Com. v. Reeves, K. ( 2018 )

J-S40040-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KIMBERLY N. REEVES :
:
Appellant : No. 883 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 10, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-0000967-2016
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2018
Kimberly Reeves appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, after a jury convicted her of one
count of aggravated assault – serious bodily injury,1 one count of aggravated
assault – serious bodily injury of an enumerated person,2 two counts of
aggravated assault – bodily injury of an enumerated person,3 two counts of
attempting to put an enumerated person in fear of imminent serious bodily
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(2).
3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(3).
____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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injury,4 two counts of simple assault,5 two counts of attempting to put another
in fear of imminent serious bodily injury by physical menace,6 and two counts
of recklessly endangering another person.7 Upon careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts underlying this case as
follows:
Briana Levanture (hereinafter [] Levanture) is employed by the
Delaware County Children and Youth Services (hereinafter CYS)
and has been so employed for the past three years. Through her
employment, [] Levanture had the occasion to become involved
with [Reeves] as her caseworker. On January 26, 2016, []
Levanture, along with her co-worker, [] Samantha Dawson
(hereinafter [] Dawson), went to visit [Reeves] at her home,
located at 279 Windermere Avenue in Lansdowne, PA. The visit
was scheduled via appointment made with [] Levanture’s superior
Kenneth Kelly; [] Levanture attempted an unannounced visit the
week prior without success.
[] Levanture and [] Dawson timely arrived for the scheduled home
visit at 3:00 p.m. [Reeves’] aunt, [Janet] McDaniel, let the
women into [Reeves’] home; it was not unusual for [] McDaniel to
be present during home visits. [Reeves], [] Dawson, [] Levanture,
and [] McDaniel all sat around the dining room table. [] Levanture
was aware that a [protection from abuse order (“PFA”)] had been
issued against [Reeves] earlier that day; however, without any
responsibility or authority to inform [Reeves] of the PFA, []
Levanture did not mention the PFA to [Reeves] during the
beginning of the meeting.
Within the initial 40-45 minutes of the visit, [Reeves] did not
inquire about the whereabouts of her children; however, once
____________________________________________
4 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(6).
5 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1).
6 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3).
7 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
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[she] became concerned that the children were not home from
school at their usual time, [] Levanture made the decision to
inform [Reeves] that the children were with their father pursuant
to the PFA issued against her.
After hearing the news, [Reeves] became increasingly agitated,
got up from the table and started pacing around the dining room
and living room using profanity. [Reeves] called [] Levanture and
[] Dawson ‘bitches’ and accused them of using crack cocaine.
[She] told the women to get the ‘fuck out of her house.’
At [Reeves’] demand, [] Levanture immediately began to gather
her things and got up from the table. [] Dawson was in the
process of answering a question posed by [] McDaniel when
[Reeves] approached [] Levanture and punched her in the face,
on the right side of her nose[,] causing [] Levanture to fall into
the chair behind her. The assault did not stop there; [Reeves]
continued to hit [] Levanture after she fell, leaving [] Levanture
helpless and unable to exit the situation. [Reeves] did not stop
assaulting [] Levanture despite [] Dawson and [] McDaniel yelling
at [Reeves] to stop.
In order to help her co-worker, [] Dawson grabbed a hold of
[Reeves’] shoulders, pulling her off of [] Levanture. [Reeves] then
grabbed [] hold of [] Dawson’s hair and began punching her face
several times. [] McDaniel attempted to pull [Reeves] off of []
Dawson, which caused [] Dawson to fall to the floor. With []
[Mc]Daniel restraining [Reeves’] hands, [Reeves] kicked []
Dawson in the jaw while she lay on the floor.
[] Dawson screamed for [] Levanture to call 911. With the
commotion, [Reeves’] oldest daughter (not a subject of the PFA)
came down from upstairs asking what was going on and
attempting to control [Reeves]. When [] Levanture and [] Dawson
were finally able to free themselves from [Reeves’] assault, they
called 911 and reported the situation; Lansdowne Police
Department responded to the call within minutes. After [Reeves’]
arrest, [] Levanture and [] Dawson were taken to the Lansdowne
Police Department where their injuries were photographed and
then both women went to Delaware County Memorial Hospital for
treatment.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/17, at 1-3 (internal citations omitted).
