Com. v. Mateo, A. ( 2022 )

J-A28020-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ALEXANDER MATEO :
:
Appellant : No. 1173 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 5, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
No(s): 2020-01177
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 25, 2022
Appellant Alexander Mateo appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after he was found in indirect criminal contempt1 (ICC) of an order
entered pursuant to the Protection from Abuse (PFA) Act.2 Appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the elements of notice
and intent. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as follows:
On January 29, 2020, the victim obtained a temporary PFA order
against [Appellant]. A hearing was scheduled for February 4,
2020. [Appellant] failed to appear at the hearing and a final PFA
was entered which prohibited [Appellant] from having any contact
with the victim. On February 8, 2020, [Appellant] was charged
with ICC for violating the PFA by contacting the victim by text
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 23 Pa.C.S. § 6114.
2 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122.
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messages at various times from February 4, 2020 through
February 7, 2020.
On March 5, 2020, a hearing was held on the ICC, Violation No.
1. According to the victim, she contacted law enforcement on
February 7, 2020 to report receiving text messages from
[Appellant] after she told him to stop contacting her. N.T.,
3/5/20, at 6, 7. The victim identified Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1,
[which showed] screen shots of text messages from [Appellant]
on the victim’s telephone. When [Appellant] began texting the
victim, she had already informed him that he was not permitted
to contact her. Id. at 25, 12.
[Appellant] also testified at the hearing. He testified he was in
Puerto Rico on February 4, 2020 and had called a “court office”
and spoke with “Nancy” who told him “everything had been done
without me being present and everything was fine. I had no
warrant; I had no problem.” Id. at 18. [Appellant] testified that
following his conversation with Nancy, he believed “everything
was dropped.” Id. [Appellant] admitted he contacted the victim
on February 4 and February 7, 2020. Id. at 19-20, 25.
[Appellant] testified it was not until he was contacted by police on
February 7, 2020 and learned he was in trouble, that he believed
there was an order against him. Id. at 20.
[The record also reflected that o]n February 4, 2020, [Appellant]
asked the victim if she went to court. Id. 12-14. The victim
informed [Appellant] that she had and a full order was entered
against him for three (3) years, including a prohibition from any
contact and asked him to stop texting her. Id.
Trial Ct. Op., 11/13/20, at 3-4 (unpaginated).
Following [the hearing], [the trial court] found [Appellant] guilty
of ICC for violating [the] PFA order entered on February 4, 2020.
[Appellant] was sentenced to fifteen (15) days to six (6) months
[of] incarceration in the Luzerne County Prison.
On March 12, 2020, [Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion
seeking reconsideration of his sentence and a judgment of
acquittal alleging he did not have notice of the PFA and lacked the
intent to violate the order prohibiting any contact with the victim.
The court denied [Appellant’s] motion on March 13, 2020.
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On May 14, 2020, [Appellant] filed a motion to reinstate his direct
appellate rights nunc pro tunc, or alternatively, a motion [to file a
petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 9541-9546]. On May 20, 2020, the court denied [Appellant’s]
motion to reinstate his appellate rights and granted his motion to
file a [PCRA] petition. A hearing on the [PCRA petition] was
initially scheduled for July 28, 2020 and was continued to August
6, 2020.
On August 6, 2020, pursuant to a stipulation, the court entered
an order reinstating [Appellant’s] appellate rights.
Id. at 1-2.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing
Appellant’s claims.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the evidence was
sufficient to demonstrate that Appellant had notice of the
protection from abuse order?
2. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the evidence was
sufficient to demonstrate that Appellant had the wrongful
intent required to violate a protection from abuse order?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Both of Appellant’s claims challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. In
reviewing these issues, we are guided by the following principles:
We review a contempt conviction for an abuse of discretion. We
rely on the discretion of the trial court judge and are confined to
a determination of whether the facts support the trial court’s
decision. In reviewing whether the evidence was sufficient to
support the conviction, we must determine whether the evidence
admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient to enable the fact
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finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying
the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for the fact-finder. Finally, the trier of fact[,] while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the
evidence.
This Court has repeatedly stated that “[t]he purpose of the PFA
Act is to protect victims of domestic violence from those who
perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance
prevention of physical and sexual abuse.” “Where a PFA order is
involved, an indirect criminal contempt charge is designed to seek
punishment for violation of the protective order.” A charge of
indirect criminal contempt consists of a claim that a violation of
an order occurred outside the presence of the court.
In order to establish indirect criminal contempt, the
Commonwealth must prove: “1) the order was sufficiently
definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt
of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the
order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been
volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful
intent.”
Commonwealth v. Felder, 176 A.3d 331, 333-334 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citations omitted, some formatting altered).
