In Re: J.A.G.-B., Appeal of: S.L.B. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.A.G.-B., MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.L.B., MOTHER :
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:
:
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: No. 1945 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered June 24, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2021-A0033
IN RE: Z.L.R.G.-B., MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.L.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1946 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered June 24, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2021-A0034
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2022
In these consolidated appeals,1 S.L.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the
decrees entered on June 24, 2021, involuntarily terminating her parental
rights to J.A.G.-B. (a male born in April 2019), and Z.L.R.G.-B. (a female
1In a December 20, 2021 per curiam order, this Court consolidated the two
appeals sua sponte.
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born in July 2017), (collectively, “the Children”), pursuant to Section 2511 of
the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.2 We affirm.
We summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as follows.
Mother has a history of prior involvement with the Montgomery County
Office of Children and Youth (“OCY” or “the Agency”), both as a child and as
a mother. N.T., 6/24/21, at 50. Mother has seven children, none of whom
are in her care. Id. In the present case, OCY received a referral at or near
the time of J.A.G.-B.’s birth in April 2019. Mother gave birth to J.A.G.-B. at
home before being transported to the hospital where Mother tested positive
for fentanyl, oxycodone, and opiates. Id. at 40. Soon after, in May 2019,
OCY received another referral, this time for Z.L.R.G.-B., then age two, who
ingested heroin and required two doses of Narcan to be revived. Id. at 41
and 94. As a result, OCY implemented a safety plan which placed Children
with maternal relatives and prohibited Mother from unsupervised contact
with Children. Id. at 43. On June 10, 2019, OCY discovered that Mother
violated the safety plan, thus OCY took emergency custody of Children and
placed them in an OCY foster home where they have remained. Id. at 43-
44. Children were adjudicated dependent on July 16, 2019. Id.
2 On the same day, the trial court terminated the parental rights of J.G.,
Z.L.R.G.-B.’s natural father, who voluntarily relinquished his rights. N.T.,
6/24/21, at 12-18, 98. Similarly, the trial court involuntarily terminated the
parental rights to any unknown natural father with respect to J.A.G.-B. Id.
at 98. Neither J.G. nor any unknown father are involved in this appeal.
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Throughout the pendency of this case, OCY created four family service
plans (FSPs) for Mother, all of which included the following permanency
objectives: address her mental health needs; address substance abuse
needs; provide safe and stable housing; demonstrate financial security;
participate in supervised visitation with the Children; and improve her
parenting skills. Id. at 59, 62. Four permanency review hearings were held
wherein Mother showed minimal progress on her permanency goals. 3 Id. at
80. Consequently, on April 6, 2021, OCY filed petitions for involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (8), and (b).
The trial court held a termination hearing on June 24, 2021.4 Although
her counsel was present and confirmed that Mother was notified of the
hearing, Mother failed to attend and provided no explanation. See id. at
8-9. At the hearing, OCY presented the testimony of OCY caseworkers
Amber Crosby and Paige Smedley, JusticeWorks YouthCare supervisor
Deseree Purdy, and Gaudenzia administrative case manager Sabrina Moore.
At the conclusion of testimonial evidence, the trial court set forth its findings
3 Although her presence was required, Mother failed to attend two of the
four permanency review hearings despite those hearings being held virtually.
4 Throughout the proceedings before the trial court and on appeal, Mother
was represented by Damien D. Brewster, Esq. Amy S. Newman, Esq. was
appointed as guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent Children’s legal and best
interests. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-1093 (Pa. 2018) (holding
“if the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment because
the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the
child’s legal interests and his or her best interests[.]”).
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of fact and conclusions of law on the record. Specifically, the trial court
found the following:
Turning to the facts established in this case by [OCY], the
children were removed from the home on June 10th 2019, and
placed in a foster care home that is now the pre-adoptive home
where both children are placed together.
Since that time, [OCY] has had four [FSPs] for [] Mother setting
forth goals she should attempt to meet in order to be reunified
with her children. [OCY] has provided a case timeline and a visit
log with respect to [] Mother that are now part of the record as
well.
