Com. v. Smith, R. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S24010-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    RONALD B. SMITH                            :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 4083 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 17, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0002870-2016
    BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                FILED MAY 14, 2019
    Ronald B. Smith appeals from his judgment of sentence, entered in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after he was found guilty,
    following a bench trial, of solicitation to commit involuntary deviate sexual
    intercourse (IDSI) with a child,1 unlawful contact with a minor,2 corruption of
    minors (defendant >18 years of age),3 and indecent assault (victim <13 years
    of age).4 After careful review, we affirm based upon the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a) opinion.
    Smith, the former boyfriend of the victim’s mother, allegedly sexually
    abused the victim in 2014 and 2015, when she was eleven and twelve years
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S. § 902(a); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(1).
    2   18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1).
    3   18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).
    418 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7).
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S24010-19
    old. The victim lived with her mother, younger sister, older brother, aunt and
    uncle at the time of the abuse.                The victim testified that Smith would
    inappropriately touch her thigh and buttocks over her clothes, grind on top of
    her when they were both clothed, offer her money “if [she] would let [him]
    eat her out,” and send her hundreds of text messages over multiple months.
    Some of Smith’s text messages to the victim expressed that he thought she
    was sexy and also indicated that he wanted to engage in oral sex with the
    victim.5 When one of the victim’s classmates saw the graphic texts sent to
    her by Smith, she reported the incident to a teacher who then escalated the
    situation to the principal of the victim’s school. Eventually the victim’s mother
    was involved in the matter; the mother called the police and took the victim
    to the hospital to be medically evaluated.
    Smith was arrested on December 18, 2017; Detective William Brophy
    took Smith’s written statement in which he admitted to sending the
    inappropriate text messages to the victim.              On January 27, 2017, Smith
    proceeded to a non-jury trial before the Honorable Diana L. Anhalt.             The
    victim, the victim’s mother, and Detective Brophy testified for the prosecution.
    Smith took the stand in his own defense, testifying that he never touched the
    victim, never sent the alleged inappropriate text messages to the victim, and
    that Detective Brophy took his statement, without first Mirandizing6 Smith,
    ____________________________________________
    5  Specifically, and quite graphically, the texts stated that Smith “wanna [sic]
    lick that pussy.”
    6   Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966).
    -2-
    J-S24010-19
    and told Smith that if he did not sign the statement implicating him in the
    crimes, the victim and her younger siblings were going to be taken away from
    their mother and the victim’s mother would be arrested. N.T. Non-Jury Trial,
    1/27/17, at 113-114, 120-121. Following trial, the court found Smith guilty
    of the aforementioned charges. The court sentenced Smith to 25-50 years’
    incarceration7 for the solicitation charge, two concurrent terms of 2½-5 years
    in prison for the unlawful contact and corruption charges, and a concurrent
    sentence of 1-2 years’ incarceration for indecent assault.8 Smith did not file
    any post-sentence motions.
    ____________________________________________
    7 Although the solicitation charge was graded as a first-degree felony, which
    carries a maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, see 18 Pa.C.S. §
    1103(1), because Smith had been convicted in 1999 of aggravated indecent
    assault with a child less than 16 years of age, the instant offense was
    considered a “second strike” for which the mandatory minimum is 25-50 years
    of state incarceration. See N.T. Sentencing, 11/17/17, at 5-6; see also 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9718.2(a)(1) (mandatory sentence for repeat sexual offenders).
    8 Smith also received credit for time served and was notified that he would be
    required to comply, as a Tier III offender, with sexual offender reporting
    requirements under Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offender Registration and
    Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42. Because Smith’s
    reporting requirement was not based on a finding that he was a sexually
    violent predator and because the acts occurred after SONRA became effective
    in 2012, it does not raise Commonwealth v. Muniz, 
    164 A.3d 1189
    (Pa.
    2017), concerns.
    -3-
    J-S24010-19
    On December 18, 2018,9 Smith filed a timely notice of appeal and court-
    ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal. Smith presents the following issues for our review:
    (1)    Whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to convict
    [Smith] for solicitation to commit involuntary deviate sexual
    intercourse when all that was presented was a couple of text
    messages from [Smith] to the complainant.
