Bellan, G. v. Penn Presbyterian Medical Center ( 2022 )

J-S04031-22
2022 PA Super 32GERALD BELLAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
PENN PRESBYTERIAN MEDICAL : No. 1118 EDA 2021
CENTER :
Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 200901301
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2022
Gerald Bellan (“Appellant”) appeals from the order entered by the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting the preliminary objections
of Appellee Penn Presbyterian Medical Center (“PPMC”) and dismissing
Appellant’s complaint with prejudice. After careful review, we affirm.
Appellant initiated this medical professional liability action to recover
damages for injuries that he allegedly sustained while he was being treated
as a patient at PPMC. Appellant was admitted to PPMC on September 24,
2018 where he underwent a cervical laminectomy. Appellant alleged that,
upon his discharge from PPMC on November 28, 2018, he had developed
severe pressure wounds.
On November 28, 2018, Appellant was initially transferred from PPMC
to Merwick Care and Rehabilitation Center in Plainsboro, New Jersey.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant was transferred back to PPMC on two occasions on December 26,
2018 and January 4, 2019 to be treated for low hemoglobin and a gluteal
abscess, respectively.
On January 23, 2019, Appellant was again discharged from PPMC and
transferred to Kindred Hospital – TCU (Transitional Care Unit)). However,
Appellant was transferred back to PPMC on two occasions on February 14,
2019 and May 8, 2019 to be treated for wound management and an abdominal
fistula repair, respectively.
Appellant asserts that the nursing staff at PPMC failed to adequately
treat his pressure wounds by turning and repositioning him every two hours
and failed to follow through with other necessary nursing interventions.
Appellant contends that his medical records contain no documentation PPMC
nurses had performed necessary interventions for his pressure wounds.
On September 23, 2020, Appellant filed a complaint against PPMC
sounding in medical malpractice/negligence. It is undisputed that Appellant
failed to serve PPMC within thirty days of filing the complaint and did not
attempt to reinstate the complaint.
On January 20, 2021, the trial court listed the matter for a case
management conference. On February 16, 2021, the trial court rescheduled
the case management conference at Appellant’s request for Appellant to
complete service. On February 17, 2021, Appellant filed an affidavit of
service, certifying that service had been made on PPMC via email on February
15, 2021.
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On February 23, 2021, counsel for PPMC entered his appearance. On
March 2, 2021, PPMC filed preliminary objections, which included its claim
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1) based on improper service of the complaint.
PPMC argued that Appellant did not serve PPMC in a timely manner between
the filing of its complaint on September 23, 2020 and his email service on
February 15, 2021. In addition, PPMC noted that Appellant did not seek to
reinstate the complaint or file an affidavit of no-service.
On March 23, 2021, Appellant filed a response to PPMC’s preliminary
objections in which he conceded that he failed to serve PPMC with his
complaint within thirty days of its filing. Appellant also acknowledged that he
did not make any attempt to reinstate the complaint, but alleged that PPMC
did not suffer any prejudice as a result.
In addition, Appellant alleged that he had attempted to serve PPMC at
its General Counsel’s Office on September 29, 2020 but was unsuccessful.
Specifically, Appellant claimed that his process server was informed that
personnel would not return to the General Counsel’s Office until after 2020.
Appellant argued that PPMC failed to leave anyone in charge to accept service
or provide instructions to those attempting service. Appellant alleged that he
tried to find an agent of PPMC who would accept service of his complaint, but
was unable to do so.
On May 3, 2021, the trial court entered an order on the docket
sustaining PPMC’s preliminary objections as to service of process and
dismissing Appellant’s complaint. On May 5, 2021, Appellant filed a praecipe
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to reinstate the complaint, which the trial court did not address. On May 26,
2021, Appellant filed this timely appeal.
Appellant raises the following question for our review on appeal:
Whether Appellee/Defendant being closed for service for
several months due to COVID, and, therefore is not accepting
service, equitably provides more time for Appellant/Plaintiff to
serve the Complaint, allowing the Complaint to remain effective,
where [Appellant] previously made a good faith attempt at service
and Appellee/Defendant suffered no prejudice from the timing of
service.
Appellant’s Brief, at 3.1
In reviewing a trial court's order sustaining preliminary objections for
improper service of process,
[o]ur standard of review ... is to determine whether the trial court
committed an error of law. When considering the appropriateness
of a ruling on preliminary objections, the appellate court must
apply the same standard as the trial court. When considering
preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the
challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all inferences
reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which
seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only
in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader
will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right
to relief.
Joyce v. Erie Ins. Exch., 74 A.3d 157, 162 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation
omitted).
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1 While our Supreme Court declared a general, statewide judicial emergency
relating to the COVID-19 pandemic, this designation expired on June 1, 2020.