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At trial, the Commonwealth presented medical records from Delaware
County Memorial Hospital that showed Levanture suffered fractured nasal
bones and a sprain to the left shoulder joint. As a result of these injuries,
Levanture missed several days of work and required one month of physical
therapy for her shoulder. Levanture eventually went out on medical leave for
her mental health and wellbeing following this incident in Reeves’ home.
Dawson’s medical records indicated she suffered sprains to the cervical and
thoracic spines and a laceration to her face. Therefore, Dawson missed
several days of work for doctor’s appointments and physical therapy, and
lacked a full range of motion in her neck for a period of time. As a result of
this incident, Dawson no longer works for CYS for her own wellbeing.
After a trial, held December 6-7, 2016, a jury found Reeves guilty of the
above charges. On February 10, 2017, the trial court sentenced Reeves to
twenty-four to forty-eight months’ confinement and four years of consecutive
probation. In March 2017, trial counsel filed a timely notice of appeal, but
subsequently petitioned the trial court to withdraw, which request was
granted. The Office of the Public Defender was appointed to represent Reeves
and requested an extension of time to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Thereafter, the Office of the Public Defender filed an application to withdraw
its representation due to a conflict. New counsel was appointed to assist
Reeves, who filed another conflict petition and application to withdraw, which
the trial court granted. On June 27, 2017 new counsel was again appointed,
and filed an application for an extension in which to file a Rule 1925(b)
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statement. The trial court granted that request and, on September 12, 2017,
counsel filed a timely statement of matters complained of on appeal.
Reeves presents the following issues for our consideration on appeal:
1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in denying [Reeves’] motion
to charge the jury with [Reeves’] defense of [property
justification], and denying [her] request to charge the jury with
the definition of ‘trespass,’ when substantial evidence was
adduced at trial to substantiate the giving of said instructions
in that [Reeves] requested multiple times for the alleged
victims to leave and said alleged victims did not leave upon
request[?]
2. Whether the [t]rial [court] erred in not instructing the jury on
the relationship between [Reeves’] requested charge of [a
defense of property justification], and the instruction given for
[the use of non-deadly force in self-defense justification], when
the [t]rial [c]ourt denied [Reeves’] oral motion to charge the
jury with [Reeve’s] [defense of property justification][?]
3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in limiting the jury’s
consideration of the issues in [Reeves’] case in violation of
[Reeves’] rights under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, and under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, when the [t]rial [j]udge
instructed the jury that ‘[t]his case is about an alleged assault
and Defendant’s contention that she acted in self-defense.
That’s what this case is about, nothing else’[?]
4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion in sustaining
the Commonwealth’s objections on grounds of legal
conclusions to [Reeves’] cross-examination, when said
questions were proper subjects of cross-examination[?]
5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in denying [Reeves’] request
to treat [] Ken Kelly as a hostile witness pursuant to Pa.R.E.
611(c) when [] Kelly was a hostile witness and/or a witness
identified with an adverse party in that [] Kelly worked for the
Delaware County Children and Youth Services, the same
agency for which the alleged victims worked at the time of the
alleged altercation[?]
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6. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in sustaining the
Commonwealth’s objection during [d]efense [c]ounsel’s closing
argument, when the Commonwealth opened the door to
[d]efense [c]ounsel’s comment on why the Commonwealth did
not call the doctor who diagnosed the victims for purposes of
worker’s compensation by eliciting testimony through the
victims of said doctor’s diagnoses, respectively, and by
mentioning in its opening statement that the alleged victims
‘went to the hospital to have their injuries tended to’[?]
Appellant’s Brief, at 4-6.
Reeves’ first two arguments concern the refusal of the trial court to
administer jury instructions regarding her defense of property justification.
