Com. v. Maldonado, M. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARCO MALDONADO :
:
Appellant : No. 1174 EDA 2017
:
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 31, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0221851-1993
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JUNE 18, 2018
Appellant, Marco Maldonado, appeals pro se from the order denying his
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 9541–9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the procedural history of this case as
follows:
On October 5, 1993, [Appellant] pled guilty to second
degree murder following the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence and the Commonwealth’s agreement not to
pursue capital murder charges. The Honorable Francis Biunno
sentenced him to life imprisonment that same day. No direct
appeal followed.
[Appellant] filed his first PCRA, counseled, on February 21,
1995. An evidentiary hearing was held on August 3, 1995 where
trial counsel testified. [Appellant] was to testify at a future
hearing; however, due to a series of delays, [Appellant’s] PCRA
petition was not addressed until February 5, 2002, when new
counsel requested that the evidentiary hearing be completed. The
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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petition was dismissed on July 15, 2004. A subsequent appeal
was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on April 14,
2005.2
2Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 876 A.2d 466 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (unpublished memorandum).
The instant petition was filed on November 5, 2009, followed
by several amended petitions dated December 2, 2010, August
12, 2011, April 5, 2012, January 16, 2015, April 13, 2016 and
August 29, 2016. Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, this court sent a
notice of intent to dismiss the petition as untimely without
exception on February 7, 2017. In response to this court’s 907
notice, [Appellant] filed another petition on February 13, 2017.
This court formally dismissed the [November 5, 2009] petition on
March 31, 2017.3 [Appellant] timely filed a notice of appeal to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court on April 5, 2017.
3 The order was issued more than twenty days after
[Appellant] was served with notice of the forthcoming
dismissal of his Post-Conviction Relief Act petition.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
PCRA Court Opinion, 6/5/17, at 1-2.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether PCRA Court erred when it dismissed the PCRA petition
as untimely when there was government interference with the
presentment of the prison visitor’s log book for a Commonwealth
v. Brooks, 839 A.2d 245, 576 Pa. 332 (Pa.2003) claim?
2. Whether PCRA court erred when it dismissed Appellant’s PCRA
petition as untimely when the prison visitor’s log book became
available as a newly discovered fact pursuant to Commonwealth
v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 593 Pa. 382 (Pa.2007) and
Commonwealth v. Burton, No.9 WAP 2016[?]
3. Whether PCRA Court erred when it failed to grant a new trial
and recognize the Brooks claim independently from Appellant’s
previous ineffective assistance of counsel claim as it was not
presented on previously litigated evidence?
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4. Whether PCRA Court erred when it failed to review Appellant’s
fraud on the court claim perpetrated by court-appointed trial
counsel, Jeffrey Kolansky, in the form of testimony at Appellant’s
prior evidentiary hearing?
5. Whether PCRA Court erred when it dismissed the PCRA petition
as untimely when newly discovered facts were presented in the
form of police misconduct and multi-witness identifications of the
actual perpetrator of the murder for which Appellant was
convicted?
6. Whether PCRA Court erred when it dismissed Appellant’s PCRA
petition without the material facts being heard and reviewed at an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa. R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2)?
Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.1
Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the
record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s
determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d
317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed
unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. Id
The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional threshold and may
not be disregarded in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA
petition that is untimely. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1038
(Pa. Super. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203
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1 We note that Appellant has failed to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 2119(a). Appellant did not divide the lengthy argument
section of his brief in coordination with his statement of questions involved.
Accordingly, our appellate review of Appellant’s claim has been substantially
hampered. Thus, we could dismiss Appellant’s appeal on this basis. Pa.R.A.P.
2101. Despite the brief’s defects, however, we address Appellant’s claims to
the extent we can discern his arguments.
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(Pa. 2000)). Effective January 16, 1996, the PCRA was amended to require a
petitioner to file any PCRA petition within one year of the date the judgment
of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence
“becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(3). Where a petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final on or
before the effective date of the amendment, a special grace proviso allowed
first PCRA petitions to be filed by January 16, 1997. See Commonwealth v.
Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054, 1056-1057 (Pa. Super. 1997) (explaining application
of PCRA timeliness proviso).
