People v. Salem , 2016 IL 118693 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                                        
    2016 IL 118693
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
    (Docket Nos. 118693, 118694)
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WAIL
    SALEM, Appellant.
    Opinion filed January 22, 2016.
    CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis concurred in
    the judgment and opinion.
    OPINION
    ¶1       In two separate trials, defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of
    vehicle titles and unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle. In each case,
    defendant filed a motion for new trial more than 30 days after the jury returned the
    guilty verdict, but less than 30 days after defendant was sentenced. The State did
    not object to the timeliness of these motions, and the circuit court of Will County
    heard arguments on the merits of each. The circuit court denied the motions. On
    appeal, the State argued that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider
    the merits of defendant’s arguments, because the notices of appeal were not filed in
    compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). The
    appellate court, in both cases, concluded that, because the notices of appeal were
    not filed within 30 days of sentencing nor within 30 days of orders disposing of
    timely filed motions against the judgment, the appeals were not timely, and thus the
    appellate court did not have jurisdiction. 
    2014 IL App (3d) 120390-U
    ; 2014 IL App
    (3d) 120523-U. For the reasons set forth below, we agree. However, given the
    unique facts of this case, we find defendant’s confusion regarding when to file his
    appeals was understandable. The right to appeal a criminal conviction is
    fundamental. Therefore, in the exercise of this court’s supervisory authority, we
    order the appeal reinstated.
    ¶2                                    BACKGROUND
    ¶3        Defendant was charged with five counts of unlawful possession of vehicle titles
    and one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The State opted to proceed to
    trial on the unlawful possession of vehicle titles counts first. The court dismissed
    one of these counts by an order of nolle prosequi.
    ¶4       During the unlawful possession of vehicle titles trial (the “open titles case”),
    defendant objected to the admission of four pieces of evidence of other crimes.
    Because the trial court found the evidence to be relevant, the evidence was
    admitted. On December 1, 2011, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on each of the
    four counts. In the days following the return of the verdict, the trial court, defense
    counsel, and the State’s Attorney discussed scheduling a sentencing hearing in the
    open titles case and setting a trial date for the stolen motor vehicle case. Defense
    counsel requested the trial court provide him with certain jury information that he
    argued would be necessary for a motion for new trial. That request was ultimately
    denied.
    ¶5       On February 27, 2012, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms
    of four and a half years on each of the four open titles charges. After the sentencing
    decision was announced, the trial court judge admonished defendant regarding his
    right to appeal. Defense counsel then informed the court that he intended to file a
    motion for a new trial. The judge noted that counsel would have 30 days to file any
    posttrial motion and that he would refrain from assigning a public defender and
    triggering the appeals process until after the motion for new trial was filed. Defense
    counsel filed the motion for new trial on March 26, 2012—116 days after the guilty
    verdict was returned. The State made no objection to the timeliness of the motion.
    -2-
    On April 9, 2012, the court heard arguments on the motion for new trial, and then
    denied it. Thirty days later, on May 9, 2012, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
    ¶6       The jury returned a guilty verdict in the stolen motor vehicle case on April 12,
    2012. A sentencing hearing was held on May 14, 2012, and a written judgment was
    entered on May 17, 2012. Defendant filed a motion for new trial on June 5,
    2012—54 days after the guilty verdict was returned. The motion was denied on
    June 21, 2012. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on June 22—one day after the
    motion for new trial was denied and 36 days after the written judgment was entered.
    ¶7        In both cases on appeal, the State argued that the appellate court lacked
    jurisdiction based on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b). Rule 606(b) requires that
    an appeal be filed within 30 days of an entry of final judgment or, if a timely motion
    is filed attacking a judgment, within 30 days of the order disposing of such motion.
    Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014). Defendant conceded that the notices of
    appeal were not filed within 30 days of the entry of final judgment in each case, but
    argued that, by filing the motions for new trial, he had sufficiently extended the
    time to file his notices of appeal.
    ¶8        Originally, defendant framed this argument as one falling within the revestment
    doctrine. This court addressed the scope of the revestment doctrine in People v.
    Bailey, which was decided while defendant’s appeals were pending. 