[] Mother, although she expresses her love and affection for the
children and has had visits with the children since the onset of
the case, her last in-person visit was March 10th, 2020,
according to the testimony. After that time, [OCY] instituted
virtual video visits during the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, in August of 2020, [] Mother was offered in-person
visits on the conditions that she both get a negative COVID test
because one of her children has respiratory issues that could be
affected by transmission of the disease and [] she comply with
drug screens as required by [OCY]. The testimony of the
caseworker was that [Mother] was aware of these two conditions
for resuming in-person visits. Nevertheless, since August 2020
to the present date, [] Mother has failed to comply with these
two conditions.
With respect to drug testing by [OCY], [] Mother has not
complied with any of the attempts to obtain a drug screen or the
contacts from the OCY caseworker to meet with her and obtain a
drug screen since August of 2020. On at least five occasions
since August of 2020, a twenty-four-hour notice [to submit to a
drug screen] was left [at Mother’s confirmed residence,] to which
she did not respond[. OCY presumes noncompliance with each
notice] to be positive. On other occasions[, Mother] simply was
not available, was not at home, or otherwise evaded meeting
with the caseworker for the purpose of complying with required
drug testing.
[The record also demonstrates,] based upon the drug screen log,
that prior to August of 2020, [Mother] also had some presumed
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positive tests, some negative tests, and some positive tests for
methamphetamines and [PCP] in early 2019, early in the case.
[] Mother had a number of goals that she was required to meet
by [OCY] throughout the history of the case. She did get drug
and alcohol evaluations, as required, on two occasions but did
not comply with the recommendations for outpatient treatment
from Gaudenzia. She sought a third evaluation in April of 2021,
but failed to attend her appointment.
[Mother] failed to comply with her mental health treatment [or]
provide evidence of compliance to the [OCY] caseworker.
[Mother] failed to attend the last two permanency review
hearings that were conducted virtually and which she could have
attended virtually. She failed to attend the hearing today or
attempt to make any arrangements to either seek a continuance
or seek an opportunity to attend virtually today’s hearing.
Her visit coaching services through JusticeWorks were
terminated due to her failure to comply with the conditions for
resuming in-person visits with her children.
Looking at the six-month period prior to the filing of the petition,
during that entire period[, Mother] has had no in-person visits
with the children and has made no progress on her [FSP] goals
with respect to drug and alcohol treatment, substance abuse
treatment, mental health treatment, or improving her
relationship and parenting skills with respect to both of her
children.
One of [Mother’s] goals was to obtain housing, which she did.
She obtained housing with the assistance of Your Way Home, but
the caseworker [] testified that she subsequently lost her
funding to support her continued residence in that home, [that
being] the rent subsidy that she had through Your Way Home[.
Thus that housing] doesn’t appear to be a sustainable living
situation at this time.
Equally, another one of her [FSP] goals was to obtain financial
stability, employment, and to be able to provide for herself and
her children[. Mother] has not provided evidence of employment
to the caseworker since January of 2020.
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Id. at 102-106 (some paragraphing edited). Thus, the trial court
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (8), and (b) in open court, see id. at 113-114, and
entered the same ruling by decrees entered on June 24, 2021. This
consolidated appeal followed.5
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for review:
1. Did the trial court err in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) where the evidence at
trial failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Mother failed to perform parental duties during the six month
time period immediately preceding the filing of the petitions to
terminate parental rights?
2. Did the trial court err in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) where the evidence at
trial failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that any
alleged repeated and continued incapacity cannot or will not be
remedied by [] Mother?
3. Did the trial court err in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) where the evidence at
trial failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of [] Mother’s parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the children?
4. Did the trial court err in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights
where the evidence at trial failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the developmental, physical[,] and
emotional needs and welfare of the children will be best served
by termination of [] Mother’s parental rights?
5On July 26, 2021, Mother filed a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal along with separate notices of appeal for each child pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court subsequently filed a Rule
1925(a) opinion on August 31, 2021, expressly adopting its findings of fact
and conclusions of law as stated in open court at the termination hearing.
See N.T., 6/24/21, at 98-120.