However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition
alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to
the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and
(iii), is met.2 A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within
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2 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
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sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the PCRA’s one-
year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove specific facts that
demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time frame” under
section 9545(b)(2). Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651-652
(Pa. Super. 2013).
Our review of the record reflects that Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on November 4, 1993, thirty days after his sentence was
imposed and the time for filing a direct appeal with this Court expired. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903. Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final prior to the effective date of the PCRA amendments.
Appellant’s instant PCRA petition, filed on November 5, 2009, does not qualify
for the grace proviso as it was neither Appellant’s first PCRA petition, nor was
it filed before January 16, 1997. Thus, the instant PCRA petition is patently
untimely.
As previously stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA petition,
his petition may nevertheless be received under any of the three limited
exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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§ 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts one of these exceptions, he must file his
petition within sixty days of the date that the exception could be asserted. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
In an attempt to overcome the PCRA time bar, Appellant makes multiple
claims under these three exceptions. In his first claim, Appellant argues that
he has met the governmental interference exception under 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(i). Specifically, Appellant maintains that between February 25,
1997, and April 16, 2002, Appellant attempted to present a copy of the prison
visitor’s log book during the proceeding on his first PCRA petition. Appellant’s
Brief at 14-15. Appellant contends that his counsel at the time was advised
that the log book was destroyed. Id. at 15. Appellant maintains that “[t]his
information interfered with Appellant’s right to present claims and evidence
for PCRA relief.” Id. at 16. Appellant further avers that “It was not until
November 29, 2008, did the Brooks[3] and fraud on the court claims become
ripe for PCRA review when investigator Wayne Schmidt forwarded a copy of
the log book to Appellant.” Id. at 17.
By Appellant’s own assertion, the investigator “forwarded a copy of the
log book to Appellant” on November 29, 2008. Appellant’s Brief at 17.
Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on November 5, 2009. Thus,
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3 Brooks essentially announced the minimum action required by counsel to
provide what is deemed constitutionally effective representation in capital
cases: counsel must conduct at least one face-to-face meeting with his client.
Brooks, 839 A.2d at 249-250.
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Appellant failed to file the petition within sixty days of the date that he could
have asserted the exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545 (b)(2). Accordingly,
Appellant fails to establish the government-interference exception.
In his second claim, Appellant seeks to invoke the newly discovered-
facts exception to the PCRA time bar. Appellant states that the visitor’s log
book was not public, and therefore, when it was reported that it had been
destroyed, Appellant had no reason to further attempt to locate it. Appellant’s
Brief at 18. Appellant contends: “On November 29, 2008, when Appellant
received a copy of the log book from investigator Wayne Schmidt, its existence
became a newly discovered fact that was unknown to him.” Id. at 19.
Again, Appellant maintains that he received a copy of the log book on
November 29, 2008. As noted, Appellant did not file the instant PCRA petition
until November 5, 2009. Thus, Appellant failed to file the petition within sixty
days of the date upon which he could have asserted the exception. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(2). Accordingly, Appellant has failed to establish this exception to
the PCRA time bar.
We address Appellant’s third and fourth issues together. In his third
issue, Appellant argues that the “PCRA court erred when it failed to grant a
new trial and recognize the Brooks claim independently from Appellant’s
previous ineffective assistance of counsel claim as it was not presented on the
previously litigated evidence[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 2. In his fourth issue,
Appellant asserts that the “PCRA court erred when it failed to review
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Appellant’s fraud on the court claim perpetrated by court-appointed trial
counsel, Jeffrey Kolansky, in the form of testimony at Appellant’s prior
evidentiary hearing[.]” Id. at 3. As outlined above, Appellant’s instant
petition is untimely. In neither of these claims does Appellant assert one of
the three limited exceptions to the PCRA time-bar. Accordingly, we lack
jurisdiction to review these claims. Taylor, 933 A.2d at 1038.
In his fifth issue, Appellant maintains that the PCRA court erred when it
dismissed his PCRA petition as untimely because “newly discovered facts were
presented in the form of police misconduct and multi-witness identifications
of the actual perpetrator of the murder for which Appellant was convicted[.]”