    2014 IL 115459
    . Under the revestment doctrine, the trial court regains jurisdiction beyond
    the 30 days following the entry of a final judgment if both parties “ ‘actively
    participate without objection in proceedings which are inconsistent with the merits
    of the prior judgment.’ ” 
    Id. ¶ 9
    (quoting People v. Kaeding, 
    98 Ill. 2d 237
    , 241
    (1983)). The appellate court found that the revestment doctrine did not apply in
    either of defendant’s cases. In light of Bailey, defendant conceded that the
    revestment doctrine did not apply, but argued that the notices of appeal should be
    considered timely because the trial court had jurisdiction when the motions for new
    trial were filed and the notices of appeal were filed within 30 days of the orders
    denying the motions for new trial. The appellate court rejected this argument
    because the motions for new trial themselves were not timely, as required by Rule
    606. Justice Wright dissented in each case. In both cases, Justice Wright agreed
    with the majority that the revestment doctrine did not apply, but agreed with
    defendant that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the motions for new trial and
    thus that the motions should have extended the time to file a notice of appeal. In the
    open titles case, Justice Wright addressed the merits of defendant’s appeal and
    -3-
    concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of other crimes, in
    allowing the State to present to the jury federal convictions from more than 10
    years ago to impeach defendant’s credibility, and in permitting the jury to consider
    a guilty plea. Therefore, Justice Wright would have vacated defendant’s conviction
    in the open titles case and awarded defendant a new trial.
    ¶9        Defendant sought leave to appeal both cases to this court, pursuant to Illinois
    Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). We allowed both petitions and
    consolidated the two appeals.
    ¶ 10                                        ANALYSIS
    ¶ 11        The only issue before the court is whether the appellate court had jurisdiction.
    This is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. People v. Marker, 
    233 Ill. 2d 158
    , 162 (2009). “The appellate court’s jurisdiction turns on litigants’
    compliance with our rules, specifically including the timelines established therein.”
    People v. Lyles, 
    217 Ill. 2d 210
    , 217 (2005). Therefore, resolving this question
    requires the court to interpret Rule 606, which establishes the procedure and
    timeline for perfecting an appeal, and section 116-1 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure of 1963, which establishes the procedure and timeline for filing a motion
    for new trial. This court reviews de novo the interpretation of supreme court rules
    and statutes. 
    Marker, 233 Ill. 2d at 162
    . “When interpreting supreme court rules,
    our court is guided by the same principles applicable to the construction of statutes.
    [Citation.] With rules, as with statutes, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the
    drafters’ intention. [Citation.] The most reliable indicator of intent is the language
    used, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.]” 
    Id. at 164-65.
    ¶ 12       Subsection (b) of Rule 606 provides, in relevant part, that “the notice of appeal
    must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the
    final judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely
    filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion.” Ill. S. Ct.
    R. 606(b). In a criminal case, the entry of a sentence constitutes the final judgment
    in the case. People v. Baldwin, 
    199 Ill. 2d 1
    , 5 (2002). Both parties agree that the
    notices of appeal were not filed within 30 days of sentencing in each case.
    Defendant relies on his motions for new trial, as motions against the judgments, to
    -4-
    extend the deadline for filing a notice of appeal beyond the 30 days following the
    entry of final judgment.
    ¶ 13       The plain language of Rule 606(b) requires that a motion challenging a
    judgment be timely filed in order to toll the 30-day deadline to file a notice of
    appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b). Defendant contends that, for purposes of the rule, a
    motion against the judgment is timely so long as the trial court had jurisdiction to
    rule on the motion. In support of this argument, defendant cites People v. Talach,
    
    114 Ill. App. 3d 813
    (1983). In Talach, the defendant filed a motion against the
    judgment more than 30 days after a verdict was returned, but before the expiration
    of the 30-day period following the entry of final judgment. 
    Id. at 818.
    The court
    found that “[t]he trial court still retains jurisdiction after 30 days from the entry of
    the verdict because the final judgment in a criminal case is the pronouncement of
    sentence.” 
    Id. Accordingly, the
    appellate court concluded that the trial court had
    jurisdiction when the motion was filed and had discretion either to dismiss the
    motion as untimely or consider its merits. 
    Id. at 818-19.
    Defendant also cites
    People v. Gilmore, which addresses a similar factual scenario and applies the
    holding from Talach. People v. Gilmore, 
    356 Ill. App. 3d 1023
    (2005). These cases,
    however, only demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider untimely
    motions. These cases do not address whether filing an untimely motion extends the
    time to file an appeal.
    ¶ 14        Rule 606 does not define the term “timely.” However, the Code of Criminal
    Procedure has long provided the timelines for when various motions must be filed.
    Therefore, a motion for new trial is timely for purposes of Rule 606 if it is filed in
    compliance with the deadline set forth in the Code. See People v. Willoughby, 
    362 Ill. App. 3d 480
    , 482 (2005) (concluding that, because the defendant’s motion for
    new trial was filed by the deadline set forth in section 116-1(b) of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure, the motion was timely for purposes of Rule 606); see also
    Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 
    103 Ill. 2d 536
    , 538 (1984) (concluding that,
    because a motion to reconsider was not filed within the timeline set forth in the
    Code of Civil Procedure, the motion was not timely for purposes of Rule 303 (Rule
    606’s equivalent for civil cases)). Section 116-1(b) of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure provides that: “A written motion for a new trial shall be filed by the
    defendant within 30 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict.”
