves noted that Defendant still disputed the Worker's Compensation
    compromise income being attributed to Defendant's total income, but that the
    Worker's Compensation income had been appealed in de nova court and was
    upheld. See 
    id. Therefore, Greaves
    would continue to include that income ln the
    support calculation. See Conference Notes Oct. 26, 2016.
    9
    hours per week and that his employment began on October 21, 2016.5 See
    Follow up Conference Notes, ,                     >, DR-0036710 (C.P.
    Northampton Co. Nov. 10, 2016) ("Conference Notes Nov. 10, 2016").
    Greaves calculated Defendant's monthly gross income as $4,182.00,
    resulting in an adjusted monthly net income of $3,724.00. See 
    id. This monthly
    net income took into account Defendant's earnings from Amazon,
    the monthly payment from his pension, and the allocation of Defendant's
    lump sum Worker's Compensation award. See 
    id. Greaves determined
    Plaintiff's adjusted monthly net income to be $3,007.00 based upon
    Plaintiff's pay stubs. See 
    id. Per the
    Uniform Support Guidelines, there was no monetary basis to
    decrease Defendant's support obligation. See 
    id. Rather, there
    was actually
    a basis to increase his support obligation. See 
    id. Greaves determined
    ,
    however, that such an increase would cause the Defendant undue hardship.
    See 
    id. On November
    10, 2016, Judge Roscioli entered an Order in accordance
    with Conference Officer Greaves's recommendation, dismissing Defendant's
    Petition to Modify without prejudice, as there was no monetary basis for a
    decrease in support. See Order,    !                  :, DR-0036710 (C.P.
    Northampton Co. Nov. 10, 2016). The Orders dated July 11, 2014 and
    March 27, 2015 remained in full force and effect. See 
    id. 5 Defendant's
    reported start date at Amazon varied from Defendant's original
    statement to Greaves by one week. See Conference Notes Nov. 10, 2016.
    10
    On December 6, 2016, Defendant filed a written demand for a de novo
    hearing. See Demand for De Novo Hearing,                          , DR-0036710
    (C. P. Northampton Co. Dec. 6, 2016). Defendant and his counsel appeared
    before the undersigned for a hearing on January 25, 2017. Plaintiff did not
    appear at the time of the hearing. See 
    id. On February
    14, 2017, the
    undersigned entered an Order making the November 10, 2016 Order of
    Court final. See Order,                       ·, DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton
    Co. February 14, 2017).
    III.     Defendant's Appeal
    Defendant timely filed his Notice of Appeal on March 15, 2017. See
    Notice of Appeal, i                   �, DR-0036710 (C. P. Northampton Co.
    Mar. 15, 2017). Per our request under Pa.R.A.P. No. 1925(b), on April 10,
    2017, Defendant timely filed his Concise Statement of Matters Complained of
    on Appeal. See Defendant's Statement of Matters of Complained of on
    Appeal,                        DR-0036710 (C.P. Northampton Co. Apr. 10,
    2017) ("Concise Statement"). Defendant raises the following three issues:
    Whether the Tria·I Court committed an error of law
    and/or an abuse of discretion in failing to adjust the
    present Order retroactively to May 2015 to reflect
    the fact that Mother has been receiving an additional
    $1,201.47 per month as (a) her pro rata portion of
    Father's pension in the amount of $701.47; and (b)
    a penalty provision from Father's pension of $500
    per month. Mother shall continue to receive
    additional income in this amount through August
    2017?
    11
    Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law
    and/or an abuse of discretion in essentially charging
    Father with three (3) full-time incomes: (a) for a
    monthly pro ration portion of his former lump sum
    distribution from a former workers compensation
    settlement; (b) for a monthly distribution from his
    pension of $201.24; and (c) for his full-time job with
    Amazon.com, any of which situations alone would
    normally be considered a "full-time job" and this
    thus represented a violation of equal protection
    under the law?
    Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law
    and/or an abuse of discretion by not bifurcating the
    present child support order given that Defendant did
    not have his present position in Amazon for over a
    month, i.e. October 21, 2016, after he had
    previously filed his Petition on September 12, 2016,
    yet the present Order does not reflect this reduced
    income for the prior five (5) weeks?
