Com. v. Snyder, J. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN HENRY SNYDER :
:
Appellant : No. 1025 MDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 20, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No: CP-22-CR-0002081-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2022
Appellant, John Henry Snyder, appeals from the July 20, 2021 order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, denying his
supplemental petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The PCRA court determined that
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request an alibi instruction at the
conclusion of Appellant’s jury trial. Appellant submits that this was error and
that he is entitled to a new trial. Upon review, we affirm.
As the PCRA court explained, at the conclusion of his June 2017 jury
trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated indecent assault of a child,
aggravated indecent assault (complainant less than 13 years old), indecent
assault (complainant less than 13 years old), unlawful contact with a minor
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(sexual offenses), and corruption of minors.1 Memorandum Order, 7/20/21,
at 1.2 On September 20, 2017, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term
of 13 to 26 years in prison. After his post-sentence motions were denied,
Appellant filed a direct appeal to this Court. On July 25, 2018, we affirmed
his judgment of sentence.
On July 26, 2019, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition. Appointed
counsel filed a supplemental petition seeking reinstatement of appellate
rights. Those rights were reinstated and Appellant sought allowance of appeal
to our Supreme Court. On March 9, 2020, the Supreme Court denied his
appeal.
On June 15, 2020, Appellant filed another PCRA petition. Appointed
counsel subsequently filed a supplemental petition, asserting trial counsel
ineffectiveness for failure to request an alibi instruction. The Commonwealth
filed its response and the PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
April 2, 2021. By order entered on July 20, 2021, the court denied Appellant’s
petition. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents one issue for this Court’s consideration:
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125(b), 3125(a)(7), 3126(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), and
6301(a)(1), respectively. The jury acquitted Appellant on a charge of rape of
a child. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c).
2 The trial judge also presided over Appellant’s PCRA proceedings.
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Whether the PCRA Court erred denying relief based upon the claim
that the trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to
request the standard alibi jury instruction, Pa. SSJI (Criminal)
3.11, when testimony showed that the complaining witness, A.M.,
testified that Appellant committed crimes at the precise time (July
2012/Summer of 2012) when it was established that the Appellant
was at another location (Dauphin County Prison)?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
“[A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews its
conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
In addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we are guided by
the following authorities:
[A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief [for ineffective assistance
of counsel] only when he proves, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from the
“[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process
that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). “Counsel is presumed
effective, and to rebut that presumption, the PCRA petitioner must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that
such deficiency prejudiced him.” Commonwealth v. Colavita,
993 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). In Pennsylvania, we have refined the
Strickland performance and prejudice test into a three-part
inquiry. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa.
2001). Thus, to prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner must
show that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2)
counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3)
the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result.
Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010). “If a
petitioner fails to prove any of these prongs, his claim fails.”
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (Pa. 2013).
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Spotz, 84 A.3d at 311-12 (citations modified).
With respect to the alibi instruction, our Supreme Court has explained
that “[a]n alibi is a defense that places the defendant at the relevant time in
a different place than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to
render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.” Commonwealth v.
Jones, 210 A.3d 1014, 1017 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Ali, 10 A.3d at 316).
In the context of the three prongs of the ineffectiveness test, the PCRA
court first considered whether Appellant’s claim had arguable merit, i.e.,
“whether the testimony provided by the victim at trial revealed whether an
alibi defense was appropriate.” Memorandum Order, 7/20/21, at 1. The court
proceeded to summarize the testimony presented at trial. Based on our
review, we find that the PCRA court’s factual findings, with citations to the
notes of testimony, are supported by the record. See Memorandum Order,
7/20/21, at 3-5.
Essentially, the victim, A.M., testified that she was born in February
2006. In 2011, she resided in Middletown, PA, with her mother and Appellant,
who was then married to her mother, as well as her younger half-brother, who
was the son of her mother and Appellant. A.M. testified that when she was
about six years old, Appellant raped and otherwise sexually assaulted her over
the course of five to seven days. A.M., who was eleven years old at the time
of the trial, described the assaults in great detail. See Notes of Testimony
(“N.T.”), Trial, at 20-41. On cross-examination, she stated that the assaults
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took place in “about July” of 2012. Id. at 53. On redirect, she repeated that
the events occurred about a year before she told her mother and that it was
“sometime in July.” Id. at 77. A.M. testified that she did not tell her mother—
or anyone else—about the assaults until October 2013 when her mother
received papers in the mail indicating her divorce from Appellant was final.