Appellant’s Brief at 3. In these claims, Appellant attempts to invoke the
exception at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Id. at 17-23. In support of this
issue, Appellant makes multiple assertions. First, he asserts that Detective
Michael Cahill, who had been an investigator in his case, was guilty of
misconduct. Id. at 26-27. Appellant asserts that “Homicide detective Michael
Cahill #830 has an established pattern of foul play and fabricated an alleged
confession while Appellant was severely intoxicated.” Id. at 43-44. Appellant
maintains that he discovered this information when, “Mr. Giovanni Reid
[(“Reid”)], another SCI-Graterford resident, informed Appellant that he
possessed material facts of Cahill’s misconduct on December 1, 2008, in the
institution’s Maintenance corridor.” Id. at 26. Appellant further avers that
“[o]n December 8, 2008, [Reid] provided Appellant with a copy of a transcript,
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affidavit, and letter that verified Detective Michael Cahill’s unauthorized visit
to Tennessee in order to threaten . . . a favorable witness to Mr. Reid’s case.”
Id. at 19-20.
This Court has set forth the following in considering an exception to the
PCRA time-bar under the newly discovered-facts exception:
The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)
requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts
upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those
facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence
demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his
own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have
obtained the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.
This rule is strictly enforced.
Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(internal citations omitted).4
We conclude that Appellant has failed to meet the requirements for the
newly discovered-facts exception regarding Detective Cahill. Initially, review
of the information obtained from Reid regarding Detective Cahill’s actions
reveals that the alleged misconduct was in a case unrelated to Appellant’s.
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4This Court has addressed the distinction between the newly discovered-facts
exception to the time-bar and the substantive claim of after-discovered
evidence recognized by the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d
171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“The timeliness exception set forth at Section
9545(b)(1)(ii) has often mistakenly been referred to as the ‘after-discovered
evidence’ exception. This shorthand reference was a misnomer, since the
plain language of subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require the petitioner to allege
and prove a claim of ‘after-discovered evidence.’ . . . Once jurisdiction is
established, a PCRA petitioner can present a substantive after-discovered-
evidence claim.”).
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Thus, the information is irrelevant to Appellant’s case and does not establish
any “newly-discovered facts” as related to Appellant’s case. Furthermore, we
cannot agree that one report pertaining to Detective Cahill in an unrelated
case establishes a pattern of misconduct.
Moreover, presuming arguendo that the information was relevant,
Appellant did not file the petition within the time required in order to invoke
the exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Appellant asserts that he first
learned of this information regarding Detective Cahill from Reid on December
1, 2008, and then on December 8, 2008, he received from Reid documentation
supporting this information. Appellant’s Brief at 19, 21, and 26. Appellant
further avers that he received a copy of the report from Reid on October 22,
2010. Id. at 20. Appellant maintains that his receipt of the documentation
prompted him to file an amendment on December 2, 2010, and thus, he timely
invoked the exception. Appellant was first made aware of this information,
however, on December 1, 2008. Appellant filed his PCRA petition on
November 5, 2009, and the amendment on December 2, 2010. Because
Appellant did not file a petition within sixty days of the date upon which the
petition first could have been filed, here December 1, 2008, when he first
received this information from Reid regarding Detective Cahill, Appellant has
not met the requirements of the exception.
Additionally, Appellant failed to establish that he acted with due
diligence in obtaining the information he submitted in his supplemental PCRA
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petition on December 2, 2010. As noted, Appellant maintains that on
December 1, 2008, Reid made him aware of Detective Cahill’s history of
misconduct in an unrelated case. Supplemental Exhibit for Motion for Post
Conviction Relief Dated 11/5/2009, 12/2/01, at 1. Appellant further states
that on October 22, 2010, Reid informed Appellant that he had in his
possession an internal affairs report finding Detective Cahill “guilty of
misconduct in another unrelated homicide case . . . . [Appellant] was
furnished with a copy of the internal affairs report on October 23, 2010.” Id.
at 2. By Appellant’s own admission, he was made aware of the alleged
relevant information related to Detective Cahill on December 1, 2008, yet he
took no action to obtain any documentation or evidence related to this
information; he simply waited until he was provided a copy of the internal
affairs report by Reid on October 23, 2010. Again, the information provided
to Appellant on October 23, 2010, was the same information provided to him
on December 1, 2008. We cannot conclude that Appellant acted with due
diligence in his attempts to obtain the information related to Detective Cahill
that he asserts he did not receive until October 23, 2010. Monaco, 996 A.2d
at 1080. Thus, Appellant has failed to establish the newly discovered-facts
exception regarding his claim as it relates to Detective Cahill.
