Eyler, T. v. Gladhill, P. ( 2018 )

J-S32045-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
TERI L. EYLER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
PAUL GLADHILL AND LORRAINE :
GLADHILL :
: No. 1965 MDA 2017
Appellees :
Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Civil Division at No.: 2015-4718
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED AUGUST 03, 2018
Appellant, Teri L. Eyler, appeals from the order granting the motion for
summary judgment of Appellees, Paul Gladhill and Lorraine Gladhill, in this
landlord-tenant negligence action. Specifically, she claims that the trial court
erred when it held that the evidence did not establish that Appellees had
breached a duty of care owed to Appellant. We affirm.
We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from our
review of the certified record. On March 25, 2015, Appellant fell down the
basement stairs of the residence that she rented from Appellees. Appellant
had observed the condition of the stairs during her initial walkthrough of the
premises prior to leasing it, and had used them often prior to the fall while
living in the home. (See Appellant’s Deposition, 4/20/17, at 15, 18). On
December 31, 2015, Appellant filed a complaint alleging that Appellees
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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negligently breached their duty as landlords to maintain the basement stairs
in a safe and usable condition with adequate lighting and handrails.
The parties completed discovery, and, on September 14, 2017,
Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence did
not establish that they had breached a duty of care owed to Appellant. The
trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on December 13,
2017. This timely appeal followed.1
Appellant raises one question on appeal: “[Whether] genuine issues of
material fact exist as to whether [Appellees] owed [Appellant] a duty of care
and breached that duty causing [Appellant’s] injuries?” (Appellant’s Brief, at
3) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
In her issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in granting
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. (See id. at 8-11). She concedes
that generally out of possession landlords are not liable for injuries suffered
by their tenant, but claims that Appellees should nevertheless be liable
because they had reason to know of the defect. (See id. at 8-9). We
disagree.
Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is well
settled.
As has been oft declared by this Court, summary judgment
is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly
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1 Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed her statement of errors
complained of on appeal on January 4, 2018. The trial court entered its
opinion on January 23, 2018. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In so doing,
the trial court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact against the moving party, and, thus,
may only grant summary judgment where the right to such
judgment is clear and free from all doubt.
On appellate review, then, an appellate court may reverse
a grant of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or
an abuse of discretion. But the issue as to whether there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact presents a question of law,
and therefore, on that question our standard of review is de novo.
This means we need not defer to the determinations made by the
lower tribunals. To the extent that this Court must resolve a
question of law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment
in the context of the entire record.
High v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 154 A.3d 341, 345 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal
denied, 171 A.3d 1287 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted).
The elements necessary to plead an action in negligence are: (1)
the existence of a duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a
failure on the part of the defendant to conform to that duty, or
breach thereof; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's
breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage
suffered by the complainant. [See] Orner v. Mallick, 515 Pa.
132, 135, 527 A.2d 521, 523 (1987).
In Pennsylvania, a landlord out of possession, in most
instances, is not responsible for injuries suffered by third parties
on the leased premises. However, as this Court has previously
stated, this rule is subject to several exceptions.
A landlord out of possession may incur liability
(1) if he has reserved control over a defective portion
of the demised premises; (2) if the demised premises
are so dangerously constructed that the premises are
a nuisance per se; (3) if the lessor has knowledge of
a dangerous condition existing on the demised
premises at the time of transferring possession and
fails to disclose the condition to the lessee; (4) if the
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landlord leases the property for a purpose involving
the admission of the public and he neglects to inspect
for or repair dangerous conditions existing on the
property before possession is transferred to the
lessee; (5) if the lessor undertakes to repair the
demised premises and negligently makes the repairs;
or (6) if the lessor fails to make repairs after having
been given notice of and a reasonable opportunity to
remedy a dangerous condition existing on the leased
premises.
Henze v. Texaco, Inc., [508 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Pa. Super.
1986)]. Our Supreme Court has elaborated on exception number
three as follows.
A landlord out of possession is liable for
resulting injuries if, when he leases premises, he
conceals an existing dangerous condition on the land
which he has reason to believe the tenant will not
discover. The liability of . . . [the landlords],
therefore, is limited to hidden or concealed
defects. . . .
Dorsey v. Cont’l Assocs., 591 A.2d 716, 718-19 (Pa. Super. 1991), appeal
denied, 612 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1992) (most citations omitted; emphasis in
original).
In the instant case, Appellees did not retain control of the premises and
thus were landlords out of possession. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 6; Trial Court
Opinion, 12/13/17, at unnumbered page 4). The evidence also demonstrated
that the condition of the basement stairs, the lack of a handrail, and the
limited lighting, existed during Appellant’s initial walkthrough of the house
before she leased it and moved into the property. (See Appellant’s
Deposition, at 15). Appellant has not set forth, nor has our review revealed,
any evidence that Appellees concealed any defect. See Dorsey, supra at
719.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its
discretion when it held that the evidence did not establish that Appellees
breached a duty of care owed to Appellant. See High, supra at 345. Because
Appellees were landlords out of possession, and because they did not conceal
any defects from Appellant when she leased the property, Appellees, as a
matter of law, are not liable for injuries caused by the condition of the stairs,
the lack of a handrail, or the limited lighting. See Dorsey, supra at 718-19.
Therefore, we agree that Appellees are entitled to summary judgment.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/03/2018
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