    (2)    Whether the evidence of these text messages was so
    contrary to the verdict of solicitation that it would shock the
    [sic] sense of justice.
    Appellant’s Brief, at 5.
    Smith asserts that the text messages he sent to the victim do not
    amount to proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he acted to solicit IDSI from
    the victim. Rather, he claims that the messages were “merely expressions of
    desire, but not commandments, encouragements, or requests to commit this
    act.” Appellant’s Brief, at 9.
    The standard for reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is
    whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable
    to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact finder to
    find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth
    v. Vetrini, 
    734 A.3d 404
    (Pa. Super. 1999).
    The crime of solicitation requires proof that a person “commands,
    encourages or requests” another person engage in specific conduct “which
    ____________________________________________
    9Because the 30th day following sentencing fell on a Sunday, Smith had until
    Monday, December 18, 2018, to file a timely notice of appeal. See Pa.R.C.P.
    106 (computation of time).
    -4-
    J-S24010-19
    would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or would
    establish his complicity in its commission or attempted commission,” and that
    he do so with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of that crime.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 902(a). Here, Smith was convicted of soliciting IDSI (victim <13
    years of age), a first-degree felony.          In order to prove IDSI (<13), the
    Commonwealth must show that:
    [T]he defendant engaged in oral or anal intercourse with a victim
    through forcible compulsion, the threat of forcible compulsion or
    where the victim was under the age of thirteen.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3126.         See also 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(b) (“person commits
    involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child . . . when the person
    engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13
    years of age.”).
    The evidence establishes that Smith requested that the victim allow him
    to perform oral sex upon her, once even offering her $70.00 in return for her
    compliance.     As the trial court notes in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the
    sexual content of Smith’s text messages, combined with his explicit offer of
    money to the victim for oral sex, his inappropriate physical touching of the
    victim over several years, his own statement to the police that he sent the
    victim “very inappropriate” texts and that several of those texts “solicit[ed]
    her to do certain sex acts with [him] such as oral sex and even intercourse”10
    ____________________________________________
    10See Investigation Interview Record of Ronald Smith, 12/18/15, at 2; see
    also N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 1/27/17, at 101-103 (Detective Brophy testifying
    about interview with Smith and Smith’s written statement acknowledging he
    -5-
    J-S24010-19
    establish, beyond a reasonable doubt his solicitation to commit IDSI with a
    child less than 13 years of age. See Commonwealth v. Morales, 
    601 A.2d 1263
    (Pa. Super. 1992) (en banc).11 We rely upon the well-written opinion,
    authored by Judge Anhalt, to affirm Smith’s judgment of sentence.           We
    instruct the parties to attach a copy of Judge Anhalt’s August 21, 2018,
    decision in the event of further proceedings in the matter.12
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    sent “very inappropriate” text messages to victim and solicited her for sex via
    text messages).
    11  Smith argues that the trial court’s reliance upon Morales is misplaced
    where the defendant in that case asked the victim if he wanted a “blow job,”
    compared to the instant case where Smith never requested the victim commit
    deviate sexual intercourse but “merely stated his desire without anything
    more.” Appellant’s Brief, at 10. We disagree. As stated above, when we view
    all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to Commonwealth,
    as the verdict winner, it is evident that Smith’s communications were meant
    to induce or encourage the victim to participate in IDSI with him.
    12 Smith has waived his second issue on appeal that challenges the weight of
    the evidence. A claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence
    must be raised in the first instance before the trial court. Smith has failed to
    present the claim in either an oral or written motion before the trial court.
    See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). Moreover, even though Judge Anhalt addressed
    Smith’s weight issue in her Rule 1925(a) opinion, we are compelled to find the
    issue waived. Commonwealth v. Washington, 
    825 A.2d 1264
    (Pa. Super.
