Barrie, I. v. Brooks, I. ( 2018 )


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  • J. A16038/18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    ISATU BARRIE AND                        :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MOHAMED BARRIE, W/H                     :           PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                    :
    :
    INEZ G. BROOKS AND                      :
    INEZ TOO BANQUET HALL,                  :          No. 282 EDA 2018
    :
    Appellants       :
    Appeal from the Order Entered July 14, 2017,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No. June Term 2016 No. 03424
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                FILED AUGUST 17, 2018
    Inez G. Brooks and Inez Too Banquet Hall (collectively, “Ms. Brooks”)
    appeal, pro se, from the July 14, 2017 order entered by the Court of Common
    Pleas of Philadelphia County denying Ms. Brooks’s motion to strike/open
    judgment by default. After careful review, we affirm.
    The trial court provided the following synopsis of the relevant factual
    and procedural history:
    The present litigation arises from a slip and fall that
    occurred at Defendant Inez Too Banquet Hall on
    May 14, 2016. On that date, Plaintiff Isatu Barrie
    [(hereinafter, “appellee”)] slipped on some water that
    had been spilled on a wooden dance floor. As a result
    of this fall, [appellee] alleges that she sustained
    serious injuries, including a fibular fracture and ankle
    fracture, which required surgery to repair.
    J. A16038/18
    On June 29, 2016[, appellee] filed the present lawsuit
    in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. [Appellee]
    subsequently filed a complaint on July 21, 2016. On
    July 25, 2016 said Complaint was served by non-party
    Stephen Bongard on [Ms. Brooks] at 624 S. 62nd
    Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.       Service was
    accepted by Lorna Brooks. [Ms. Brooks] did not
    answer [appellee’s] complaint and on September 10,
    2016, [appellee] mailed a Notice of Praecipe to Enter
    Judgment by Default.        This Notice was sent to
    [Ms. Brooks] via [C]ertified and [F]irst [C]lass [M]ail.
    The [C]ertified [M]ail was returned as unclaimed, but
    the [F]irst [C]lass [M]ail was not returned.
    On Tuesday[,] September 27, 2016, a Case
    Management Conference was held and the Honorable
    Arnold New issued a Case Management Order setting
    relevant discovery deadlines and a proposed trial
    date. [Ms. Brooks] did not appear at this conference.
    On May 9, 2017[, Ms.] Brooks filed a Motion for
    Extraordinary Relief stating that she had not been
    served, that she did not carry premises liability
    insurance, and that no discovery in this matter had
    been conducted. In this Motion[, Ms. Brooks] asked
    [the trial court] to [o]rder [appellees] to personally
    serve [Ms. Brooks], vacate the Case Management
    Order, and allow the parties to complete discovery
    before rescheduling the requisite litigation events.
    [The trial court] denied [Ms. Brooks’s] Motion without
    prejudice on June 1, 2017.
    On May 10, 2017[, appellees] filed a Praecipe to Enter
    Default Judgment against [Ms. Brooks.] A default
    judgment was entered against [Ms. Brooks] that day
    and notice was sent two days later on May 12, 2017.
    On June 2, 2017[, Ms. Brooks] filed a Petition to Open
    Judgment. [Appellees] answered on June 22, 2017
    and on June 30, 2017[, Ms. Brooks] filed a reply to
    said answer. On July 14, 2017, [the trial court] denied
    [Ms. Brooks’s] Motion and ordered an assessment of
    damages hearing be scheduled.            To date no
    assessment of damages hearing has taken place.
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    J. A16038/18
    [Ms. Brooks] timely appealed [the trial court’s]
    July 14, 2017 Order to the Commonwealth Court on
    July 21, 2017.      Pursuant to [the trial court’s]
    December 6, 2017 Order, [Ms. Brooks] filed a
    Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on December 27, 2017.
    In this Statement, [Ms. Brooks] argues that she was
    never personally served as required by the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and that as such
    [the trial court] should have exercised its equitable
    powers in her favor and opened the Default Judgment.
    Trial court opinion, 12/27/17 at unnumbered pages 1-3 (citations to the record
    and footnotes omitted).
    Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court filed its opinion on
    December 27, 2017. On January 29, 2018, this case was transferred from the
    Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to this court. On July 18, 2018, this
    court heard oral argument in this case. Ms. Brooks attended oral argument
    and argued before the panel on her own behalf. This court listened intently
    to Ms. Brooks’s arguments and is now in a position to review her issues raised
    on appeal.
    Ms. Brooks raises the following issues for our review:
    1.   Did [Ms. Brooks] receive personal service of
    [a]ppellees’ Complaint as required by Pa. Rules
    of Civil Procedure, Rule 402?
    2.   Did the Court/Court Administration err in failing
    to mail notice of the Case Management Hearing
    to [Ms. Brooks] who had not yet entered an
    appearance in the civil action against [her], in
    accordance with Pa. Rules of Civil Procedure,
    Rule 440(a)(1), (2)(i), Service of Legal Papers
    Other than Original Process?
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    J. A16038/18
    3.   Did counsel to [a]ppellees act in good faith when
    calling [Ms. Brooks] to inquire about premises
    liability insurance prior to the Case Management
    Hearing, while failing to provide notice of the
    Hearing to [Ms. Brooks], when he knew [Ms.
    Brooks was] unrepresented by counsel, in
    accordance with Pa. Rules of Civil Procedure,
    Rule 440(a)(1), (2)(i), Service of Legal Papers
    Other than Original Process?
    4.   Did Court/Court Administration err in failing to
    mail the Case Management Order to [Ms.
    Brooks], in accordance with Pa. Rules of Civil
    Procedure, Rule 440(a)(1), (2)(i), Service of
    Legal Papers Other than Original Process?
    5.   Did counsel to [a]ppellees act in good faith by
    failing to mail a copy of the [a]ppellees’ Case
    Management        Memorandum       and     Case
    Management Order to [Ms. Brooks], when he
    knew they were unrepresented by counsel, in
    accordance with Pa. Rules of Civil Procedure,
    Rule 440(a)(1), (2)(i), Service of Legal Papers
    Other than Original Process?
    6.   Did the Court display bias towards [a]ppellees,
    by denying [Ms. Brooks’s] Petition for
    Extraordinary Relief after being apprised [Ms.
    Brooks] had not been served with the
    Complaint, Notice of the Case Management
    Hearing or Case Management Order and that
    the case was not ripe for settlement discussions
    since no discovery had been completed? (See
    [Ms. Brooks’s] Petition for Extraordinary Relief
    and [Ms. Brooks’s] May 4 and 5, 2017 letters to
    the Court appended hereto.)
    7.   Did the Court display bias towards [a]ppellees,
    by denying [Ms. Brooks’s] Petition to
    Strike/Open Judgment by Default which was
    timely filed?
    8.   Considering [a]ppellees waited from September
    8, 2016 (the date of the Notice of Default) until
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    J. A16038/18
    May 10, 2017 (the date [Ms. Brooks] filed a
    Petition for Extraordinary Relief), some eight (8)
    months later, to file a Praecipe to Enter
    Judgment by Default, would [a]ppellees by
    unduly harmed by the slight delay necessitated
    to allow the case to work its way through the
    Court?
    9.    In consideration of the gravity of the allegations
    in [a]ppellee[s’] Complaint, and the fact the
    [a]ppellees were in no apparent rush to litigate
    the case (demonstrated by waiting eight (8)
    months to take judgment by default), why did
    the trial Court not use its equitable powers and
    discretion to grant [Ms. Brooks’s] Petition to
    Strike that was timely filed with the Court?
    Ms. Brooks’s brief at 4-6 (emphasis in original).
    As a prefatory matter, although this Court is willing to
    construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant,
    pro se status generally confers no special benefit
    upon an appellant. Commonwealth v. Maris, [] 
    629 A.2d 1014
    , 1017 n.1 (Pa.Super. 1993). Accordingly,
    a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural
    rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.
    
    Id.
     This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an
    appellant fails to conform with the requirements set
    forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
    Procedure. 
    Id.