Also in his fifth issue, Appellant asserts that he has satisfied the newly
discovered-facts exception by submitting affidavits of Justino Sanchez
(“Sanchez”) and Frank Lowry (“Lowry”). Appellant attached an “affidavit”
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from Sanchez to his amended PCRA petition filed January 16, 2015. Affidavit
of Justino Sanchez and Supplement to Amended Petition for Post Conviction
Relief Pursuant to the [PCRA], and Consolidated Memorandum of Law,
1/16/15, at 2. The “affidavit” appears to be signed by Sanchez, but is not
dated or notarized. Id. The affidavit asserts that Sanchez has personal
information that Appellant was not guilty of the murder of which he was
convicted, and in fact, that Sanchez knows the true perpetrator, who was his
brother, Nestor Romero. Id.5 On August 29, 2016, Appellant also filed an
amendment to his PCRA petition and attached to it a Certification of Witnesses
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1). Appellant included Appellant’s personal
information and a summary of Sanchez’s proposed testimony in the
Certification, asserting that Sanchez would testify that Nestor Sanchez6 was
responsible for the murder. In his brief, Appellant asserts that on November
22, 2014, Sanchez told Appellant that Sanchez’s brother had committed the
murder. Appellant’s Brief at 29.
Section 9545(d)(1) provides as follows:
Where a petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing, the
petition shall include a signed certification as to each intended
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5Sanchez’s “affidavit” asserts that the perpetrator of the murder, Nestor
Romero, died in a motorcycle accident in 2011.
6 This name is different than the name used in Sanchez’s “affidavit,” which
indicated that Nestor Romero was the perpetrator. Affidavit of Justino
Sanchez and Supplement to Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief
Pursuant to the [PCRA], and Consolidated Memorandum of Law, 1/16/15, at
2.
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witness stating the witness’s name, address, date of birth and
substance of testimony and shall include any documents material
to that witness’s testimony. Failure to substantially comply with
the requirements of this paragraph shall render the proposed
witness’s testimony inadmissible.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1). Additionally, Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15) provides:
“The request for an evidentiary hearing shall include a signed certification as
to each intended witness, stating the witness’s name, address, and date of
birth, and the substance of the witness’s testimony.”
In interpreting these provisions, this Court has concluded that a sworn
affidavit is not necessary to secure a hearing, and we observed:
the notes from the legislative history pertaining to the enactment
of this statutory section indicate that the legislature expressly
considered the question of whether a PCRA petitioner would be
required to obtain a sworn or notarized statement from a proposed
witness in order to have the witness testify at an evidentiary
hearing. A principal architect of the 1995 Legislative Amendments
to the PCRA, Senator Stewart Greenleaf, spoke on this question
as follows:
In addition, when we held the hearing there was concern
about the fact that when you file a petition, we want to make sure
that it is a meritorious petition, we do not want to have a frivolous
petition, that there are some witnesses that would be available to
testify, so the original bill required that each witness had to sign
a statement and have a notarized, sworn statement at the end of
the statement indicating that this was a true and correct
representation of what he would testify to at the coming collateral
hearing. There were objections to that, feeling that that was too
onerous to require a defendant to go out and obtained notarized
statements from all of his witnesses, some of which would be
hostile witnesses, and I agreed with that.
So as a result, this amendment allows a defendant to merely
present a summary of the statement so we know generally what
that witness is going to say and merely sign a certification. Either
the witness, his attorney, the defendant’s attorney, or the
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petitioner himself, the defendant himself can sign a certification
saying to his best knowledge that this was an accurate statement
of what the witness would testify to. So I think it is an effort,
again, not to take anyone’s rights away from him but also to help
that defendant in the processing of his appeal and hopefully to
make it easier for him to obtain a hearing, which we want him to
obtain.
