Com. v. Coker, T. ( 2018 )

J-S22023-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TYJAH COKER
Appellant No. 3348 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered September 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0009563-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: Filed July 20, 2018
Appellant, Tyjah Coker, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
on September 12, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
following his convictions of attempted kidnapping and unlawful restraint of a
minor, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2901(a.1) and 2902(b)(1), respectively. Appellant
asserts the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction. We disagree
and, therefore, affirm.
Following a waiver trial held on May 16, 2016, the trial court aptly
summarized its findings of fact as follows:
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S22023-18
On June 18, 2014, 7-year-old complainant S.E. was playing ball
with a milk crate outside her home [] in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Complainant was accompanied by her three minor
siblings and her mother. At that time, [Appellant 1] grabbed
complainant and began dragging her down the street by her left
arm. The complainant’s mother [] grabbed the wooden milk crate
and began beating [Appellant] in the head in an effort to free her
daughter. She hit him so many times that she lost count, but
continued beating him even as blood began coming out of [his]
head. Meanwhile, the complainant continued to scream, “Mom,
mom, help me.” Although testimony at trial was somewhat
inconsistent as to the exact distance that [Appellant] had the
complainant, it was clear that he made it at least to the end of the
block before she was released. After finally freeing her daughter,
[complainant’s mother] continued to chase [Appellant] until he
ran into a nearby store at 16th and Cecil B. Moore Streets. During
that time, she also called 911, and the cops arrived almost
immediately. After dropping the complainant, [Appellant] was
chased by other males in the neighborhood, including the
complainant’s father, who proceeded to beat him up before he was
apprehended by police. The cops arrived at the scene and
arrested [Appellant] at the store. The complainant was taken to
the hospital, but only sustained scrapes and bruises.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/17, at 2.
At the conclusion of the waiver trial, the court found Appellant guilty of,
inter alia, attempted kidnapping of a minor and unlawful restraint of a minor.
The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of four to ten years in state
prison, followed by six years’ probation. Appellant filed a post-sentence
motion that was denied on September 27, 2016. This timely appeal followed.
Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant asks us to consider two issues in this appeal:
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1Appellant, whose date of birth is January 15, 1982, was thirty-two years of
age on June 18, 2014.
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A. Was not the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to sustain
[Appellant’s] conviction for attempted kidnapping of a minor
where [Appellant’s] conduct did not demonstrate the requisite
intent, and did not the trial court violate his due process right
to have every element of every charge against him proven
beyond a reasonable doubt by inferring such intent where no
evidence existed?
B. Was not [Appellant] erroneously convicted of unlawful restraint
of a minor where there was insufficient evidence that he
exposed the complainant to actual risk of serious bodily injury?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Our standard of review from a challenge to sufficiency of evidence is
well settled.
When a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is made, our
task is to determine whether the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, were
sufficient to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment
for the fact-finder. Moreover, we must defer to the credibility
determinations of the trial court, as these are within the sole
province of the finder of fact. The trier of fact, while passing upon
the credibility of witnesses, is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence.
In re T.G., 836 A.2d 1003, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his
conviction of kidnapping. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2901 provides, in relevant part:
(a.1) Kidnapping of a minor.--A person is guilty of kidnapping
of a minor if he unlawfully removes a person under 18 years of
age a substantial distance under the circumstances from the place
where he is found, or if he unlawfully confines a person under 18
years of age for a substantial period in a place of isolation, with
any of the following intentions:
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(1) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage.
(2) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight
thereafter.
(3) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or
another.
(4) To interfere with the performance by public officials of
any governmental or political function.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2901(a.1) (emphasis added).2
Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
kidnapping the minor, S.E., because his conduct did not demonstrate requisite
intent. He claims the trial court inferred his intent and, as a result, violated
his due process rights to have each element of kidnapping proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. We cannot agree.
As this Court explained in Commonwealth v. Eckrote, 12 A.3d 383
(Pa. Super. 2010):
“The kidnapping statute is not designed to criminalize every sort
of incidental transportation or detention which may take place
during the commission of another crime.” Commonwealth v.
Mitchell, 883 A.2d 1096, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied,
587 Pa. 688, 897 A.2d 454 (2006). “Such trivial movements of
the victim generally do not substantially increase the risk of harm
to the victim.” Id. Therefore, to successfully prosecute the crime
of kidnapping under this section, the Commonwealth must
establish [the defendant] kidnapped his victim with the intent to
facilitate the commission of a felony. Commonwealth v. King,
786 A.2d 993, 994 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 571 Pa. 704,
812 A.2d 1228 (2002).
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2 The parties stipulated that S.E.’s date of birth is November 19, 2006. See
Notes of Testimony, 5/16/16, at 96. Therefore, she was seven years old on
June 18, 2014, when the underlying events occurred.
