Com. v. Gurdine, L. ( 2022 )


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  • J-A26044-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    LAMAR GURDINE                              :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1070 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 30, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0009766-2007
    BEFORE:       BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 25, 2022
    Lamar Gurdine (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order entered in
    the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his second Post
    Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition as untimely filed. The sole claim raised
    in the petition was prior PCRA counsel’s ineffective assistance, for failure to
    preserve a claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. We affirm.
    On direct appeal, a prior panel of this Court summarized the underlying
    facts as follows. On the afternoon of February 16, 2007, Philadelphia Police
    Officers Joseph McCauley and Michael Maresca
    were in the area of 13th and Pike Streets in Philadelphia when
    they heard gunfire. Officer McCauley ran towards the gunfire and
    observed [A]ppellant and other males shooting at each other while
    running southbound on 13th Street. When Officer McCauley
    ____________________________________________
    1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
    J-A26044-21
    ordered them to drop their weapons, [A]ppellant pointed his gun
    at the officer, said “[f**k] you,” and continued running while firing
    at Officer McCauley.
    When Officer Maresca . . . arrived on the scene, [A]ppellant
    turned and pointed his weapon at [him]. Appellant pulled the
    trigger, but the gun had no more ammunition and made only a
    clicking sound.
    Commonwealth v. Gurdine, 909 EDA 2010 (unpub. memo. at 2) (Pa. Super.
    Mar. 30, 2011) (paragraph break added and citation to trial court opinion
    omitted), appeal denied, 267 EAL 2011 (Pa. Nov. 14, 2011).
    Appellant was charged with, inter alia, two counts of attempted murder2
    of the two police officers.        The case proceeded to a bench trial, and on
    February 19, 2009, the trial court found Appellant guilty of these two counts,
    as well as violations of the Uniform Firearms Act3 and related offenses.4 On
    November 13, 2020, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 22½ to
    45 years’ imprisonment.
    Appellant took a direct appeal to this Court, which affirmed the
    judgment of sentence on March 30, 2011. See Gurdine, 909 EDA 2010. The
    ____________________________________________
    2   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2502(a).
    3   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101 – 6187.
    4 Appellant was also found guilty of: two counts each of simple assault,
    aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering another person, see 18
    Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a), 2702(a), 2705; and one count each of possessing an
    instrument of crime, persons not to possess firearms, firearms not to be
    carried without a license, and carrying firearms on public streets in
    Philadelphia. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 907(a), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a), 6108.
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    Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of
    appeal on November 14, 2011. See Gurdine, 267 EAL 2011.
    Relevant to our discussion of Bradley, infra, we review the ensuing
    PCRA procedural history in detail. On January 24, 2012, Appellant filed a pro
    se timely, first PCRA petition, raising multiple claims of trial counsel’s
    ineffectiveness and Officer Maresca’s alleged perjury at trial. Appellant’s Pro
    Se   Petition    for   Post-Conviction         Collateral   Relief,   1/24/12,   at   4-5
    (unpaginated). More than a year later, on February 21, 2013, PCRA counsel,
    Peter Levin, Esquire,5 filed an “amended petition,” presenting two claims: (1)
    trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file a post-trial motion challenging
    the weight of the evidence; and (2) direct appeal counsel’s ineffectiveness for
    failing to address the denial of Appellant’s motion to reconsider sentence.
    Appellant’s Amended Petition Under Post-Conviction Relief Act, 2/21/13, at 2-
    3.
    Almost one year thereafter, on February 2, 2014, Attorney Levin filed a
    “supplemental petition,” without first seeking leave of the PCRA court to do
    so. This petition raised an additional claim for the first time: that Appellant
    ____________________________________________
    5 It appears Attorney Levin was appointed. The trial docket includes two
    October 22, 2012, entries, which state, respectively, “Entry of Appearance”
    and “Appointment Notice.” Neither entry, however, identifies the attorney,
    and there are no corresponding documents in the certified record.
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    requested trial counsel to call witnesses, but counsel did not. 6 Appellant’s
    Supplemental Petition Under Post-Conviction Relief Act, 1/21/14, at 1.
    Attorney Levin attached signed statements by two individuals; both claimed
    they observed the shooting and that Appellant did not shoot at the police
    officers.7 Both witnesses also stated they were willing and available to testify
    at Appellant’s trial.