Pa. Senate Journal, 1st Spec. Sess., June 13, 1995, at 217.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 767 A.2d 576, 582–583 (Pa. Super. 2001). The
Brown panel then stated, “consistent with this express legislative intent, we
hold that Appellant was not required to attach sworn affidavits to his PCRA
petition in support of his request for an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 583. The
Court further explained, “Nevertheless, . . . in order to have witnesses testify
at an evidentiary hearing, [the a]ppellant was required to provide a signed
certification as to each witness.” Id. at 583. Additionally, “the certification
requirement can be met by an attorney or pro se petitioner certifying what
the witness will testify regarding.” Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d
626, 642 (Pa. 2014). Brown, 767 A.2d at 583; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1);
Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15).
Thus, an affidavit for Sanchez was not necessary to support Appellant’s
request for an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, it was of no consequence that
Sanchez’s “affidavit” was not dated or notarized. Appellant did need to
support his request for an evidentiary hearing, however, with a Certification
of Witnesses, pursuant to Section 9545(d)(1). Appellant filed the Certification
of Witnesses on August 29, 2016, as an amendment to his PCRA petition.
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Appellant asserted in his brief that he learned from Sanchez on November 22,
2014, that Sanchez’s brother, Nestor Sanchez, was responsible for the victim’s
murder. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant failed to file this amendment
certifying Sanchez as a witness within sixty days of the date on which he could
have filed his petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Therefore, Appellant has
failed to meet the requirements for the newly discovered-facts exception to
the PCRA time bar.
Appellant also filed an amended PCRA petition on April 13, 2016.
Appellant attached to that petition an alleged affidavit from Frank Lowry.
Amended PCRA Petition, 4/13/16, at 8. In the affidavit, Lowry asserts that on
February 21, 2016, he met with Appellant and told him that Nestor Sanchez
had confessed to Lowry that Nestor Sanchez had committed the murder at
issue in this case. Id. The statement appeared to be signed by Frank Lowry,
but was not notarized or dated. Appellant also certified Lowry as a witness in
his amended PCRA petition filed August 29, 2016. Motion for Leave to
Supplement Affidavits of Mr. Justino Sanchez and Mr. Frank Lowry with
Certification of D.O.B.’s, Addresses, and Content of their Testimony, 8/29/16,
at 2. In his Certification, Appellant asserts that Lowry would testify that
Nestor Sanchez admitted to Lowry that he had murdered the victim. Id.
As stated previously in discussion of Sanchez’s “affidavit”, an affidavit
for Lowry was not necessary to support Appellant’s request for an evidentiary
hearing. Accordingly, it was of no consequence that Lowry’s “affidavit” was
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not dated or notarized. Section 9545(d)(1), however, requires the
Certification of Witnesses to be provided when a petitioner requests an
evidentiary hearing. Appellant filed the Certification of Witnesses on August
29, 2016, as an amendment to his PCRA petition, but in Lowry’s affidavit and
Appellant’s brief, it is asserted that Lowry revealed to Appellant that Nestor
Sanchez was the perpetrator of the victim’s murder on February 21, 2016.
Thus, Appellant failed to file this amendment within sixty days of the date on
which he could have filed his petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Appellant
has failed to meet the requirements for the newly-discovered facts exception
to the PCRA time bar.
In his sixth issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred when it
dismissed his PCRA petition without “the material facts being heard and
reviewed at an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2).”
Appellant’s Brief at 3. The PCRA court may dismiss a petition without a
hearing when the court is satisfied “that there are no genuine issues
concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction
collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose would be served by any further
proceedings.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2). Commonwealth v Johnson, 139
A.3d 1257, 1273 (Pa. 2016). As discussed above, Appellant’s petition is
patently untimely, and he has failed to satisfy any of the three time exceptions
to that time bar. Because Appellant’s petition is untimely, no legitimate
purpose would have been served by any further proceedings. Accordingly,
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the PCRA court did not err in dismissing his petition without a hearing.
Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1273.
Consequently, because the PCRA petition was untimely and no
exceptions apply, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the claims
presented and grant relief. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396,
398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear
untimely petition). Likewise, we lack the authority to address the merits of
any substantive claims raised in the PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v.
Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007) (“[J]urisdictional time limits go to
a court’s right or competency to adjudicate a controversy.”).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/18/18
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