Appellant infers that PPMC’s Office of General Counsel, like many corporate
offices at that time, was closed to the public as a result of the pandemic.
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It is well-established that “[s]ervice of process is a mechanism by which
a court obtains jurisdiction of a defendant, and therefore, the rules concerning
service of process must be strictly followed. Thus, improper service is not
merely a procedural defect that can be ignored when a defendant
subsequently learns of the action against him or her.” Lerner v. Lerner, 954
A.2d 1229, 1237 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting Cintas Corp. v. Lee's Cleaning
Services, Inc., 549 Pa. 84, 91, 700 A.2d 915, 917 (1997) (citing Sharp v.
Valley Forge Medical Ctr. and Heart Hosp., Inc., 422 Pa. 124, 221 A.2d
185 (1966)).
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 401(a) provides that “[o]riginal
process shall be served within 30 days after the issuance of the writ or the
filing of the complaint.” Pa.R.C.P. 401(a). If the plaintiff is unable to serve
the complaint within the period prescribed by Rule 401(a), the plaintiff may
file a praecipe for the reissuance of the writ or reinstatement of the complaint
in order to continue its validity. Pa.R.C.P. 401(b).2
Our courts have provided that “[s]o long as the plaintiff files her writ or
complaint before the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to her
cause of action, the original filing, as well as any subsequent reissuances or
reinstatements, tolls the statute of limitations.” Gussom v. Teagle,
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2 Our rules of civil procedure also require a plaintiff to submit a return of
service to the trial court averring that service of original process has been
made. Pa.R.C.P. 405(a). In the event that service could not be made and the
writ has not been reissued or the complaint reinstated, a plaintiff must make
a “return of no service” upon the expiration of the period allowed for service.
Pa.R.C.P. 405(a).
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___Pa.___, 247 A.3d 1046, 1048 (2021). The Supreme Court in Gussom
outlined the relevant precedent related to this topic:
“In the seminal case of Lamp v. Heyman, 469 Pa. 465, 366 A.2d
882 (1976), this Court sought to end abuses of process by
plaintiffs who tolled the statute of limitations by filing a writ of
summons, had the writ repeatedly reissued, and deliberately
failed to notify the defendant of the pending litigation.” McCreesh
v. City of Philadelphia, 585 Pa. 211, 888 A.2d 664, 665 (2005).
“This process, while technically compliant with the Rules of Civil
Procedure, nonetheless defeated the purpose of the statute of
limitations, which is to protect defendants from stale claims.” Id.Thus, in Lamp, this Court held that “a writ of summons shall
remain effective to commence an action only if the plaintiff then
refrains from a course of conduct which serves to stall in its tracks
the legal machinery he has just set in motion.” Lamp, 366 A.2d
at 889. This “Lamp rule” applies equally to actions commenced
by way of the filing of a complaint.
We refined the Lamp rule in Farinacci v. Beaver County
Industrial Development Authority, 510 Pa. 589, 511 A.2d 757,
759 (1986), holding that “Lamp requires of plaintiffs a good-faith
effort to effectuate notice of commencement of the action.” In
addition, Farinacci clarified that: (1) the plaintiff carries an
evidentiary burden of proving that she made a good-faith effort to
ensure that notice of the commencement of an action was served
on the defendant, McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 672; and (2) “[i]n each
case, where noncompliance with Lamp is alleged, the [trial] court
must determine in its sound discretion whether a good-faith effort
to effectuate notice was made[,]” Farinacci, 511 A.2d at 759.
This Court's most recent decision in the Lamp-line of cases is
McCreesh, supra. In McCreesh, the Court expressed that when
plaintiffs’ improper actions in serving original process put
defendants on actual notice of the commencement of actions, trial
courts should “dismiss only those claims where plaintiffs have
demonstrated an intent to stall the judicial machinery or where
plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure has
prejudiced defendant.” McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 674.
***
Although McCreesh made clear that a plaintiff could fulfill
her good-faith service mandate without strictly complying with the
service rules as long as her efforts resulted in actual notice of the
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lawsuit to the defendant, like Farinacci, McCreesh did nothing
to modify a plaintiff's duty to act diligently to serve notice of the
commencement of an action so as not to undermine the policies
that drive the statute of limitations. Nor, for that matter, did
McCreesh change the rule clarified in Farinacci that the plaintiff
carries an evidentiary burden to prove that she made a good-faith
effort to effectuate service of process in a timely manner. To the
contrary, as observed throughout this opinion, the McCreesh
Court alluded to this evidentiary requirement. See id. at 672
(“We subtly altered our holding in Lamp in Farinacci, requiring
plaintiffs to demonstrate ‘a good-faith effort to effectuate notice
of commencement of the action.’”).