    The PCRA court denied the petition without a hearing. On appeal to this
    Court, Appellant re-raised his ineffectiveness claims that: (1) trial counsel
    failed to challenge the weight of the evidence in a post-sentence motion; and
    (2) direct appeal counsel failed to challenge the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence.     This Court addressed them on the merits and denied relief.
    Commonwealth v. Gurdine, 157 EDA 2015 (unpub. memo. at 4-7, 8-11)
    (Pa. Super. Apr. 12, 2016), appeal denied, 190 EAL 2016 (Pa. Sept. 27, 2016).
    However, this Court found Appellant’s third issue — whether trial counsel was
    ineffective for not calling two fact witnesses — was waived for failure to raise
    it in the timely amended PCRA petition. Id. at 7. Instead, this Court noted,
    ____________________________________________
    6We note Appellant’s pro se January 24, 2012, petition included an assertion,
    “Trial counsel failed to investigate/interview known witnesses.” Appellant’s
    Pro Se Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief at 4. However, Appellant
    provided no further discussion, including any explanation of who these
    witnesses were or what information they would have provided.
    7The two alleged eyewitnesses were Genessis Butler, an inmate at Riverside
    Correctional Facility, and Cheryl Campbell.
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    the issue was raised for the first time in an “unauthorized supplemental PCRA
    petition.” Id. at 7-8, citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A) (“The judge may grant leave
    to amend or withdraw a petition for post-conviction collateral relief at any
    time.”); Commonwealth v. Mason, 
    130 A.3d 601
    , 621 n.19 (Pa. 2015) (Rule
    905 “explicitly states that amendment is permitted only by direction or leave
    of the PCRA court’”). Accordingly, this Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief
    on April 12, 2016, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of
    appeal on September 27, 2016.
    Within a month thereof, on October 20, 2016, Appellant filed the instant
    PCRA petition, pro se.8        He did not invoke any of the PCRA’s timeliness
    exceptions.     Instead, Appellant raised a sole claim: Attorney Levin was
    ineffective for failing to seek leave of court before filing the supplemental PCRA
    petition, which resulted in waiver of Appellant’s claim of trial counsel’s
    ineffectiveness for failing to investigate witnesses.             Appellant’s Post-
    Conviction Relief Act Petition, 10/20/16, at 5. Appellant averred he became
    aware    of   Attorney    Levin’s    ineffectiveness   through   this   Court’s   prior
    ____________________________________________
    8 This October 20, 2016, filing date corresponds to the date on the postage
    stamp on Appellant’s envelope. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 
    17 A.3d 1279
    , 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“Under the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem a
    pro se document filed on the date it is placed in the hands of prison authorities
    for mailing.”).
    -5-
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    memorandum. He requested relief in the form of reinstatement of his “initial
    PCRA rights.”9 Appellant’s Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition, 10/20/16, at 7.
    On January 4, 2021 — more than four years after Appellant filed the
    PCRA petition — the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to
    dismiss the petition without a hearing.10 The court reasoned the petition was
    untimely, and Appellant did not invoke any timeliness exception.        Notice
    Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, 1/4/21. The notice
    informed Appellant that any response must be filed within 20 days. 
    Id.
     On
    February 4th — beyond the 20-day period — Appellant filed a pro se extension
    of time to file a response to the Rule 907 notice. The court did not rule on
    this extension request, and on April 30, 2021, issued the underlying order
    denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.11   The PCRA court filed an
    opinion on June 8, 2021, reasoning that Appellant filed the PCRA petition
    ____________________________________________
    9Subsequently, Appellant filed the following additional pro se pleadings, which
    raised additional claims: (1) on November 23, 2016, an amended PCRA
    petition; (2) on February 10, 2017, a “Memorandum of Law Regarding Actual
    Innocence and Failure to Investigate Witnesses;” and (3) more than three
    years later, on July 8, 2020, a second amended PCRA petition. Appellant did
    not seek leave of court to file these.
    10The docket does not indicate a reason for the lapse of time following
    Appellant’s filing of the initial petition on October 20, 2016.
    11The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
    of errors complained of on appeal.
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    beyond the general one-year filing period, but did not invoke any of the
    timeliness exceptions. PCRA Ct. Op., 6/8/21, at 3.