Our standard of review is well-settled:
In reviewing a jury charge, we determine whether the trial court
committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which
controlled the outcome of the case. We must view the charge as
a whole; the trial court is free to use its own form of expression
in creating the charge. Our key inquiry is whether the instruction
on a particular issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents
the law to the jury, and is sufficient to guide the jury in its
deliberations.
Commonwealth v. Wise, 171 A.3d 784, 787-88 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
Defendants are generally entitled to jury instructions they request, so
long as they are supported by the evidence. Commonwealth v. Hairston,
84 A.3d 657, 668, (Pa. 2014). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
explained:
[T]he reason for this rule is that instructing the jury on legal
principles that cannot rationally be applied to the facts presented
at trial may confuse them and place obstacles in the path of a just
verdict. A criminal defendant must, therefore, establish that the
trial evidence would reasonably support a verdict based on the
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desired charge and may not claim entitlement to an instruction
that has no basis in the evidence presented during trial.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). A trial court’s refusal to give
a requested charge does not merit reversal unless the defendant was
prejudiced by that refusal. Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77 A.3d 663, 667
(Pa. Super. 2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 904 A.2d 964, 970
(Pa. Super. 2006).
A defendant is entitled to the defense of property instruction where she
believes force is immediately necessary “to prevent or terminate an unlawful
entry or other trespass upon land.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 507(a)(1). Reeves has not
demonstrated that she was entitled to such an instruction.
Levanture and Dawson were present in Reeves’ home for a pre-arranged
visit. While Reeves herself did not physically admit the workers onto her
property, the two were invited guests until about forty-five minutes into the
meeting, when Levanture informed Reeves of the existence of the PFA against
her. Once Reeves became angry and demanded that Levanture and Dawson
leave, the CYS workers did not attempt to stay longer than the time necessary
to collect their belongings. In the course of their attempted exit, Reeves
began her assault. Reeves presented no evidence that the two women
lingered on her property or showed any sign of refusing to leave. The sole
evidence conceivably supporting a defense of property instruction came from
Reeves’ own testimony that she screamed for the women to leave. Morever,
there was no evidence that the force used by Reeves was necessary to eject
the workers from her home. Indeed, Reeves’s own testimony indicated that
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Levanture began to place her belongings into her bag after being asked to
leave. N.T. Trial, 12/7/16, at 125 (“And she’s sitting there with her legs
crossed, and then I see her sliding what looks to be like her cell phone down
in her bag.”). In light of the foregoing, it was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to refuse to give the defense of property justification.8
Reeves next argues the trial court erred by sustaining the
Commonwealth’s objections to defense counsel’s cross-examination of
Levanture on the grounds that the questions called for legal conclusions.
Reeves argues that, in sustaining the objections, Reeves was improperly
prohibited from eliciting testimony from Levanture regarding her personal
perception of her injuries. Reeves is entitled to no relief.
Questions regarding the admission of evidence are left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and we, as an appellate court,
will not disturb the trial court’s rulings regarding the admissibility
of evidence absent an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of
discretion is not merely an error of judgment; rather, discretion is
abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment
exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record.
Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1036 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
____________________________________________
8Because we find that Reeves was not entitled to an instruction on defense of
property, we need not address her next two claims that she was entitled to
an instruction clarifying the interplay between the defenses of self-defense
and defense of property and that the trial court improperly “limited” the jury’s
consideration of the issues.
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Here, trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objections to the
following questions on the basis that they called for legal conclusions because
the phrasing of the questions tracked the statute:9
DEFENSE COUNSEL: At any point in time did you believe that you
might lose the function of some type of body organ or—
...
DEFENSE COUNSEL: In regard to your injury, you really didn’t
have any impairment [of] physical condition, did you?
N.T. Trial, 12/6/16, at 148, 149. After the court sustained the
Commonwealth’s objections, counsel rephrased his questions as follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you lose your sense of smell?
WITNESS: No.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So your nose still works?
WITNESS: Yes.
Id. at 149. Because counsel was able to effectively cross-examine the witness
regarding her injuries, Reeves suffered no prejudice.