Notice
Appellant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove that
he had notice of the PFA order. Appellant’s Brief at 10. In support, Appellant
argues that although the victim informed Appellant about the PFA, he received
“contradictory information from a court official,” who led him to believe that
no such order was in place. Id. Specifically, Appellant claims that he called
the court after the PFA hearing and an employee named Nancy “informed him
‘everything was fine,’ which he reasonably interpreted to mean that the order
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was dismissed.” Id. Appellant argues that the record supports his version of
events because “after he was told by Trooper Smith that the PFA was in fact
active and prohibited contact, he ceased all communication with the victim
and complied with the PFA order.” Id. Therefore, Appellant concludes that
there is insufficient evidence to prove notice.
To satisfy the notice element of ICC, the Commonwealth must prove
“actual notice or its equivalent [] in the absence of personal service.”
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 885 A.2d 994, 997 (Pa. Super. 2005) (finding
that the notice requirement for ICC was satisfied by a police officer’s phone
call to the defendant informing him of the PFA order); see also
Commonwealth v. Staton, 38 A.3d 785, 794-95 (Pa. 2012) (concluding that
the defendant “had equivalent knowledge of the PFA order” based on witness
testimony that the victim had informed the defendant of the PFA order and
the defendant deliberately avoided service by the sheriff).
Here, the trial court explained:
[Appellant] had notice of the order even though he was in Puerto
Rico and had not yet been served. . . .
[Appellant’s] testimony that he thought the PFA had been dropped
was not credible. The evidence of record establishes that
[Appellant] knew there was a hearing, chose not to attend the
hearing and was advised by the victim that a full PFA order had
been entered against him.
Trial Ct. Op. at 6 (unpaginated).
Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court. See Felder, 176 A.3d at 333. As noted previously, Appellant
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expressly acknowledged that the victim informed him about the PFA order
when he contacted her via text message after the PFA hearing. See N.T.,
3/5/20, at 12-14. Although Appellant claimed that he received contradictory
information from a court official, the trial court did not find that testimony
credible. See Felder, 176 A.3d at 334 (reiterating that “the trier of fact, while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence”). Therefore, we
agree with the trial court that there was sufficient evidence to prove that
Appellant had notice of the PFA order against him. See Staton, 38 A.3d at
794-95; Padilla, 885 A.2d at 997.
Further, to the extent Appellant claims that his version of events is
credible because he stopped contacting the victim after he spoke with police,
that assertion goes to the weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence.
See Staton, 38 A.3d at 798 (explaining that although the defendant testified
that he was unaware that a PFA order had been entered, the jury was not
required to accept his testimony as true); see also Commonwealth v.
Gaskins, 692 A.2d 224, 227 (Pa. Super. 1997) (stating that credibility
determinations are made by the finder of fact and that challenges to those
determinations go to the weight, not the sufficiency of the evidence). For
these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
Wrongful Intent
Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence establishing
intent. Appellant’s Brief at 13. Specifically, he argues that although he “was
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not drugged, forced, or threatened to contact the victim, he was misled into
believing he could contact the victim.” Id. In support, Appellant reiterates
his claim that a court official “led him to believe the PFA was dismissed and
he was permitted to have contact with the victim.” Id. He again notes that
he “immediately ceased all communication” after Trooper Smith confirmed
that a PFA was in effect and claims that this “demonstrates that [Appellant]
did not have the wrongful intent necessary to be convicted of indirect criminal
contempt.” Id. at 13-14.
“In contempt matters, wrongful intent can be imputed by virtue of the
substantial certainty that [one’s actions would place one] in contact with [PFA
petitioner] in violation of the PFA Order.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 227
A.3d 928, 932-33 (Pa. Super. 2020).
Here, the trial court explained:
[The] record establishes [Appellant’s] intent to contact the victim.
Despite the fact that [Appellant] knew he was under a PFA order
which prohibited him from contacting the victim for three (3) years
and the victim requested that he stop contacting her, [Appellant]
persisted in contacting the victim by text message until he was
contacted by police to turn himself in.
Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7.
Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court. See Felder, 176 A.3d at 333. As discussed previously,
Appellant had notice of the PFA order, which prohibited Appellant from
contacting the victim for a period of three years. See N.T., 3/5/20, at 12, 25.
Further, there is no dispute that Appellant continued to send text messages
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to the victim even after she informed Appellant about the order and asked him
to stop contacting her. See N.T., 3/5/20, at 19-20, 25. Therefore, given the
substantial certainty that Appellant’s contact with the victim would be a direct
violation of the PFA order, we agree with the trial court that there was
sufficient evidence to establish wrongful intent. See Wilson, 227 A.3d at
932-33. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/25/2022
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