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Mother’s Brief at 7 (re-numbered; extraneous capitalization omitted).
We review an appeal of a termination of parental rights according to
an abuse of discretion standard.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). “[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility
determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214
A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “If competent evidence
supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also
support the opposite result.” In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super.
2019) (citation omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for
termination followed by an assessment of the needs and welfare of the child.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
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evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the [trial] court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the [trial] court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section
2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child
under the standard of best interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is “so clear, direct,
weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier[-]of[-]fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In
re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). Instantly, we conclude that the certified record supports the decrees
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows.
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
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child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b); see also In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at
least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which
reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or
failure to perform parental duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (citation omitted). It is well-established that “Section 2511
does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform
parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties.”
In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) (emphasis
in original) (citation omitted).
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his[, or
her,] ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must
utilize all available resources to preserve the parental
relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting
obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child
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relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a
more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental
responsibilities while others provide the child with the child's
physical and emotional needs.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1119 (citation and original brackets omitted). Our
Supreme Court explained that parental duty “is best understood in relation
to the needs of a child.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977).
A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this
Court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty
which requires affirmative performance. This affirmative duty
encompasses more than a financial obligation; it requires
continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain
communication and association with the child. Because a child
needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires that a
parent ‘exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance
in the child’s life.’
Id. (citations omitted). Additionally,
[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given case
and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.
The court must examine the individual circumstances of each
case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing
termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the
evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly
warrants the involuntary termination.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations
omitted).
Mother argues that OCY did not meet its evidentiary burden under
Section 2511(a). Specifically, Mother argues that she “requested and
attended frequent visits with the Children; provided supervision, love, and
affection during those visits; maintained a loving bond with them; and
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obtained housing which was suitable for Mother and the Children and met
OCY’s specifications.” Mother’s Brief at 14 (punctuation edited).
Based on the testimony and evidence elicited at the termination
hearing, the trial court concluded OCY established clear and convincing
evidence that Mother “failed to perform any parental duties for a period of
more than six months prior to the filing” of the instant petitions. N.T.,
6/24/21, at 108-109. It determined that within the six-month period
preceding the termination petition, Mother made no progress on her FSP
goals including drug and alcohol treatment, substance abuse treatment,
mental health treatment, or improving her relationship and parenting skills.
Id. at 105. Moreover, Mother failed to obtain employment or financial
stability. Id. at 106. While Mother did obtain housing with the assistance of
Your Way Home, she lost the financial assistance offered by that program;
thus, the sustainability of such living situation became questionable. Id. at
106. The trial court also credited Mother’s love and affection for Children
and attendance during virtual visits, but emphasized that it was her own
noncompliance with the required conditions that prevented in-person
visitation. Id. at 103. JusticeWorks terminated her visit coaching services,
and she never progressed beyond supervised visitation with Children. Id. at
105, 111.
At the time of the termination hearing, Children were in placement for
two years, constituting the majority of J.A.G.-B.’s and half of Z.L.R.G.-B.’s
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lives. During that period, Mother did not fulfill any of her FSP objectives.
Overall, Mother thwarted caseworker’s attempts to help her achieve these
goals and remained uncooperative throughout the case. OCY caseworker,
Ms. Smedley, testified that her last meeting with Mother occurred on August
3, 2020, after which “[t]here have been scheduled appointments for me to
meet with [Mother, but] she texted me that she’s not home[,] doesn’t
answer the door[,] or she fails to respond to my attempts to meet with her.”
Id. at 76.
Regarding mental health, since June 2019, Mother neither provided
documentation of a mental health evaluation nor completed any mental
health treatment despite suffering a mental breakdown in March 2020 which
necessitated a week-long hospitalization at Horsham Clinic. Id. at 64-68.