A.M. explained that she told her mother at that time because she “knew that
he wouldn’t be with us and that they were separated finally.” Id. at 43.
The PCRA court noted that Appellant was in and out of prison throughout
his relationship with A.M.’s mother, largely for violating protection from abuse
orders. Memorandum Order, 7/20/21, at 4. The court explained that the
Commonwealth introduced a timeline at trial establishing that Appellant was
in prison from May 22, 2012 until November 22, 2012. Id. Accordingly,
Appellant’s counsel argued in his closing that A.M. “told you it happened in
July. If something happened to [A.M.], it wasn’t at the hands of [Appellant].”
N.T., Closing Arguments and Jury Charge, at 4-5.
The PCRA court did not find that argument dispositive, concluding that,
“as a six year old child, she was not exactly sure when she was victimized.
However, the victim was explcitily able to testify to what happened to her.
Thus we are not sure whether an alibi instruction would have been proper.”
Memorandum Order, 7/20/21, at 5. The court then appropriately noted that
even if Appellant was entitled to an alibi charge, i.e., even if Appellant’s claim
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was of arguable merit, it was necessary to consider the other prongs of the
Pierce test. Id.
The PCRA court proceeded to examine the second prong, i.e., whether
counsel had a reasonable basis for not requesting an alibi instruction.
“Admittedly, trial counsel conceded at the PCRA evidentiary hearing that he
could not recall what, if any, trial strategy supported his deicsion not to
request an alibi instruction. Thus, [Appellant] has satisfied element two of
the Pierce test.” Id.
The PCRA court next discussed the third prong, i.e., whether counsel’s
omission resulted in actual prejudice to Appellant. Similarly, in Jones, the
Court determined that the resolution of the appeal turned on the prejudice
prong of the Pierce test. The Court explained:
In the context of a post-conviction challenge to counsel’s
stewardship, prejudice is established where the truth-determining
process was so undermined that “no reliable adjudication of guilt
or innocence could have taken place,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii),
i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error,
the outcome of the trial would have been different. See
Commonwealth v. Laird, 119 A.3d 972, 978 (Pa. 2015) (citing
Commonwealth v. Harris, 852 A.2d 1168, 1173 (Pa. 2004)).
This does not mean a different outcome would have been more
likely than not; a reasonable probability is a probability “sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Id.(citing Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 613 (Pa. 2012)).
Still, a speculative or attenuated possibility of a different outcome
is insufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. See
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792
(2011) (“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial,
not just conceivable.” (citation omitted)).
Jones, 210 A.3d at 1018-19 (citations modified) (footnote omitted).
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In Jones, our Supreme Court indicated that “the totality of the
evidence” introduced at trial is to be reviewed in order to evaluate whether an
appellant has proven prejudice. Id. at 1019 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069). Here, the PCRA court aptly summarized the
testimony of the victim, noting that while she was unable to state exactly
when the abuse occurred, she nevertheless “testified to the gruesome details
that she had to endure.” Memorandum Order, 7/20/21, at 5-6. However, as
our Supreme Court instructed in Jones, the testimony of other witnesses is
also important to a review of “the totality of the evidence.” Jones, 210 A.3d
at 1019.
At trial, A.M.’s mother testified not only to A.M.’s details of the abuse
revealed upon the mother’s receipt of her divorce decree, but also to details
of the tumultuous and oft-times violent relationship mother had with Appellant
during their marriage, giving credence to A.M.’s statement that she did not
tell her mother about the abuse when it happened because Appellant
threatened A.M., saying he would kill her mother if she reported the abuse.
N.T., Trial, at 122-40, 148-53, 179. Further, representatives from the
Children’s Resource Center and District Attorney’s Child Abuse Unit testified
as to their interactions with A.M., her descriptions of the abuse, and her
October and November 2013 video interviews, which were shown to the jury.
Id. at 102-04, 229-33. Finally, Appellant’s sister testified that Appellant
admitted to her and her husband on three occasions that Appellant molested
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A.M. She explained that the first two times he admitted his actions, he had
been drinking and she thought he was just joking. However, the third time
Appellant acknowledged his misconduct, he was not drinking and she decided
he was serious, prompting her to contact A.M.’s mother. Id. at 276-85.