    Commonwealth v. Lyons, 
    833 A.2d 245
    , 251-252 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal
    denied, 
    879 A.2d 782
     (Pa. 2005).        For example, the Rules of Appellate
    Procedure require that each issue raised for appellate review be supported by
    “discussion and analysis of pertinent authority.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 
    94 A.3d 1080
    , 1088 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 
    110 A.3d 998
     (Pa. 2014).
    “Arguments not appropriately developed include those where the party has
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    J. A16038/18
    failed to cite any authority in support of a contention.” 
    Id.,
     citing Lackner v.
    Glosser, 
    892 A.2d 1
    , 29-30 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citations omitted).
    With the exception of her seventh issue on appeal, Ms. Brooks’s
    arguments in her brief do not develop any of her issues, nor do they provide
    citation to any legal authority as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of
    Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we are constrained to find that Ms. Brooks
    has waived issues one through six, eight, and nine on appeal.
    In her seventh issue on appeal, Ms. Brooks contends that the trial court
    erred when it denied her motion to open the default judgment entered against
    her.
    It is well settled that a petition to open a
    default judgment is an appeal to the
    equitable powers of the court, and absent
    an error of law or a clear, manifest abuse
    of discretion, it will not be disturbed on
    appeal. An abuse of discretion occurs
    when a trial court, in reaching its
    conclusions, overrides or misapplies the
    law, or exercises judgment which is
    manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
    partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
    US Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 
    982 A.2d 986
    , 994
    (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting ABG Promotions v.
    Parkway Publishing, Inc., 
    834 A.2d 613
    , 615-616
    (Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc) (quotations, quotation
    marks, and citations omitted).
    Generally speaking, a default judgment may be
    opened if the moving party has (1) promptly filed a
    petition to open the default judgment, (2) provided a
    reasonable excuse or explanation for failing to file a
    responsive pleading, and (3) pleaded a meritorious
    defense to the allegations contained in the complaint.
    -6-
    J. A16038/18
    McFarland v. Whitham, [] 
    544 A.2d 929
     (Pa. 1988);
    Seeger v. First Union National Bank, 
    836 A.2d 163
    (Pa.Super. 2003). Moreover, we note the trial court
    cannot open a default judgment based on the
    “equities” of the case when the defendant has failed
    to establish all three of the required criteria. Seeger,
    
    supra.
    Myers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
    986 A.2d 171
    , 175-176 (Pa.Super. 2009).
    Our analysis begins with the third prong: whether Ms. Brooks pleaded
    a meritorious defense to the allegations contained in appellees’ complaint. In
    her petition to open default judgment, Ms. Brooks provides the following:
    In the instant matter, [Ms. Brooks denies appellees’]
    injuries occurred at [Ms. Brooks’s] facility, but
    nonetheless have been in conversation/negotiation
    with [appellees] counsel for several months, having
    provided counsel with a copy of the banquet hall’s
    insurance declarations sheet during the week of
    May 15, 2017.
    Ms. Brooks’s petition to strike/open default judgment, 6/1/17 at 5, # 24.
    This court has defined the term “meritorious defense” as “allegations of
    fact that, if proven at trial, would entitle the petitioners to relief[.]” Smith v.
    Morrell Beer Distributors, Inc., 
    29 A.3d 23
    , 28 (Pa.Super. 2011).               In
    Smith, this court found that the appellants did not plead a meritorious defense
    because the appellants relied on conclusions of law and challenges to the
    plaintiff’s proof rather than setting forth a meritorious defense supported by
    verified allegations of fact.” 
    Id.
    In the instant case, Ms. Brooks attached a copy of her answer to
    appellee’s complaint.       Therein, much like the appellants in Smith,
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    J. A16038/18
    Ms. Brooks’s answer consists of little more than conclusions of law and
    challenges to appellees’ proof. We find that in neither her answer nor in her
    petition to open default judgment does Ms. Brooks provide a meritorious
    defense based in allegations of fact that would entitle her to relief if proven at
    trial. Accordingly, because Ms. Brooks was unable to meet all three elements
    required to open a default judgment, we must find that the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Brooks’s petition to open default
    judgment.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/17/2018
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