    725 ILCS 5/116-1(b) (West 2014). Both of defendant’s motions for new trial were
    filed later than 30 days after the jury verdicts were returned.
    -5-
    ¶ 15       Defendant argues that section 116-1 is not jurisdictional and should not be
    determinative of whether the motions were timely for purposes of Rule 606. In
    support, he cites cases in which the court has held that the written motion
    requirement in section 116 is not a jurisdictional requirement to argue that the time
    requirement in that section is also not a jurisdictional requirement. See People v.
    Enoch, 
    122 Ill. 2d 176
    , 186-87 (1988) (concluding that the State’s failure to object
    to the oral form of the motion for new trial waived the written motion requirement);
    People v. Friesland, 
    109 Ill. 2d 369
    , 377 (1985) (citing several cases in which the
    State waived the written requirement for a motion for new trial by failing to object
    to an oral motion). While the requirements of section 116 may not control questions
    of jurisdiction in the trial court, compliance with Rule 606, including the
    requirement that a motion be timely filed, is required for the appellate court to have
    jurisdiction. Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(a).
    ¶ 16       If we were to adopt defendant’s reading of Rule 606(b), any motion filed while
    the trial court had jurisdiction would extend the time to file a notice of appeal and
    the term “timely” would be rendered meaningless. This court is obliged “to avoid a
    construction which renders a part of the statute superfluous or redundant, and
    instead presume that each part of the statute has meaning.” People v. Baskerville,
    
    2012 IL 111056
    , ¶ 25 (citing People v. Jones, 
    223 Ill. 2d 569
    , 594 (2006)). Thus,
    we reject defendant’s interpretation of the rule. Because defendant failed to meet
    the deadline provided in section 116 for filing a motion for new trial, he failed to
    meet either of the deadlines provided in Rule 606(b) for filing a notice of appeal.
    Consequently, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction.
    ¶ 17       Defendant alternatively urges this court to consider the appeals timely because
    the notices were filed before the extended deadline for filing a late appeal set forth
    in subsection (c) of Rule 606 expired. Defendant cites People v. Williams, 
    59 Ill. 2d 243
    (1974), and People v. Brown, 
    54 Ill. 2d 25
    (1973), in support of his argument
    that subsection (c) somehow saves his untimely notices of appeal. Neither of these
    cases turns on the fact that the late appeals were filed within the time period set
    forth in subsection (c). In fact, the majority opinion in Brown makes no mention of
    Rule 606(c). Instead, the court in Brown held that the appellate court abused its
    discretion in dismissing the appeal on its own motion, because the trial court had
    failed to advise the defendant of his right to appeal and at least two years had passed
    during which the court had accepted briefs from each party and heard oral
    arguments. 
    Brown, 54 Ill. 2d at 26-27
    . Furthermore, the court considered the
    defendant to have made a motion for leave to file a late appeal in his petition for
    -6-
    rehearing. 
    Id. at 26.
    The court in Williams relied on the holding in Brown and also
    concluded that the appellate court abused its discretion given the “exceptional
    circumstances” of the situation. People v. Frey, 
    67 Ill. 2d 77
    , 84 (1977) (discussing
    
    Williams, 59 Ill. 2d at 246
    ).
    ¶ 18       We see no reason why the appellate court in this case should have considered
    the appeal timely under subsection (c). Defendant did not file any affidavit
    explaining why the appeals were late or meet any of the other requirements set forth
    in the rule. Without fulfilling those requirements, a defendant cannot expect the
    appellate court to alternatively consider an extended deadline sua sponte.
    ¶ 19        Defendant also suggests that the appellate court should have excused
    defendant’s failure to adhere to the requirements of Rule 606(b). The appellate
    court had no discretion to forgive defendant’s failure to comply with the rule.
    “[T]he appellate and circuit courts of this state must enforce and abide by the rules
    of this court. The appellate court’s power ‘attaches only upon compliance with the
    rules governing appeals.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) 
    Lyles, 217 Ill. 2d at 216
    (quoting
    People v. Flowers, 
    208 Ill. 2d 291
    , 308 (2003)); see also Secura Insurance Co. v.
    Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 
    232 Ill. 2d 209
    , 217-18 (2009) (“[T]he appellate
    court does not have the authority to excuse the filing requirements of the supreme
    court rules governing appeals.”).