Regarding substance abuse, Mother obtained evaluations but never
followed through with recommended treatment. Mother undertook two drug
and alcohol evaluations, the second being required “[b]ecause she failed to
comply with the recommended services within the allotted time frame, and
she had to be reassessed for services.” Id. at 66. Mother never
documented her completion of any drug and alcohol treatment. Moreover,
of the required drug screens, Mother complied with only nine of 29 attempts
between June 2019 and May 2021, the last submission being February 20,
2020. Id. at 70-71, 72. Specifically, Ms. Smedley explained that Mother
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received 11 twenty-four-hour notices6 but complied once, in which she
tested positive for methamphetamines.
Regarding employment and housing, Mother failed to secure stable
arrangements that demonstrated that she could provide for her own or the
Children’s needs. Mother provided a single paystub from McDonalds in
January 2020; however, in the same month she informed Ms. Smedley that
she was no longer employed because it was too far from her home. Id. at
63. While Mother obtained suitable housing through Your Way Home, Ms.
Smedley expressed her concern for whether Mother could sustain such
accommodations because “she’s no longer receiving the rental payments
[from Your Way Home,] the home rent is $1,200[.00] a month, and she
doesn’t have suitable employment that she’s made me [aware] of to be able
to cover that rent each month.” Id. at 91. Since January 2020, Mother did
not report any employment to OCY despite being requested to do so. Id. at
63-64.
Finally, regarding visitation and Mother’s overall parenting skills,
Mother never progressed from supervised visitation. Id. at 80. Mother’s
last in-person visit with Children was March 10, 2020, approximately fifteen
6 “A twenty-four-hour notice is a document that is left for the parents when
an attempted drug screen is made at their home, and the notice is left on
their door or in their mailbox for them to comply with the drug screen within
twenty-four hours or else it would be considered presumed positive for all
drugs.” N.T., 6/24/21, at 71. Ms. Smedley discussed with Mother the
consequences of noncompliance with a twenty-four-hour notice on multiple
occasions. Id.
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months prior to the termination hearing. Id. at 80. Due to the COVID-19
global pandemic, visits were held virtually. Id. at 79. Mother consistently
attended virtual visits. Ms. Purdy testified that during some of these virtual
visits, Mother dressed inappropriately or “wasn’t able to appropriately
interact with the children because of whatever mental health issues she was
experiencing at that time.” Id. at 32-33.
Since August 2020, Mother was offered the opportunity to transition
back to in-person visitation on the conditions that she submit to drug
screening and produce negative COVID-19 test, however, Mother failed to
abide by these conditions. Id. at 29, 74-75, 79-80. Had Mother complied,
she could have attended 42 in-person visits with Children. Id. at 80.
Upon review, we conclude that competent evidence supported the trial
court’s determination that OCY presented clear and convincing evidence to
terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). Most
strikingly, Mother failed to attend the termination hearing, thus she did not
provide any explanation for her conduct to refute OCY’s claims. Id. at 107.
Therefore, her first issue is without merit.7
Once the trial court determines that termination of parental rights is
warranted under Section 2511(a), the trial court is required to engage in an
7 Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that OCY provided clear and convincing evidence warranting termination of
Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), we need not address
Mother’s remaining claims involving Section 2511(a)(2) or (8). See In re
B.L.W., supra. Accordingly, we proceed to an evaluation of Children’s best
interests and welfare under Section 2511(b).
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analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) to determine whether termination is in
the best interests of the child. “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the
custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill
. . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and
fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 856 (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, while the focus in terminating parental rights under Section
2511(a) is on the parent, that focus shifts to the child pursuant to Section
2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super.
2008) (en banc).
In the context of a Section 2511(b) analysis, “the court must take into
account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533-536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The
mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910(Pa. Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’
parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong
emotional bond against parents’ inability to serve needs of
child). Rather, the orphans’ court must examine the status of
the bond to determine whether its termination “would destroy an
existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption
of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 2003).
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In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). Equally, the trial court
should consider “whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and
whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d
at 268. “Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily
depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of
J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). The court is not required to use
expert testimony; social workers and caseworkers may offer evaluations as
well. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Ultimately, the concern is the needs
and welfare of a child. Id. Moreover, a parent’s own feelings of love and
affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights.
See id. at 1116; In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“a child’s life
simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the
ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting”).