In sum, Lamp and its progeny require a plaintiff to make a
good-faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on a
defendant. When a defendant presents a factual dispute as to
whether a plaintiff fulfilled this duty, the plaintiff carries an
evidentiary burden to demonstrate that she met her good-faith
mandate. If a plaintiff presents credible evidence that she made
this attempt at service, then she fulfills her requirement to prove
good faith. If a plaintiff does not present such evidence, then she
has failed to satisfy her evidentiary burden, regardless of whether
her actions (or inaction) were intentional, unintentional, or
otherwise. However, pursuant to McCreesh, a trial court should
not punish a plaintiff by dismissing her complaint where she is
able to establish that her improper but diligent attempts at service
resulted in the defendant receiving actual notice of the
commencement of the action, unless the plaintiff's failure to serve
process properly evinced an intent to stall the judicial machinery
or otherwise prejudiced the defendant.
Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1048, 1057.
In Gussom, the plaintiff attempted to serve the defendant with her
timely complaint but learned the defendant had moved to Virginia. After filing
an affidavit of non-service, the plaintiff took no further action until she filed a
praecipe to reinstate the complaint five weeks after the statute of limitations
expired. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff failed to meet her
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evidentiary burden to show she made a good-faith effort to timely effectuate
service. Id. at 1057-58.
The Supreme Court also noted in Gussom there was no evidence to
show the plaintiff’s action or inaction gave the defendant actual notice of the
lawsuit in a timely manner. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the trial
court’s order sustaining the defendant’s preliminary objection based on
improper service.
In the instant case, Appellant’s complaint alleged that, during his
hospitalization at PPMC from on September 24, 2018 through November 28,
2018, he developed severe pressure wounds as a result of the negligence of
PPMC’s nursing staff. Thus, Appellant was subject to the two-year statute of
limitations set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2) (stating that actions must be
commenced within two years … “to recover damages for injuries to the person
or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or
unlawful violence or negligence of another”).
Appellant timely commenced this action by filing a complaint on
September 23, 2020. However, Appellant did not serve PPMC within thirty
days of filing his complaint and did not seek to reinstate the complaint to
maintain its validity. The trial court record and docket reflect that Appellant
took no action to serve PPMC until he filed an affidavit of service on February
17, 2021, claiming that PPMC had accepted service via email on February 15,
2021, which was months after the statute of limitations had already expired.
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We reject Appellant’s argument that he made a good faith effort to serve
PPMC with the complaint, solely based on his allegation that he made one
attempt to serve PPMC on September 29, 2020. Appellant indicated that his
attempt to complete personal service was unsuccessful as the process server
was informed by front desk security in the General Counsel’s office that no
one would be working in the office until after 2020.
Appellant fails to explain why he neither filed an affidavit of no-service
with the trial court nor informed the trial court in any way that PPMC had not
been served with the complaint in violation of Pa.R.C.P. 405(a).
Moreover, after Appellant’s first attempt at service was unsuccessful,
Appellant offers no evidence that he diligently made an effort to discover how
to serve PPMC or provide any notice to PPMC of the action. Appellant did not
seek permission from the trial court to use an alternative method of service
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 430.
Instead, Appellant’s counsel took no action until five months later on
February 15, 2021 when an associate in his firm contacted PPMC’s Office of
General Counsel through email, informed them that Appellant had
unsuccessfully attempted to personally serve his complaint, and asked if
PPMC’s Office of General Counsel would accept his complaint via email.
Nancy VanTrieste, claims administrator at the Office of General Counsel,
promptly replied to this email and indicated that she was able to accept service
by email or, in the alternative, was able to meet with Appellant’s process
server on Wednesdays. Within an hour of Appellant’s initial email, Ms.
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VanTrieste confirmed that she accepted service of Appellant’s complaint on
behalf of PPMC.
Appellant offers no explanation as to why he could not have made this
inquiry months earlier. To the contrary, Appellant’s lack of due diligence is
apparent in this case, and his attempt to blame the COVID-19 pandemic as
the cause of the lack of timely service is misplaced.
Since there is no evidence of record to show that Appellant’s actions
gave PPMC actual notice of his action in a timely manner, Appellant cannot
rely on this Court’s decision in McCreesh to argue that he should be given an
equitable exception to the good-faith service mandate without strictly
complying with the service rules. As noted above, our courts have never
modified a plaintiff's duty to act diligently to serve notice of the
commencement of an action so as not to undermine the policies that drive the
statute of limitations. Gussom, supra.
As a result, we conclude that Appellant failed to produce evidence to
show he acted diligently in making a good-faith effort to serve PPMC with
notice that he had filed his complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
decision to sustain PPMC’s preliminary objection with respect to Appellant’s
improper service of the complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1) and
dismissing Appellant’s complaint.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/22/2022
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