    ¶ 20       Lastly, defendant urges this court to exercise its supervisory authority and
    reinstate the appeals. Article VI, section 16, of the Illinois Constitution vests this
    court with supervisory authority over all of the lower courts of this state. Ill. Const.
    1970, art. VI, § 16; In re J.T., 
    221 Ill. 2d 338
    , 347 (2006). This authority is
    “unlimited in extent and hampered by no specific rules or means for its exercise.”
    In re Estate of Funk, 
    221 Ill. 2d 30
    , 97 (2006). It is “an ‘unequivocal grant of
    power.’ [Citation.] This authority extends to ‘the adjudication and application of
    law and the procedural administration of the courts.’ ” (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) People v. Whitfield, 
    228 Ill. 2d 502
    , 521 (2007).
    ¶ 21        This court has previously exercised its authority to instruct the appellate court
    to hear the merits of a case after the appellate court lost jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
    Lyles, 217 Ill. 2d at 220
    . However, “[s]upervisory orders are disfavored.” In re 
    J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 347
    . “[A]s a general rule, this court will issue a supervisory order only if
    the normal appellate process will not afford adequate relief and the dispute involves
    a matter important to the administration of justice, or where intervention is
    -7-
    necessary to keep an inferior court or tribunal from acting beyond the scope of its
    authority.” 
    Id. (citing People
    ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, 
    196 Ill. 2d 510
    , 513 (2001)).
    ¶ 22        In seeking a supervisory order, defendant highlights the apparent confusion of
    trial counsel and the court regarding the time to file a motion for new trial. At the
    February 27 sentencing hearing in the open titles case, weeks after the 30-day
    deadline to file a motion for new trial had expired, counsel and the court discussed
    scheduling a time to file and hear a motion for new trial. Counsel also filed a
    preliminary motion for jury information to be used to inform his motion for new
    trial, pushing the filing back even later. Neither the State’s Attorney nor the trial
    court took issue with the timeliness of defendant’s motions for new trial.
    Furthermore, the court heard arguments on the motions and the State responded on
    the merits. The timeliness of the motions was not discussed until the State filed its
    responses in the appellate court. Even then, the parties were preoccupied with a
    discussion of the scope of the revestment doctrine, indicating additional confusion
    on the part of all parties involved regarding when to file a motion for new trial and
    subsequent notice of appeal. We also note that the dissenting justice found
    defendant’s substantive arguments in his motion in the open titles case to be
    compelling, suggesting that defendant’s appeal, had it been timely, may have been
    successful. 
    2014 IL App (3d) 120390-U
    , ¶¶ 28-42.
    ¶ 23       Given the unique facts of this case, we find that defendant has not been afforded
    adequate relief by the normal appellate process through no fault of his own. The
    right to appeal a criminal conviction is fundamental and thus it is in the best interest
    of justice that we reinstate defendant’s appeal. People v. Ross, 
    229 Ill. 2d 255
    , 268
    (2008) (“A criminal defendant has no federal constitutional right to a direct appeal,
    but under the Illinois Constitution the right to appeal a criminal conviction is
    fundamental.”). However, we reiterate that the appellate court was correct in
    finding that it lacked jurisdiction. Should a similar situation present itself in the
    future, the appellate court would not have the authority to excuse compliance with
    Rule 606(b). See 
    Lyles, 217 Ill. 2d at 220
    (explaining how the appellate court ought
    to approach future cases similar to the one in which the court was issuing a
    supervisory order).
    -8-
    ¶ 24                                      CONCLUSION
    ¶ 25        For the appellate court to have jurisdiction in a criminal case, a notice of appeal
    must be filed either 30 days from the entry of final judgment or, if a timely motion
    is filed challenging a judgment, within 30 days of the entry of an order disposing of
    such motion. In this case, defendant’s appeals would have been timely only if his
    motions for new trial had been timely. Section 116-1(b) of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure requires motions for a new trial be filed within 30 days of the return of a
    jury verdict. In both cases, defendant failed to file his motion for new trial by this
    deadline. Thus, the time to file an appeal was not extended by the filing of the
    motions. That the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the untimely motions is
    irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the appellate court had jurisdiction.
    It is also irrelevant that defendant’s notices of appeal were filed within the extended
    six-month period for filing late appeals under Rule 606(c), as defendant failed to
    comply with any of the requirements for filing a late notice of appeal. Therefore,
    the appellate court was correct when it dismissed defendant’s appeals for lack of
    jurisdiction. However, given the unique facts of this case and the importance of
    allowing defendant to appeal his criminal conviction, the appellate court is directed
    to vacate its judgment and consider the merits of defendant’s appeal.
    ¶ 26      Appellate court judgment vacated.
    ¶ 27      Appeal reinstated.
    -9-