    
    Id. DISCUSSION It
    is well established that the Superior Court's scope of review is
    limited in child support cases. See Haley v. Haley, 
    549 A.2d 1316
    , 1317
    (Pa. Super. 1988). It is within the trial court's discretion to determine the
    amount of a support Order, and its judgment should not be disturbed on
    appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. 
    Id. (citing Ritter
    v. Ritter, 
    518 A.2d 319
    , 322 (Pa. Super. 1986)). "'On appeal, a trial court's child
    support order will not be disturbed unless there is insufficient evidence to
    sustain it or the court abused its discretion in fashioning the award."' 
    Id. (quoting Fee
    v. Fee, 
    496 A.2d 793
    , 794 (Pa. Super. 1985)). A finding of
    abuse will be made only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.
    12
    
    Id. (citing Koller
    v. Koller, 
    481 A.2d 1218
    (Pa. Super. 1984)). "The role of
    an appellate Court in support proceedings is limited and a finding of abuse of
    discretion ... [should] not [be] made lightly." See 
    Haley, 549 A.2d at 1317
    (citing Hartley v. Hartley, 
    528 A.2d 233
    (Pa. Super. 1987)); see also Shindel
    v. Leedom, 
    504 A.2d 353
    (Pa. Super. 1986).
    A. Effective Date of Support Order
    Defendant first argues that we erred in making the effective date of
    our Order the date Defendant filed for modification, rather than applying the
    Order retroactively to May 2015 when Plaintiff began receiving payments
    from Defendant's pension. See Concise Statement f 4(A).
    "A party seeking to modify a support order has the burden of proving a
    modification is warranted and that he/she promptly filed a modification
    petition." Krebs v. Krebs, 
    944 A.2d 768
    , 774 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (citing Maddas v. Dehaas, 
    816 A.2d 234
    , 239 (Pa. Super.2003), appeal
    denied, 
    827 A.2d 1202
    (Pa. 2003)).        Further, "[a]n order modifying a prior
    support order is ordinarily retroactive to the date of filing of a petition for
    modification." 
    Krebs, 944 A.2d at 774
    (citing Albert v. Albert, 
    707 A.2d 234
    ,
    236 (Pa. Super.1998)); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4352(e).6 Where a party
    6
    Section 4352(e) of Title 23 provides:
    Retroactive modification of arrears.v-No court shall modify
    or remit any support obligation, on or after the date it is
    due, except with respect to any period during which there
    is pending a petition for modification. If a petition for
    modification was filed, modification may be applied to the
    period beginning on the date that notice of such petition
    FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE
    13
    misrepresents his or her income, however, "the court may order a
    modification of arrearages retroactive to the date a party
    first misrepresented income." 
    Id. at 774.
    To obtain additional retroactive
    arrearages, the party must have promptly filed a modification petition upon
    discovery of the misrepresentation. See 
    id. "There is
    no bright-line rule for
    determining if a petition for modification was promptly filed. We look to the
    facts of each case and ask whether the delay was reasonable." 
    Id. at 775,
    (citing Maue v. Gilbert, 
    839 A.2d 430
    , 433 (Pa. Super.2003)).
    Defendant filed his Petition for Modification on September 12, 2016.
    See Petition for Modification, Ferraro v. Ferraro, DR-0036710 (C.P.
    Northampton Co. Sep. 12, 2016). He sought, however, to have the support
    order modified retroactively with an effective date of May 2015. 
    Id. We did
                             7
    not grant his request.
    FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM THE PREVIOUS PAGE
    was given, either directly or through the appropriate
    agent, to the obligee or, where the obligee was the
    petitioner, to the obligor. However, modification may be
    applied to an earlier period if the petitioner was precluded
    from filing a petition for modification by reason of a
    significant physical or mental disability, misrepresentation
    of another party or other compelling reason and if the
    petitioner, when no longer precluded, promptly filed a
    petition. In the case of an emancipated child, arrears
    shall not accrue from and after the date of the
    emancipation of the child for whose support the payment
    is made.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4352{e).