    2003) (where weight issue raised for first time in appellate brief, claim still
    waived even though trial court addressed issue in Rule 1925(a) opinion);
    Commonwealth v. Causey, 
    833 A.2d 165
    (Pa. Super. 2003) (where weight
    issue raised for first time in Rule 1925(b) statement and court addressed issue
    in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, claim still not reviewable on appeal). Finally,
    Smith abandons the issue in his appellate brief, neither addressing it in the
    summary of the argument section nor the argument section.
    -6-
    J-S24010-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/14/19
    -7-
    Circulated 04/25/2019 01:43 PM
    FiL�r1
    IN 1'nt'COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
    2018 AUG 21 pr, 3·'CJ'fST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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    4083 EDA 2017
    RONALD B. SMITH
    OPINION
    ANHALT,J.                                                                                               August 21, 2018
    OVERVIEW AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Ronald Smith (hereinafter "Appellant") was arrested on December 18, 2015. He was
    charged with Attempted Rape of a Child under 18 Pa. C.S.A. §901 (a); Solicitation of Rape of a
    Child under 18 Pa. C.S.A. §902(a); Solicitation of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse
    (hereinafter "]OSI") with a Child 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 902(a); Unlawful Contact with a Minor for
    Sexual Offenses under 18 Pa. C.S.A. §63 I 8(a)( I); Solicitation of Statutory Sexual Assault of an
    Eight to Eleven year old under 18 Pa. C.S.A. §902(a); Corruption of Minors where the
    Defendant is above Eighteen under 18 Pa. C.S.A. §6301 (a)(I )(ii); Indecent Assault of a Person
    less than Thirteen under 18 Pa. C.S.A. §3126(a)(7); Harassment for Lewd or Threatening
    Language under 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2709(a)(4); and Indecent Exposure under 18 Pa. C.S.A.
    §3127(a).
    On November 17, 2017, after a bench trial, the Court found Appellant guilty of
    Solicitation ofIDSI with a Child, Unlawful Contact with a Minor, Corruption of Minors where
    the Defendant is above Eighteen, and Indecent Assault of a Person less than Thirteen. The Court
    sentenced Appellant to an aggregate of twenty-five to fifty years state incarceration with credit
    for time served as well as statutorily mandated SORNA conditions.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on December l 81 2017. A statement of matters
    complained of on appeal was filed on June 14, 2018. Appellant raises the following issues on
    appeal:
    1.      Whether sufficient evidence was presented to prove Solicitation to Commit IDST with
    a Child.
    2.      Whether the weight of the evidence presented supported a guilty verdict of the
    Solicitation to commit IDSI charge.
    FACI'S
    When the Appellant's criminal conduct began, M. W was twelve, and lived with her
    mother, younger sister, older brother, uncle, and aunt. Notes of Testimony ("N.T."), 01/27/17 at
    15. She had an older sister who did not live in the home; her father passed away when she was
    eight years old. 
    Id. at 16.
    Her mother started dating Appellant when M.W. was eight. Td. Appellant was
    incarcerated for three of the five years her mother and Appellant were together. 
    Id. at 71.
    M.W.
    and Appellant spent time together when he was around - playing video games, watching
    television, and playing cards, among other things. 
    Id. at 18.
    She initially enjoyed spending time
    with Appellant. 
    Id. When M.W.
    was twelve years old, Appellant began touching her inappropriately. 
    Id. at 19.
    One instance occurred while the two played video games in M.W.'s bedroom. 
    Id. Appellant reached
    over and started stroking her leg, moving bis hand from the top of her thigh, then down
    to her knee, and back up. 
    Id. at 23.
    She was wearing shorts so her legs were partially exposed. 
    Id. 2 al
    24. He did not say anything while he was touching M. W., and she did not tell an adult
    afterwards. 
    Id. Another instance
    occurred after M.W. left the shower, again at age twelve. 
    Id. at 27.
    She
    put on shorts and a shirt after showering and went to her mother's bedroom to apply lotion. 
    Id. Upon entering
    the bedroom, Appellant pushed M. W. onto her mother's bed. 
    Id. at 28.