    Appellant raises one issue for our review:
    Whether the PCRA court was in error in dismissing the Appellant’s
    PCRA petition as untimely pursuant to 42 [Pa.C.S.] §9545(b).
    Appellant’s Brief at 7.
    Appellant does not invoke any of the enumerated timeliness exceptions
    at Subsection 9545(b)(1), but instead cites the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
    2009 plurality decision in Commonwealth v. Ligons, 
    971 A.2d 1125
     (Pa.
    2009).12     Appellant reiterates Ligon’s statement that “Pa.R.Crim.P. 904
    embodies an enforceable right to effective PCRA counsel in a first PCRA
    petition and therefore we must permit claims challenging PCRA counsel’s
    stewardship in an appeal to this Court.”         See Ligons, 971 A.2d at 1138;
    Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant further cites this passage:
    [A]bsent invocation of one of the three statutory exceptions to the
    timeliness requirement set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-
    (iii), it would be virtually impossible for a petitioner to ever file a
    serial petition raising PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in a timely
    manner as his first PCRA petition would not be disposed of before
    the one-year statutory filing period expires.
    See Ligons, 971 A.2d at 1139-40; Appellant’s Brief at 15.             Finally, with
    respect to the merits of his present ineffectiveness claim, Appellant maintains:
    ____________________________________________
    12  Justice Todd joined Justice Baer’s majority opinion. Chief Justice Castille
    filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Eakin and McCaffery.
    Justice Saylor filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.
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    (1) his underlying claim has arguable merit, where Attorney Levin’s actions
    resulted in the waiver of his first PCRA claim; (2) Attorney Levin did not
    “operat[e] within the strictures of criminal procedures [and thus] denied
    Appellant the opportunity to have his ineffective claim hear[d;]” and (3)
    “Appellant’s interest[s] were not served by counsel’s course of action.”
    Appellant’s Brief at 16. After careful review, we determine no relief is due.
    Preliminarily, we note the relevant standard of review:
    We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
    light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This
    review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence
    of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is
    supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.
    Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 
    204 A.3d 448
    , 450 (Pa. Super. 2019)
    (citation omitted). With respect to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements, this
    Court has explained:
    Section 9545 of the PCRA expressly states that a PCRA petition
    “shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes
    final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545. A judgment of sentence becomes
    final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
    review, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review. [42
    Pa.C.S.] § 9545(b)(3). “Our courts have strictly interpreted this
    requirement as creating a jurisdictional deadline.” A court may
    not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition
    was not timely filed.
    Id. (some citations omitted).
    Here, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s October 20, 2020,
    petition was filed beyond the PCRA’s general one-year filing period.         Our
    Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal from his
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    direct appeal on November 14, 2011. Appellant had 90 days, or until Monday,
    February 13, 2012, to file a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
    Court.13 He did not, and thus his judgment of sentence became final for PCRA
    purposes on that day. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant then generally
    had one year, or until February 13, 2013, to file a PCRA petition. See 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). The instant petition was filed more than seven years
    thereafter and, as the PCRA court pointed out, Appellant did not invoke any
    of the Subsection 9545(b)(1) timeliness exceptions.         See 42 Pa.C.S. §
    9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii); PCRA Ct. Op. at 3. On appeal, Appellant likewise does not
    rely on any of the Subsection 9545(b)(1) timeliness exceptions, but instead
    refers to the statements, quoted above, set forth in Ligons, 
    971 A.2d 1125
    .
    Nevertheless, we find instructive the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
    decision in Commonwealth v. Peterson, 
    192 A.3d 1123
     (Pa. 2018).14 In
    ____________________________________________
    13The 90th day after November 14, 2011, was Sunday, February 12th. For
    purposes of calculating PCRA time requirements, Appellant thus had until the
    next day, Monday, to seek certiorari. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 30(1) (where last
    permitted day for filing falls on weekend, filing deadline shall be extended to
    next business day).
    14 We acknowledge the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth
    v. Bradley, 
    261 A.3d 381
     (Pa. Oct. 20, 2021), issued while this appeal was
    pending. In Bradley, the Court concluded: “[A] PCRA petitioner may, after
    a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se,
    raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so,
    even if on appeal.” Id. at 401 (footnote omitted). However, that case, unlike
    the instant matter, concerned a first, timely PCRA petition. See id. at 384.