    7      Insofar as Defendant disputes Plaintiff's entitlement to a portion of his
    pension, the parties' prior litigation and Defendant's abandoned appeal bar redress
    of this issue.
    FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE
    14
    Defendant had direct knowledge of the pension payments made to
    Plaintiff since May 2015. See Order of Court dated Apr. 12, 2015.
    Defendant could have petitioned to modify his support obligation at any
    point after May 2015. Defendant, however, did not seek to modify his
    support obligation until September 12, 2016, seventeen months later. See
    generally Petition for Modification. Therefore, Defendant's petition was not
    "promptly filed." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4352(e); see also Krebs, 944 A2.d at 774.
    Assuming, arguendo, that Defendant's petition could be considered
    "promptly filed," there is no other "compelling reason" to apply the order
    retroactively to May 2015. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4352(e). The record does not
    indicate Plaintiff misrepresented her income, and Defendant did not proffer
    any other reason supporting the requested retroactivity.
    FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM THE PREVIOUS PAGE
    "[R]es judicata provides that where a final judgment on the merits exists, a
    future lawsuit on the· same cause of action is precluded." J.S. v. Bethlehem Area
    School District, 
    794 A.2d 936
    , 939 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). "[R]es judicata requires
    the coalescence of four factors: (1) identity of the thing sued upon or for; (2)
    identity of the causes of action; (3) identity of the persons or parties to the action;
    and ( 4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or being sued." 
    Id. "Generally, causes
    of action are identical when the subject matter and the ultimate
    issues are the same in both the old and new proceedings." 
    Id. In April
    2015, Judge Zito determined that Plaintiff was entitled to 50% of the
    proceeds from Defendant's pension as well as an additional $500.00 per month
    until August 2017 to compensate Plaintiff for the months in which she did not
    receive her share of the pension payout due to Defendant's actions and/or
    inactions. See Order of Court, .                     t C-48-CV-2007-8484 (C.P.
    Northampton    Co. Apr.  12, 2015).   The Superior  C_ourt dismissed Defendant's appeal
    in January 2016 for failure to file a brief. See -                  , 1471 EDA 2015
    (Pa. Super. 2015). Any dispute as to Plaintiff's entitlement to Defendant's pension
    is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as there is an identity of parties and
    claims.
    15
    The record is devoid of any evidence that would require this court to
    make the effective date of our support order any date other than the date of
    filing of the Petition for Modification. We respectfully submit that
    Defendant's first issue on appeal is without merit.
    B. Defendant's Income
    Defendant argues that we erred in assessing Defendant three separate
    incomes any one of which, he argues, constitutes a full-time job. Defendant
    contends this violates his constitutional guarantee of equal protection under
    the law. See Concise Statement ,i 4(B).
    By statute, income "[i]ncludes compensation for services, including,
    but not limited to, wages, salaries ... ; all forms of retirement; pensions ..
    . ; [and] workers' compensation." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302. "When determining
    income available for child support, the court must consider all forms of
    income." MacKinley v. Messerschmidt, 
    814 A.2d 680
    , 681 (Pa. Super. 2002)
    (citing Blaisure v. Blaisure, 
    577 A.2d 640
    , 642 (Pa. Super. 1990)).
    "Generally, the amount of support to be awarded is based upon the
    parties' monthly net income." Pa.R.C. P. 1910.16-2. Rule 1910.16-2(a)
    defines "Monthly Gross Income" as follows:
    (a) Monthly Gross Income. Monthly gross income is
    ordinarily based upon at least a six-month
    average of all of a party's income. The term
    "income" is defined by the support law, 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 4302, and includes income from any
    source. The statute lists many types of income
    including, but not limited to:
    16
    ( 1) wages, salaries, bonuses, fees and
    commissions;
    (2) net income from business or dealings in
    property;
    (3) interest, rents, royalties, and dividends;
    ( 4) pensions and all forms of retirement;
    (5) income from an interest in an estate or trust;
    (6) Social Security disability benefits, Social
    Security retirement benefits, temporary and
    permanent disability benefits, workers'
    compensation and unemployment
    compensation;
    (7) alimony if, in the discretion of the trier of
    fact, inclusion of part or all of it is
    appropriate; and
    (8) other entitlements to money or lump sum
    awards, without regard to source, including
    lottery winnings, income tax refunds,
    insurance compensation or settlements;
    awards and verdicts; and any form of
    payment due to and collectible by an
    individual regardless of source.
