Com. v. Langston, D. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S68027-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DENEA LANGSTON
    Appellant                        No. 166 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the PCRA Order December 13, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1101532-2001
    BEFORE: ALLEN, J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:                           FILED DECEMBER 19, 2014
    Denea Langston (“Appellant”) appeals from the order dismissing her
    petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1           After
    careful review, we affirm.
    The   PCRA     court   summarized      the   facts   underlying   Appellant’s
    convictions as follows:
    The convictions arose from [Appellant’s] and [her co-
    defendant’s] participation in fraudulent real estate transactions
    involving fourteen Philadelphia area properties. [Appellant] and
    [her co-defendant] forged deeds and falsified loan documents
    and related correspondence to attempt to secure mortgages and
    coerce the victims to enter into a business relationship for the
    purchase of land not their own [and] renovation of said
    properties for future return of capital in resale.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
    J-S68027-14
    PCRA Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, April 14, 2014, pp. 1-2.
    On May 6, 2004, a jury convicted Appellant of theft (3 counts),2
    forgery (14 counts),3 and criminal conspiracy.4 On September 14, 2004, the
    trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate of 28 to 56 months’
    imprisonment on the forgery convictions and 5 years’ probation on the
    conspiracy conviction.5          The court further ordered Appellant to pay
    $14,000.00 in restitution.         This was an obligation imposed jointly and
    severally with her co-defendant.
    Appellant appealed her convictions, and the Commonwealth cross-
    appealed the restitution order. On September 21, 2006, this Court affirmed
    Appellant’s convictions and remanded the matter for the trial court to
    determine the proper restitution amount. On May 20, 2009, the trial court
    ordered Appellant and her co-defendant to pay the victims restitution
    aggregating $95,000.00.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    One count of theft by unlawful taking or disposition, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921;
    one count of theft by deception, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922; one count of theft by
    failure to make required deposition of funds received, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3927.
    3
    18 Pa.C.S. § 4101.
    4
    18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
    5
    The theft convictions merged for sentencing purposes.
    -2-
    J-S68027-14
    On June 15, 2010, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA
    court appointed counsel who filed a Turner/Finley6 no merit letter on July
    15, 2011.     Counsel subsequently withdrew the Turner/Finley letter and
    filed an amended PCRA petition on October 11, 2013. The Commonwealth
    responded by filing a motion to dismiss the PCRA petition on December 10,
    2013.      The PCRA court dismissed the petition without a hearing on
    December 13, 2013.7 This timely appeal followed.8
    Appellant raises the following question for our review:
    I. Did the Honorable PCRA Court err when it dismissed
    [Appellant’s] Amended PCRA Petition without holding a hearing,
    even though [Appellant] properly pled, and would have been
    able to prove, that she was entitled to PCRA relief where trial
    counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to preclude the
    use of certain tape recordings, as the Wire Tap Act prohibits the
    taping of telephone conversations without the consent of all
    parties to the conversation and where said evidence was
    introduced and was integral to [Appellant’s] conviction?
    Appellant’s Brief, p. 3.
    In reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, our well-settled standard of
    review is “to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court is
    supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA
    ____________________________________________
    6
    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa.1988) and
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa.Super.1988) (en banc).
    7
    The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas docket indicates Appellant waived
    the formal filing of a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss in open
    court on December 13, 2013. See Docket, CP-51-CR-1101532-2001, p. 25.
    8
    Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    -3-
    J-S68027-14
    court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
    findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 
    74 A.3d 185
    ,
    191-192 (Pa.Super.2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
    Initially, to be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must
    plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is “currently
    serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime[.]” 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i). A petitioner who has completed his sentence is no
    longer eligible for post-conviction relief. Commonwealth v. Soto, 
    983 A.2d 212
    , 213 (Pa.Super.2009); see also Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    80 A.3d 754
    , 765 (Pa.2013) (“due process does not require the legislature to
    continue to provide collateral review when the offender is no longer serving
    a sentence.”). This is so even if the petitioner filed his PCRA petition during
    the pendency of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    977 A.2d 1174
    , 1176 (Pa.Super.2009) (“As soon as his sentence is completed, the
    petitioner becomes ineligible for relief, regardless of whether he was serving
    his sentence when he filed the petition.”).
    Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 28 to 56 months’
    incarceration followed by 5 years’ probation on September 14, 2004.
    Therefore, even without accounting for any credit to which Appellant may
    have been entitled for any time served prior to sentencing, Appellant’s
    -4-
    J-S68027-14
    sentence ended on May 14, 2014.9               As a result, Appellant is no longer
    eligible for PCRA relief, regardless of the fact that she initially filed her pro se
    PCRA petition during the pendency of her sentence in June 2010.                See
    Williams, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing
    Appellant’s petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/19/2014
    ____________________________________________
    9
    Nothing in Appellant’s filings, the PCRA court summary, or the docket of
    the underlying matter indicate or suggest that the sentence was modified at
    any time beyond the imposition of the new restitution amount following this
    Court’s remand as discussed supra.
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 166 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 12/19/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/19/2014