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    Peterson, the petitioner’s attorney filed a PCRA petition one day beyond the
    filing deadline.    Id. at 1125.      Nevertheless, the PCRA court conducted an
    evidentiary hearing and denied relief on the merits. Id. at 1126. On appeal,
    this Court quashed the appeal, finding the petition was filed one day late. Id.
    The petitioner then filed a second PCRA petition, claiming counsel was
    ineffective in filing the prior petition late. Peterson, 192 A.3d at 1126. The
    PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing, found the petitioner did not know his
    attorney missed the filing deadline, and accordingly concluded the second
    PCRA petition was timely filed. Id. at 1127. On appeal, this Court reversed,
    concluding the petition was not timely filed. Id.
    Our Supreme Court reversed this Court’s decision, holding “[c]ounsel’s
    untimely filing of [the] first PCRA petition constituted ineffectiveness per se,
    as it completely foreclosed [the petitioner] from obtaining review of the
    collateral claims set forth in his first PCRA petition.” Peterson, 192 A.3d at
    1132. The Court considered the
    [“]distinction between situations in which counsel has narrowed
    the ambit of appellate review by the claims he has raised or
    foregone versus those instances, as here, in which counsel has
    ____________________________________________
    In any event, we do not consider the applicability of Bradley to the
    instant appeal. Although “a new rule of constitutional law is generally
    retrospectively applicable . . . to cases pending on direct appellate review[,]”
    “a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure [generally] does not apply . .
    . to convictions that were final when the new rule was announced.”
    Commonwealth v. Washington, 
    142 A.3d 810
    , 813 (Pa. 2016) (citations
    omitted). As the present appeal lies from the denial of PCRA relief, rather
    than from the judgment of sentence, Bradley is not applicable.
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    J-A26044-21
    failed to file an appeal at all.” We concluded that the difference in
    degree between partial and complete deprivations of review is
    significant, as the latter “is the functional equivalent of having no
    counsel at all.” This denial of counsel constitutes a form of
    ineffectiveness per se, pursuant to which prejudice must be
    presumed because the process itself has been rendered
    “presumptively unreliable” under the Sixth Amendment. [See]
    Commonwealth v. Rosado, . . . 
    150 A.3d 425
    , 428-29 (Pa.
    2018) (“[T]his Court has . . . held that errors which completely
    foreclose appellate review amount to a constructive denial of
    counsel and thus ineffectiveness of counsel per se, whereas those
    which only partially foreclose such review are subject to the
    ordinary Strickland/Pierce[15] framework.”) . . . .
    Id. at 1129 (some citations omitted).
    Here, Appellant correctly points out that Attorney Levin’s failure to
    preserve his one issue — whether trial counsel was ineffective for not calling
    two fact witnesses — resulted in the waiver of that issue. See Gurdine, 157
    EDA 2015 (unpub. memo. at 7-8). Accordingly, neither the PCRA court nor
    this Court considered the merits of the claim. Nevertheless, we emphasize
    that Appellant was afforded review on the other claims raised in his first,
    timely PCRA petition.       The PCRA court denied relief on — albeit without a
    hearing — and on appeal, this Court addressed the merits of Appellant’s claims
    that: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the weight of the
    ____________________________________________
    15 Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
     (1984); Commonwealth v.
    Pierce, 
    527 A.2d 973
     (Pa. 1987). Under Pennsylvania’s Pierce/Strickland
    standard, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show:
    “(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction
    lacked a reasonable strategic basis; and (3) but for counsel’s conduct, there
    is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have
    been different.” Rosado, 150 A.3d at 429.
    - 11 -
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    evidence in a post-sentence motion; and (2) direct appeal counsel was
    ineffective for not challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See
    id. at 4-7, 8-11. Thus, while Attorney Levin “narrowed the ambit of appellate
    review by the claims he has raised or foregone,” his actions did not result in
    a “complete deprivation[ ] of review.”     See Peterson, 192 A.3d at 1129.
    Accordingly, Attorney Levin was not ineffective per se under Peterson, and
    the PCRA court did not err in denying relief. On this basis, we affirm the denial
    of relief.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/25/2022
    - 12 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1070 EDA 2021

Judges: McCaffery, J.

Filed Date: 2/25/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/25/2022