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Id. at 388 (emphasis in original). With respect to intent:
“A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of
an offense when . . . it is his conscious object to engage in conduct
of that nature or to cause such a result.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 302(b)(1)(i). “As intent is a subjective frame of mind, it is of
necessity difficult of direct proof.” Commonwealth v.
Matthews, 870 A.2d 924, 929 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).
“Intent can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence; it may
be inferred from acts or conduct or from the attendant
circumstances.” Id.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 641 (Pa. Super. 2017) (brackets
omitted). Importantly, “entirely circumstantial evidence is sufficient so long
as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Eckrote, 12 A.3d at 386 (citations omitted). “Any doubts
regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted).
Finally, “[t]he factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented at trial.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the evidence established that Appellant, a stranger to seven-year-
old S.E., grabbed her by the arm from in front of her home and dragged her
down the street as she called out to her mother for help. S.E.’s mother
responded by beating Appellant in the head with a wooden milk crate in an
attempt to free her daughter from Appellant’s grasp. As the trial court noted,
the testimony relating to the distance Appellant dragged S.E. was not clear.
However, it is clear that he removed S.E. from the front of her home and
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dragged her a distance that would likely be more than substantial to a seven-
year-old child. As the trial court stated, “[S]he was dragged, kicking and
screaming, down the street to at least the end of the complainant’s block. []
The distance here was enough to remove complainant from the safety of her
mother and her home.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/17, at 5 (unnumbered).3
In the course of doing so, Appellant caused S.E. to sustain scrapes to her legs
and feet. Id. at 2 (unnumbered).
Viewing the evidence—including circumstantial evidence—as well as all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to enable the trial
judge, as factfinder, to find that Appellant possessed the requisite intent to
kidnap S.E. and that the Commonwealth proved every element of kidnapping
a minor beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s first issue fails.
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3 Although Appellant does not assert the Commonwealth failed to prove he
moved S.E. a “substantial distance,” we find that element of the kidnapping
definition was satisfied here. When determining whether a victim was moved
a substantial distance, “this Court has held that the definition cannot be
confined to a given linear distance.” In re T.G., 836 A.2d at 1006 (citing
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 399 A.2d 693, 696 (Pa. Super. 1979) (en
banc)). “[A] sensible interpretation is one that views a substantial distance
as one that isolates the victim and exposes him or her to increased risk of
harm.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Campbell, 509 A.2d 394, 397 (Pa.
Super. 1986)).
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In his second issue, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction of unlawful restraint of a minor. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902
provides, in relevant part:
(b) Unlawful restraint of a minor where offender is not
victim’s parent.--If the victim is a person under 18 years of age,
a person who is not the victim’s parent commits a felony of the
second degree if he knowingly:
(1) restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing
him to risk of serious bodily injury[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(b)(1).
Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to prove he exposed S.E.
to “serious bodily injury.” “Serious bodily injury” is “[b]odily injury which
creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. Appellant argues that the evidence
showed he “pulled the girl down the sidewalk the distance of a few house
lengths. He carried no weapons, he made no threats and he never hit or
kicked or otherwise attempted to strike the complainant.” Appellant’s Brief at
15. Appellant then cites several decisions of this Court in an effort to
demonstrate that S.E. was never exposed to serious bodily injury. Id. at 15-
18. However, none of the cited cases is factually similar to the case before
us, where a 32-year-old man grabbed a 7-year-old girl and dragged her down
the street. Moreover, as the Commonwealth recognizes, “The offense of
unlawful restraint requires the risk of serious bodily injury, not the infliction
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of actual bodily injury. Commonwealth Brief at 10 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2902(b)(1)). “[T]he mere fact that the victim only sustained minor injuries
and did not sustain ‘serious bodily injury’ does not ipso facto establish that
appellant's actions did not place others in danger of such injury.”
Commonwealth v. Lawton, 414 A.2d 658, 662 (Pa. Super. 1979).
As the trial court observed:
[A]t trial, the complainant’s mother testified that while she was
chasing [Appellant] down the street, she was hitting him very hard
with the wooden milk crate, to the point where [Appellant] began
bleeding from the head. Meanwhile, [Appellant] is still dragging
the 7-year-old complainant and restraining her from escape,
putting the child at risk for serious bodily injury on account of the
chaos that is occurring between her mother and her captor.
Therefore, based on the evidence presented at trial, there is
sufficient evidence to support [Appellant’s] conviction for Unlawful
Restraint.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/17, at 6 (unnumbered).
Once again, employing the applicable standard of review, viewing the
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we find the evidence was sufficient
to enable the trial judge, as factfinder, to find every element of unlawful
restraint beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, Appellant is not entitled
to relief on his second issue.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/20/2018
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