    Appellant
    climbed on top of her and started "nibbing" and "grinding" his pelvic area against hers. 
    Id. at 58.
    M. W. eventually told him     lo   get off of her, and he did. ld. at 31. After this incident, M.W. went
    downstairs but did not yet tell her mother or any other adult what had happened. 
    Id. Another incident
    occurred outside of her house, while M.\V. was twelve. 
    Id. at 32.
    Appellant placed his hand on her butt for a few seconds, over her jeans, while walking around
    the neighborhood together. 
    Id. at 33.
    He then told her he would give her money if she "let [him]
    cat (her] out". 
    Id. M.W. repeatedly
    said "no." 
    Id. Additionally, Appellant
    repeatedly called and texted M.W. when she was twelve. 
    Id. at 35.
    Trial counsel stipulated that Appellant's phone records showed that he contacted M.W.'s
    phone 358 times between August 1, 2015 and November 20, 2015. 
    Id. at 108-109,
    Commonwealth Exhibit C-4. M.W. testified that although not all of the messages were vulgar,
    Appellant sent her "nasty" and .. freaky" text messages over the course of several months. N. T. at
    36. One text message read, "I want to lick that pussy" with a cat emoji. Commonweallh Exhibit
    C-1. Other text messages from the Appellant read "U are thick" followed by "I want to really do
    it." 
    Id. M.W. testified
    that her brother "found something out" and told their older sister. N.T. at
    60. M.W.'s sister then told their mother about the inappropriate texts from Appellant and that he
    was looking at M.W.'s bull. 
    Id. at 36.
    M. W.'s mother did not call the police or reach out for any
    3
    help upon learning this information. 
    Id. at 46.
    She continued to date Appellant and he continued
    to come over to the house. 
    Id. In November
    2015, M. W. told her seventh grade teacher, Ms. Leader, about the text
    messages. 
    Id. at 42.
    While at school, M.W.'s friend Rebecca had her phone and saw a "freaky"
    text message from Appellant pop up on the screen. 
    Id. at 43.
    The friend told Ms. Leader there
    was "some man that's tcxting (M.W.] some freaky stuff." Td. at 45. Ms. Leader then called the
    principal. 
    Id. at 44.
    The principal called M. W. down to the office, where M.W. showed her the
    phone. 
    Id. at 45.
    The principal then called M.W.'s mother to school and showed her some of the
    text   messages, including one that said, "I want to lick that pussy." 
    Id. at 78-80.
    M. W,'s mother
    was "horrified" when she saw those messages, and after that she took M.W. to the police station
    and St. Christopher's hospital. 
    Id. At the
    hospital, doctors gave M. W. various tests and discussed with her what had
    happened. 
    Id. at 48.
    A few weeks later: M.W. had a follow-up with Dr. Maureen McColgan at
    •
    the Child Protection Program. 
    Id. at 109.
    There, M.W. had a normal exam and told Dr.
    McColgan she had been inappropriately touched by her mother's boyfriend. 
    Id. After receiving
    the report, Detective William Brophy of the Special Victims Unit (SVU)
    set up a forensic interview at Philadelphia Children's Alliance. 
    Id. at 90.
    Detective Brophy
    testified that during that interview, M.W. showed the interviewer several alarming text messages
    on her phone, and the detective heard the interviewer read the messages aloud. 
    Id. at 90.
    Appellant was arrested on December 18, 2015; he was given his Miranda Warnings, which he
    waived.    kl Appellant initially told Detective Brophy that M.W. asked him to send her the text
    messages. 
    Id. at 106.
    However, in his official statement to Detective Brophy, Appellant admitted
    4
    that he sent a lot of"very inappropriate" text messages to M.W. from his cell phone and that he
    solicited her for sex via text message. 
    Id. al 102-103.
    At trial, Appellant testified that M. W. was like a daughter to him and that he never
    touched her. 
    Id. at 112.
    Furthermore, he testified that the number sending those text messages
    was not his, even though M.W. and her mother both identified that phone number as belonging
    to him. 