Admittedly, Appellant and his sister had a strained relationship at the time of
the third “confession.” However, it was up to the jury to consider whether her
testimony was credible. Further, as the PCRA court recognized, “defense
counsel made it abundantly clear, during cross-examination and in his closing
argument, that [Appellant] was incarcerated during the time that the victim
testified that the abuse occurred.” Memorandum Order, 7/20, 21, at 6. See
also N.T., Closing Arguments and Jury Charge, at 4-5.
In Jones, after considering the evidence admitted at trial, the Court
then stated:
When evaluating prejudice based on the lack of an alibi
instruction, courts have considered whether the trial court
expressly charged the jury that the burden is always on the
government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
that burden never shifts to the defendant. This is relevant
because such an instruction, if given, tends to diminish the
concern that jurors might otherwise have believed that, by
offering an alibi, the defendant was required to prove it rather
than simply create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. See
generally Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 1068(recognizing that, in undertaking a prejudice analysis, reviewing
courts assume that the fact-finder “reasonably, conscientiously,
and impartially appl[ied] the standards that govern[ed] the
decision”); Commonwealth v. Brown, 605 Pa. 103, 124, 987
A.2d 699, 712 (2009) (noting juries are presumed to follow the
court's directions).
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Here, the trial court defined the concept of reasonable doubt and
then explained the government had the burden of proving guilt
beyond that threshold. The court continued by emphasizing that
the defendant is presumed innocent and “has no duty to prove
anything.” N.T., July 26, 2011, at 571 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 525 (reflecting that the Commonwealth, in its
summation, also highlighted that the defendant “does not have to
prove anything”). Although the judge did not specifically say
Appellant had no duty to prove his alibi, it seems likely his alibi
would have been understood by the jury as encompassed by the
term “anything.”
Jones, 210 A.3d at 1024-25 (some citations omitted).
In the case before us, the trial court similarly provided instructions
addressing the presumption of innocence and instructed that the presumption
carries throughout the trial, unless and until the jury concludes that
Commonwealth has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Memorandum
Order, 7/20/21, at 6 (quoting N.T., Closing Arguments and Jury Charge, 45-
46). The court continued, explaining reasonable doubt. Id. at 7 (quoting
N.T., Closing Arguments and Jury Charge, at 46-47). Additionally, the court
addressed credibility, instructing the jurors that they were the sole judges of
credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. Id. at 7-8 (quoting N.T.,
Closing Arguments and Jury Charge, 42, 47-49.)3
As the PCRA court explained:
[The trial court’s] instructions suggest that [the] jury considered
all the testimony and inconsistencies presented in reaching a final
verdict. Thus, the instructions when read as a whole clarified that
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3 We note that Appellant did not testify at trial. The trial court properly
delivered a “no adverse inference” instruction. N.T., Closing Arguments and
Jury Charge, at 49.
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the burden remained on the government to prove that the
defendant did in fact commit the crimes. Further, the
Commonwealth’s evidence of guilt was substantial. The strength
of the government’s evidence is relevant because “a verdict or
conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to
have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record
support.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104
S.Ct. 2052[,] 2069 (1984). The victim’s testimony was very
compelling and it was the province of the jury to decide the
credibility of the witness.
Memorandum Order, 7/20/21, at 8 (footnote omitted).
There was no challenge to the Commonwealth’s exhibit indicating
Appellant was in prison in July 2012. As noted, defense counsel made it clear
during cross-examination of Commonwealth witnesses and during his closing
argument that Appellant could not have committed the assaults during July
2012. The question for the jury to decide was not if the abuse occurred during
July 2012, but rather whether A.M.’s claim of abuse was credible, even if her
timeline was incorrect. As illustrated above, there was substantial evidence
that Appellant assaulted A.M. Appellant has not established that there is a
reasonable probability of a different outcome had trial counsel requested, and
the court delivered, an alibi instruction. Again, “[t]he likelihood of a different
result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Jones, 210 A.3d at 1019
(quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112, 131 S.Ct. at 792). Because Appellant
has failed to demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice based on the lack
of an alibi instruction, he has not satisfied the third prong of the Pierce
ineffectiveness test and is not entitled to PCRA relief.
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Based on our review of the record, we find that the PCRA court’s findings
of facts are supported by the record. Further, we find no error in the court’s
conclusions of law. Therefore, we shall affirm the PCRA court’s order denying
Appellant’s petition for collateral relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/04/2022
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