Moreover,
[b]efore granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is
imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible
dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, comfort,
security, and closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship,
as well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of the relationships
is also important to a child, for whom severance of close
parental ties is usually extremely painful. The trial court, in
considering what situation would best serve the child[ren]’s
needs and welfare, must examine the status of the natural
parental bond to consider whether terminating the natural
parents’ rights would destroy something in existence that is
necessary and beneficial.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121, quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa.
Super. 2000). Similarly, the trial court may emphasize the safety needs of
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the child and may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security,
and stability the child might have with the foster parent. See In re N.A.M.,
33 A.3d at 103.
Here, Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence for the trial
court to conclude that the Children’s developmental, physical and emotional
needs would be best served by terminating her parental rights because “she
and the Children share a loving bond.” Mother’s Brief at 18. In support of
her claim, Mother solely relies on evidence indicating her love and affection
for the Children. Id. at 18-19 (arguing that caseworkers testified that they
observed love and affection, and that Mother expressed her love for the
Children to them).
Regarding Section 2511(b), the trial court stated:
In this case, the evidence demonstrated that [] Mother loves the
two children; although, her bond with the younger child, [J.A.G.-
B.,] with whom she has not resided since he was two months
old, is even less than a bond with the older child[, Z.L.R.G.-B.]
[] Although she has love and affection for the children and has
attended video visits, [] Mother simply has not done the work to
sustain a parent/child bond with each of these children,
particularly in failing to take the opportunity to make herself
available to attend in-person visits and to continue her work with
JusticeWorks with their support to make the visits meaningful
and to deepen her relationship with each of the children and to
provide them one-on-one care, love, affection, and support in an
in-person setting.
She never progressed beyond supervised visitation with the
children, and she never met the [FSP] goals of providing for the
children financially, providing safe and stable housing, and in
particular, addressing her mental health needs and her
substance abuse needs.
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For all of these reasons, the bond between the children and []
Mother has become attenuated, and the children are, by
contrast, safe and secure, loved, and supported in the foster
home and have developed a bond with the foster mother.
N.T., 6/24/21, at 110-111. Accordingly, the trial court concluded:
In this case, the testimony clearly established that [] Mother has
not maintained sufficient ongoing and enduring contact, love,
and support, and has not taken advantage of the opportunities
provided to her to develop a deeper parental relationship with
her children, and there is an insufficient parental bond between
birth mother and the two children. Therefore, severing this
natural relationship will not be contrary to the needs and welfare
of the [C]hildren.
Id. at 112.
We find that competent evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion
that the Children will not be harmed by termination of Mother’s parental
rights. While Mother correctly notes that caseworkers acknowledged her
love for the Children, see id. at 46, 86, a parent’s love and affection alone
will not preclude termination. Z.P., supra. Moreover, Mother disregards
the credited testimony from the same witnesses that the Children would not
be irreparably harmed if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. N.T.,
6/24/21, at 86.
Conversely, unequivocal testimony described the strong, stable,
supportive, and loving bond that the Children shared with Foster Mother,
who appropriately provided for their needs and welfare since June 2019 and
presented as an adoptive resource. Id. at 82-83. Ms. Smedley testified the
Children “are doing wonderfully. They’re very well adjusted to be with
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[Foster Mother.] [J.A.G.-B.] has been with her since he was less than two
months old. As far as he’s aware, [Foster Mother] is the only caregiver that
has ever been consistently in his life and met his needs.” Id. at 83.
Moreover,
[the Children] are frequently looking to [F]oster [M]]other for
reassurance and approval. If they have a need that’s being met,
they are comfortable in going back to her and asking for her
support. They’re affectionate towards her and sit on her lap and
hug her and give her kisses, which seems to be a very positive
interaction. And there’s never been reason [ ] to feel concerned
that their needs are not being met.
Id. at 84. It is Foster Mother who tends to the Children’s medical and
emotional needs. Id. at 84-85. Therefore, the trial court did not err or
abuse its discretion in concluding that the Children’s developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare necessitate the involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
As we have determined that clear and convincing evidence supported
the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(1) and (b), we affirm the trial court decrees.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/28/2022
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