    Id. at 38,
    78, 113. Appellant claimed he had given false information in his signed
    statement because Detective Brophy threatened to remove the kids and arrest M. W. 'smother. lg_,_
    at 114. He further contended that M.W.'s aunt, brother, and older sister convinced M.W. to lie
    about the situation. 
    Id. at 118.
    The Court found the testimony of M.W., her mother, and Detective William Brophy all to
    be credible. Appellant's testimony about the salient facts was not credible.
    DISCUSSION
    I.      SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    The evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support Appellant's conviction of
    Solicitation to Corrunit IDSI with a Child. When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence
    challenge, the well-settled standard is "whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
    to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to enable the fact-finder to establish every element of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Com. v. Williams, 
    586 Pa. 553
    , 
    896 A.2d 523
    , 535 (2006).
    "Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material
    element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable
    doubt." Com. v. Brewer, 
    2005 Pa. Super. 207
    , 
    876 A.2d 1029
    , 1032 (2005). The Commonwealth
    5
    is not required to show guilt by a "mathematical certainty" and may sustain its burden by
    presenting solely circumstantial evidence. Com. v. Norley, 
    2012 Pa. Super. 224
    , 
    55 A.3d 526
    ,
    53 l. (2012). "The finder of fact, while passing upon the credibility of the witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence." Com. v,
    Brooks, 
    2010 Pa. Super. 185
    , 7 AJd 852, 856-57 (2010).
    A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if, with the intent of promoting or
    facilitating its commission, he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in
    specific conduct which would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or
    which would establish his complicity in its commission or attempted commission. 18 Pa. C.S.A.
    §902(A). A person commits IDSI with a Child, a felony of the first degree, when he engages in
    deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than thirteen years of age. 18 Pa.
    C.S.A. §3 I 23(b). "Deviate sexual intercourse" in relevant part is defined as sexual intercourse
    per os or per anus between human beings. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §310 I.
    The evidence here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    sufficiently established Solicitation to commit JOSI with a Chi.Id. Appellant's text messages
    stating "I want to lick that pussy," and "I want to really do it," show Appellant requesting that
    she engage in sexual intercourse per os when she was twelve years old. Appellant's admission
    that he sent a lot of "very inappropriate" text messages to M.W., and that he in fact solicited her
    for sex via text message, combined with his inappropriate physical touching, and the reaction of
    everyone who saw the text messages: make it clear that "pussy" meant vagina in this context.
    In addition, saying "J want to" can constitute a "request" for purpose of solicitation t.o
    commit a crime. Com. v. Morales, 
    411 Pa. Super. 471
    , 
    601 A.2d 1263
    (1992). These text
    messages demonstrate Appellant's intent to encourage M.W. to engage in sexual conduct that
    6
    would constitute deviate sexual intercourse. So docs the fact that Appellant offered to give her
    money to perform oral sex on her. N.T. at 33. M.W. was born on June 29, 2003. She testified that
    these incidents took place when she was eleven and twelve. 
    Id. at 19-35.
    In addition, Appellant
    sent hundreds of text messages to M.W. in 2015, when she was twelve years old. Thus, the
    evidence sufficiently supports each element necessary for the conviction of Solicitation to
    Commit IDSI with a Child.
    II.     WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
    Appellant's conviction of Solicitation to Commit IDSI with a Child was not against the
    weight of the evidence. The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the fact finder to determine.
    The fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility
    of the witnesses. Com.   v,   Johnson, 
    542 Pa. 384
    , 
    668 A.2d 97
    , 101 (1995). J\ judge who saw and
    heard the witnesses and had the opportunity to observe their demeanor may properly author an
    opinion in support of an order based solely upon the issue of credibility. Com. v. Yogel, 307 Pa.
    Super. 241, 
    453 A.2d 15
    , 16 (1982). The trial court's verdict may only be reversed if it is so
    contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. Com. v. Hawkins, 
    549 Pa. 352
    , 
    701 A.2d 492
    , 500 ( 1997). The standard to review the weight of the evidence claim is summarized as
    follows:
    A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of
    the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not
    be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the
    same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the
    trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts arc so
    clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all
    the facts is to deny justice. ft has often been stated that a new trial should be
    awarded when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's
    sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be
    given another opportunity to prevail.