    Pa.R.C. P. 1910.16-2(a). The "Official Note" to Rule 1910-16.2(a) states:
    [t]he trial court has discretion to determine the most
    appropriate method for imputing lump-sum awards
    as income for purposes of establishing or modifying
    the party's support obligation. These awards may be
    annualized or they may be averaged over a shorter
    or longer period of time depending on the
    circumstances of the case. They may also be
    escrowed in an amount sufficient to secure the
    support obligation during that period of time.
    Pa.R.C.P. 1910-16.2(a), Official Note.
    Defendant has three sources of monthly income, all of which were
    properly utilized in calculating Defendant's child support obligation. See 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 4302; Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(a). At the October 26, 2016
    conference on Defendant's petition for modification, Defendant reported that
    17
    he had been hired full-time by Amazon. See Conference Notes Oct. 26.
    Defendant subsequently provided a wage certification from Amazon. See
    Follow up Conference Notes,                       DR-0036710 (C.P.
    Northampton Co. Nov. 10, 2016). Defendant's Amazon income constitutes
    "income" within the meaning of Section 4302 and Rule 1910. 16-2(a)( 1).
    See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302; Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(a)(1).
    The amount of income assessed to Defendant from both his pension
    and his Worker's Compensation compromise were previously litigated. See
    1450 EDA 2015 (Pa. Super. 2015) (dismissing
    Defendant's appeal related to Worker's Compensation income for failure to
    file brief);                  , 1471 EDA 2015 (Pa. Super. 2015) (dismissing
    Defendant's appeal regarding his pension for failure to file brief). These
    funds are "income" within the meaning of Section 4302 and Rule 1910.16-
    2(a)( 4) and (6), respectively. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302; Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-
    2(a)(4), (6).
    There is no basis for Defendant's assertion that we violated his equal
    protection rights by properly applying Section 4302 and Rule 1910.16-2(a)
    in calculating Defendant's monthly gross income. Therefore, we respectfully
    suggest that Defendant's second issue on appeal is without merit and should
    be dismissed.
    18
    c.   Bifurcation
    Finally, Defendant argues that we erred in not 'bifurcating' the
    November 16, 2016 Order to reflect the fact that he did not begin his
    position at Amazon until October 21, 2016.8 See Concise Statement f 4(C).
    Defendant argues that the Order should have reflected a reduced income
    between September 12, 2016 and October 21, 2016. Only thereafter,
    Defendant contends, should the court have attributed additional income to
    him from his employment at Amazon. See 
    id. The November
    16, 2016
    Order was effective retroactively to September 12, 2016, the filing date of
    Defendant's petition for modification. See Order of Court dated Nov. 16,
    2016; Order of Court dated Feb. 14, 2017.
    Following a hearing on Defendant's petition, Conference Officer
    Greaves determined there was no basis for Defendant's requested
    modification. See Follow Up Conference Notes Nov. 10. Rather, there was a
    basis to increase Defendant's support obligation. See 
    id. Ultimately, Greaves
    did not recommend an increase in Defendant's support obligation
    because she determined that such an adjustment would create an undue
    hardship for the Defendant. See 
    id. Given this
    finding, bifurcation was not
    warranted. Thus, we respectfully suggest that Defendant's third issue on
    appeal is without merit.
    8
    Defendant initially claimed that he began working for Amazon on October 14,
    2016. See Conference Notes Oct. 26. Defendant eventually provided a wage
    certification, which showed that he actually started working for Amazon on October
    21, 2016. See Follow Up Conference Notes Nov. 10, 2016.
    19
    CONCLUSION
    Based on foregoing, we respectfully suggest that Defendant's appeal is
    without merit and should be dismissed.
    BY THE COURT
    20