Reeves also claims that the trial court improperly sustained the
Commonwealth’s general objection to the following question:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: But you didn’t find your injuries severe
enough to require you to go to the hospital—
COMMONWEALTH: Objection Judge.
____________________________________________
9See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (defining serious bodily injury as “injury which creates
a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement
or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ”).
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Id. at 150. Defense counsel immediately rephrased the question as follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You didn’t request to the police officer to go
to the hospital immediately?
WITNESS: No.
Id.
Again, Reeves was able to elicit the desired information from Levanture
upon rephrasing the questions. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in
sustaining the Commonwealth’s non-specific objection, Reeves cannot
demonstrate that she suffered any prejudice as a result of the court’s ruling.
Next, Reeves argues the trial court erred in denying her request to treat
Ken Kelly as a hostile witness. Particularly, Reeves argues that Kelly should
have been deemed a hostile witness based upon his employment at CYS,
which rendered him “a witness identified with an adverse party.” Appellant’s
Brief, at 37, quoting Pa.R.E. 611(c). Rule 611(c) provides:
Leading questions should not be used on direct or redirect
examination except as necessary to develop the witness’s
testimony. Ordinarily, the court should allow leading questions:
(1) on cross-examination; and
(2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a
witness identified with an adverse party. A witness so examined
should usually be interrogated by all other parties as to whom the
witness is not hostile or adverse as if under redirect examination.
Pa.R.E. 611(c).
A witness may be treated as hostile where “the testimony of the witness
is unexpected, contradictory to earlier statements, and harmful to the party
calling the witness, and where an injustice would result if the request to treat
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the witness as hostile is denied.” Commonwealth v. Bibbs, 970 A.2d 440,
453 (Pa. Super. 2009), citing Commonwealth v. Lambert, 765 A.2d 306,
357-59 (Pa. Super. 2000). Trial courts have wide discretion in controlling the
use of leading questions, and a court’s decision to allow or disallow them will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 453.
Here, Reeves called Kelly to establish that Reeves had had previous,
unfavorable interactions with Levanture in the course of Levanture’s
employment with CYS. His testimony was elicited to lend credibility to the
claim that Reeves’ assault was justified. The trial court observed that “Kelly’s
testimony was cooperative, not biased or unexpected, and his demeanor
towards counsel was professional and appropriate. There was no reason to
treat [] Kelly as a hostile witness solely because he was employed by CYS as
well.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/17, at 13. We can discern no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing Reeves’ groundless request
to treat Kelly as a hostile witness.
Finally, Reeves argues the trial court erred in sustaining a
Commonwealth objection to defense counsel’s closing argument. The relevant
portion of the closing is as follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: But, funny, the doctor [Levanture and
Dawson] go to the [day after the assault] finds fractures, spinal
injuries, and all these other injuries. This is a determination you
can make, but I don’t think the emergency room would have
missed those things. I don’t think they would have. If there were
serious injuries, the emergency room would have caught that.
They wouldn’t have discharged them with just ibuprofen . . .[.]
But funny, the doctor who’s responsible for putting people on
worker’s [compensation] and some other things, he finds a host
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of injuries. Why didn’t that doctor appear? I argue that he
probably knew—
COMMONWEALTH: Objection, Judge.
THE COURT: Basis?
COMMONWEALTH: Speculation with regard to why evidence
wasn’t presented.
THE COURT: Sustained.
N.T. Trial, 12/7/16, 205-06.
At trial, both Levanture and Dawson testified as to their injuries and
diagnoses; neither witness’s testimony provoked an objection from defense
counsel. There is no evidence that Reeves ever subpoenaed the treating
physicians to assess what they did or did not know, and they did not testify
at trial. A closing argument must be based upon evidence in the record or
reasonable inferences therefrom. Commonwealth v. Culver, 51 A.3d 866,
878 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal citations omitted). Here, there was no
evidence of record to support counsel’s speculative statements. Accordingly,
the trial court properly sustained the Commonwealth’s objection, and Reeves’
final claim is meritless.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/31/18
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