    7
    Com. v. Brown, 
    538 Pa. 410
    , 
    648 A.2d 1177
    , 1189 (1994).
    Far from shocking one's sense of justice, the evidence reliably demonstrated Appellant's
    criminal conduct. The Court presided over the trial, saw and heard the witnesses, and had the
    opportunity to observe their demeanor. The testimony of the three main Commonwealth
    witnesses was consistent and credible. In particular, the testimony of M. W. was detailed and
    compelling. The Commonwealth testimony was supported by evidence that Appellant sent M.W.
    hundreds of text messages when she was twelve, and that at least several of those messages
    consisted of language that requested M.W. to engage in deviate sexual intercourse with him. The
    text messages were so inappropriate that M. W. 's teacher alerted the principal to the situation, the
    principal alerted M.W. 'smother, and the mother took M.W. to the police and the hospital. In his
    statement to Detective Brophy, Appellant admitted that he sent a lot of "very inappropriate" text
    messages and that he solicited her for sex via text message. N.T. at 102-103.
    Jn contrast, the Court found Appellant's testimony to be self-serving and false. At trial,
    he claimed he sent the messages to M.W. at her request: and that he admitted his behavior to
    Detective Brophy because the Detective threatened to have �1. W. and her sister taken from their
    mother if Appellant didn't sign the incriminating statement. The evidence presented at trial that
    Appellant touched M.W. inappropriately, sent her hundreds of text messages, some of which he
    admitted were very inappropriate, some of which solicited sex from her, outweighs Appellant's
    incredible explanations.
    Appellant argues that the evidence showed he touched M. W. but never sexually
    penetrated her body or displayed his genitalia to her. That is beside the point: the conviction was
    for Solicitation, not a completed act of intercourse. In other words, a person need only have the
    intent of promoting of facilitating a crime's commission to be guilty of solicitation to commit a
    8
    crime. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §902(a). Based on Appellant's own statement to Detective Brophy on
    December 18, 2015, he was soliciting M.W. for sex via text message. This is the necessary intent
    for solicitation to commit IDS[ with a Child.
    Appellant also argues that the weight of the evidence did not prove that the words sent in
    text messages were expressed with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of
    IDSI. Here too, he is mistaken. The defendant's actions of physically touching M.W. in
    conjunction with the texts messages, show his escalation efforts to follow through on his
    intentions of wanting to have sexual contact with a minor. Given the number of messages
    Appellant sent to a 12-year-old child, her credible testimony of other inappropriate interactions
    with him, and his lack of a credible explanation for any of the above, the Court was eminently
    reasonable in giving more weight to the credible testimony of M.W., her mother, and Detective
    Brophy, than Appellant's unsupported and incredible denial of criminal conduct.
    CONCLUSION
    Given the applicable statutes, testimony, and case law, the sufficiency and weight of the
    evidence supported Appellant's conviction of Solicitation to commit IDSI. Accordingly, the
    Court's decision should be affirmed.
    BY THE COURT:
    aJ-��a�
    DIANA L. ANHALT, J.
    DA TE: August 21. 2018
    9
    ..
    PROOF OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that on the date set forth below, I caused an original copy of the Judicial
    Opinion to be served upon the persons at following locations, which service satisfies the
    requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 122:
    Benjamin B. Cooper
    The Cooper Law Firm
    The Penthouse
    1500 Walnut Street, 2211d Fl
    Philadelphia, PA 19102
    Appeals Unit
    Philadelphia District Attorney's Office
    Three South Penn Square
    Philadelphia, PA 19107
    Ronald Smith
    DZ9069
    SCI-Dallas
    1000 Follies Rd
    Dallas, PA 18612
    ik Ackerman, Esq.
    rk to the Honorable Diana L. Anhalt
    Date: August 22, 2018
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